

# Are There Increasing Returns in Marriage Markets?\*

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## Abstract

Most matching models of the marriage market assume increasing returns to scale, that is, they postulate that a larger pool of eligibles will lead to a higher marriage rate. Empirically, the difficulty in studying the cross-section relationship between the size of the marriage market and marriage behavior is that, in general, market size is endogenous. We address this issue in two ways. First, we estimate the degree of returns to scale in U.S. marriage markets using the 2000 census. Given that in the United States people move to cities to find marriage partners and, therefore, the size of the marriage market is endogenous, we instrument the current size of a cohort in the marriage market with the size of that cohort twenty years earlier. Second, we estimate city scale effects in two societies—early Renaissance Tuscany and pre-reform China—where there was little internal mobility, and thus, the size of the marriage market can be considered exogenous. The main finding is that in all three societies, there is no evidence of increasing returns to scale in marriage markets, whereas the hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. This is true when looking at marriage odds ratios, total gains to marriage, and the quality of marital match. Given the different characteristics of the three societies in terms of population size, time period, economic structure, and social norms characterizing marriage markets, the similarity and precision of the estimates for returns to scale parameters is remarkable.

*JEL Classification:* J12, J41

*Keywords:* marriage markets, matching, thick market externality, returns to scale, spousal search, endogeneity

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# 1 Introduction

Starting with the seminal paper by Mortensen (1988), economists have used search frictions and sequential search to model the marriage market. His paper also raised the possibility of a thick market externality or increasing returns to scale (IRS henceforth) in marriage markets. Under IRS, a larger pool of eligible individuals searching for a marriage partner may lead to a higher marriage rate in that market.

In the *theoretical* literature, IRS is a popular assumption in models of marital search. For example, Chiappori and Weiss (2000), and Anderberg and Mongrain (2001), adopt it to motivate multiple equilibria in marriage and divorce rates, whereas Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings (2005) use it to motivate their model of two way urban–rural migration.

Although popular, IRS is an assumption. Alternatively, the marriage market may exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS henceforth), where the marriage rate is independent of the size of the stock of eligibles, as in the dynamic marriage market model of Choo and Siow (2006). Lastly, in the case of decreasing returns to scale (DRS henceforth), the marriage rate falls as the stock of eligibles increases.

In the *empirical* literature, researchers have begun to investigate the degree of returns to scale in a marriage market. Following the empirical literature testing for agglomeration effects in labor markets, a first approach is to use a city as the unit of observation and to regress the marriage rate in a city on the size of the marriage market in that city.<sup>1</sup> The coefficient on city size provides an estimate of the degree of returns to scale in marriage markets. For example, using the 1970, 1980 and 1990 US censuses, Gould and Paserman (2003) estimate a probit regression of the probability of marriage of an eligible woman on individual covariates including a measure of men’s wage inequality and log population in the Metropolitan Area in which the woman resides. In the pooled regression, they show that there are IRS in the marriage market. When they used fixed effects for the 321 Metropolitan Areas in their sample, the point estimate for log population becomes statistically insignificant.

The econometric problem that stems from using linear probability models when testing for agglomeration effects is well known. If individuals who want to marry, choose to migrate to cities, then the regression suffers from the problem of endogeneity bias.

There is substantial empirical evidence showing that individuals choose to locate in cities in order to engage in marital search or related activities. For example, Costa and Kahn (2000) argue that educated couples are more likely to live in cities because it is easier for both of them to find suitable jobs. Compton and Pollak (2004) suggest that cities are attractive to both married and single educated individuals, and that the higher observed rate of educated couples in cities relative to other types is partly because of the larger stock of educated eligibles in cities. Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings (2005) show that in Denmark, single educated individuals are more likely to migrate to cities and married educated couples are more likely to leave the cities. In Sweden, single women are more likely to migrate to cities (Edlund 2005). Thus the problem of endogeneity bias in OLS or probit regressions

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<sup>1</sup>Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) present a survey of the empirical literature testing for agglomeration effects in labor markets and conclude that CRS is a reasonable description of the labor market data.

when testing for agglomeration effects in marriage markets has to be addressed.

Using the 1980 U.S. census, Drewianka (2003) deals with this problem by regressing the propensity to marry for individuals of a particular gender on individual attributes and the sex ratio (ratio of eligible men to women) of the city in which the individual resides. He concludes that there are IRS in the marriage market. However, if the sex ratio in a city is endogenous, his result is not conclusive.

The objective of our paper is to estimate the degree of returns to scale in marriage markets by regressing the marriage rate (or a related variable) in a city on the size of the eligible population in that city. We deal with the endogeneity problem in two ways. First, when moving to marry is an important concern, we implement an instrumental variables strategy. Second, we use data from societies in which we can make an *a priori* argument that moving to marry is not an important issue.

We use data from three societies that are different in many dimensions (e.g., time period, area and population size, economic structure, and social norms governing the marriage markets).

First, we study the United States as described in the 2000 census. Clearly, the assumption of no in- or out-migration in cities is untenable here. To deal with the endogeneity problem, for each city we use the size of the cohort twenty years earlier as an instrument for the size of the same cohort in the year 2000. For example, when we analyze the marriage rate of 25–29 year old women in the 2000 census, we use the size of 5–9 year old women in the 1980 census in that city as an instrument for the size of the 25–29 year old women in 2000. Our assumption is that children (or their parents) do not choose the city in which to reside based on their marital prospects twenty years later.

Next, we consider two societies in which the endogeneity problem is not an issue because people do not migrate for marriage purposes.

The first society is the city of Florence and her dominions consisting of Tuscan towns and hundreds of villages in the countryside. Data on marriages come from the 1427 Florentine *Catasto*, a census and property survey of about 60,000 Tuscan households. The endogeneity problem is not a concern for early Renaissance Tuscany: a sample of more than 7,000 dowry (marriage) contracts from 1250 to 1435 indicate that Tuscan people did not migrate to find marriage partners.

The second society is the People’s Republic of China as described in the 1982 census. Until 1978, internal mobility and particularly migration to cities was severely limited.<sup>2</sup> After 1978, farmers began to obtain the right to temporarily migrate to small- and medium-size cities to look for work. Even today, internal migration is restricted in China. Because the census we use was conducted in 1982, we can assume that the population in each city is essentially free from in migration.

The main finding is that in all three societies, there is no evidence of increasing returns to scale. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected. More in detail, marriage rate regressions by gender at the district level do not lend support for strong departures from the hypothesis of CRS in early Renaissance Tuscan marriage markets and U.S. marriage markets. Chinese marriage markets do not display IRS or CRS, but the point

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<sup>2</sup>See Goldstein and Goldstein (1990), Goldstein and Yang (1990), and Yang (1996a, 1996b).

estimates suggest a mild DRS. Since the marriage rates of men and women in a marriage market must be related, we also estimate marriage gain regressions. The marriage gain statistic, due to Choo and Siow (2006), is a bivariate extension of the univariate gender specific marriage rates. The empirical results on marriage rates and marriage gains from our three data sets and different empirical methods are consistent with each other.

An important caveat is in order. Even if we find that the *marriage rate* in a city is independent of the number of eligibles in that city, a thick market externality may still exist. The reason is that agents may react to a thick market externality, with faster arrivals of potential partners and/or more disperse match value distribution, by waiting for a better match rather than marrying earlier. In this case, the thick market externality generates higher *marital output* but not necessarily a higher marriage rate. Because women have a finite amount of time to bear children, they may choose to marry in a narrow age window even if the pool of potential partners is poor. Therefore, if the pool of partners increases, women may continue to marry in that age window but now they may be able to find better matches.

Addressing this issue is similar to what has been done in the labor markets literature. For example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2005) estimate a structural model of search and unemployment with scale effects. They show that the unemployment hazard is unaffected by scale effects. Scale effects lead to higher reservation wages and higher post-employment wages. This means that it is possible for scale effects to show up in the quality of the match rather than in a higher matching rate.

We mainly focus on estimating the matching rate in marriage markets. However, for the US 2000 sample we also study scale effects on the average quality of the marital match using two proxies of average marital output: (i) the fraction of young children who live with two parents, and (ii) the educational attainment of children within marriage. The marital output evidence does not support the hypothesis that larger marriage markets result in higher average marital output.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodological approach. Sections 3, 4, and 5 present the datasets and empirical findings for the United States in 2000, Tuscany in 1427, and China in 1982, respectively. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Methodology

**Marriage Odds Ratio Regressions.** Using a city as a unit of observation, let  $c$  denote city  $c$ ,  $f$  denote type  $f$  women and  $m$  denote type  $m$  men.  $\mu_f^c$  is the number of married women of type  $f$  in city  $c$ .  $n_f^c$  is the number of eligible women of type  $f$  in city  $c$ .  $\mu_m^c$  is the number of married men of type  $m$  in city  $c$ .  $n_m^c$  is the number of eligible men of type  $m$  in city  $c$ . Consider the following cross-section log marriage odds ratio regressions:

$$\ln \frac{\mu_g^c}{n_g^c - \mu_g^c} = \pi_g + \alpha_g \ln n_g^c + u_g^c \quad g = f, m \quad (1)$$

where  $u_g^c$  are the error terms of the regressions.

