THE COMPOSITION OF COMPENSATION POLICY:
FROM CASH TO FRINGE BENEFITS

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ABSTRACT. We develop a Principal-Agent model to analyze the optimal composition of the compensation policy with both monetary and non-monetary incentives. We characterize nonmonetary benefits as symbols to capture a large set of non-wage compensations such as fringe benefits, status, identity (or self-image) or even sanctions. We characterize the optimal composition of the compensation policy when the principal fully or imperfectly knows the agent’s preferences.

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1. Introduction

A firm's compensation policy has three independent dimensions: the level, the functional form and the composition of rewards (Baker et al. [5]). The level of compensation determines the quality and quantity of employees - that is who the firm can attract, the functional form determines the links between pay and performance - that is how employees perform once they're hired, and the composition defines the relative amounts of the components of the pay package such as cash, fringe benefits, working conditions, relationships with co-workers, leisure etc. Most of the research on incentives has privileged the first two dimensions. During the last 10 years, researchers' interest in studying non-monetary benefits as part of worker compensation schemes has increased (see for instance, Dale-Olsen [11], Goldman et al. [14], Hart [15], Hashimoto and Zhao [16], Rajan and Wulf [18], Royalty [19], Wood [20], Yermack [23], etc.). However, the literature is still rather thin. The focus of the researchers the last decade has primarily been on empirics (important exceptions are, for instance, Akerlof and Kranton [1], Oyer [17], Becker et al. [6], Auriol and Renault [3]), about for example the prevalence of fringe benefits, gender differences in fringe benefits, tax preferences for fringe benefits, how fringe benefits affect firm performance and worker turnover, and job-lock issues caused by health and pension plans.

Our short paper tackles the task of providing an understanding of the optimal composition of firms' compensation package. We contribute to the literature on incentives by proposing an agency framework in which the agent may be compensated for her effort by a wage and a nonmonetary reward, and the non-monetary compensation is treated as a symbol. This concept of symbol allows us to express a wide range of non-monetary benefits, like fringe benefits, perks, status, identity and sanctions.

The symbolic nature of non-wage benefits is a crucial assumption in our analysis and relies on the idea that most nonpecuniary benefits have, as a common denominator, a symbolic dimension at least implicitly. Overall non-monetary benefits represent a significant share of compensation, around one third of total labour costs in OECD countries (Dale-Olsen [9], Watters [21]) and are multi-faceted. They embed employer-provided benefits (pension scheme, health and life insurance, stock options), non-wage amenities (e.g., office space or working condition), fringe benefits, perquisites or payments-in-kind (free car, free housing, travel or lower valued fringes such as merchandises, free coffee etc.). But despite their multiple components, most non-monetary benefits have a symbolic dimension. Like true symbols (medals or public prizes awarded during lavish ceremonies) any form of privilege (merchandise, company car, travel etc.) commands recognition by others. In fact, basically all types non-monetary benefits are inherently symbolic because even when they are offered to attract and retain employees (like health insurance, pension scheme or stock options) and/or have a direct monetary equivalent, they improve material well-being or signal employer’s interest and recognition to workers. By treating non-monetary benefits as symbols, we therefore consider that symbols are not a cheap substitute for money. More precisely, the notion of symbol refers to nonpecuniary rewards...
with a symbolic, trophy-like, value and not immediately liquid for the agent, whereas benefits which are “almost-liquid” are embedded into the variable describing monetary wage.

This paper analyzes the optimal combination of wage and non-wage benefits in a Principal-Agent framework with moral hazard. However this problem is not trivial. For instance, the program in which the compensation package is composed of a nonmonetary reward only, does not necessarily admit a solution. In other words, incentive-compatibility does not trivially meet profitably for the principal.

We show that under symmetric information over the agent’s preferences for symbols, mixed incentives Pareto-dominate purely monetary incentives. Under asymmetric information over the agent’s preference relation, a compensation policy comprising a fixed fringe benefit combined with a variable wage also Pareto-dominates purely monetary incentives. This result is interesting because it offers an explanation to why some firms provide non-discriminatory non-performance related benefits (i.e., to all employees) while other provide performance-related benefits to selected groups of employees. In our model, of course, when the agent’s preference over non-monetary benefits is pure private information, and the principal has no prior about it, then the principal has to resort to pure monetary rewards only.

Several papers have analyzed the optimal incentives mix with monetary and non-monetary benefits (see for instance Auriol and Renault [4] and [3], Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss [12], Akerlof and Kranton [1], Oyer [17], Becker, Murphy and Werning [6]). These approaches focus on symbolic differentiation in the workplace such as social status and identity, and examine how the firm may use the workers’ different preferences for such symbols in order to elicit more effort.

Auriol and Renault [4] analyze hierarchies as an incentive device in a promotion system and show that when agents with a higher rank are more responsive to monetary incentives, the optimal hierarchical structure associated with a promotion system is based on seniority and has two ranks, an agent’s rank being solely determined by his seniority. When the responsiveness of effort to incentives diminishes, hierarchies are based both on merit and seniority and has three ranks with the young at the bottom, the old who were unsuccessful when young in the middle and the old who were successful when young at the top. Our model analyzes a different issue as we focus on a static set-up without promotion. Though receiving a large amount of symbol may confer a hierarchical status, we rather focus on situations where the allocation of symbols is not linked to past performance or merit, in order to examine the static trade-off between wage and symbols in the optimal compensation mix.

Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss [12] focus on heterogeneity in workers’ preferences for social status and productivity. They examine whether competing firms can induce the workers who care more (less) about status to exert more (less) effort, and how cultural diversity affects labor market equilibrium. They show that in equilibrium, firms mix workers with different status.
concerns and workers with status concerns will have more high-powered incentives, work more and earn more than workers who do not care about status.

Focusing on internal labor contracts, Auriol and Renault [3] develop a comprehensive analysis of status allocation in a hierarchy by disentangling static and dynamic effects. In their model, high status agents are also willing to exert more effort in exchange for additional income while better paid agents are willing to exert more effort in exchange for an improved status.

