Séminaires

Economie et Psychologie

• Prochainement
• Archives

Prochainement

• Vendredi 24 mai 11:00-12:30

  Susan Laury (Georgia State University)
  "Will Girls be Girls? Risk Taking and Competition in Single Gender Girls' Schools"

• Jeudi 30 mai

  Ariel Rubinstein ( Tel Aviv University, Israel)
  TBA

• Vendredi 31 mai 11:00-12:30

  Jeremy Celse (LESSAC – Department of Management, Organization & Entrepreneurship - Burgundy School of Business)
  "Altruistic behaviour depends on what we think others expect: how expectations shape pro-social behaviour"

  Abstract

  Expectations play a crucial role in human interactions and they can be used as a guidance in decision-making. Although recent papers highlight the importance of expectations in decision-making, we still lack direct evidences of how expectations are integrated into an agent’s decision process. In this paper, we examine the role of expectations in altruistic choices in a Dictator Game in which Dictators have limited information about the receiver’s actual expectation. Our hypothesis is that the willingness to conform to others’ expectations can be one motive behind altruistic behaviour even in anonymous and non-repeated interactions. We compared two experimental conditions in order to test whether potential expectations could enter the decision-making process of dictators, and how these expectations affected their decisions. Our results show that the majority of dictators are sensitive to receivers' expectations, even when these expectations are only potential. We also observe that this tendency to fulfil others' expectations is connected to receivers' expectations and not to any sensitivity to numbers. In addition, we find that the willingness to conform to others’ expectations is not blind but it depends on the expected amount. The implications of expectations for theories of social preferences are discussed

• Vendredi 7 juin 11:00-12:30

  Heinrich H. Nax (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE))
  "Learning in a Black Box" (with Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew , Stuart A. West , and H. Peyton Young)

  Abstract

  Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and complex that individual players are in the dark about what others are doing and howtheir own payoffs are affected. This paper analyzes learning behavior in such `black box' environments, where players' only source of information is their own history of actions taken and payoffs received. Specifically we study repeated public goods games, where players must decide how much to contribute at each stage, but they do not know how much others have contributed or how others' contributions affect their own payoffs. We identify two key features of the players' learning dynamics. First, if a player's realized payoff increases he is less inclined to change his strategy, whereas if his realized payoff decreases he is more inclined to change his strategy. Second, if increasing his own contribution results in higher payoffs he will tend to increase his contribution still further, whereas the reverse holds if an increase in contribution leads to lower payoffs. These two effects are clearly present when players have no information about the game; moreover they are still present even when players have full information. Convergence to Nash equilibrium occurs at about the same rate in both situations.

• Vendredi 14 juin 11:00-12:30

  Muriel Niederle (Stanford University)
  TBA

• Vendredi 27 septembre 11:00-12:30

  Han Bleichrodt (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
  TBA

Archives

• Vendredi 17 mai 11:00-12:30

  Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham)
  "Do emotional carryovers carryover?" (with Tim Lloyd and Nikhil Masters.)

  Abstract

  Incidental emotions arise from situational sources that are unrelated to a decision at hand but, nevertheless, “carryover” and have an impact on that decision. This paper reports an experiment in which we examined, between subjects, the impact of three different emotion induction tasks (neutral, targeted fear and naturalistic risk) on subsequent valuations of risky and ambiguous lotteries. A central research question was whether the known effects of targeted stimuli can be observed for more naturalistic stimuli that may have a broader spectrum but lower amplitude. Carryover effects were found to be stronger using the more naturalistic stimulus and for ambiguous as compared to risky lotteries. There were clear gender differences with only males showing consistent carry over effects.

• Vendredi 26 avril 11:00-12:30

  Jean-Francois Laslier (Ecole Polytechnique, Paris)
  "Utilitarian voting: theory and practice"

• Vendredi 12 avril 11:00-12:30

  Jean-Louis Rullière (GATE-Lyon)
  "Rank Order Tournament with Relative Prizes: Theoretical and Experimental Evidence." (with Lata GANGADHARAN and Giancarlo MUSTO)

• Vendredi 5 avril 11:00-12:30

  James Andreoni (University of California, San Diego)
  "Uncertainty Equivalents: Linear Tests of the Independence Axiom." with Charles Sprenger

• Vendredi 29 mars 11:00-12:30

  David Masclet (CNRS, University Renne 2)
  "The Role of Information in Deterring Discrimination: A New Experimental Evidence of Statistical Discrimination" (with E. Peterle and S. Larribeau)