The marriage rate  $\left(\frac{\mu_g^c}{n_g^c}\right)$  is monotonically increasing in the marriage odds ratio  $\left(\frac{\mu_g^c}{n_g^c - \mu_g^c}\right)$ . The behavioral justification for studying the log odds ratio is that it can be derived from McFadden's (1974) random utility model where the choice is between marriage or otherwise.<sup>3</sup> Under McFadden's interpretation, the log odds ratio, that is the left-hand side of (1), measures the mean difference in utility of type  $g$  in city  $c$  from marrying versus not marrying.

Estimating the parameters  $\alpha_f$  and  $\alpha_g$  enables to assess the degree of returns to scale in marriage markets Under CRS,  $\alpha_f = \alpha_m = 0$ . Under IRS,  $\alpha_f > 0$  and  $\alpha_m > 0$ . Under DRS,  $\alpha_f < 0$  and  $\alpha_m < 0$ . It is also important to discuss orders of magnitude. In general, for any city, a doubling of its population is a very large change. Suppose that the initial marriage rate in city  $c$ ,  $\frac{\mu_g^c}{n_g^c}$ , is 0.8. Then a doubling of the city's population will increase the marriage rate to 0.801 if  $\alpha_g = 0.01$ , and to 0.81 if  $\alpha_g = 0.1$ . In contrast, let the initial marriage rate in city  $c$ ,  $\frac{\mu_g^c}{n_g^c}$ , be 0.5. Then a doubling of the city's population will increase the marriage rate to 0.5017 if  $\alpha_g = 0.01$ , and to 0.517 if  $\alpha_g = 0.1$ . This implies that if the initial marriage rate is higher, the increase in the marriage rate will be more modest. This will help understand the orders of magnitude when we present the empirical findings in the next sections.

In general, the difficulty with estimating the above regressions by OLS is the potential endogeneity of  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$  due to endogenous migration to cities to find marriage partners. In order to obtain consistent OLS estimates of  $\alpha_f$  and  $\alpha_m$ , one has to make an *a priori* argument that  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$  are exogenous. Net migration across cities due to differences in labor market conditions and amenities is fine because migration unrelated to marital behavior generates exogenous variations in  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$  across marriage markets, which is what one needs for OLS to be consistent. Otherwise, one has to find instruments for  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$ .

A standard concern in regression inference is when a covariate,  $n_g^c$  in our case, appears on both the right- and left-hand sides of the equation. If this covariate is measured with error, then measurement error may cause a correlation between the covariate and the dependent variable causing the OLS estimate of  $\alpha_g$  to be inconsistent. Since there is sampling error in observed  $n_g^c$ , the estimation strategy may have a potential problem. However, this is not a first order problem in our case because the marriage odds ratio is independent of the sampling error in  $n_g^c$ .<sup>4</sup> There is still the conventional problem of measurement error in observed  $n_g^c$ . We will deal with this issue in two ways. First, we estimate population weighted regressions where smaller cities, which should suffer from more sampling error, have less weight. Second, our instrumental variables technique should alleviate the measurement error problem.

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<sup>3</sup>This model is the workhorse model in the empirical discrete choice literature.

<sup>4</sup>Let  $n_g^{c*} = n_g^c + u_g^c$  where  $n_g^{c*}$  is the measured population,  $n_g^c$  is the true population and  $u_g^c$  is the sampling error. As long as the marriage rate,  $r_g^c$ , is the same for the true population and sampling error,  $\frac{\mu_g^{c*}}{n_g^{c*} - \mu_g^{c*}} = \frac{\mu_g^c}{n_g^c - \mu_g^c} = \frac{1}{r_g^c} - 1$ .

**Total Gains to Marriage Regressions.** Independent of the problem of endogeneity bias,  $\mu_f^c$  and  $\mu_m^c$  are not independent of each other. Because each heterosexual marriage consists of a man and a woman, the marriage rate of type  $m$  men must be related to the marriage rate of type  $f$  women if they marry each other. However, estimating (1) for men and women separately does not impose the restriction that  $\alpha_f$  and  $\alpha_m$  are related. Type  $f$  women can marry type  $m$  men, as well as other types of men, and type  $m$  men can marry type  $f$  women, as well as other types of women. These substitution possibilities make the relationship between  $\alpha_f$  and  $\alpha_m$  complicated. As Angrist (2004) and Choo and Siow (2006) have shown, separate male and female marriage rate regressions can give conflicting results.

To deal with the above problem, we also estimate total gains to marriage regressions. Let the total gains to an  $\{m, f\}$  marriage be  $\pi_{mf}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{mf} &= \ln \sqrt{\frac{\mu_{mf}^c \mu_{mf}^c}{\mu_{m0}^c \mu_{f0}^c}} \\ \mu_{m0}^c &= n_m^c - \mu_m^c; \mu_{f0}^c = n_f^c - \mu_f^c\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

where  $\mu_{mf}^c$  is the number of  $\{m, f\}$  marriages in city  $c$ .  $\mu_{m0}^c$  and  $\mu_{f0}^c$  are the number of type  $m$  men and type  $f$  women in city  $c$  who choose to remain unmarried, respectively.

Following Choo and Siow (2006), who derive total gains to marriage by embedding McFadden's random utility model in a marriage market, we behaviorally interpret total gains to marriage as an average of the mean utilities of the two types of individuals married to each other relative to not marrying. That is, if the log marriage odds ratio  $\frac{\mu_{mf}}{\mu_{m0}}$  ( $\frac{\mu_{mf}}{\mu_{f0}}$ ) represents the mean utility that a type  $m$  man (type  $f$  woman) obtains from marrying a type  $f$  woman (type  $m$  man) relative to remaining unmarried, in (2) the total gain to a  $\{m, f\}$  marriage is the average of the male and female log marriage odds ratios.

To estimate the degree of returns to scale in marriage markets, consider the following total gains to marriage regression:

$$\pi_{mf} = \ln \sqrt{\frac{\mu_{mf}^c \mu_{mf}^c}{\mu_{m0}^c \mu_{f0}^c}} = \rho_{mf} + \alpha_{mf} \left( \frac{\ln n_m^c + \ln n_f^c}{2} \right) + v_{mf}^c\tag{3}$$

$\rho_{mf}$  estimates the common total gains to a type  $m, f$  marriage across all cities.  $\alpha_{mf}$  measures the degree of returns to scale. If  $\alpha_{mf} = 0$ , the marriage market is characterized by CRS. If  $\alpha_{mf} > 0$ , the marriage market displays IRS.  $v_{mf}^c$  is an error term, which allows for idiosyncratic deviations of total gains to marriage across different cities.

In the above specification, the coefficients on male and female populations are restricted to be the same,  $\alpha_{mf}$ , which means that doubling the population will increase total gains to marriage by  $2\alpha_{mf}$  percent. Given that male and female populations across cities are highly collinear, if we allow for gender-specific population coefficients, multicollinearity results in unstable and implausible point estimates.

Like in (1),  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$  in (3) are potentially endogenous. If the idiosyncratic gain to marriage in city  $c$ ,  $v_{mf}^c$ , is large, individuals may want to move to city  $c$  to find a marriage partner and, therefore,  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$  may also be large, leading to an upward bias in the OLS

estimate of  $\alpha_{mf}$ . On the other hand, sampling error in the number of eligibles,  $n_m^c$  and  $n_f^c$  may lead to a negative correlation between the covariate and total gains to marriage. This implies that the OLS estimate of  $\alpha_{mf}$  will be biased downward. As discussed in the case of log marriage odds ratio regressions, this sampling error is unlikely to be important. We will use OLS and also instrument for  $(\ln n_m^c + \ln n_f^c)$  in (3).

**Marital Output Regressions.** A caveat to our empirical approach is necessary. Even if we find that the marriage rate in a city is independent of the number of eligibles in that city, a thick market externality may still exist. The reason is that agents may react to a thick market externality, with faster arrivals of potential partners and/or a more disperse match value distribution, by waiting for a better match rather than marrying earlier. In this case, the thick market externality generates higher marital output but not necessarily a higher marriage rate. Because women have a finite amount of time to bear children, they may choose to marry in a narrow age window even if their pool of potential partners is poor. If the pool of partners increases, women may continue to marry in that age window but now they may be able to find better matches. In Section 3.3 we will provide some evidence on this alternative hypothesis on how individuals may react to thick market externalities.

We now present the datasets and discuss the results.

### 3 United States, 2000

For the United States we use the 5 percent random sample of the 2000 census. We use the sample weights to calculate our population counts.

Since there is unrestricted mobility in the United States, the population in each city must be regarded as endogenous in the marriage rate or marriage gains regressions. To address this endogeneity problem, for a particular category of individuals in a city, we use the number of individuals in that group 20 years younger to instrument for the number of the same individuals in the year 2000. For example, we instrument the number of men in the 27–31 age group in a city in the year 2000 with the number of male children in the 7–11 age group in that city in the year 1980.

There are 248 cities in the sample and we use the census definition of a standard metropolitan statistical area, SMSA, for a city. The smallest city in the sample has 105,000 individuals, whereas the largest city has 9,700,000 individuals. Across cities, the average population is 810,787, which is consistent with the well-known fact that most cities in the United States have less than 1 million individuals.