From a static perspective, they examine whether an employer would ex ante choose to differentiate status among a-priori identical workers. They show that although agents with a high status are more responsive to monetary incentives, the resulting benefits are outweighed by the impact of a lower work motivation for those with lower status. In the long run however, it is optimal to give young agents both low status and monetary incentives as their motivation to work stems solely from the prospect of being promoted. Because individual preferences exhibit complementarities between status and money, symbolic and material rewards are mutual reinforcers. In our single-agent model, symbols are likely to be traded against monetary rewards, but this depends on the marginal rate of substitution between wages and symbols which, given a general concave utility function, is higher at low wage levels.

Focusing on identity in the workplace, Akerlof and Kranton [1] develop a model in which identity and monetary rewards are relatively substitutable. They show that if a worker has an identity as insider (outsider), the presence of identity in the utility function reduces (increases) the wage differential needed to induce the worker to take the high effort action. Relative complementarity between identity and wage may arise on the contrary when effort takes more than two values.

Here, we do not assume that individuals with greater income and status (identity concerns) have higher (lower) marginal utility of income than those with lower status (identity concerns) and lower income. In our framework, symbols and monetary incentives are then relative complements at the top of the wage structure but relative substitutes at the bottom of the wage structure. By considering a standard utility function in which wage and symbol are imperfect substitutes or complements, our model hence proposes a general framework for the analysis of optimal contracts in the presence of both monetary and non monetary incentives. We are therefore able to offer a general formulation for the trade-off in the utility function between wage and symbols. This implies that our model differs from previous approaches in several dimensions.

First, by characterizing non-monetary rewards through their symbolic dimension our analysis is applicable not only to social status, but also to many types of symbols like perks or any form of privilege or non-monetary recognition in the workplace.

Second, since we rely on a very standard Principal-Agent framework with moral hazard, the contract offered to the agent proposes a level of wage and symbol conditional upon observable output. Hence symbols are received ex post, and not ex ante as for instance in Auriol and Renault [3]. Such an
assumption is standard in Principal-Agent models without status, but in the real world as well, ex post and performance-based allocation of status is also observed in many situations (see for instance the awards to salesperson).

Finally, to solve analytically the model, we have to rely on a static and single-agent context, which does not allow analyzing long run issues regarding contract renegotiation, promotions or between-firms competition.

Our article is composed of six sections. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the optimal contract under symmetric information over the agent’s preference for symbols. Section 4 analyze the optimal contract under asymmetric information (partial or full) over the agent’s preference for symbol, and section 5 concludes the article. All the proofs are relegated in Appendix.

2. The Model

2.1. Basic set-up and definitions.

We consider a moral hazard model\(^1\) between a Principal and an Agent. The output of the relationship is a random observable variable and the agent’s effort is unobservable by the principal. The principal designs the optimal contract by proposing a compensation package composed of a monetary wage and/or a nonmonetary reward. The nonmonetary reward is characterized by two essential dimensions: its symbolic nature and its value for the agent who receives it.

We label nonmonetary rewards under the term of symbol. The notion of symbol encompasses non-wage amenities like fringe benefits (e.g. health and life insurance, vacation trips, use of automobile, childcare services etc) and all types of nonmonetary incentives with a trophy value. Examples of various symbols are receiving a medal (military or civil like an olympic medal), an academic prize, a business award or recognition (e.g. being elected the “Manager of the year”). The main characteristics of symbols is that they are not immediately liquid for the agent, their role therefore does not consist in yielding a monetary, tradable, revenue. Symbols also have a trophy value and affect one’s image (either self-image and identity or social image and hierarchical status in the organization).

The value of symbols depends on the agent’s preferences between monetary and nonmonetary benefits. These preferences are representative of the agent’s value system\(^2\). To define the value and costs of symbols, we denote

\(^1\)The analysis can be extended to any other type of agency relationship (adverse selection, signalling,...).

\(^2\)For instance, these preferences indicate whether it is worth proposing to salespersons nonmonetary benefits in the form of travel, merchandize or cash given that they already have to travel for accomplish their job duties.
by Ω the infinite overall set of symbols. The agent’s preferences are characterized by a standard preference relation ≿ defined over Ω and by a real symbolic equivalent (of ω) s ∈ S such that:

\[ s = h(\omega), \quad \omega \in \Omega \]

where \( h \) represents a self-satisfaction or ego function and where \( S \) is the set of real numbers “equivalent” to the set of symbols Ω.

The cost of symbols for the principal is defined by the cost of a symbol \( \omega, c(\omega) \in \mathbb{R}^+ \), and its equivalent for \( s \):

\[ c(h^{-1}(s)) \in \mathbb{R}^+, \quad s \in S \]

To simplify notations, and when no confusion arises, we replace the notation \( c(h^{-1}(s)) \) by \( c(s) \). Note that function \( c \) is not necessarily either monotonically increasing or decreasing. For now, \( c \) is simply assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.

2.2. Technology and preferences.

Given the costs and rewards defined previously, we characterize in this section the principal’s profit, the agent’s utility and effort and the output of the relationship.

The stochastic production level can take \( n \) possible values: \( x \in X = \{x_1, ..., x_n\} \) where \( x_1 < x_2 < x_3 < ... < x_n \).

The agent’s effort level can take two possible values: \( e \in \{e_L, e_H\} \) with \( e_L < e_H \).

The agent’s cost of effort is denoted by \( v(e) \) where \( v'(e) > 0 \), \( v(0) = 0 \). The stochastic influence of effort in production is defined by the probabilities

\[ p_H^i = \Pr(x = x_i|e = e_H) > 0, \quad p_L^i = \Pr(x = x_i|e = e_L) > 0 \]

The probabilities of success satisfy the usual monotone likelihood ratio property.

The agent’s compensation is composed of a monetary wage \( w(x_i) \) and a nonmonetary component \( s(x_i) \). To simplify exposition, we will use the following notations in the rest of the paper:

\[ w(x_i) = w_i, \quad s(x_i) = s_i, \quad v(e^k) = v^k, \quad i = 1..n, \quad k = H, L \]

The agent is risk-averse and her a utility function is defined by:

\[ U_i = u(w_i, s_i) - v(e^k), \quad i = 1..n, \quad k = H, L \]

3In the sense that \( \succeq \) is complete and transitive and that \( (\succeq, \Omega) \) satisfies the usual condition of perfect separability.