• Vendredi 22 mars 11:00-12:30

  Serge Pajak (Université Paris Sud)
  "Do Recruiters ‘Like’ it? Privacy and Social Network Profile in Hiring: A Randomized Experiment" (with Matthieu Manant and Nicolas Soulié)

• Vendredi 15 février 11:00-12:30

  Pedro Bordalo (University of London)
  "Salience and Consumer Whoice" (with N. Gennaioli and A. Schleifer)

• Vendredi 8 février 11:00-12:30

  Luis Santos Pinto (HEC Lausanne)
  "Entry into Entrepreneurship: Risk Loving, Optimism or Overweighting of Small Probabilities?"

• Vendredi 25 janvier 11:00-12:30

  Botond Közegi (University of California, Berkeley)
  "Reference-dependence preferences"

• Lundi 21 janvier 17:00-18:30

  Ecole Normale Supérieure (joint with the Roy seminar)

  Botond Koszegi (University of California Berkeley)
  TBA

• Lundi 7 janvier 17:00-18:30

  École normale supérieure (joint with the Roy seminar)

  Aurélien Baillon (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
  Prudence (and more) with respect to Uncertainty and Ambiguity

  Abstract

  Several studies have recognized the importance of risk prudence, for instance for analyzing precautionary savings behavior. Under expected utility, it is equivalent to the third derivative of utility being positive. Eeckhoudt and Schlessinger (2006) proposed behavioral definitions of this concept and extended it by defining risk apportionment of order n, determining the sign of the nth derivatives of utility. This paper proposes similar definitions for prudence with respect to uncertainty (when probabilities are unknown) but also for uncertainty apportionment of order n. Moreover, these concepts are extended to ambiguity, i.e. the difference between uncertainty and risk. Implications for several models are derived. For instance, it is shown that ambiguity prudence determines the sign of the third derivatives of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji's (2005) smooth ambiguity attitude function. Moreover, Hansen and Sargent's (2001) multiplier preferences imply ambiguity prudence (and even ambiguity apportionment of order n for all n). The relationship between uncertainty and ambiguity prudence and savings behavior is analyzed in some simple savings models.

• Vendredi 30 novembre 2012 11:00-12:30

  Ido Erev (Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management)

• Vendredi 9 novembre 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, room 114

  Karim Sadrieh (University of Magdeburg)
  Detrimental Effects of Uniform Wages and Collective Action in Reciprocal Labor Relations

  Abstract

  We study the effect of uniform wages and collective action on the performance of laboratory firms with an employer and twelve employees. In our gift exchange setting, the employer first offers a fixed uniform wage and then the employees choose effort levels. We replicate the finding that uniform wages lead to a downward spiral of decreasing average effort levels, wages, and firm output, all falling significantly below the corresponding values in firms with individually differentiated wages. We investigate whether the introduction of collective action structures that are commonly found in unionized labor can stop or reverse the downward spiral of wage and effort choices, thus, improving the efficiency of the firm. Neither the possibility to coordinate effort choices via non-binding communication, nor the option to strike leads to an enhanced firm performance with higher effort and wage choices. Enabling the employer to terminate a selected labor relationship after each period of financial distress leads to wage and effort choices that are on average indistinguishable from the corresponding values in firms with differentiated wages. But, the performance of the firms with uniform wages and a termination possibility remains significantly below the performance of the firms with differentiated wages.

• Vendredi 26 octobre 2012 11:00-12:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, room B.2.2

  (University of Amsterdam) Theo Offerman
  Endogenizing punishments in social dilemmas - Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability

  Abstract

  It has convincingly been shown that punishments provide an effective way to encourage cooperation in social dilemmas. In practice, the possibility to punish may not automatically exist, or the extent to which free riders can be punished may be limited by property rights. In this paper, we endogenize punishments in social dilemmas. In particular, we consider the possibility that cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma is fostered by people's voluntarily enhancement of their own vulnerability. By enhancing the own vulnerability, a player increases the effectiveness of a possible punishment by the other player. Thus, players have a means to signal their intention to (conditionally) cooperate. Provided that the other player punishes opportunistic behavior with sufficiently high probability, players' signals may become credible. We investigate this possibility in a harsh environment where initial attempts at cooperation quickly unravel if no punishments are allowed. We consider two versions of the mechanism. In the "Gradual " mechanism, players may start small and may condition their incremental enhancements of their own vulnerability on the extent to which the other player enhances the own vulnerability. In the "Leap" mechanism, they simultaneously submit one (final) vulnerability level. Theoretically, we show that both mechanisms allow for multiple equilibria; both mutual defection and mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium when one of the two mechanisms is employed. In an experiment, we show that after some time subjects start to voluntarily enhance their own vulnerability. This process provides a substantial boost to the extent in which mutual cooperation is observed. Although the Gradual mechanism outperforms the Leap mechanism in some aspects (for instance, the outcome where one player cooperates and the other defects is observed less often), even the Leap mechanism raises the contribution level substantially compared to the control where no punishments are possible.