Table 1 displays summary statistics where each city is an observation.

[TABLE 1 HERE]

We consider men in the 27–31 age group and women in the 25–29 age group. The mean marriage rates for men and women are 0.485 and 0.508, respectively. As one can see, there is substantial variation in marriage rates across cities. One standard deviation of the marriage rates exceeds 0.06, which is more than 10% of the mean marriage rates across cities.

The mean total gains to marriage for men in the 27–31 age group married to women in the 25–29 age group is -0.567. One standard deviation is 0.278, which means that in most cities total gains to marriage are negative. A negative total gain to a specific marriage match is not unusual. It means that, a marriage match that is imposed on a randomly chosen  $\{m, f\}$  couple will generally be worse than having the couple remaining unmarried. Type  $m$  and type  $f$  individuals who choose to marry each other are not randomly drawn from the  $\{m, f\}$  population. These couples, compared with other  $m$  and  $f$  individuals who do not choose to marry each other, have high idiosyncratic payoffs from marrying each other.

### 3.1 City Size and Marriage Rates

Table 2 presents log marriage odds ratio weighted regressions at the city level with population weights. The dependent variable is the log of the *number of married individuals* divided by the *number of unmarried individuals* by gender and age. The independent variable is the log of the *number of individuals* in the same gender and age groups.

[TABLE 2 HERE]

Column (1) indicates that the coefficient for men in the 27–31 age group is -0.133 with a standard error of 0.021, which implies slight DRS for men in the marriage market.

Adding (in column 2) the proportions of black and white men in that age group, the proportion of men with college degree, the mean family income and the variance of family income as covariates, the point estimate increases to -0.028 with a standard error of 0.024. Now  $\alpha_m = 0$  is in the confidence interval and we can no longer reject CRS.

The negative sign of the coefficient of the variance of family income indicates that in cities with more income dispersion (and therefore, with a more dispersed quality of potential partners), men marry less, which is consistent with the argument that men delay their marriages in order to find a good spouse when the distribution of potential partners is more dispersed.

To deal with the endogeneity problem, column (3) instruments the log number of men in the 27–31 age group with the log number of men 20 years younger, that is, with the number of 7–11 years old male children in 1980.<sup>5</sup> The point estimate becomes -0.048 with a standard error of 0.028. The IV point estimate is slightly more negative than the OLS estimate.<sup>6</sup> Both the IV and OLS estimates do not reject CRS. Given the standard errors, using a 95% confidence interval, the point estimate for  $\alpha_m$  will not exceed 0.01, which means that even in the best case for IRS, the quantitative effect is very modest. From Table 1, the mean marriage rate across cities is 0.485. A doubling of the population of a city will increase the marriage rate of men by less than half percent. Recall that there is substantial variation in marriage rates across cities (in Table 1 the standard deviation of marriage rates

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<sup>5</sup>The first stage IV regression is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.

<sup>6</sup>As expected, the more negative IV estimate suggests that measurement error in the covariate is more important than having the number of individuals in both the right- and left-hand sides of the regression.



for men across cities is 0.063, which exceeds 10% of the mean marriage rate). However, the findings in Table 2 indicate that variation in city size alone cannot explain the variation in male marriage rates across cities.

Columns (4-6) run the same regressions for women in the 25-29 age group. In column (4) the point estimate is -0.166 with a standard error of 0.030 so that we can reject the hypothesis of CRS at the 5% significance level. When we include (in column 5) the proportions of black and white women in that age group, the proportion of women with college degree, the mean family income and the variance of family income as covariates, the point estimate increases to -0.010 with a standard error of 0.026. Now we cannot reject the hypothesis of CRS at the 10% significance level.

Also for women, the coefficient of the variance of family income is negative, which is consistent with the delay argument set forth by Gould and Paserman (2003): when the pool of potential partners is more dispersed, women delay their marriage to find a better match.

Column (6) instruments the log number of women in the 25-29 age group with the log number of women 20 years younger. The point estimate drops slightly to -0.021 with a standard error of 0.030. Here we cannot reject the hypothesis of DRS at the 5% significance level. However, the magnitude of the DRS is modest: the 95% confidence interval upper bound is 0.04. From Table 1, the mean marriage rate for women across cities is 0.508. A doubling of the population in a city will increase the marriage rate of women by less than half percent. As explained above, recall that there is substantial variation in marriage rates across cities (in Table 1 the standard deviation of marriage rates for women across cities is 0.069, which exceeds 10% of the mean marriage rate). The findings in Table 2 indicate that variation in city size alone cannot explain the variation in female marriage rates across cities.

Two caveats are in order. First, if in large cities individuals are more likely to divorce, using the number of *currently married* individuals may undercount the number of marriages in large cities and explain the absence of increasing returns to scale. To check for this possibility, we also investigate log marriage odds ratio regressions using *ever married* individuals instead of currently married individuals (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The evidence for DRS is even stronger. A possible interpretation is that in larger cities, there may be less stigma from getting divorced and not remarrying.

Second, to check the issue of delay, that is, the possibility that in large cities with a large pool of eligibles, individuals may wait and delay marriage, we also run log marriage odds ratio regressions for currently married in older age groups: men age 37-41 and women age 35-39. The results (Table A3 in the Appendix) are similar to the ones for the younger individuals: there is no evidence of IRS. There is some slight evidence of DRS and in most regressions, we cannot reject CRS. However, unlike for young women who seem to wait when there is more dispersion in the pool of eligibles (measured by the variance of family incomes), older women do not delay their marriages when faced with a more dispersed pool of potential partners.

To sum up the findings from the marriage rate regressions, we can conclude that, unlike Angrist (2004) and Choo and Siow (2006), these regressions tell a consistent story<sup>7</sup>: CRS

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<sup>7</sup>Angrist and Choo Siow ask different substantive questions unrelated to the issues discussed here.

cannot be rejected as a first approximation in U.S. contemporary marriage markets.

### 3.2 City Size and Total Gains to Marriage

In order to impose marriage market clearing on our estimation, Table 3 presents total gains to marriage ( $\pi_{mf}$ ) weighted regressions at the city level for men in the 27–31 age group and for women in the 25–29 age group. The dependent variable is the log of the number of marriages among men and women in the two age groups minus the log of the geometric average of the number of unmarried individuals in the corresponding age groups. The independent variable of interest is  $\frac{1}{2}(\ln n_m + \ln n_f)$ , the log of the geometric mean of the number of men and women in the corresponding age groups.

[TABLE 3 HERE]

In Column (1) the point estimate for  $\alpha_{mf}$  is -0.047 with a standard error of 0.010. We can reject  $\alpha_{mf} = 0$ , CRS, at the 5 percent significance level. When adding in column (2) the proportions of black and white individuals in that age group, the proportion of individuals with college degree, and the mean and variance of family income as covariates, the point estimate increases to 0.010 with a standard error of 0.011, and, therefore, we cannot reject  $\alpha_{mf} = 0$ , CRS. Columns (3) and (4) instrument  $\frac{1}{2}(\ln n_m + \ln n_f)$  with the log of the number of individuals twenty years younger, that is, with the size of the cohort of men who were 7–11 years old and of women who were 5–9 years old in 1980. Without other covariates, the point estimate is -0.045 with a standard error of 0.011. So we can reject  $\alpha_{mf} = 0$ , CRS, at the 5 percent significance level. When adding the other covariates, the point estimate increases to 0.011 with a standard error of 0.013, which means we cannot reject CRS.

Although the IV point estimates are slightly larger than the OLS estimates, both sets of estimates tell the same story. Moreover, the standard errors in all the regressions are small and similar. The largest point estimate on  $\frac{1}{2}(\ln n_m + \ln n_f)$  from column (4) is 0.011. Given a standard error of 0.013, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for  $\alpha_{mf}$  is 0.037. Doubling the population will increase total gains by  $\alpha_{mf} \ln 2 = 0.025$ . From Table 1, the standard deviation of total gains to marriage across cities is 0.277. Using the 95% confidence interval upper bound estimate, a doubling of the population will explain less than 10% of a standard deviation in total gains. Under the most favorable interpretation, there is a slight evidence in favor of IRS.

Although the size of the marriage market seems largely not to affect total gains to marriage, other factors do affect total gains to marriage in a city. In both columns (2) and (4), as can be anticipated from the increment in  $R^2$ , the P-values that all the other variables are different from zero are smaller than 0.001.

Again, to control for the issue of delay, we also estimate total gains to marriage regressions for older individuals (Table A4 in the Appendix): men in the 37–41 age group and women in the 35–39 age group. The findings are the same: we cannot reject CRS. We also estimate total gains to marriage regressions where each observation gets the same weight. The results are not qualitatively different from the weighted regressions.

### 3.3 City Size and Marital Match Quality

Tables 2 and 3 above indicate that when looking at marriage rates and total gains to marriage, CRS is a reasonable assumption for marriage markets in the United States.