4From a mathematical standpoint, \( h \) is an order isomorphism defined from \( (\succeq, \Omega) \) into \( (\mathbb{R}, \geq) \). Hence rather than using Ω, we can use the set \( S = h(\Omega) \). It is worth working with this set \( S \) because any element \( s \in S \) is a real number while the \( \omega \) are pure symbols. Since \( h(\omega) \) captures the nonmonetary reward provided by the symbol \( \omega \), the set \( S \) is interpreted thorough our paper as the set of nonmonetary rewards.

5The agent prefers \( \omega \) to \( \omega' \) because \( \omega \) provides more self-esteem than does \( \omega' \).
where $u(.,.)$ is a strictly increasing (in both arguments) concave utility function. $U_i$ denotes the ex post utility obtained by the agent in the $n$ states of nature corresponding to outputs $x_i$, $i = 1..n$.

This utility function relies on two main assumptions. First, we assume that utility is separable between the money-symbol mix and effort. This corresponds to the conventional assumption of separability of utility between money and effort in the basic Principal-Agent model. The second assumption is more important and relates to the utility function $u(w(x), s(x))$. We do not impose indeed any particular form for this function and keep it very general. In the literature, most models rely on a particular case of this general utility function (with an exception for Becker et al. [6]). For instance, wages and symbolic rewards are additively separable in Akerlof and Kran- ton [1]), multiplicative in Auriol and Renault [3] and [4]. Our model hence generalizes these approaches in a static and single-agent framework.

The principal is risk-neutral, with a profit function defined by:

$$B_i = x_i - w_i - c(s_i), \quad i = 1..n$$

where $w_i$ denotes the agent’s monetary reward, $c(s_i)$ is the $C^2$ cost of the nonmonetary reward $s_i$, and $x_i$ is the output level.

### 2.3. The Agent’s value system.

The agent’s value system plays a crucial role in the optimal compensation policy. The reward package will indeed depend on the agent’s preferences over wage and non-wage benefits. In practice, knowing the agent’s value system is crucial to determine the best compensation policy.

*The agent’s value system* is represented by his preference relation $\succ$ or equivalently by the real symbolic equivalent $h = s(\omega)$ of this preference relation.

Two situations can then arise.

1. **Symmetric information**: In this case, $h$ is known both by the principal and by the agent. This is our benchmark case (see sections 3).

2. **Asymmetric information**: In this case, $h$ is not perfectly known by the principal and is *conditional* to the observation of a random variable $\theta \in \Theta$ (see section 4). This case corresponds to a partial asymmetry of information. There is full asymmetric information when the principal does note the probability distribution of $\theta$.

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6The random variable $\theta$ can be interpreted as a signal over the agent’s preferences and can thus allow introducing heterogeneous types of agent. In this situation, the design of the compensation package may become a screening and auto-selection device leading to an endogenous sorting of workers according to their type (Besley and Ghatak [7] developed a similar argument).
3. Optimal contract under symmetric information over preferences

In this section, we first describe incentive feasible contracts and then characterize the properties of the optimal contracts when there is symmetric information over the agent’s preferences.

3.1. Incentive feasible contracts.

Since the agent’s effort is not observable, the principal can only offer a contract based on the observable and verifiable production level. Such a contract links both the monetary (wage \( w \)) and the non-monetary compensation (symbol \( s = h(\omega) \)) to the random output \( x \). With \( n \) possible output levels \( x_i \), the contract is defined by a pair of wage and symbol \( w_i \) and \( s_i \) \( \forall i = 1..n \).

The problem of the principal is to decide whether to induce the agent to exert effort the high or low effort and then which incentive contracts should be used, that is which composition of wage and symbol should be offered.

Each effort level that the principal would like to induce corresponds to a set of contracts ensuring participation and incentive compatibility. Both types of constraints are defined as follows.

The incentive constraint imposes the agent to prefer to exert the high effort level:

\[
(ICC) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) u(w_i, s_i) \geq v^H - v^L
\]

The participation constraint ensures that if the agent exerts the high effort level, this yields at least her outside opportunity utility level (reservation utility \( U \)):

\[
(PC) \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u(w_i, s_i) - v^H \geq U
\]

Definition 1. A contract is incentive feasible if it induces a high effort level \( e^H \) (satisfies the incentive constraint (ICC)) and ensures the agent’s participation (satisfies the participation constraint (PC)).

The following assumption with respect to the cost of symbols guarantees the existence of a solution in all possible contractual arrangements, in particular when for instance the agent is paid with symbols only (see Appendix for details).

Assumption 1. The cost function \( c \) is a strictly increasing convex function.

As a benchmark, let first consider the case of complete information over effort, that is when both the agent and the principal can observe the agent’s effort level, and this public information is verifiable by a third party.
The effort level can then be included into the contract, and if the principal wants to induce the high effort level $e^H$, her problems write:

\[
\text{(FB)} \quad \max_{(w_i,s_i)} \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^H (x_i - w_i - c(s_i))
\]

subject to (PC)

In this program, only the agent’s participation constraint matters for the principal because the agent can be forced to exert a positive effort level (if not, deviation would be detected and could be punished). Denoting by $\lambda$ the multiplier of the participation constraint and optimizing with respect to $w_i$ and $s_i$ leads to the following first order conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
- p_i^H + \lambda p_i^H u_w'(w^*_i, s^*_i) &= 0 \\
- p_i^H c'_s(s^*_i) + \lambda p_i^H u_s'(w^*_i, s^*_i) &= 0
\end{align*}
\]

where $w^*_i$ is the first best monetary transfer and $s^*_i$ is the first best symbol.

From (3.2) and (3.2), we derive that $\lambda = \frac{1}{u_w(w^*_i, s^*_i)} = \frac{c'(s^*_i)}{u_s'(w^*_i, s^*_i)}$ and finally that $w^*_i = w^*$, $s^*_i = s^*$ $\forall i = 1..n$.

With a verifiable effort level, the agent obtains full insurance and constant wage and symbol whatever the output level.

