7-9th September : 4th Transatlantic Theory Workshop

Organizers

Scientific Committee

  • Francis Bloch, Ecole Polytechnique
  • Gabriel Desgranges, Université de Cergy
  • Françoise Forges, Université Paris Dauphine
  • Olivier Gossner, CNRS Paris School of Economics
  • Nicolas Vieille, HEC Paris


If you wish to attend the workshop, registration is free, but compulsory.
Please email Isabelle Lelièvre : isabelle.lelievre enpc.fr


Venue


Paris School of Economics
48 Boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France


Conference Program


September 7th
9:00-9:30 Welcome, coffee, and registration
9:30-10:20 Eran Shmaya, Northwestern University. Testing Exchangeable Theories
10:20-10:50 Coffee break
10:50-11:40 Edoardo Gallo, Oxford University Social learning by chit-chat
11:40-12:30 Eduardo Perez, Ecole Polytechnique. Complicating to Persuade
12:30-14:00 Lunch
14:00-14:50 Ron Siegel, Northwestern University. Asymmetric Contests with Interdependent Valuations
14:50-15:40 David Martimort, Paris School of Economics. Public contracting in delegated agency games
15:40-16:10 Coffee break
16:10-17:00 Marion Oury, Université Cergy-Pontoise. Continuous implementation in finite environments
17:00-17:50 Ronen Gradwohl, Northwestern University. Privacy-Protecting Implementation
September 8th
9:00-9:30 Coffee
9:30-10:20 David Ettinger, Université Paris Dauphine. Hiding information in open auctions through jump bids
10:20-10:50 Coffee break
10:50-11:40 Ingela Alger, Toulouse School of Economics, The evolutionary stability of social preferences
11:40-12:30 Itai Arieli, Oxford University, Fast convergence in population game
12:30-14:00 Lunch
14:00-14:50 Nicolas Vieille, HEC Paris. Recursive methods in stochastic games
14:50-15:40 Luciano De Castro, Northwestern University. A New Approach to Existence and Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information
15:40-16:10 Coffee break
16:10-17:00 Wioletta Dziuda, Northwestern University. Communication with Detectable Deceit
17:00-17:50 Manuel Mueller-Frank, Oxford University. The Robustness of Consensus in Network-Based Non-Bayesian Learning Models
September 9th
9:00-9:30 Coffee
9:30-10:20 Guy Mayraz, Oxford University. Priors and Desires - A Model of Payoff-Dependent beliefs
10:20-10:50 Coffee Break
10:50-11:40 Margaret Meyer, Oxford University. Reputational Incentives for Biased Evaluators
11:40-12:30 Gabrielle Demange, Paris School of Economics. Collective attention and ranking methods
12:30-14:00 Lunch
14:00-14:50 Francis Bloch, Ecole Polytechnique. Learning, preemption and cooperation in R & D race
14:50-15:40 Gabriel Kreindler, Oxford University. Noisy Learning Dynamics
15:40-16:10 Coffee Break
16:10-17:00 Andrew Mell, Ofxord University. Re-Thinking Reputation
17:00-17:50 Olivier Compte, Paris School of Economics. Plausible theories of behavior