However, despite these findings, a thick market externality may still exist in these marriage markets, in the sense that individuals in larger markets have faster arrival of potential matches and/or a more dispersed match value distribution to draw from. As is well known from the sequential search literature (e.g., Mortensen 1986), both of these effects may lead to delayed marriages in larger markets, thus lowering observed marriage rates and marriage gains. Thus our empirical evidence on marriage rates and marriage gains may still be consistent with IRS. Addressing this issue is similar to what has been done in the labor markets literature. For example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2005) estimate a structural model of search and unemployment with scale effects. They show that the unemployment hazard is unaffected by scale effects. Scale effects lead to higher reservation wages and higher post-employment wages. This means that scale effects may show up in the quality of the match rather than in a higher matching rate.

We can shed some light on this issue by looking at two measures of marital match quality: (i) the proportion of children age 1–6 living with two parents, and (ii) the educational attainment of 16-year old children of married parents. We do not use the divorce rate or marital tenure to proxy for marital quality because one can argue that married individuals in larger cities may also choose to break up more and rematch more and they still have higher average welfare.

A major reason why individuals marry is to have children. We use the proportion of 1–6 years old children, who live with two parents in a city, as a measure of average marital match quality in that city. Figure 1 shows a plot of  $\log(\text{proportion of children age 1–6 who live with two parents})$  against  $\log(\text{population})$  in that city.

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

As can be seen in the scatter plot and the non-parametric regression line, there is little evidence that average match quality is increasing in city size. There is an increase for the largest cities but there are few observations there.

Table 4 presents population weighted regressions of the  $\log(\text{proportion of children 1–6 who live with two parents})$  on  $\log$  population and covariates.

[TABLE 4 HERE]

The point estimate in column (1), -0.016, shows no relationship between the proportion of children age 1–6, who live with two parents, and  $\log$  population in a city. When controlling in column (2) for the proportions of black and white men and women in the 27–31 and 25–29 age groups, respectively, and for the proportions of those individuals with college degrees, the estimated coefficient, -0.015, is still zero at the 5% significance level. Column (3) adds regional dummies. This specification does show a statistically significant negative estimated

coefficient, -0.015, at the 5% significance level, which is consistent with the negative slope for the largest cities in Figure 1. Weighting the observations by population size gives increasing weight to larger cities, and therefore, this negative slope is driven by very few observations. When we rerun the regressions treating all observations equally, the estimated coefficients on log population are not significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level in all specifications. Thus, the findings in Table 4 indicate that delay in marriage does not seem to increase average marital match quality as proxied by the proportion of children age 1–6, who live with two parents. If anything, there is some evidence that the largest cities reduce marital match quality.

A possible objection to using the proportions of children age 1–6 living with two parents as a proxy for average marital match quality is another endogeneity problem: if married individuals leave a city (for example, when they have children, they decide to move to the suburbs), then cities may be left with unmarried individuals who are still hoping to marry. If there are IRS, larger cities with their higher *actual* marriage rates, may not have higher *observed* marriage rates if married individuals leave the cities at a higher rate than unmarried individuals. Since we use the metropolitan definition of a city (SMSA), which includes the nearby suburbs, this endogeneity problem of leaving the city after marriage should not be a first order problem for the regressions in Table 4.

The second proxy for the quality of marital match is the educational attainment of 16-year old children of married parents. Age 16 is chosen because most of these children are still living with their parents and a non-trivial proportion of them is behind their birth cohort in terms of attained years of schooling. This proxy does not suffer of the endogeneity problem described above: by looking at the educational attainment of 16-year old children, we are basically comparing the average marital match quality of couples in small cities, who did not leave the city after marriage, with the average marital match quality of couples in large cities, who did not leave the city after marriage. Table 5 presents the results of two regressions.

[TABLE 5 HERE]

In column (1), the number of years of education of 16-year old children with married parents in a city is regressed on the log population of that city, father’s age, mother’s age, father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, and dummy variables for father’s and mother’s races. The point estimate indicates that, controlling for parents’ education, a 1% increase in the population size of a city decreases the years of schooling of a 16-year old by 0.004 years. However, the standard error, which is clustered by city, shows that the point estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 10% significance level.

Column (2) reports the results of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 16 year-old child of a couple attained the median years of education of 16-year old children in his or her state, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficient on log population is 0.012 but again the standard error, which is clustered by city, shows that the point estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 10% significance level.

The two regressions lead to similar conclusions. Marital output, as proxied by the educational attainment of 16-year old children, does not rise with city size. Also, regardless

of which proxy for marital match quality, this evidence on marital output is unlikely to be affected by the out-migration of married couples from the city.

In both regressions, the estimated coefficients on the interaction between the parents' years of schooling are positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. So there is evidence of gains in marital quality, as proxied by educational attainment of the children, by matching by education of the parents. It should be clear that gains from marital matching is separate from the question of whether the degree of returns to scale in the marriage market.

To sum up the findings for U.S. marriage markets in the year 2000, we conclude that there is no evidence of IRS, whereas the hypothesis of CRS cannot be rejected. A thick market externality is rejected when one looks at marriage rates and total gains to marriage (Tables 2 and 3), as well as at marital match quality (Tables 4 and 5).

Given the potential endogeneity of marriage market size in the United States, the credibility of our findings is predicated upon the exogeneity of our instruments for population vectors. While we have made a priori arguments for the exogeneity of these instrumental variables, we cannot externally validate the exogeneity assumption.

We now turn our attention to two societies in which the potential endogeneity problem that characterizes U.S. marriage markets does not exist. Both in early Renaissance Tuscany and in China in 1982 individuals did not move to cities to search for marriage partners. Therefore, we can assume that in these two societies the size of the marriage market is exogenous.

## 4 Tuscany, 1427

Late medieval and early Renaissance Tuscany was one of the most urban and commercial economies in Europe, with Florence being one of the most important trade and banking centers. The other Tuscan towns under Florentine rule (e.g., Pisa, Prato, Arezzo, Pistoia, San Gimignano) were also commercial economies, though on a smaller scale. The rest of Tuscany consisted of hundreds of rural villages, with a mix of farmers, who owned and worked on their farms, and sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants, who worked on the farms owned by town- and village-dwellers.

Two features of Tuscan marriage markets are relevant for our study. First, early Renaissance Tuscany was a virilocal society in which daughters left their natal households upon marriage and moved into their in-laws' households, whereas most married sons continued to live with, and work for, their parents (Botticini 1999; and Botticini and Siow 2003). Second, Tuscan people rarely moved to other towns or villages for the purpose of marriage as shown in Table 6, which illustrates the place of residence of the bride's and groom's families for a sample of more than 7000 dowry and marriage contracts we collected at the State Archives of Florence.

[TABLE 6 HERE]

From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, the vast majority of urban grooms married urban brides, and vice versa, rural grooms mainly married rural brides. There were very few instances of an urban groom marrying a rural bride, or vice versa. This implies that the size of the marriage market in Tuscan cities and villages can be taken as exogenous.

The data on marriage matches come from the machine readable data file *Census and Property Survey of Florentine Dominions in the Province of Tuscany, 1427-1480*, prepared by David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (1978).<sup>8</sup> Faced with a fiscal crisis because of the protracted warfare against the duchy of Milan, in 1427 the Priors of the Florentine Republic instituted a new tax survey for all citizens of the city of Florence, the Tuscan towns, and hundreds of villages in her territories. Government officials and their staffs interviewed every head of household in Tuscany, for a total of more than 60,000 households (about 260,000 people). The survey, completed within a few months, included information on all real property (houses in the city, farms and land holdings), business investments, loans, shares of the public debt, debts, occupations, and household demographics (number, gender, and age of children and other household members).

The machine readable data file divides the Tuscan population into 29 distinct series (Table A5 in the Appendix). For the purpose of our study, each series is labeled as one distinct “district,” where each district corresponds to either a city (town) or to the rural area surrounding a city (town). There was clearly a large variance in the size of the population, and hence, of marriage markets, in each of the 29 districts. For example, district no. 1 corresponds to the city of Florence, which had 9780 households, whereas district no. 18 consists of the villages in the Garfagnana rural area, which hosted a tiny population of only 175 households.

#### 4.1 City Size and Marriage Rates

Figure 2 describes the marriage behavior of individuals surveyed in the 1427 census. Women married in a very narrow age window, 15–25, whereas men married much later.

[FIGURE 2 HERE]

We consider men in the 22–32 and women in the 18–27 age groups, respectively. Table 7 indicates that women’s marriage rate was very high: 73% of 18–27 years old women were married versus 52% of 22–32 years old men.

[TABLE 7 HERE]

Because of the lack of mobility for marital reasons in early Renaissance Tuscany, reverse causality is not a concern and, therefore, we can investigate the returns to scale hypothesis using OLS.

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<sup>8</sup>The tax survey on which the Catasto data are based, and the documentary sources for the Catasto, are fully described in David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (1978), *Les Toscans et leurs familles: Un étude du catasto Florentin de 1427* (English abridged edition: *Tuscans and their Families: A Study of the Florentine Catasto of 1427*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

Table 8 presents log marriage odds ratio population weighted regressions at the district level. The dependent variable is the log of the *number of married individuals* divided by the *number of unmarried individuals* by gender and age. The independent variable is the log of the *number of individuals* in the same gender and age group. As these are log linear regressions, the point estimates are interpretable as elasticities.