We now characterize the optimal compensation scheme under imperfectly observable effort (second-best) but symmetric information over the agent’s preferences (value system represented by function $h(\omega) = s$).

### 3.2. Optimal mixed contracts.

When effort is not observable by the principal but information over the agent’s preferences is symmetric, the principal’s problem writes:

\[
\text{(MIX)} \quad \max_{(w_i,s_i)} \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^H (x_i - w_i - c(s_i))
\]

subject to (ICC) and (PC)

The following proposition characterizes the solution of (MIX) and the relationships between the wage and symbols offered.

**Proposition 1.** Under symmetric information over preferences, the optimal solution of (MIX), $(w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i)$, characterized by the following equation,

\[
\frac{u_s'(w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i)}{u_w'(w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i)} = c'(s^\text{mix}_i), \quad \forall i = 1..n.
\]

exhibits stronger wage/symbol congruence at high wage levels.
The fact that the optimal compensation policy depends on the degree of substitutability between monetary and nonmonetary rewards relies on the concavity (in the two arguments) of the utility function: in the plane \((w_i, s_i)\), a convex indifference curve exhibits increasing marginal rate of substitution between \(s_i\) and \(w_i\), \(\text{MRS}_{sw} = \frac{u'_s}{u'_w}\). In other words, the value that the agent places on one extra unit of a symbol is higher at high wage levels, and lower at low wage levels.

Given that our result holds for general concave utility functions, the agent’s degree of risk aversion will affect the optimal compensation mix. We now examine different utility function, reflecting different degree of risk aversion.

\subsection*{3.3. Optimal contracts under different risk aversion.}

We analyze how the wage-symbol mix is affected when the agent is either risk neutral or risk-averse with constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA utility function) or with decreasing absolute risk-aversion (we will consider a CES, Leontieff, Cobb-Douglas and a multiplicative utility function).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Risk-neutrality}
\end{itemize}

When the agent is risk-neutral, the principal who wants to induce a high effort level chooses the compensation mix that solves program (MIX) in which the agent’s utility is given by \(u(w_i, s_i) = w_i + s_i\). The solution of this program leads to \(c'(s_{mix}) = 1\) so that the first-best optimal compensation contract with full insurance \(w^*\) and \(s^*\) are optimal. Homogeneous wages and symbols hence are attained when agents are risk neutral.

Moreover, with risk neutrality, the monetary and the non-monetary dimension of the compensation are relatively substitutable (this is evident when the principal chooses the compensation mix so that the participation constraint (PC) is binding and the agent has no rent). In a related model, Akerlof and Kranton [1] obtain a comparable result. Our model therefore proposes a general framework in which systematic substitutability between wage and non-wage benefits compares to risk-neutrality.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Constant absolute risk-aversion}
\end{itemize}

When the agent has constant absolute risk-aversion and her utility function writes \(u(w_i, s_i) = 1 - \exp(-Aw_i - Bs_i)\) where \(w_i, s_i \geq 0\) and \(A, B > 0\) are respectively the absolute aversion coefficients over the monetary and the non-monetary dimensions. The optimality condition derived from proposition 1 writes: \(\frac{B}{A} = c'(s_{mix})\). Since \(c\) is a strictly increasing convex function, then \(\frac{B}{A} = c'(s_{mix})\) implies \(s_{mix} = s_0\), \(\forall i\), with \(s_0 = c^{-1}\left(\frac{B}{A}\right) > 0\). Hence, if the agent’s preferences are characterized by constant absolute risk aversion (CARA utility function), the optimal compensation mix is such that the non-monetary reward \(s_0\) is fixed. This non-monetary reward \(s_0\) is indirectly connected to the optimal wage through \(\frac{B}{A}\): the higher \(\frac{B}{A}\), the higher \(s_0\). Hence, the congruence between wage and symbol is higher at high wage levels. This property holds for standard utility functions.
Decreasing absolute risk-aversion

When the agent has a CES utility function (constant elasticity of substitution), we assume that \( u(w_i, s_i) = [\alpha w_i^{\varepsilon} + \beta s_i^{\varepsilon}]^{-\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \) where \( \varepsilon \geq -1 \), and \( \alpha, \beta \) and \( v \) are positive constants. The optimality condition derived from proposition 1 writes:

\[
\frac{\beta}{\alpha} \left[ \frac{w_i^{mix}}{s_i^{mix}} \right]^{\varepsilon+1} = c'(s_i^{mix}), \text{ that is: } \frac{w_i^{mix}}{s_i^{mix}} = \left[ \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \times c'(s_i^{mix}) \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon+1}}.
\]

We see that \( \frac{w_i^{mix}}{s_i^{mix}} \) varies with the elasticity of substitution between wages (\( w \)) and symbols (\( s \)):

\[ \sigma = \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon}. \]

As \( \varepsilon \) increases, \( s \) and \( w \) become less and less substitutable. In the limit case when \( \varepsilon = +\infty \) (Leontief utility function), \( s \) and \( w \) are complementary and the optimality condition implies \( w_i^{mix} = s_i^{mix} \), \( \forall i = 1..n \).

When \( \varepsilon \) decreases, \( s \) and \( w \) become more substitutable. For instance, when \( \varepsilon = 0 \) (Cobb-Douglas function) then \( \frac{w_i^{mix}}{s_i^{mix}} = \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \times c'(s_i^{mix}) \), \( \forall i = 1..n \).

A multiplicative utility function, \( u(w_i, s_i) = w_i \times s_i \), leads to a similar result: \( \frac{w_i^{mix}}{s_i^{mix}} = c'(s_i^{mix}) \), \( \forall i = 1..n \).

Hence, with such a class of utility functions, the monetary and the non-monetary dimension of the compensation are relative complements. Using a similar type of utility function, Auriol and Renault [3] show that differentiation in terms of social status is optimal in a long term perspective. They show indeed that it is optimal to give young agents a status as low as possible along with no monetary incentives, but promotions are more substantial for those who have been successful in the past. Here, we obtain that when wages and symbols are relative complements in the utility function, the optimal compensation mix is twofold: low symbol and low wage (suggesting possible low firm tenure) together with high symbol and high wage (suggesting possible high firm tenure and/or high past performance). Our model therefore proposes a general (though different) framework allowing both relative substitutability (at low wage level) and relative complementarity (at high wage levels) between wages and symbols.

