Within the Paris Scool of Economics, the Economic Theory Group covers many areas of economic theory, with a special focus on auction theory, market and organization design, allocation mechanisms and game theory. We also pursue more foundational work, as well as work at the frontier between economics and psychology.

Our primary aim is academic research and teaching. However, we also promote long-term interactions with firms and organizations, with three different aims:
- accompanying change by providing guidance based on strong theoretical background;
- opening prospects for students;
- developing new research agenda.

For further information, please contact Olivier Compte

ETG Members

This group puts together ten seniors, two post-doc and 3 PhD students :

• Bernard Caillaud, Olivier Compte, Olivier Gossner, Philippe Jehiel, Frédéric Koessler, Laurent Lamy, Ariane Lambert Mogiliansky, David Martimort and Olivier Tercieux;
• Christoph March and Christina Pawlowitsch (recruted in 2010) ;
• Jean-Edouard Colliard, Alexandre Cornière, Romain DeNijs.

Main publications in 2009/2010

> Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective, Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel Journal of Political Economy 2010
> The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution, Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel, Econometrica 2010
> Ability and knowledge, Olivier Gossner, Games and Economic Behavior 69: 95-105, 2010
> Information independence and common knowledge, Olivier Gossner, Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber, Econometrica, 77: 1317–1328, 2009
> A Theory of Deception, Philippe Jehiel and David Ettinger, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2010
> Strategic Communication Networks, Frédéric Koessler et Jeanne Hagenbach, Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 77(3), 1072-1099
> Iterated potential and robustness, D. Oyama et Olivier Tercieux, Journal of Economic Theory 2009
> Robust equilibria under non-common priors, D. Oyama et Olivier Tercieux, Journal of Economic Theory 2009
> Selecting Equilibria in Common Agency Games, David Martimort et Lars Stole, Journal of Economic Theory, (2009), 144: 604-644.
> Market Participation under Delegated and Intrinsic Common Agency
Games, David Marimort et Lars Stole, Rand Journal of Economics,
Spring (2009), 40: 78-102.
> The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts for
Manufacturers-Retailers Hierarchies, David Martimort et Salvatore Piccolo,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, (2010), 2:204-229.
> Common Agency and Public Good Provision under Asymmetric Information, David Martimort et Humberto Moreira, Theoretical Economics, (2010), 5:159-213.
> Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information, David Martimort, Jean-Christophe Poudou et Wilfried Sand-Zantman, Journal of Industrial Economics, Abstract Published Online: 24 May 2010.

Seminars & Conferences

3 seminars ar organized or co-organized by ETG (Theory, Organization and Market-TOM, Séminaire Roy-Adres et Séminaire parisien de théorie des Jeux) and 2 new courses have been delivered by ETG members since septembre 2010 within APE and PPD programmes (respectively Industrial Organisation and Corruption Economics).
ETG has co-organized many conferences:

• “Transatlantic Theory Workshop” : in 2008 at PSE, in 2009 at the Kellog School of Management and in 2010 at Oxford.
• “Workshop on information transmission and Persuasion in Games” in december 2010 at PSE by F. Koessler.