[TABLE 8 HERE]

Column (1) indicates that a 1% increase in the number of women in the 18–27 age group results in a 0.038% decrease in the marital odds ratio for women in that age group. Since the standard error is 0.107, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of CRS ( $\alpha_f = 0$ ) at any reasonable significance level.

Column (2) includes the average log assets per adult in the district, that is, the average wealth per adult in the district. Again, the size of the marriage market in a given age group does not affect the probability of being married in that age group. Also wealth per adult does not affect the odds of being married.

In columns (3) and (4), we instrument the log of the number of women in the 18–27 age group with the log total population of the district. Again, there is no effect of the size of marriage market on the number of marriages in that age group.

So for women in the 18–27 age groups, we cannot reject the hypothesis of CRS ( $\alpha_f = 0$ ) in marriage markets at the district level. There is also no discernible effect of average wealth in a given district on the marriage rate of women.

Columns (5)-(8) present the results for 22–32 years old men. The OLS point estimate for  $\alpha_m$  in column (5) is -0.035 with a standard error of 0.153. We cannot reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_m = 0$  (CRS) at the 10% significance level. When adding in column (6) the average log assets per adult in the district for that male age group, the OLS point estimate for  $\alpha_m$  is -0.037 with a standard error of 0.056. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_m = 0$  (CRS) at the 10% significance level. The point estimate for average log assets per adult in the district is -0.353 with a standard error of 0.089. Thus, unlike women whose marriage rates did not seem to be affected by the average wealth in the district, 22–32 years old men in richer districts were more likely to remain unmarried.

In columns (7) and (8), we instrument the log of the number of men in the 22–32 age group with the log total population of the district. Again, there is no effect of the size of the marriage market on the number of marriages of that male age group. The point estimate for average log assets per adult in the district is -0.353 with a standard error of 0.090. Consistent with the OLS results, 22–32 years old men in richer districts were more likely to be unmarried. In general, the OLS and corresponding IV point estimates and standard errors are very similar. Thus, there is no evidence of endogenous mobility in a district for marital reasons, which is consistent with our prior.

We also run unweighted regressions and the results are quantitatively similar to those in Table 8. Thus when looking at both OLS and IV, weighted or unweighted, male or female marriage odds ratio specifications, we cannot reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_m = \alpha_f = 0$ , that is, the hypothesis of CRS. However, because of the small number of districts (observations)

and the relatively large standard errors, it is premature to reject modest IRS. For example, we often cannot also reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_m = \alpha_f = 0.1$ .

## 4.2 City Size and Total Gains to Marriage

Table 9 presents unweighted total gains to marriage regressions at the district level for men in the 22–32 age group and for women in the 18–27 age group. The dependent variable is the log of the number of marriages among men and women in the two age groups divided by the geometric mean of the number of unmarried men and women in the two age groups. The independent variable is the log of the geometric mean of the numbers of individuals in the two age groups .

[TABLE 9 HERE]

Column (1) indicates that the OLS point estimate of  $\alpha_{mf}$  is -0.012 with a standard error of 0.131. Column (2) includes the average log assets per adult in the district. The OLS point estimate for  $\alpha_{mf}$  is -0.027 with a standard error of 0.092. Neither estimate can reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_{mf} = 0$  (CRS) at standard confidence intervals. The point estimate for log assets per adult in the district is -0.206 with a standard error of 0.149. So there is some evidence that wealthier districts lower total gains to marriage between 18–27 years old women and 22–32 years old men.

In columns (3) and (4), we instrument the log of the geometric mean of the numbers of individuals in the two age groups with the log population in the district. In column (3), the IV estimate is 0.021 with a standard error of 0.132. When including the average log assets per adult in the district, the IV point estimate in column (4) is 0.009 with a standard error of 0.100. Also, the IV point estimate for average log assets shows that wealthier districts have a negative impact on total gains to marriage between 18–27 years old women and 22–32 men years old men suggesting that wealthier individuals delay marriage.

We also run unweighted total gains to marriage regressions and obtain similar results. Whatever specification we run, we cannot reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_{mf} = 0$ , that is, the hypothesis of CRS. However, because of the small number of observations and the relatively large standard errors, it is premature to reject modest IRS. For example on a few occasions, we cannot also reject the hypothesis that  $\alpha_{mf} = 0.2$  at the 5% confidence interval. If  $\alpha_{mf} = 0.2$ , a doubling of the population will increase total gains to marriage by  $0.2 * \ln 2 = 0.139$ , which is 27% of the standard deviation of total gains to marriage across districts.

## 5 China, 1982

The data comes from the 1982 census, which is a 1 percent random sample of the population. We restrict our analysis to people living in the 245 cities identified in the census.

Until 1978, internal migration in China was strictly restricted and residents of cities had to live in the cities where they were born. After 1978, at the same time when economic reforms in the countryside started being implemented, migration restrictions from rural to



small- and medium-size cities began to be relaxed. Even though the pace of social and economic changes has been enormous since 1978, internal migration is still restricted in China. At the time of the 1982 census, most residents had no choice about where they could live, and even if individuals wanted to migrate across cities for marital purpose, they could not do so (Goldstein and Goldstein 1990).

Only under two circumstances internal migration was relatively free. First, individuals who got into institutions of higher education were allowed to move there. In 1982, though, few Chinese people had higher education. Second, individuals could move to another city if a firm was willing to hire them. However, because there was no free market for labor, very few people moved for this reason.

This restricted and limited internal migration makes the endogeneity problem not a issue when we use the 1982 Chinese census to study the effect of city size on marriage rates. Au and Henderson (forthcoming) also exploited labor immobility across and into Chinese cities to study other agglomeration effects of cities.

Since there was little divorce in China in that time period, the marriage rate in the 1982 census refers to permanent marriages.

## 5.1 City Size and Marriage Rates

Table 10 shows summary statistics for the Chinese data. There were 244 cities. We study the marital status of men in the 24–28 and 29–33 age groups, and women in the 21–25 and 26–30 age groups. Each age group has over 70,000 observations.

[TABLE 10 HERE]

By age 30, marriage was essentially universal for women: 46 percent of women in the 21–25 age group was married, whereas 97 percent of women in the 26–30 age group was married. For young and old men, the percentages of married were 58 and 90 percent, respectively. Ninety six percent of men and ninety two percent of women in the two age cohorts had completed primary school.

Table 11 presents marriage odds ratio OLS regressions at the city level. Each observation is weighted by the population of the city. The dependent variable is, by gender and age, the log of the *number of married individuals* divided by the *number of unmarried individuals*. The independent variable is the log of the *number of individuals* in the same gender and age group.

[TABLE 11 HERE]

Column (1) indicates that a 1% increase in the number of women in the 21–25 age group results in a 0.35% decrease in the number of marriages in that age group. This estimate is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.

Columns (2) adds the log odds ratio of women in the 21–25 age group, who have completed primary education in a given city. The point estimate implies a population elasticity

of -0.17. It continues to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficient on log odds ratio of education is negative, consistent with the hypothesis that educated women delay marriage. The negative estimated population elasticities suggests that there may be some delay in marriage in larger cities.

Column (3) runs the same log marriage odds ratio regression for women in the 31–35 age group. The estimated population elasticity is -0.24, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. Column (4) adds the log odds of primary education. The estimated population elasticity becomes -0.02 and not statistically different from zero. Note that the standard error is reasonably small. The negative estimated education elasticity suggests that the long run marriage rate of educated women was lower than their less educated peers. The results in columns (3) and (4) do not suggest any strong departure from CRS in long run female marriage rates.

Columns (5)–(8) run similar regressions for men in the 24–28 age group. Column (5) indicates that a 1% increase in the number of men in the 24–28 age group results in a 0.23% decrease in the number of marriages in that age group. This estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level.

Column (6) adds the log odds of men in the same age group, who have completed primary education in a given city. The point estimate implies a population elasticity of -0.17, which is almost the same as the women’s point estimate in column (2), and it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficient on log odds of education is negative, albeit not statistically different from zero. The negative estimated population elasticities suggests that there may be some delay in marriage in larger cities.

Column (7) runs the same log marriage odds ratio regression for men in the 31–35 age group. The estimated population elasticity is -0.10, which is statistically not different from zero. Column (8) adds the log odds ratio of primary education. The estimated population elasticity becomes -0.18 and statistically different from zero at the 5% level. The negative estimated education elasticity is again not different from zero suggesting that the long run marriage rates of men did not differ by education. The results in columns (7) and (8) do not suggest any strong departure from CRS in long run male marriage rates.

[TABLE 12 HERE]

Table 12 presents population weighted IV regression results. The instrument for log number of individuals by gender and age is the log population of the city. The columns correspond to the similarly numbered columns in Table 11. By comparing the results for the same numbered columns in Tables 11 and 12, one can see that the results are essentially the same between the two tables. Thus, instrumenting the number of individuals by gender and age does not change the conclusion that there is minimal evidence of IRS in both short and long run marriage rates in China. A first approximation is that Chinese marriage markets are characterized by CRS.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>We have also run the equivalent unweighted regressions for Tables 11 and 12 and the results largely do not change.

## 5.2 City Size and Total Gains to Marriage

Table 13 presents population weighted total gains to marriage regressions.