In sum, the optimal composition of the compensation package and the degree of substitutability between monetary and nonmonetary benefits varies with the workers’ wage level. There is some empirical evidence in line with this issue. Dale-Olsen [10] shows that in Norwegian non-public sector establishments in 2002, there seems to exist a positive correlation between wages and fringe benefits. However, when accounting for the size of the establishments then Norwegian manufacturing is actually characterized by a convex relationship between fringe benefits and workforce size to the position in the conditional wage distribution. This convex relationship means that high wage establishments offer more fringes to their employees and have a higher size, but very low wage establishments also offer more fringes and are large (in terms of size)\(^7\). These facts are not inconsistent with our assessment that congruence is higher for high wage levels.

\(^7\)US data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that very low wage employees receiving only health benefits and sick leave sometimes have a very high percentage of total compensation in fringe benefits. This is due to the fact that the cost of health
3.4. Equilibrium contracts.

We have shown the optimal contract is characterized by a mix of wage and symbols characterized in equilibrium by the condition expressed in proposition 1. In the real world, many types of contracts are offered to employees, corresponding to very different amounts and nature of symbols (office space, status, health and life insurance, company car etc.). Apparently identical employees (with the same level of skills) may also be offered different amounts of symbols or wages, depending on their preferences. Similarly, in the public sector, as opposed to the private sector, the wage is quasi independent of output but symbols play an important role in motivating civil servants (this is what Akerlof and Kranton [1] call identity). In turn, one wonders whether the principal would find it profitable to offer different contracts to different types of agents. For instance, some agents might never accept output-dependent wages or symbols. To examine this issue, we need to take into account particular preferences for wages and symbols and then analyze, among the optimal contracts characterized by 1, which type of contract would most likely be offered to which type of agent in equilibrium. We will highlight in particular two classes of contracts, in which either the monetary reward or the symbolic reward is fixed (independent of output).

Before examining such equilibrium contracts, let note that one might think that it is always more profitable for the principal to offer a mixed contract because when there are more rewarding tools, incentives are more powerful and this automatically increases the principal’s profit. However, when offering a mix of rewards, the principal relies on more incentives instruments but also bears more costs. Let consider for example a particular type of non-monetary benefits such that $c(s_i) = w_i \forall i = 1..n$. In this case, a mixed contract reduces the principal’s profit compared to a purely monetary contract. Hence, the issue of the optimal composition of the compensation policy is not trivial.

We now make the following assumption.

**Assumption 2.** Let $S_a$ be the set (strictly included in $S$) of non-monetary rewards effectively used by the Principal. Within this set, we assume that:

$$E(s) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_ip_i^H > E(c(s)) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} c(s_i)p_i^H$$

Assumption 2 means that in expected terms, the value (for the agent) attached to symbols should exceed its costs for the principal. In other words, the employer should have a relative comparative advantage in offering non-monetary benefits to the employee. Under symmetric information over the agent’s preferences, assumption 2 is not too much constraining because the set of non-monetary incentives is sufficiently large for the principal to find benefits is very large relative to the wages of a minimum wage employee and comparisons should be made very carefully in such particular cases (see Campbell [8]).
out a set (subset of $S$) of non-monetary benefits whose expected cost conditional upon $e^H$ is lower than their conditional expected value. Of course, assumption 2 does not obviously imply the results obtained in theorem 1.

We now consider how the optimal contract is affected when the agent is characterized by the following utility functions.

- **When the agent values monetary rewards only (variable wages and fixed symbols),** her utility function is defined by $u_i(w_i, \bar{s}) = f(w_i)$ that is $U_i = f(w_i) - v^k$, $i = 1..n$, $k = H, L$, with $f'(.) > 0$, $f''(. \leq 0$, $f(0) = 0$.

  This situation corresponds to the standard Principal-Agent framework with moral hazard, in which the compensation package is composed of a monetary wage only. Normalizing the fixed component to 0, the contract based on fixed symbols and performance-based wages only solves the following program:

$$\text{(FIXS)} \quad \max \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H (x_i - w_i)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H f(w_i) - v^H \geq U \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) f(w_i) \geq v^H - v^L$$

The solution of this program, when it exists is denoted by:

$$w_i^{fixs} = u'^{-1} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda + \mu \left( \frac{w_i}{p_i^H} \right)} \right) \quad \forall i = 1..n$$

where $\lambda$ and $\mu$ are strictly positive Lagrange multipliers.

- **When the agent values nonmonetary rewards only (fixed wages and variable symbols),** her utility function is defined by $u_i(\tilde{w}, s_i) = g(s_i)$ that is $U_i = g(s_i) - v^k$, $i = 1..n$, $k = H, L$, with $g'(.) > 0$, $g''(.) \leq 0$.

  The main difference between $f(.)$ and $g(.)$ is that $g(.)$ can be negative\(^8\) (this would correspond to 'sanctions'). Normalizing the fixed component to 0, the contract based on fixed wages and performance-based symbols only solves the following program:\n
$$\text{(FIXW)} \quad \max \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H [x_i - c(s_i)]$$

subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H g(s_i) - v^H \geq U \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) g(s_i) \geq v^H - v^L$$

Note that the program (FIXW) does not necessarily admit a solution (see proof in Appendix). In particular, if the cost function is strictly decreasing then the program (FIXW) has no solution. The absence of solution in such a case relies on the fact that there is a contradiction between the profit maximizing objective of the principal and the participation and incentive constraints. This property is interesting because it shows that using symbols

\(^8\)Recall that while $w \in \mathbb{R}_+$, $s \in \mathbb{R}$. 
as incentive devices in agency problems is not trivial even when the costs of providing symbols are decreasing. Assumption 1 (convexity of the cost function) avoids this problem.

Let consider that the principal has to choose among two agents and that the first agent has preferences defined over monetary rewards only (which we will call 'monetary preferences') and the second agent has preferences defined over both monetary and non-monetary rewards (which we will call 'mixed preferences'). Let $\Pi^{fixs}$ and $\Pi^{mix}$ denote the principal’s optimal profit in the programs (FIXS) and (MIX).