• Vendredi 15 juin 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Charles Sprenger (Stanford University)
  Uncertainty Equivalents: Testing the Limits of the Independence Axiom

  Abstract

  There is convincing experimental evidence that Expected Utility fails, but when does it fail, how severely, and for what fraction of subjects? We explore these questions using a novel measure we call the uncertainty equivalent. We find Expected Utility performs well away from certainty, but fails primarily near certainty for about 50% of subjects. Among non-Expected Utility theories, the majority of the violations are in contrast to familiar formulations of Cumulative Prospect Theory. A further surprise is that nearly 40% of subjects indirectly violate first order stochastic dominance, preferring certainty of a low outcome to a near-certain, dominant gamble. Interestingly, these dominance violations have predictive power in standard experimental techniques eliciting prospect theory shapes.

• Vendredi 8 juin 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Toni Schmader (University of British Columbia)
  Stereotype Threat: How Performance is Impaired by Being Negatively Stereotyped

  Abstract

  Members of certain segments of society consistently underperform on intellectual tests. These differences have been widely documented and lead to heated discussion about their cause. Social psychological evidence suggests that performance situations themselves can activate a temporary state called stereotype threat that can undermine performance and contribute to these apparent differences in ability between people of different groups. Stereotype threat has been one of the most highly studied social psychological phenomenon of the last decade, yet until recently, little was understood about the mechanisms by which performance is impaired in contexts where negative stereotypes are made salient. In this talk, I'll describe the research we have carryied out to understand the interplay of cognitive, affective, and motivational processes that underlie how negative stereotypes impair performance particularly as it relates to women's experience in science and math. I'll present evidence that subtle reminders of being stereotyped cue an uncertain connection to the domain that elicits meta-cognitive interpretation of one's experience. These off-task thoughts hijack working memory resources and engage mind-wandering, accounting for performance impairments due to threat. Efforts to retrain stereotyped associations and provide a positive reappraisal of one's experience can alleviate these effects. Implications for gender and racial equality as well as applications to other types of decision making will be discussed.

• Vendredi 25 mai 2012 12:00-13:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Daniel Zizzo (University of East Anglia)
  Complexity and Smart Nudges with Inattentive Consumers

  Abstract

  In an experiment on markets for services, we find that consumers are likely to stick to defaults and make suboptimal choices. We unpack two key psychological reasons why they do this - complexity (in terms of non-linearity, number and bundling of tariffs) and consumer inattention -. The complexity induced by non-linearity and number of tariffs has an important role, but one overstated if the explanatory power of inattention is neglected. We show that a ‘smart nudge’ policy of automatically switching default tariffs can be used to exploit inattention-based consumer inertia to achieve better consumer outcomes.

• Vendredi 25 mai 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Jordi Brandts (Barcelona School of Economics)
  How communication affects contract design: An experimental study of formal and informal contracting

  Abstract

  We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency of using flexible and rigid contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher quality levels. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are more frequent and productive. The first result generalizes previous theory and evidence to noncompetitive environments. The second result shows that communication can remove the cost of flexibility. We offer a theoretical explanation based on social norms.

• Vendredi 11 mai 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Steffen Andersen (Copenhagen Business School)
  Canceled

• Vendredi 30 mars 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S.114

  Arno Riedl (Maastricht University)

  Abstract

  Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people are able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to choose their interaction neighborhood. We conduct experiments with medium sized and large groups and show that neighborhood choice indeed leads to coordination on the fully efficient equilibrium, irrespective if group size. This leads to substantial welfare effects. Achieved welfare is between 40 and 60 percent higher in games with neighborhood choice than without neighborhood choice. We identify exclusion as the simple but very effective mechanism underlying this result. In early rounds, high performers exclude low performers who in consequence ‘learn’ to become high performers.

