New collection - n°1 ETA Chair Memo
Synthesis
This paper studies firms’ incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent.
In his evaluation of firms’ offers for a public contract, the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. It is only when the agent’s discretion is strong and the market’s profitability is small that a low quality firm may prefer not to commit. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms’ beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that need not be large) allows to completely eliminate corruption.
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Diary
Tuesday 18 June 2013
Atelier "Methods of economics dynamics’
Salle S18(12h00-13h00)
Baris Vardar : Imperfect Energy Substitution and Optimal Switching to Clean Technologies
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment F, 1er étage, salle de Réunions (12h30-13h30)
Julia CAGE (PSE & Havard University) : Trash Media: How Competition Affects Information
Thursday 20 June 2013
D&G - Development and Globalisation - PhD Workshop
MSE-Paris 1, 6th floor(11h00-12h30)
Maria KUECKEN (Paris 1) : Does malaria control impact education? A study of the Global Fund in Africa.
Econometrics & Microeconomic Applications
Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle S18(12h00-13h30)
Steffen ANDERSEN (Copenhagen Business School) : Fire Sales and House Prices: Evidence from Estate Sales due to Sudden Death (with Kasper Meisner Nielsen)
Macro Workshop
15h00-16h00
Basile Grassi, Paris 1 : Firm Dynamics and the Granular Hypothesis (joint with Vasco Carvalho (CREI-UPF))
Paris Environmental and Energy Economics
45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (salle des thèses, bâtiment Jacob, 5ème étage)(16h30-18h00)
Robert Tol (University of Sussex) : Targets for global climate policy: An overview
Friday 21 June 2013
Casual Friday Development Seminar
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h30-13h30)
Ricardo ESTRADA (PSE) : *
Monday 24 June 2013
Workshop CEPII-PSE 2013, 24th June 2013
Workshop CEPII-PSE 2013, 24th June 2013 :
24 et 25 juin: Third INEXC Conference, Paris
From 24 to 25 June(10h00-18h00)
24 et 25 juin: Third INEXC Conference, Paris :
Friday 28 June 2013
IMF-PSE Advances in Numerical Methods for Economics
IMF-PSE Advances in Numerical Methods for Economics :
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