In column (1), the dependent variable is the total gains to marriage between 21–25 years old women and 24–28 years old men for each city. The independent variable is the log of the geometric mean of the populations of those women and men for each city. The OLS estimated population elasticity is -0.270 and it is statistically significant at the 5% level.

Column (2) adds the log odds ratio of educated men and women as additional regressors. The OLS estimated population elasticity is -0.143 and it is statistically significant at the 5% level.

Columns (3) and (4) estimate the total gains for women in the 31–35 age group and men in the 34–38 age group. In column (3), the estimated population elasticity is -0.198 and it is statistically significant. Adding educational regressors in column (4) changes the estimated population elasticity to -0.123. It is now only significant at the 5% level. Thus, the total gains estimates suggest that the long run total gains to marriage in China in 1982 is best approximated by CRS.

[TABLE 13 HERE]

Columns (5) to (8) re-estimate columns (1) to (4) using log of the total population as an instrument for  $\frac{1}{2} \ln n_f n_m$ . There is little difference between the OLS and the IV estimates for the younger age match (compare columns [5] and [6] with [1] and [2], respectively). Here the evidence suggests that larger cities have lower total gains for these young marriages.

The estimates of  $\alpha_{mf}$  in columns (7) and (8) are different from those in columns (3) and (4). Although statistically not different from zero, the point estimates in (7) and (8) are positive, unlike the estimated coefficients for younger marriages. At the 95% confidence interval, the upper bound estimate for  $\alpha_{mf}$  is 0.14 from column (7). This estimate implies that a doubling of the population will increase total gains to marriage by 0.097, which is less than 20% of the standard deviation of the total gains to marriage across cities. So while we cannot reject the hypothesis of CRS for the older matches, we can also not reject mild IRS.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

The empirical results on marriage rates and marriage gains from our three data sets and different empirical methods are consistent with each other. Given the widely different circumstances of the three societies in terms of geography, time periods, social norms, and population size differences, the similar estimates for returns to scale parameters in all three data sets are remarkable.

CRS is a reasonable approximation for marriage markets. Using a 95% confidence interval upper bound estimate for  $\alpha_{mf}$ , there is sometimes some mild evidence for IRS in some specifications. Even in these most favorable cases, the quantitative effects are small. A doubling of the population cannot increase total gains by more than 30% of a standard

deviation of total gains across observations. Also, there is more evidence in favor of DRS in Chinese marriage markets.

In order to rule out IRS, which does not show up in marriage rates or marriage gains, we also investigated the relationship between a proxy for average marital quality, the proportion of children in the 1–6 age group who live with two parents, and population in a city. There is little evidence of a such positive relationship in 2000 US census. We also investigated the relationship between city size and educational attainment of 16 year olds living with two married parents. The evidence suggest that, controlling for parental characteristics, education attainment fell with city size.

These findings suggest that economists should focus on models of the marriage market that deliver CRS. One rationale for the CRS finding is that, given their individual characteristics, marriage within a narrow age window is a compelling experience for most individuals. This is consistent with the findings of Gould and Paserman (2003) that male wage inequality in a city delays marriage for women but a city's population size does not delay marriage for women.

TABLE 1  
[Summary Statistics for the United States, 2000]

| <b>Variable</b>   | <b>Obs</b> | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std. Dev.</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> |
|---|------------|-------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| city population   | 248        | 810787.1    | 1278090          | 104620     | 9693861    |
| male marriage rate 27-31                                    | 248        | .4848656    | .0632461         | .2783659   | .6868826   |
| female marriage rate 25-29                                  | 248        | .5079871    | .0693261         | .3015561   | .7034433   |
| log male marriage odds ratio 27-31                          | 248        | -.0616503   | .2581518         | -.9525817  | .7855852   |
| log female marriage odds ratio 25-29                        | 248        | .0326766    | .2834523         | -.8398988  | .8637488   |
| total gains, male 27-31 & female 25-29                      | 248        | -.5675295   | .2773048         | -1.495041  | .31952     |
| <b>Men in age group 27-31</b>                               |            |             |                  |            |            |
| married men in age group 27-31                              | 248        | 13501.24    | 20702.69         | 1400       | 155707     |
| men in age group 27-31                                      | 248        | 29899.75    | 50690.39         | 2918       | 404160     |
| fraction of white non-Hispanic men in age group 27-31       | 248        | .6956852    | .1694574         | .0706376   | .962669    |
| fraction of black non-Hispanic men in age group 27-31       | 247        | .1106061    | .0946172         | .0042088   | .5034516   |
| fraction of Hispanic men in age group 27-31                 | 245        | .1376126    | .1563904         | .00472     | .9041904   |
| fraction of men with college education in 27-31 age group   | 248        | .2508582    | .092841          | .0666877   | .5367855   |
| mean, family income of married men in age group 27-31       | 248        | 10.703      | .1755243         | 10.00776   | 11.34783   |
| variance, family income of married men in age group 27-31   | 248        | .9238498    | .5567852         | .1606871   | 3.296332   |
| <b>Women in age group 25-29</b>                             |            |             |                  |            |            |
| married women in age group 25-29                            | 248        | 13272.79    | 20430.38         | 1420       | 159143     |
| women in age group 25-29                                    | 248        | 28417.72    | 48995.97         | 3004       | 389689     |
| fraction of white non-Hispanic women in age group 25-29     | 248        | .686116     | .1768417         | .0526116   | .9712891   |
| fraction of black non-Hispanic women in age group 25-29     | 241        | .1258497    | .1137709         | .0022065   | .5414208   |
| fraction of Hispanic women in age group 25-29               | 245        | .1307977    | .1579633         | .0009231   | .9340033   |
| fraction of women with college education in 25-29 age group | 248        | .2828585    | .0976157         | .0799842   | .5773229   |
| mean, family income of married women in age group 25-29     | 248        | 10.68228    | .1682126         | 10.0596    | 11.16422   |
| variance, family income of married women in age group 25-29 | 248        | .9715473    | .6027898         | .1686794   | 3.018593   |

TABLE 2 –LOG MARRIAGE ODDS RATIO REGRESSIONS, U.S. 2000

|                         | DEPENDENT VARIABLE = $\text{LOG} \left( \frac{\mu}{n - \mu} \right)$ |                   |  |                   |                   |   |
|-------------------------|--|-------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|---|
|                         | Men<br>27-31   | Men<br>27-31      | Men<br>27-31                           | Women<br>25-29    | Women<br>25-29    | Women<br>25-29                          |
|                         | OLS<br>(1)   | OLS<br>(2)        | IV<br>(3)                              | OLS<br>(4)        | OLS<br>(5)        | IV<br>(6)                               |
| Log (men 27-31)         | -0.133<br>(0.021)  | -0.028<br>(0.024) | -0.048<br>(0.028)                      |                   |                   |   |
| White men (27-31)       |  | 0.511<br>(0.189)  | 0.472<br>(0.198)                       |                   |                   |   |
| Black men (27-31)       |  | 0.079<br>(0.216)  | 0.100<br>(0.220)                       |                   |                   |   |
| Men (27-31), college    |  | -2.071<br>(0.338) | -1.990<br>(0.359)                      |                   |                   |   |
| Mean, family income     |  | -0.127<br>(0.114) | -0.113<br>(0.112)                      |                   |                   |   |
| Variance, family income |  | -0.062<br>(0.027) | -0.062<br>(0.027)                      |                   |                   |   |
| Log (women 25-29)       |  |                   |  | -0.166<br>(0.030) | 0.010<br>(0.026)  | -0.021<br>(0.030)                       |
| White women (25-29)     |  |                   |  |                   | 0.671<br>(0.129)  | 0.618<br>(0.139)                        |
| Black women (25-29)     |  |                   |  |                   | -0.514<br>(0.206) | -0.481<br>(0.209)                       |
| Women (25-29), college  |  |                   |  |                   | -2.166<br>(0.298) | -2.129<br>(0.310)                       |
| Mean, family income     |  |                   |  |                   | -0.622<br>(0.171) | -0.533<br>(0.173)                       |
| Variance, family income |  |                   |  |                   | -0.123<br>(0.032) | -0.111<br>(0.031)                       |
| Instruments             |  |                   | $\text{log}(\text{men}_{7-11}^{1980})$ |                   |                   | $\text{log}(\text{women}_{5-9}^{1980})$ |
| R-squared               | 0.19   | 0.53              | 0.53                                   | 0.20              | 0.66              | 0.65                                    |
| Observations            | 248  | 247               | 247                                    | 248               | 241               | 241                                     |

Note: regressions weighted by city population with robust standard errors in parentheses.

$\mu$  = number of ever married

n = total number

Log (men 27-31) = log (number of men in the 27-31 age group).

Log (women 25-29) = log (number of women in the 25-29 age group).

Men (27-31), college = number of men in the 27-31 age group with college degree.

Women (25-29), college = number of women in the 25-29 age group with college degree.

$\text{Log}(\text{women}_{5-9}^{1980})$  = log (number of women who were 5-9 years old in 1980).

$\text{Log}(\text{men}_{7-11}^{1980})$  = log (number of men who were 7-11 years old in 1980).