• Vendredi 16 mars 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Giuseppe Attanasi (TSE)
  Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game

  Abstract

  We adopt a psychological games perspective to analyze behavior and beliefs in a Trust Game experiment. Subjects are randomly assigned to the role of truster, A player, and trustee, B player. Assuming that B subjects may be affected by guilt aversion and reciprocity, we try to elicit their belief dependent motivations with a set of hypothetical questions. We design the experiment so that subjects have no incentives to manipulate and we check that answers are reliable. We have two main treatments. In the No-Transmission (control) treatment, B's (belief dependent) preferences cannot be common knowledge, hence the game has incomplete information. In the Transmission treatment, B's answers to the hypothetical questions are transmitted and made common knowledge between the two matched subjects. In so far as such answers reveal the ìpsychological typeîof B, this treatment approximates a psychological game with complete information. In this case, assuming that players coordinate their expectations on the efficient equilibrium, we should observe trust/cooperation when the revealed type of B is guilt averse (or reciprocal) and no-trust/defection when he is selfish. We also provide qualitative predictions for the incomplete information case, based on a simplified Bayesian psychological game. The main insight is that average behavior is intermediate. We analyze the set of answers of each B subject with a grid estimation al- gorithm. Most B subjects are not selfish and we observe a dominance of guilt aversion over reciprocity. Coherently with our theoretical insights, our experi- mental results show that in the Transmission treatment inducing a psychological game with (approximately) complete information behavior is more extreme: in the subpopulation of matched pairs where B is highly guilt averse there is more trust and cooperation than in the corresponding incomplete information setting without transmission; whereas in the subpopulation of matched pairs where B has low guilt aversion there is less trust and cooperation than in the correspond- ing incomplete information setting. In both information settings, we find that the B subjects'cooperation rate is positively related to guilt aversion.

• Vendredi 2 mars 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Hans-Theo Normann (University of Duesseldorf)
  Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis

  Abstract

  In game theory, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent ingredients of best-response behavior. However, beliefs and preferences themselves are likely to interact and this has important implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows to separate different interaction channels. We find that the frequently observed correlation between first- and second-mover behavior primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a more conventional direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.

• Vendredi 3 février 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Kyle Hyndman (Maastricht University)
  Procrastination, Self-Imposed Deadlines and Other Commitment Devices: Theory and Experiment

  Abstract

  In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision maker optimally waits to exert eff-ort until costs are less than a given threshold, the solution to an optimal stopping time problem. We derive the solution to this model for three cases: (1) time consistent decision makers, (2) naï-ve hyperbolic discounters and (3) sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters behave as if they were time consistent but instead have a smaller reward for completing the task. Moreover, they will often self-impose a deadline to ensure early completion of the task. Other forms of commitment are also discussed. We then report the results of an experiment designed to study procrastination and the role of deadlines. Unlike previous experimental results on deadlines, we show that deadlines do not lead to improved performance, though those subjects who do self-impose deadlines on themselves also report themselves as being less conscientious than those who do not self-impose deadlines. Beyond procrastination, our results indicate that over-con-fidence and unanticipated cost shocks played an important role in the low completion rates.

• Vendredi 27 janvier 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/114

  Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham)
  Preference imprecision - what is it good for?

  Abstract

• Vendredi 20 janvier 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Olivier Armantier (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, CIRANO, and CIREQ)
  Framing of Incentives and Effort Provision

  Abstract

  The object of this paper is to better understand how effort provision is af- fected when workers face economically equivalent employment contracts framed as a combination of bonuses and penalties. Using a simple prospect theory model, we show that the link between incentive framing and effort provision is ambiguous: small penalties yield higher effort (because of loss aversion), but large penalties may decrease effort (because of diminishing sensitivity). To test the model's predictions, we conduct a framed field experiment in which economically equivalent incentives contracts are framed as menus of either i) bonuses, ii) penalties, and iii) bonuses and penalties. Consistent with our model, we find that performance and effort are highest when bonuses and penalties are combined. These results suggest that both loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity can have explanatory power for labor decisions.

• Vendredi 13 janvier 2012 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3

  Graham Loomes (University of Warwick)
  Which Way to Model the Stochastic Nature of Decision Making Under Risk

• Vendredi 16 décembre 2011 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, B.2.2

  Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham)
  Preference imprecision - what is it good for?