The contract that would be most likely offered in equilibrium is then characterized as follows.

**Theorem 1.** Under symmetric information over the agent’s preferences, and when the solution to (FIXS) exists, the principal finds it more profitable to contract with an agent who has mixed preferences than with an agent who has monetary preferences, whereas both agents receive the same expected utility:

$$\Pi^{mix} > \Pi^{fixs}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u_i^{mix} - v^H = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H f_i^{fixs} - v^H$$

where $(w^{fixs}_i)$ $\forall i = 1..n$ solve (FIXS) and $(w^{mix}_i, s^{mix}_i)$ $\forall i = 1..n$ solve (MIX).

This result indicates that when the principal knows the agent’s preferences, she always finds it profitable to contract with an agent characterized by mixed preferences.

**Corollary 1.** Under symmetric information over the agent’s preferences, and when the solution to (FIXS) exists, there exists a (suboptimal) mixed contract $(\tilde{w}^{mix}_i, \tilde{s}^{mix}_i)$ $\forall i = 1..n$ such that:

$$\Pi^{mix} > \tilde{\Pi}^{mix} \geq \Pi^{fixs}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u_i^{mix} - v^H > \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H f_i^{fixs} - v^H$$

This corollary establishes that if the principal is willing to accept an expected profit level $\Pi^{mix}$ strictly lower than $\Pi^{mix}$ (but still greater than $\Pi^{fixs}$), then there exists a mixed contract which is more profitable than the purely monetary contract, and which offers a higher expected utility. In other words, any compensation mix always improve the employer’s profits compared to a monetary contract.

Let now consider a particular case of (FIXW) in which the agent values fixed wages and output-dependent symbols, such that $u_i = u(\bar{w}, s_i)$ that is
U_i = u(\bar{w}, s_i) - v^k, i = 1..n, k = H, L, for \bar{w} \geq I_A, where I_A is the certainty equivalent of the lottery \Lambda = (p^H_1, w^fixs_1; \ldots; p^n_H, w^fixs_n), with (w^fixs_i) \forall i = 1..n solution (FIXS).

In this case, the optimal output-dependent symbol (s_i^{fixw}) \forall i = 1..n that solves FIXW is characterized by the following proposition.

**Proposition 2.** Under symmetric information over the agent’s preferences, the optimal solution of (FIXW), (\bar{w}, s_i^{fixw}) \forall i = 1..n, where s_i^{fixw} is such that:

\[
\frac{u'_s(\bar{w}, s_i^{fixw})}{c'(s_i^{fixw})} = \frac{1}{\lambda_3 + \mu_3 \left(1 - \frac{p^L_i}{p^H_i}\right)}
\]

(with \lambda_3, \mu_3, the strictly positive Lagrange multipliers of (FIXW))

The agent’s expected utility is the same in (FIXW) (fixed wage-output / depende symbol) and in (FIXS) (output-dependent wage / fixed symbol) but implies a lower risk exposure in terms of monetary reward.

Hence, the principal can rely on nonmonetary incentives to reduce monetary risk exposure. Since expected utility is the same under both types of contract, choosing the riskier contract in terms of monetary reward reveals a preference for risk. Becker et al. [6] develop a model in which a higher status raises the marginal utility of income to explain the demand for risky activities. Higher status is acquired by the winners of lotteries and other risky activities and the willingness to participate in risky activities is the result of the importance of status in the agents’ preferences. This assumption implies a complementarity between status, income and “risk-loving”. In our framework, risk-averse agents (regarding the monetary transfer) prefer the variable part of rewards to bear on symbols. However, potentially higher symbols (conditional on output) are associated with lower risk in terms of monetary wage in contract (FIXW), which is preferred by risk-averse agents. Our assumption of a general utility function implies that the links between symbol, wage and risk are more complex and depend on the agent’s wage level and propensity to risk exposure.

4. Optimal contracts under asymmetric information

When the agent’s preferences are not known by the principal, h is then conditional to the observation of a random variable \theta \in \Theta. The agent’s preferences over wage and non-wage amenity is denoted by \succeq^\theta and its corresponding real symbolic equivalent writes h(\omega, \theta). Three subcases are distinguished:
(1) The principal does not know (and has no prior on) the probability distribution of $\theta$. In this case, the principal can only resort to pure monetary incentives.

(2) The principal knows the probability distribution of $\theta$. In this case, a mixed monetary/nonmonetary incentives mechanism can be designed by working on the expected self-satisfaction of a symbol $\omega$ denoted $\hat{h}(\omega) = \hat{s} = E_{\Theta}[h(\omega, \theta)]$.

(3) The principal does not know (and has no prior on) the probability distribution of $\theta$ but she knows that there exist (at least) two symbols $\omega', \omega'' \in \Omega$ such that $\omega' \succ \omega''$. In this case, the principal can design a mixed contract composed of a variable wage and a fixed nonmonetary reward $s'$ (associated to $\omega'$). Since the compensation package is composed of a monetary wage and a nonmonetary reward fixed and independent of output, the optimal contract solves program (FIXS) when the fixed symbol is no longer normalized to 0, that is when the agent’s utility is defined by $u_i = u(w_i, s')$ and the principal’s expected profit by $B_i = \max_{(w_i)_{i=1}^n} \sum_{i=1}^n p_{H_i} [x_i - w_i] - c(s')$. The corresponding program is denoted by (FIXS2) (see appendix). Since the principal uses only one symbol, then assumption 2 writes: $s' > c(s')$. The optimal compensation package is then characterized by the following proposition.

**Proposition 3.** When the principal does not know (and has no prior) the probability distribution of $\theta$ but knows that there exist (at least) two symbols $\omega', \omega'' \in \Omega$ such that $\omega' \succ \omega''$, then the optimal contract $(w_{i\text{fixs2}}^i, s') \forall i = 1..n$ solution of (FIXS2) such that:

$$u_w(w_{i\text{fixs2}}^i, s') = \frac{1}{\lambda_4 + \mu_4 \left(1 - \frac{p_{H_i}^i}{p_{T_i}^i}\right)}$$

with $\lambda_4$ and $\mu_4$ the strictly positive Lagrange multipliers, Pareto-dominates purely monetary incentives (no symbol at all), which solves (FIXS).