Table A1: First stage regressions (weighted by population)

|  | (1)            | (2)              |
|--|----------------|------------------|
| Dependent variable                     | Log(men 27-31) | Log(women 25-29) |
| Log(number of men, 7-11 in 1980)       | 0.930          |                  |
|  | (0.041)        |                  |
| fraction of white 27-31 males          | -1.056         |                  |
|  | (0.233)        |                  |
| fraction of black 27-31 males          | -0.621         |                  |
|  | (0.352)        |                  |
| fraction of 27-31 males - bachelor +   | 1.204          |                  |
|  | (0.486)        |                  |
| mean income, married 27-31 males       | 0.218          |                  |
|  | (0.350)        |                  |
| variance income, married 27-31 males   | -0.139         |                  |
|  | (0.087)        |                  |
| log (number of women, 5-9 in 1980)     |                | 0.968            |
|  |                | (0.037)          |
| fraction of white 25-29 females        |                | -0.806           |
|  |                | (0.286)          |
| fraction of black 25-29 females        |                | -0.390           |
|  |                | (0.320)          |
| fraction of 25-29 females - bachelor + |                | 0.945            |
|  |                | (0.454)          |
| mean income, married 25-29 females     |                | 0.134            |
|  |                | (0.292)          |
| variance income, married 25-29 females |                | -0.066           |
|  |                | (0.093)          |
| Constant                               | -0.901         | -0.551           |
|  | (3.459)        | (2.874)          |
| Observations                           | 247            | 241              |
| R-squared                              | 0.90           | 0.91             |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 3  
 Marriage matches (men 27-31, women 25-29), United States 2000 (weighted)  
 Dependent variable:  $\pi_{mf}$

|  | OLS<br>(1)          | OLS<br>(2)        | IV<br>(3)                                    | IV<br>(4)                                    |
|--|---------------------|-------------------|--|--|
| 0.5*ln(N <sub>f</sub> N <sub>m</sub> ) | -0.047<br>(0.010)** | 0.010<br>(0.011)  | -0.045<br>(0.011)**                          | 0.011<br>(0.013)                             |
| Fraction White M                       |                     | 0.463<br>(1.027)  |  | 0.482<br>(1.029)                             |
| Fraction Black M                       |                     | 0.101<br>(1.289)  |  | 0.125<br>(1.305)                             |
| Fraction College M                     |                     | 0.974<br>(1.061)  |  | 0.976<br>(1.057)                             |
| Mean inc married M                     |                     | -0.467<br>(0.522) |  | -0.469<br>(0.519)                            |
| Var inc married M                      |                     | -0.036<br>(0.091) |  | -0.036<br>(0.091)                            |
| Fraction White F                       |                     | 0.240<br>(0.872)  |  | 0.227<br>(0.871)                             |
| Fraction Black F                       |                     | -0.433<br>(1.092) |  | -0.454<br>(1.106)                            |
| Fraction College F                     |                     | -1.551<br>(0.928) |  | -1.554<br>(0.924)                            |
| Mean inc married F                     |                     | -0.061<br>(0.544) |  | -0.064<br>(0.546)                            |
| Variance inc married F                 |                     | -0.145<br>(0.101) |  | -0.145<br>(0.101)                            |
| Observations                           | 248                 | 241               | 248  | 241  |
| R-squared                              | 0.126               | 0.539             | 0.126  | 0.539  |
| Instruments                            |                     |                   | Ln(N80 <sub>f</sub> ), Ln(N80 <sub>m</sub> ) | Ln(N80 <sub>f</sub> ), Ln(N80 <sub>m</sub> ) |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

$\pi_{mf} = \log(\text{number of marriages between men, 27-31, and women, 25-29}) - 0.5 * (\log(\text{unmarried men in the age group 27-31}) + \log(\text{unmarried women in the age group 25-29}))$ .

N<sub>m</sub> = number of men in the age group 27-31.

N<sub>f</sub> = number of women in the age group 25-29.

Ln(N80<sub>f</sub>) = log (number of women who were 5-9 years old in 1980).

Ln(N80<sub>m</sub>) = log (number of men who were 7-11 years old in 1980).



Table 4: Fraction of children 0-6 living with two parents

|                        | (1)     | (2)     | (3)       |
|------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
|                        | lfrac   | lfrac   | Lfrac     |
| Lpop                   | -0.016  | -0.015  | -0.015    |
|                        | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.006)** |
| Observations           | 248     | 241     | 241       |
| Demographic covariates |         | X       | X         |
| Region                 |         |         | X         |
| R-squared              | 0.04    | 0.45    | 0.55      |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

TABLE 5  
MARITAL OUTPUT, UNITED STATES 2000

|   | DEPENDENT<br>VARIABLE<br>YEARS OF<br>EDUCATION<br>OF 16-YEAR<br>OLDS | DEPENDENT<br>VARIABLE = 1<br>IF 16-YEAR OLD<br>ATTAINED<br>MEDIAN<br>EDUCATION |
|---|--|--|
| Log (population)  | -0.004<br>(0.014)  | 0.012<br>(0.016)   |
| Boy dummy   | -0.144<br>(0.011)**  | -0.053<br>(0.005)**  |
| Father's age  | 0.002<br>(0.002)   | 0.000<br>(0.001)   |
| Mother's age  | 0.010<br>(0.002)**   | 0.002<br>(0.001)**   |
| Father's years of schooling   | 0.018<br>(0.007)**   | 0.006<br>(0.003)**   |
| Mother's years of schooling   | 0.021<br>(0.008)**   | 0.006<br>(0.002)**   |
| <u>Father's years of schooling x mother's years of schooling</u><br>100 | -0.119<br>(0.047)**  | -0.042<br>(0.020)**  |
| Dummy - father is white, mother is black                                | -0.213<br>(0.248)  | -0.012<br>(0.062)  |
| Dummy - father is white, mother is Hispanic                             | 0.038<br>(0.053)   | -0.046<br>(0.026)  |
| Dummy - father is black, mother is white                                | -0.111<br>(0.097)  | -0.055<br>(0.043)  |
| Dummy - father is black, mother is black                                | 0.193<br>(0.024)**   | 0.020<br>(0.016)   |
| Dummy - father is black, mother is Hispanic                             | 0.020<br>(0.144)   | -0.118<br>(0.088)  |
| Dummy - father is Hispanic, mother is white                             | 0.121<br>(0.049)**   | -0.020<br>(0.027)  |
| Dummy - father is Hispanic, mother is black                             | 0.126<br>(0.108)   | 0.104<br>(0.072)   |
| Dummy - father is Hispanic, mother is Hispanic                          | 0.212<br>(0.052)**   | -0.012<br>(0.026)  |
| Intercept   | Yes  | yes  |
| R-squared   | 0.01   | 0.01   |
| Observations  | 81772  | 82021  |

Note: standard errors clustered by city. The left out category in the race dummies is white father and white mother.

Table 7

| Variable             | Obs | Mean     | Std. Dev. | Min       | Max      |
|----------------------|-----|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| nfemale18_27         | 29  | 653.8276 | 736.8201  | 34        | 2325     |
| nmale22_32           | 29  | 764.7931 | 897.2486  | 42        | 3408     |
| mrf                  | 29  | .7304995 | .0860927  | .4850427  | .8584071 |
| mrm                  | 29  | .5202609 | .0788332  | .32       | .6518724 |
| Lodds_f18_27         | 29  | 1.910165 | .8921885  | -.6030494 | 3.553666 |
| Lodds_m22_32         | 29  | .07843   | .4879213  | -1.166617 | .9427419 |
| Total gain 1827_2232 | 29  | .5981932 | .6699954  | -.8927364 | 1.948401 |
| nlpassets            | 29  | 3.328261 | .9168769  | 1.244081  | 5.224039 |

Table 8: Florence log marriage odds ratio (weighted)

|           | (1)       | (2)       | (3)       | (4)       | (5)       | (6)       | (7)       | (8)       |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
|           | OLS       | OLS       | IV        | IV        | OLS       | OLS       | IV        | IV        |
|           | lorf18_27 | lorf18_27 | lorf18_27 | lorf18_27 | lorm22_32 | lorm22_32 | lorm22_32 | lorm22_32 |
| Lnfe18_27 | -0.038    | -0.023    | 0.024     | 0.030     |           |           |           |           |
|           | (0.107)   | (0.120)   | (0.118)   | (0.132)   |           |           |           |           |
| Ln22_32   |           |           |           |           | -0.035    | -0.037    | 0.007     | -0.015    |
|           |           |           |           |           | (0.153)   | (0.056)   | (0.141)   | (0.061)   |
| nlpassets |           | 0.102     |           | 0.108     |           | -0.353    |           | -0.353    |
|           |           | (0.183)   |           | (0.189)   |           | (0.089)   |           | (0.090)   |
| Obs       | 29        | 29        | 29        | 29        | 29        | 29        | 29        | 29        |
| R-squared | 0.00      | 0.02      |           | 0.02      | 0.00      | 0.55      |           | 0.55      |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 9: Florence total gains (weighted)