  Abstract

• Vendredi 9 décembre 2011 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/19

  Andreas Ortmann (Australian School of Business)
  Group Incentives or Individual Incentives? A Real-Effort Weak-Link Experiment

  Abstract

  Motivated by previous research on coordination problems and incentive design in organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new experimental test-bed: a real-effort task embedding a weak-link lab coordination game technology. Comparing group incentives and individual incentives, we find that the observed dynamics of both individual errors and worst performances within firms are largely indistinguishable, suggesting that firm-based incentives are as effective as individual-based incentives in the present context. Simulations suggest that, in our test-bed, production costs are lower and profits are higher under group incentives. We find that more than 80 percent of our laboratory firms, notwithstanding initially widespread inefficiency, were eventually able to achieve and sustain efficient coordination, despite the presence of extremely unforgiving payoff structure. This result stands in stark contrast to standard results in the coordination game literature and provides an interesting challenge to test-beds currently used.

• Vendredi 2 décembre 2011 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, B.2.2

  Bo Sanitioso (Paris Descartes University)
  Motivated self-perception: Mechanisms and impact on social interaction and on general information processing

  Abstract

  People often process information and behave in ways that allow them to attain or maintain a positive perception of themselves. I will first present studies showing that the motivation to maintain a positive self influences what and how people recall past behaviors (leading to momentary self changes), followed in the second part by studies showing the impact of motivated self on social interactions (e.g., attention to social feedback) and on general information processing (e.g., whether people process information in a rational or an intuitive manner).

• Vendredi 4 novembre 2011 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/18

  Mattia Nardotto (Telecom - Paris Tech)
  Nudging with information: a randomized field experiment on reminders and feedback

  Abstract

  Can people be helped to stick to their plans with a little help from information? We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of reminders and feedback on investment activities involving up-front costs and delayed benefits, such as education and healthy behavior. By means of a randomized field experiment, we show that simple weekly reminders induce users of a gym to substantially increase their levels of physical exercise. We show that limited attention helps explain our results, and we find evidence of mental accounting in users' response to the stimulus of reminders. These results show that virtuous behavior, such as following a healthy life style, can be promoted without the need for monetary incentives: providing incentives through information is both effective and cheap.

• Vendredi 21 octobre 2011 11:00-12:00

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/18

  Pavlo Blavatsky (University of Innsbruck)
  Which decision theory?

  Abstract

  A new laboratory experiment is designed to identify the best theories for describing decisions under risk. The experimental design has two noteworthy features: a representative sample of binary choice problems (for fair comparison across theories) and a lottery set with a small number of outcomes and probabilities (for ease of non-parametric estimation). We find that a simple heuristic, rank-dependent utility and expected utility theory provide the best goodness of fit. Each theory can account for about a quarter of individual choice patterns. Most of choice patterns best rationalized by expected utility theory can be equally well described by Yaari's dual model. Some of choice patterns best rationalized by rank-dependent utility can be equally well described by modified mean-variance approach.

• Vendredi 1er juillet 2011

  Tomaso Regianni (University of Bologna)

  Abstract

  Tomaso Regianni (University of Bologna)

• Vendredi 24 juin 2011

  Charles NOUSSAIR (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  Abstract

  Charles NOUSSAIR (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

• Vendredi 17 juin 2011

  Georg Oechsler (Heidelberg University)

  Abstract

  Georg Oechsler (Heidelberg University)

• Vendredi 10 juin 2011 11:00-13:00

  10 juin 2011 - Juergen Bracht

  Abstract

  10 juin 2011 - Juergen Bracht

• Vendredi 27 mai 2011

  Katrin SCHMELZ (IMPRS, MPI of Economics, Jena, Germany)

  Abstract

  Katrin SCHMELZ (IMPRS, MPI of Economics, Jena, Germany)

• Vendredi 6 mai 2011

  Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University)

  Abstract

  Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University)

• Vendredi 29 avril 2011

  Guy MAYRAZ (Nuffield College, Oxford)

  Abstract

  Guy MAYRAZ (Nuffield College, Oxford)

• Vendredi 8 avril 2011

  Jason LUSK (Oklahoma State University, Stillwater)

  Abstract

  Jason LUSK (Oklahoma State University, Stillwater)

• Vendredi 1er avril 2011

  Ulrich SCHMIDT (Leibniz Universität, Hannover)

  Abstract

  Ulrich SCHMIDT (Leibniz Universität, Hannover)