This proposition shows that even when the principal imperfectly knows the agent’s value system, a mixed contract can still be offered and is pareto-improving compared to the purely monetary contract: the agent obtains the same reservation utility while the principal’s profit are increased. This proposition is important since in most firms and organizations, many fringe benefits are not conditioned to the firm’s result. This is the case for instance of health insurance, nursery, or free car. Our results suggest that using a fixed fringe benefit and a variable monetary wage as an incentive device improves firms’ profits. In particular, a profitable firm’s strategy would be to target the fringe benefits policy. On the one hand, fixed non-wage amenities would be offered on the basis of weak information (only that employees
have a preference for them) and could thus be interpreted as a way to retain employees and reduce turnover (see Dale-Olsen [10]). This could be the case of health insurance for example. On the other hand, symbols with a high trophy value would be offered on the basis of strong information, employers should know what trade-off determine workers preferences between wage and non-wage rewards, and could thus be profitably linked to the firm’s results. This could be the case of status in the organization.

5. Conclusion

This paper develops a Principal-Agent model to analyze the optimal composition of the compensation policy with both monetary and nonmonetary incentives. Our results are compatible with the empirical literature concerning nonmonetary incentives.

From an economic policy perspective, taking into account the tax system might reinforce our results in the following sense. A mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme would be more interesting both for the principal and for the agent under a progressive tax system for the lower part of the income distribution subject to a traditional threshold level. Indeed, for such categories of workers, a monetary bonus may sometimes be completely suboptimal when it implies that the agent switches up to the higher income category, making her pay taxes and losing social transfers. For the principal as well, if labor taxes are progressive, a non-purely monetary incentives scheme represents a non-negligible fiscal advantage, even though we have seen that the role of cost in the optimal compensation package is not trivial.

Our static model could be extended to dynamic one in order to analyze the long term relationship between wage and symbols. For instance, a desire for a status in the future can induce workers to perform efficiently, therefore reducing the need for monetary incentives.
APPENDIX: Proofs

Proof: (FIXW) does not necessarily admit a solution.

We can solve the program (FIXW) using Kuhn and Tucker’s method because the cost function is twice continuously differentiable and $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H g(s_i)$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) g(s_i)$ are concave functions. However the solution if it exists is a local maximum. Let $L(s_1, \ldots, s_n, \lambda_1, \mu_1)$ the Lagrangean of program (FIXW) with $\lambda_1, \mu_1 \geq 0$. Kuhn and Tucker’s conditions are given as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad -p_i^H c'(s_i) + \lambda_1 p_i^H g'(s_i) + \mu_1 (p_i^H - p_i^L) g'(s_i) = 0 \\
(b) & \quad \lambda_1 \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H g(s_i) - v^H - U = 0 \\
(c) & \quad \mu_1 \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) g(s_i) - v^H + v^L = 0
\end{align*}
\]

Equation (a) also writes:

\[
\lambda_1 p_i^H + \mu_1 (p_i^H - p_i^L) = p_i^H \frac{c'(s_i)}{g'(s_i)}
\]

Hence we have:

\[
\lambda_1 = \sum_i p_i^H \frac{c'(s_i)}{g'(s_i)}
\]

Recall however that while $g'(s_i) > 0$, we have made no assumption about the monotony of cost function $c$. If this function is strictly decreasing then $\sum_i p_i^H \frac{c'(s_i)}{g'(s_i)} < 0$ and we have a contradiction with $\lambda_1 \geq 0$. Therefore if the cost function is strictly decreasing then program (FIXW) admits no solution. We have the same conclusion if $c$ is not monotone decreasing but is such that $\sum_i p_i^H \frac{c'(s_i)}{g'(s_i)} < 0$. \hfill \Box

Proof of proposition 1.

We can solve the program (MIX) using Kuhn and Tucker’s method because the cost function is a convex function and $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u(w_i, s_i)$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) u(w_i, s_i)$ are negative semidefinite functions. Moreover the solution if it exists is a global maximum. Let $L(w_1, \ldots, w_n; s_1, \ldots, s_n, \lambda_2, \mu_2)$ the Lagrangean of program (MIX) with $\lambda_2, \mu_2 \geq 0$. Kuhn and Tucker’s conditions are given as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad -p_i^H + \lambda_2 p_i^H u'_w(w_i, s_i) + \mu_2 (p_i^H - p_i^L) u'_w(w_i, s_i) = 0 \\
(b) & \quad -p_i^H c'(s(x_i)) + \lambda_2 p_i^H u'_w(w_i, s_i) + \mu_2 (p_i^H - p_i^L) u'_s(w_i, s_i) = 0 \\
(c) & \quad \lambda_2 \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u(w_i, s_i) - v^H - U = 0 \\
(d) & \quad \mu_2 \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) u(w_i, s_i) - v^H + v^L = 0
\end{align*}
\]

(a) writes also:

\[
\lambda_2 p_i^H + \mu_2 (p_i^H - p_i^L) = \frac{p_i^H}{u'_w(w_i, s_i)}
\]
Hence:
\[ \lambda_2 = \sum_i p_i^H \frac{u'_w(w_i, s_i)}{u'_w(w_i, s_i)} \]
Since \( u'_w(w_i, s_i) > 0 \) then \( \lambda_2 > 0 \) (we reach exactly the same conclusion using Kuhn and Tucker’s condition (b)). Concerning \( \mu_2 \), if \( \mu_2 = 0 \) then (a) and (b) implies respectively that:
\[ \lambda_2 = \frac{1}{u'_w(w_i, s_i)} \]
and
\[ \lambda_2 = \frac{c'(s_i)}{u'_s(w_i, s_i)} \]
\( \lambda_2 = \frac{1}{u'_w(w_i, s_i)} \) implies that (using the implicit functions theorem) \( w_i = \phi(\lambda_2, s_i) \). Therefore, \( \lambda_2 = \frac{c'(s_i)}{u'_s(w_i, s_i)} \) also writes:
\[ \lambda_2 = \frac{c'(s_i)}{u'_s[\phi(\lambda_2, s_i), s_i]} \]
Let us denote \( \frac{c'(s_i)}{u'_s[\phi(\lambda_2, s_i), s_i]} \) by \( \psi(s_i) \) then the previous equation becomes:
\[ \lambda_2 = \psi(s_i) \]
That is:
\[ s_i = \psi^{-1}(\lambda_2) \]
In other words, the agent receives the same symbol whatever the result.
In this case, the agent chooses the lowest effort level \( e^L \). Therefore, such a mechanism is not optimal. Hence we have \( \mu_2 > 0 \). The optimal mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme \((w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i)\) is then given by:
\[ \frac{u'_w(w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i)}{u'_w(w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i)} = c'(s^\text{mix}_i), \quad \forall i = 1..n. \]
\[ \Box \]