|              | (1)         | (2)         | (3)         | (4)         |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|              | OLS         | OLS         | IV          | IV          |
|              | tg1827_2232 | tg1827_2232 | tg1827_2232 | Tg1827_2232 |
| l1827_2232   | -0.012      | -0.027      | 0.021       | 0.009       |
|              | (0.131)     | (0.092)     | (0.132)     | (0.100)     |
| Nlpassets    |             | -0.206      |             | -0.205      |
|              |             | (0.149)     |             | (0.153)     |
| Observations | 29          | 29          | 29          | 29          |
| R-squared    | 0.00        | 0.13        |             | 0.13        |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table 10: China 1982 census (1% sample)

| Variable     | Obs | Mean     | Std. Dev. | Min       | Max      |
|--------------|-----|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| F21_25       | 244 | 295.4508 | 490.2071  | 3         | 4334     |
| M24_28       | 244 | 359.0861 | 565.4684  | 4         | 5000     |
| F31_35       | 244 | 212.1885 | 296.8116  | 1         | 2423     |
| M34_38       | 244 | 197.7992 | 255.5903  | 3         | 2015     |
| mrf21_25     | 244 | .534265  | .1330949  | 0         | .8571429 |
| mrm24_28     | 244 | .6317338 | .1304273  | .213      | 1        |
| mrf31_35     | 244 | .9781885 | .0187359  | .8888889  | 1        |
| mrm34_38     | 244 | .9551621 | .0330025  | .8333333  | 1        |
| Loddf21_25   | 243 | .1589318 | .5630422  | -1.793915 | 1.791759 |
| Loddm24_28   | 243 | .5760572 | .5910648  | -1.306936 | 2.31677  |
| Loddf31_35   | 203 | 3.821214 | .6838675  | 2.079442  | 5.869297 |
| Loddm34_38   | 217 | 3.122967 | .6681294  | 1.609438  | 5.214936 |
| Tg2125, 2428 | 243 | .3674945 | .4935487  | -1.550425 | 1.522261 |
| Tg3135, 3438 | 189 | 3.48161  | .4831838  | 2.300022  | 5.157401 |

Table 11: China log marriage odds ratio weighted regressions

|              | (1)       | (2)       | (3)      | (4)       | (5)      | (6)       | (7)      | (8)      |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|
|              | F: 21-25  | F: 21-25  | F: 31-25 | F: 31-25  | M: 24-28 | M: 24-28  | M: 34-38 | M: 34-38 |
| Lnp F:21-25  | -0.351    | -0.170    |          |           |          |           |          |          |
|              | (0.067)** | (0.041)** |          |           |          |           |          |          |
| lnodds edu F |           | -0.320    |          | -0.474    |          |           |          |          |
|              |           | (0.046)** |          | (0.065)** |          |           |          |          |
| Lnp M:34-38  |           |           |          |           |          |           | -0.103   | -0.181   |
|              |           |           |          |           |          |           | (0.060)  | (0.059)* |
| lnodds edu M |           |           |          |           |          | -0.115    |          | 0.205    |
|              |           |           |          |           |          | (0.106)   |          | (0.112)  |
| Lnp M:24-28  |           |           |          |           | -0.226   | -0.165    |          |          |
|              |           |           |          |           | (0.092)* | (0.057)** |          |          |
| Lnp F:31-35  |           |           | -0.243   | -0.020    |          |           |          |          |
|              |           |           | (0.099)* | (0.066)   |          |           |          |          |
| Observations | 243       | 240       | 203      | 203       | 243      | 243       | 217      | 217      |
| R-squared    | 0.378     | 0.600     | 0.108    | 0.423     | 0.160    | 0.184     | 0.028    | 0.087    |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 12: China log marriage odds ratio IV weighted regressions

|              | (1)       | (2)       | (3)       | (4)       | (5)      | (6)       | (7)      | (8)      |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|
|              | F: 21-25  | F: 21-25  | F: 31-25  | F: 31-25  | M: 24-28 | M: 24-28  | M: 34-38 | M: 34-38 |
| lnp F:21-25  | -0.314    | -0.145    |           |           |          |           |          |          |
|              | (0.072)** | (0.042)** |           |           |          |           |          |          |
| lnodds edu F |           | -0.333    |           | -0.467    |          |           |          |          |
|              |           | (0.046)** |           | (0.063)** |          |           |          |          |
| lnp M:34-38  |           |           |           |           |          |           | -0.100   | -0.191   |
|              |           |           |           |           |          |           | (0.061)  | (0.056)  |
| lnodds edu M |           |           |           |           |          | -0.114    |          | 0.210    |
|              |           |           |           |           |          | (0.106)   |          | (0.112)  |
| lnp M:24-28  |           |           |           |           | -0.224   | -0.166    |          |          |
|              |           |           |           |           | (0.091)* | (0.060)** |          |          |
| lnp F:31-35  |           |           | -0.266    | -0.037    |          |           |          |          |
|              |           |           | (0.091)** | (0.061)   |          |           |          |          |
| Observations | 243       | 240       | 203       | 203       | 243      | 243       | 217      | 217      |
| R-squared    | 0.373     | 0.599     | 0.107     | 0.423     | 0.160    | 0.184     | 0.028    | 0.087    |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 13: Total gains: weighted IV regressions

|                      | (1)              | (2)              | (3)              | (4)              | (5)              | (6)              | (7)              | (8)              |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                      | F:21-<br>25,M:+3 | F:21-<br>25,M:+3 | F:31-<br>35,M:+3 | F:31-<br>35,M:+3 | F:21-<br>25,M:+3 | F:21-<br>25,M:+3 | F:31-<br>35,M:+3 | F:31-<br>35,M:+3 |
| Lp F:21-<br>25,M:+3  | -0.270           | -0.143           |                  |                  | -0.139           | -0.127           |                  |                  |
|                      | (0.080)**        | (0.045)**        |                  |                  | (0.033)**        | (0.032)**        |                  |                  |
| Ln odds edu<br>F     |                  | -0.071           |                  | 0.036            |                  | -0.098           |                  | 0.032            |
|                      |                  | (0.079)          |                  | (0.115)          |                  | (0.061)          |                  | (0.088)          |
| Ln odds edu<br>M     |                  | -0.182           |                  | -0.211           |                  | -0.017           |                  | -0.037           |
|                      |                  | (0.109)          |                  | (0.133)          |                  | (0.072)          |                  | (0.105)          |
| Lnp F:31-<br>35,M:+3 |                  |                  | -0.198           | -0.123           |                  |                  | 0.045            | 0.045            |
|                      |                  |                  | (0.072)**        | (0.048)*         |                  |                  | (0.047)          | (0.046)          |
| Observations         | 243              | 240              | 189              | 189              | 243              | 240              | 189              | 189              |
| R-squared            | 0.300            | 0.429            | 0.141            | 0.198            | 0.104            | 0.139            | 0.011            | 0.012            |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%



TABLE 6: TO BE COMPLETED  
MARRIAGE PATTERNS BY LOCATION, TUSCANY 1260-1435

|                           | 1260–1299 | 1340–1360 | 1420–1435 |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Urban groom – urban bride | 17.9      |           |           |
| Urban groom – rural bride | 5.7       |           |           |
| Rural groom – urban bride | 2.3       |           |           |
| Rural groom – rural bride | 74.0      |           |           |
| Observations              | 476       |           |           |

Source: State Archives of Florence, Notarile Antecosimiano, 794 volumes of notarial deeds (see Botticini 2006 for details).

TABLE A6  
1427 FLORENTINE CATASTO: THE 29 DISTRICTS

| District no. | Name of city or rural area                                  | Population size<br>(number of households) |
|--------------|---|---|
| 1            | Florence  | 9780                                      |
| 2            | Rural quarter of S. Spirito (countryside of Florence)       | 7530                                      |
| 3            | Rural quarter of S. Croce (countryside of Florence)         | 4881                                      |
| 4            | Rural quarter of S. Maria Novella (countryside of Florence) | 7369                                      |
| 5            | Rural quarter of S. Giovanni (countryside of Florence)      | 7147                                      |
| 6            | Cortona   | 898                                       |
| 7            | Countryside of Cortona                                      | 1121                                      |
| 8            | Castiglion Fiorentino (city and countryside)                | 559                                       |
| 9            | Montepulciano (city and countryside)                        | 733                                       |
| 10           | Arezzo  | 1194                                      |
| 11           | Countryside of Arezzo                                       | 3694                                      |
| 12           | Mountain villages near Arezzo                               | 1194                                      |
| 13           | Pisa  | 1740                                      |
| 14           | Countryside of Pisa   | 3966                                      |
| 15           | Pistoia   | 1247                                      |
| 16           | Countryside of Pistoia                                      | 2043                                      |
| 17           | Mountain villages near Pistoia                              | 492                                       |
| 18           | Rural villages in the Garfagnana area                       | 175                                       |
| 29           | Towns and rural villages in Val di Nievole                  | 1262                                      |
| 20           | Towns and rural villages in Val d'Arno di Sotto             | 642                                       |
| 21           | San Gimignano (city and countryside)                        | 576                                       |
| 22           | Colle   | 571                                       |
| 23           | Volterra  | 797                                       |
| 24           | Countryside of Volterra                                     | 751                                       |
| 25           | Sillano and Montecastelli                                   | 119                                       |
| 26           | ??  |   |
| 27           | ??  |   |
| 28           | ??  |   |
| 29           | ??  |   |

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