• Vendredi 25 mars 2011

  Aldo RUSTICHINI (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis)

  Abstract

  Aldo RUSTICHINI (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis)

• Vendredi 18 mars 2011

  Benedetto DE MARTINO (University College of London)

  Abstract

  Benedetto DE MARTINO (University College of London)

• Vendredi 11 mars 2011

  Gani Aldashev - University of Namur (Belgium), and European Development Network (EUDN)

  Abstract

  Gani Aldashev - University of Namur (Belgium), and European Development Network (EUDN)

• Vendredi 4 mars 2011

  Andrea Isoni (University Warwick, UK)

  Abstract

  Andrea Isoni (University Warwick, UK)

• Vendredi 4 février 2011

  Ganna Pogrebna (University of Warwick, Coventry)

  Abstract

  Ganna Pogrebna (University of Warwick, Coventry)

• Vendredi 21 janvier 2011

  Johannes Abeler (Univ. Nottingham)

  Abstract

  Johannes Abeler (Univ. Nottingham)

• Vendredi 14 janvier 2011

  Michael Ziegelmeyer (Mannheim University)

  Abstract

  Michael Ziegelmeyer (Mannheim University)

• Jeudi 6 janvier 2011

  Han Bleichrodt (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)

  Abstract

  Han Bleichrodt (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)

• Vendredi 26 novembre 2010

  Imran Rasul (LSE)

  Abstract

  Imran Rasul (LSE)

• Vendredi 19 novembre 2010

  Peter Wakker (Erasmus University, Rotterdam/Warwick)

  Abstract

  Peter Wakker (Erasmus University, Rotterdam/Warwick)

• Vendredi 12 novembre 2010

  Chris Boyce (PSE)

  Abstract

  Chris Boyce (PSE)

• Vendredi 5 novembre 2010

  Hector Calvo (University of Southampton)

  Abstract

  Hector Calvo (University of Southampton)

• Vendredi 29 octobre 2010

  Pavlo Blavatsky (University of Innsbruck)

  Abstract

  Pavlo Blavatsky (University of Innsbruck)

• Vendredi 15 octobre 2010

  Katsunori Yamada (Osaka University)

  Abstract

  Katsunori Yamada (Osaka University)

• Vendredi 8 octobre 2010

  Aurélien Baillon (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)

  Abstract

  Aurélien Baillon (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)

• Vendredi 1er octobre 2010

  Luca Corazzini (Univ. Bocconi, Milan)

  Abstract

  Luca Corazzini (Univ. Bocconi, Milan)

• Vendredi 17 septembre 2010

  Ferdinand Vieider (Ludwig-Maximilians University, Germany)

  Abstract

  Ferdinand Vieider (Ludwig-Maximilians University, Germany)

• Vendredi 2 juillet 2010

  Guillaume Frechette (NYU)

  Abstract

  Guillaume Frechette (NYU) _ MSE

• Vendredi 25 juin 2010

  Bob Willis (University of Michigan)

  Abstract

  Bob Willis (University of Michigan) _ MSE

• Vendredi 11 juin 2010

  Michael MacBride (University of California, Irvine)

  Abstract

  Michael MacBride (University of California, Irvine) _ MSE

• Vendredi 28 mai 2010

  Luc Arrondel et André Masson (PSE)

  Abstract

  Luc Arrondel et André Masson (PSE) _ MSE

• Vendredi 14 mai 2010

  Thomas Dohnen (IZA)

  Abstract

  Thomas Dohnen (IZA) _ MSE

• Vendredi 7 mai 2010

  Frederic Koessler (PSE)

  Abstract

  Frederic Koessler (PSE) _ MSE

• Vendredi 16 avril 2010

  Jeremy Celse (U. Montpellier)

  Abstract

  Jeremy Celse (U. Montpellier) _ MSE

• Vendredi 2 avril 2010

  Timothy Cason (Purdue University)

  Abstract

  Timothy Cason (Purdue University) _ MSE

• Vendredi 26 mars 2010

  Andrew Caplin (New York University)

  Abstract

  Andrew Caplin (New York University) _ MSE

• Vendredi 19 mars 2010

  Mathias Pessiglione (MBB, CRICM, INSERM, UPMC, Hopital Pitié-Salpêtrière)

  Abstract

  Mathias Pessiglione (MBB, CRICM, INSERM, UPMC, Hopital Pitié-Salpêtrière) _ MSE

• Vendredi 12 mars 2010

  Fabrice Etile (PSE)

