December 16-17, 2010
Paris School of Economics
48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Site du workshop : http://sites.google.com/site/workshopsit2010/

09:30 - 10:30 : Françoise Forges (University of Paris Dauphine) : Communication in Bayesian games : Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory
11:00 - 11:45 : Lucie Menager (University of Lille 1, LEM and EQUIPPE) : Strategic communication with exponential bandits
11:45 - 12:30 : Nicolas Vieille (HEC Paris) : Dynamic sender-receiver games
14:00 - 14:45 : Elisabeth Schulte (University of Mannheim) : Informativeness of testing procedures with endogenous participation : The binary case
14:45 - 15:30 : Navin Kartik (Colombia University) : Pandering to persuade
16:00 - 16:45 : David Martimort (PSE) : How much discretion for risk regulation ?
16:45 - 17:30 : Jérôme Mathis (TSE and University of Paris 8) : Deliberation with hard information
09:30 - 10:30 : Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego) : Giving and receiving advice
11:00 - 11:45 : Sidartha Gordon (University of Montreal) : Strategic advice on a timing decision
11:45 - 12:30 : Regis Renault (University of Cergy-Pontoise) : When does a firm disclose product information ?
14:00 - 14:45 : Penélope Hernandez (University of Valencia) : Good Nash codes
14:45 - 15:30 : Ludovic Renou (University of Leicester) : Secure transmission of messages on directed networks
16:00 - 16:45 : Ricardo Alonso (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California) : Indispensable experts
16:45 - 17:30 : Wolf Gick (Georgia Institute of Technology and Harvard University) : Cheap talk equilibria with two senders in one dimension
Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics
CNRS Secretary : Isabelle Lelievre, Paris School of Economics, Phone +33(0)1 43 13 63 83. Email : lelievre pse.ens.fr
Sponsors : ADRES, CEPREMAP, Paris School of Economics, Région Île-de-
France
Inscription is free but to help us plan the event please indicate your attendance at lelievre pse.ens.fr
vendredi 18 mai 2012
Larry Blume, Cornell University : Network Formation in the Presence of Contagious Risk
Room S17, MSE 106-112 Bd de l’Hôpital 75013 Paris
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h30-13h30)
Christian LEHMAN (PSE, Paris) : Local Economy Effects of Cash Transfers
lundi 21 mai 2012
MSE (S18), 106 Bd de l'hopital, Paris 13
Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez (Groningen University) : Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition
TEMA-IO
Chiara Tomasi (University of Trento) : Export activities under financial constraints: margins, quantities and prices
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 10 (17h00-18h30)
Bernard LEBRUN (University of York, Canada) : Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (17h30-19h00)
Jane HUMPHRIES (Oxford University) : Childhood and child labour in the British industrial revolution
mardi 22 mai 2012
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h30-13h30)
Marie-Anne VALFORT (PSE, Paris) : One Muslim is Enough! Evidence from a Field Experiment in France
Co-author(s): Claire Adida & David Laitin
Sciences-Po - 56 rue des saints Pères – 7ème (Salle Goguel) (14h30-16h00)
Gianmarco OTTAVIANO (LSE) : Agglomeration, Trade and Selection
jeudi 7 juin 2012
Du 7 au 8 juin
7-8 juin, Communication and Beliefs Manipulation :
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