[12-13 juillet] Workshop “Advances in Mechanism Design”

Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”

July 12–13, 2012
Paris School of Economics
48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France

Organizer : Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics – CNRS)
If you wish to attend, please send a mail to lelievre pse.ens.fr
before June 22. Please specify if you would like to attend the lunch on
July, 12 and July, 13 (subject to limitation)


Thursday, July 12
10:00 - 10:45 : Tilman Borgers (Michigan U) : “Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules”
10:45 - 11:30 : Takuro Yamashita (TSE) : “A robustly revenue maximizing auction in admissible strategies”
11:45 - 12:30 : Andy Postlewaite (U Penn) : “Matching with Incomplete Information”
14:00 - 14:45 : Onur Kesten (Carnergie Mellon U) : “From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance : Theory and Experiments on a family of assignment mechanisms”
14:45 - 15:30 : Fuhito Kojima (Stanford) : “Promoting School Competition Through School Choice : A Market Design Approach”
16:00 - 16:45 : Lucie Ménager (Paris 2) : “Communication in procurement”
16:45 - 17:30 : Laurent Lamy (PSE) : “Equilibria in two-stage sequential second-price auctions with multi-unit demands”

Friday, July 13
09:15 - 10:00 : Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore) : “Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction”
10:00 - 10:45 : Alia Gizatulina (Max Planck Institute — Bonn) : “On Designer’ Uncertainty and Robustness of the BDP Property”
11:00 - 11:45 : Guillaume Haeringer (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) : “Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences”
11:45 - 12:30 : Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern) : “On the Limits of Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design”