Workshop on Information Transmission and Persuasion in Games

December 16-17, 2010
Paris School of Economics
48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Site du workshop: http://sites.google.com/site/workshopsit2010/

Thursday, December 16

09:30 - 10:30: Françoise Forges (University of Paris Dauphine): Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory
11:00 - 11:45: Lucie Menager (University of Lille 1, LEM and EQUIPPE): Strategic communication with exponential bandits
11:45 - 12:30: Nicolas Vieille (HEC Paris): Dynamic sender-receiver games
14:00 - 14:45: Elisabeth Schulte (University of Mannheim): Informativeness of testing procedures with endogenous participation: The binary case
14:45 - 15:30: Navin Kartik (Colombia University): Pandering to persuade
16:00 - 16:45: David Martimort (PSE): How much discretion for risk regulation?
16:45 - 17:30: Jérôme Mathis (TSE and University of Paris 8): Deliberation with hard information

Friday, December 17

09:30 - 10:30: Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego): Giving and receiving advice
11:00 - 11:45: Sidartha Gordon (University of Montreal): Strategic advice on a timing decision
11:45 - 12:30: Regis Renault (University of Cergy-Pontoise): When does a firm disclose product information?
14:00 - 14:45: Penélope Hernandez (University of Valencia): Good Nash codes
14:45 - 15:30: Ludovic Renou (University of Leicester): Secure transmission of messages on directed networks
16:00 - 16:45: Ricardo Alonso (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California): Indispensable experts
16:45 - 17:30: Wolf Gick (Georgia Institute of Technology and Harvard University): Cheap talk equilibria with two senders in one dimension

Organizer:

Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics
CNRS Secretary: Isabelle Lelievre, Paris School of Economics, Phone +33(0)1 43 13 63 83. Email: lelievre pse.ens.fr
Sponsors: ADRES, CEPREMAP, Paris School of Economics, Région Île-de-
France
Inscription is free but to help us plan the event please indicate your attendance at lelievre pse.ens.fr