Ph. D. student
Campus Jourdan – 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
Building B, ground floor, office B032
Phone +33(0)1 43 13 62 65
Family economics, income and wealth distribution, public economics
Abstract: This paper investigates the relative importance of inheritance and labor income in marital choices. In France, there is clear evidence that people are sensitive to the source of wealth: heirs marry heiresses and top income men marry top income women. However, there are asymmetries in tastes. Assortative mating is higher along the inheritance dimension than along the labor income dimension. Top labor income women prefer top labor income men whereas the latter are indifferent between top heiresses and top labor income women. I discuss three explanations: the role of areas of socialization, marital instability, and the symbolic power of inheritance. These new results are crucial to deeply understand the dynamics of inequalities and more especially the consequence of the long-run evolution of inheritance as a fraction of aggregate wealth.
Abstract : Do couples share the same values? The social sciences have mainly concentrated on comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of spouses, but rarely their preferences to risk and time. In this paper, we use conventional measurements and an original method. We find that spouses are very similar in their savings preferences, even when we control for the individual characteristics. These conclusions are decisive in explaining wealth inequalities between households, since homogamy causes a divide in the population. However, if the correlation between preferences and wealth is clear when measured at the household level, spouses with opposite attitudes tend to be richer for some parameters.
Abstract: We study the evolution of the choice to get married and to opt for a marriage contract between 1992 and 2010. We show that the default property contract, that states a community of goods acquired during the marriage, is not the most common form of life arrangement among recent couples. This is explained by the decrease of marriage rates and the increase of couples choosing to separate their asset through a marital contract. First, we test if this evolution is explained by a different behaviour of couples, due to the increase of the risk of divorce. Second, we test if this evolution is explained by a change in the characteristics of couples : wealth, inequalities between spouses, experience of divorce. Third, in order to determine if the recent evolution is mostly explained by a change in behaviour or a change in characteristics, we use the Oaxaca Blinder method to decompose the evolution. On the one hand, we show that the decrease of marriage rate is explained by a change in behaviour rather than a change in characteristics. On the other hand, the evolution of the choice to opt for a contract of separation of assets is jointly due to a change in characteristics and in behaviour. Especially, inequalities in wealth explain a large part of the increase in marriage contracts.
2010 - 2012 : Macroeconomics, undergraduate Paris 1 (website)