Proof of proposition 2.
Applying the same reasoning as in the proof of proposition 1, we have \( \lambda_3 > 0 \) and \( \mu_3 > 0 \). The optimal incentives scheme \((\bar{w}, s^\text{fixw}_i)\) is given by:
\[ \frac{u'_w(\bar{w}, s^\text{fixw}_i)}{c'(s^\text{fixw}_i)} = \frac{1}{\lambda_3 + \mu_3 \left( 1 - \frac{p_i^*}{p_i^H} \right)} \]
The agent is indifferent between the solution of (FIXW) and the solution of (FIXS) because in both case he gets his reservation utility. However his risk exposure w.r.t. the monetary wage is reduced since he gets the (risk-less) fixed wage \( \bar{w} \) which is, by construction, greater than \( I_{\Lambda} \) the certainty equivalent of \( \Lambda = (p_1^H, w_1^\text{fixs}; \ldots; p_n^H, w_n^\text{fixs}) \), the lottery faced by the agent in the pure monetary incentives mechanism (FIXS). \[ \Box \]
Lemma 1. Let denote by \( q \) the following random variable
\[
q = w^\text{fixs} - c(s^\text{mix}) - w^\text{mix}
\]

\( q \) denotes the difference between the optimal wage of the monetary incentives scheme \( w^\text{fixs} \) (variable wage / fixed symbol) and the overall cost of the mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme. The following two conditions are equivalent.

1. \( \Pi^\text{mix} \geq \Pi^\text{fixs} \)
2. \( E[q] \geq 0 \)

Proof of lemma 1.

\[
\Pi^\text{fixs} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H (x_i - w^\text{fixs})
\]
\[
\Pi^\text{mix} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H [x_i - c(s^\text{mix}) - w^\text{mix}]
\]

Thus:

\[
\Pi^\text{mix} \geq \Pi^\text{fixs} \iff \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H [w^\text{fixs} - c(s^\text{mix}) - w^\text{mix}] \geq 0
\]

That is:

\[ E[q] \geq 0 \]

□

Proof of theorem 1.

The proof consists in showing that \( E[q] > 0 \). Using lemma 1, this amounts to show that:

\[ \Pi^\text{mix} > \Pi^\text{fixs} \]

Let:

\[
C = \left\{ (w_i, s_i) \forall i = 1..n, \text{ such that } \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u(w_i, s_i) - v^H = U \right. \]
\[
\left. \text{ and } \sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^H - p_i^L) u(w_i, s_i) = v^H - v^L \right\}
\]

Clearly, the optimal solution \((w^\text{mix}_i, s^\text{mix}_i) \forall i = 1..n\) of program (MIX) belongs to \( C \).

Let us note that \( C \) also writes:

\[
C = \left\{ (w_i, s_i) \forall i = 1..n, \text{ such that } \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^L u(w_i, s_i) = U + v^L \right\}
\]

Now let \( w^\text{fixs}_i \forall i = 1..n \) denote the optimal solution of program (FIXS). Let determine \((\bar{w}_i, \bar{s}_i) \forall i = 1..n \in C\) such that:

\[
(5.4) \quad w^\text{fixs}_i = \bar{w}_i + \bar{s}_i, \quad i = 1..n
\]
Such a \( (\bar{w}_i, \bar{s}_i) \) \( \forall i = 1..n \) necessarily exists and by assumption 2, we have:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H \bar{s}_i > \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H c(\bar{s}_i), \quad \forall i = 1..n
\]

We finally get:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H \left( x_i - w_i^{fixs} \right) < \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H [x_i - \bar{w}_i - c(\bar{s}_i)]
\]

Let recall that \( (w_i^{mix}, s_i^{mix}) \) \( \forall i = 1..n \) the optimal solution of program (MIX) belongs to \( C \). Moreover by definition we have: \( \Pi^{mix} \geq \Pi^{fixs} \). Hence:

\[
\Pi^{mix} > \Pi^{fixs}.
\]

It remains to show that:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u(w_i^{mix}, s_i^{mix}) - v^H = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^H u(w_i^{mix}) - v^H
\]

This comes directly from the fact that the agent has the same reservation utility under (MIX) and (FIXS).

\( \Box \)

**Proof of Corollary 1.** We know that

\[
\Pi^{mix} > \Pi^{fixs}.
\]

If we take for example \( 0 < \varepsilon < \Pi^{mix} - \Pi^{fixs} \), and if we build another non-purely monetary incentive scheme with:

\[
w_i = w_i^{mix} + \varepsilon
\]

\[
s_i = s_i^{mix}, \quad \forall i = 1..n
\]

then we get our result.

\( \Box \)

**Proof of proposition 3.** Applying the same reasoning as in the proof of proposition 1, we have \( \lambda_4 > 0 \) and \( \mu_4 > 0 \). The optimal incentives scheme \((w_i^{fixs2}, s'_i)\) that solves (FIXS2) is given by:

\[
u'_w(w_i^{fixs2}, s'_i) = \frac{1}{\lambda_4 + \mu_4 \left( 1 - \frac{p_i^H}{p_i^L} \right)} \quad \forall i = 1..n
\]

Finally, using the same strategy of proof as for theorem 1, we get that the solution of (FIXS2) Pareto-dominates purely monetary incentives.

\( \Box \)
References