  Abstract

  Fabrice Etile (PSE) _ MSE

• Jeudi 18 février 2010

  Uri Gneezy

  Abstract

  Uri Gneezy _ ENS Ulm

• Vendredi 12 février 2010

  Claudia Senik (PSE)

  Abstract

  Claudia Senik (PSE) _ Jourdan

• Vendredi 5 février 2010

  Olivier Gossner (PSE)

  Abstract

  Olivier Gossner (PSE) _ Jourdan

• Vendredi 29 janvier 2010

  Nagore Iriberri (Univ. Pompeu Fabra)

  Abstract

  Nagore Iriberri (Univ. Pompeu Fabra) _ Jourdan

• Vendredi 22 janvier 2010

  Sabrina Teyssier (INRA, ALISS)

  Abstract

  Sabrina Teyssier (INRA, ALISS) _ Jourdan

• Vendredi 15 janvier 2010

  Raphael Godefroy (PSE)

  Abstract

  Raphael Godefroy (PSE) _ Jourdan

• Vendredi 8 janvier 2010

  Ori Heffetz (Cornell University)

  Abstract

  Ori Heffetz (Cornell University) _ Jourdan

• Vendredi 18 décembre 2009

  Andrew Clark (PSE)

  Abstract

  Andrew Clark (PSE) _ Jourdan, building F, room F

• Vendredi 11 décembre 2009

  Alpaslan Akay (IZA)

  Abstract

  Alpaslan Akay (IZA) _ Jourdan, building F, room F

• Vendredi 27 novembre 2009

  Matthias Sutter (University of Innsbruck)

  Abstract

  Matthias Sutter (University of Innsbruck) _ Jourdan, building F, room F

• Vendredi 20 novembre 2009

  Guillaume Hollard (PSE)

  Abstract

  Guillaume Hollard (PSE) _ Jourdan, building F, room F

• Vendredi 13 novembre 2009

  Georg Weizsacker (LSE)

  Abstract

  Georg Weizsacker (LSE) Jourdan, Salle de réunion, B

• Du 25 juin 2009 10:00 au 26 juin 2009 11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  John List, University of Chicago
  TBA

• Vendredi 12 juin 2009 13:00-17:00

  Drazen Prelec - MIT
  Meta-knowledge and the Bayesian truth serum mechanism

• Vendredi 5 juin 2009 13:00-17:00

  Jim Andreoni - UCSD
  Diverging opinions

• Jeudi 4 juin 2009 16:00-19:00

  Salle 314

  Lise Vesterlund - Pittsburgh
  Gender differences in bargaining: a field experiment

• Vendredi 15 mai 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Arno Riedl, Maastricht University
  Norm enforcement in heterogeneous populations

• Vendredi 3 avril 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Rupert Sausgruber, University of Innsbruck
  Honesty on the streets : a natural field experiment on newspaper purchasing.

• Vendredi 13 mars 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Lionel Page, University of Westminster, London
  The momentum effect in competitions : field evidence from tennis matches

• Vendredi 6 mars 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Peter Wakker, Rotterdam and Maastricht Universities

• Vendredi 13 février 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  ATTENTION - SEMINAIRE REPORTE A UNE DATE ULTERIEURE

  Nagore Iriberri, Pompeu Fabra University
  TBA

• Vendredi 6 février 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Steffen Huck, University College of London
  Engineering Trust

• Vendredi 30 janvier 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Theo Offerman, University of Amsterdam
  How to subsidize contributions to public goods - Does the frog jump out of the boiling water?

• Vendredi 16 janvier 2009 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Jean-Robert Tyran, University of Copenhaguen
  The Demand for Discrimination

• Vendredi 12 décembre 2008 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Orif Heffetz, Cornell University
  Conspicuous Consumption and Expenditure Visibility : measurement and application

• Vendredi 21 novembre 2008 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Graham Loomes, University of East Anglia

• Jeudi 20 novembre 2008 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle B.3.1

  Graham Loomes, University of East Anglia
  Séance Supplémentaire

• Vendredi 14 novembre 2008 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Hilke Plassmann, INSEAD, Fontainebleau
  Neural basis of simple economic decision-making

• Vendredi 17 octobre 2008 10:00-11:30

  Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°

  Salle 6e

  Tibor Neugebauer, University of Luxembourg
  The Petersburg paradox : 300 years of introspection and experimental evidence at last

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