Oliver Vanden Eynde
Campus Jourdan – 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
5e étage, bureau 59
Tél. 01 80 52 17 22
- Économie du développement
My research focuses on civil conflict, crime, economic development, and the role of the military and police in developing countries.
"Targets of violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict" (working paper version), Economic Journal (forthcoming)
"Military service and human capital accummulation: evidence from colonial Punjab", Journal of Human Resources (2016), Vol.51 (4).
"Trickle-down Ethnic Politics: Drunk and Absent in the Kenya Police Force (1957-1970)", joint with Patrick Kuhn and Alex Moradi (Revise and resubmit, AEJ:Economic Policy)
"Building Connections: Political Corruption and Road Construction in India", joint with Jonathan Lehne and Jacob Shapiro (Revise and resubmit, Journal of Development Economics)
Our "Ideas For India" column can be found here.
Work in Progress
“Mapping rural infrastructure development in India”, joint with Jacob Shapiro.
We collected implementation details for India's flagship rural infrastructure programmes: PMGSY (roads), RGGVY (electrification, now DDUGJY), USOF (mobile phone coverage), NRDWP (rural drinking water), and IAP (small-scale projects in Maoist affected districts). We matched hundreds of thousands of individual projects to India's more than 600,000 census villages. We will be using this data to understand the impacts of these programmes, with a particular focus on regions affected by Maoist violence.
"Connecting the Red Corridor: Infrastructure Development in Conflict Zones", joint with Jamie Hansen-Lewis, Jacob Shapiro, and Austin Wright.
A description of the data we collected is provided in an IGC Working Paper, and our descriptive analysis is summarized in an IGC Policy Brief.
“Political change, economic growth, and Crime reduction in Bihar”, joint with Clement Imbert, Chinmaya Kumar, and Nishith Prakash.
Our project aims to understand the mechanisms through which Bihar was able to leave its history of poor law an order behind. While the reduction in violent crime after 2005 is clearly marked in the State level crime statistics, there has been no in-depth academic study of the mechanisms through which Bihar’s political change enabled this swift improvement. Interestingly, the drop in crime that Bihar experienced after 2005 was not evenly spread across Bihar (State Crime Records Bureau, 2012). As part of this project, we have collected a unique data set of police station level crime data (covering almost 800 police stations, at monthly frequency, between 2001 and 2013), in order to uncover sub-district level variation in crime outcomes. This data set will allow us to identify how policy interventions and political changes contributed to Bihar's remarkable crime reduction.
"Long-term effects of Gurkha Recruitment in Nepal", joint with François Libois and Juni Singh
The British colonizers were particularly impressed by the fighting skills of the so-called “Gurkha’s” during the Gorkha war (1814-1816). As a result, the East India Company started to recruit soldiers from a large region that is now part of Nepal almost 200 years ago. The Gurkha soldiers provided many regiments to the colonial Indian Army, and they were heavily relied on during the two World Wars. After 1947, both the British and the Indian army kept recruiting soldiers from Nepal until the present day. The transformational role that Gurkha soldiers played in the development of their villages is well documented by historians and sociologists, who suggest that they are instrumental in improving the educational facilities in their home communities. Our paper aims to provide the first quantitative evaluation of the hypotheses that Gurkha recruitment contributed to the development of rural Nepal.
"Economic Determinants of the Maoist Conflict in India", joint with Maitreesh Ghatak.
Our paper provides an overview of the emerging economic literature on India's Maoist conflict. India's Maoist movement is often thought to be rooted in economic deprivation. A detailed review of the emerging literature on this topic as well as descriptive evidence from a district-level data set on Maoist conflict indivate that the relationship between underdevelopment and Maoist activity cannot be explained in simple economic terms. At the state level, Maoist conflict affected states that have similar growth trends and do not score significantly lower on development measures. In a cross-section of districts, the most robust predictor of Maoist activity is forest cover. In contrast, measures of human and infrastructure development do not consistently predict the intensity and extent of Maoist violence. Taking these findings together, which are admittedly correlations as opposed to causal relationships, we argue that choosing the appropriate level of analysis is important for understanding the economic determinants of the Maoist movement.
Microeconomics, Markets and market failures : theory and public policies (PPD, M1)
Conflict and Development (PPD and APE, M2)