Paris School of Economics - École d'Économie de Paris

Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Economie de Paris
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Séminaires

Economie et Psychologie

This Economics and Psychology seminar is dedicated to research in behavioural and experimental economics. It is open to specialists in various fields such as economics, psychology, sociology, philosophy and neurosciences.

The seminar takes place twice a month on friday, from 11:00 to 12:15 am at the Maison des Sciences Economiques.

The organizers are : Louis Lévy-Garboua, Hela Maafi, Laetitia Placido and Jonathan Vaksmann. If you wish to present a paper, please contact Laetitia Placido (laetitia.placido univ-paris1.fr).

Location of the seminar :
Maison des Sciences Economiques (MSE)
106 bd Hôpital 75013 PARIS
Access : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/menu-bas-ces/acces/


Prochainement

  • Vendredi 2 mars 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Hans-Theo Normann (University of Duesseldorf)
    Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis
    Abstract
    In game theory, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent ingredients of best-response behavior. However, beliefs and preferences themselves are likely to interact and this has important implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows to separate different interaction channels. We find that the frequently observed correlation between first- and second-mover behavior primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a more conventional direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.
  • Vendredi 16 mars 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Giuseppe Attanasi (TSE)
    Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game
    Abstract
    We adopt a psychological games perspective to analyze behavior and beliefs in a Trust Game experiment. Subjects are randomly assigned to the role of truster, A player, and trustee, B player. Assuming that B subjects may be affected by guilt aversion and reciprocity, we try to elicit their belief dependent motivations with a set of hypothetical questions. We design the experiment so that subjects have no incentives to manipulate and we check that answers are reliable. We have two main treatments. In the No-Transmission (control) treatment, B's (belief dependent) preferences cannot be common knowledge, hence the game has incomplete information. In the Transmission treatment, B's answers to the hypothetical questions are transmitted and made common knowledge between the two matched subjects. In so far as such answers reveal the ìpsychological typeîof B, this treatment approximates a psychological game with complete information. In this case, assuming that players coordinate their expectations on the efficient equilibrium, we should observe trust/cooperation when the revealed type of B is guilt averse (or reciprocal) and no-trust/defection when he is selfish. We also provide qualitative predictions for the incomplete information case, based on a simplified Bayesian psychological game. The main insight is that average behavior is intermediate. We analyze the set of answers of each B subject with a grid estimation al- gorithm. Most B subjects are not selfish and we observe a dominance of guilt aversion over reciprocity. Coherently with our theoretical insights, our experi- mental results show that in the Transmission treatment inducing a psychological game with (approximately) complete information behavior is more extreme: in the subpopulation of matched pairs where B is highly guilt averse there is more trust and cooperation than in the corresponding incomplete information setting without transmission; whereas in the subpopulation of matched pairs where B has low guilt aversion there is less trust and cooperation than in the correspond- ing incomplete information setting. In both information settings, we find that the B subjects'cooperation rate is positively related to guilt aversion.
  • Vendredi 30 mars 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Arno Riedl (Maastricht University)
  • Vendredi 27 avril 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Steffen Andersen (Copenhagen Business School)
    TBA

Archives

  • Vendredi 3 février 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Kyle Hyndman (Maastricht University)
    Procrastination, Self-Imposed Deadlines and Other Commitment Devices: Theory and Experiment
    Abstract
    In this paper we model a decision maker who must exert costly effort to complete a single task by a fixed deadline. Effort costs evolve stochastically in continuous time. The decision maker optimally waits to exert eff-ort until costs are less than a given threshold, the solution to an optimal stopping time problem. We derive the solution to this model for three cases: (1) time consistent decision makers, (2) naï-ve hyperbolic discounters and (3) sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. Sophisticated hyperbolic discounters behave as if they were time consistent but instead have a smaller reward for completing the task. Moreover, they will often self-impose a deadline to ensure early completion of the task. Other forms of commitment are also discussed. We then report the results of an experiment designed to study procrastination and the role of deadlines. Unlike previous experimental results on deadlines, we show that deadlines do not lead to improved performance, though those subjects who do self-impose deadlines on themselves also report themselves as being less conscientious than those who do not self-impose deadlines. Beyond procrastination, our results indicate that over-con-fidence and unanticipated cost shocks played an important role in the low completion rates.
  • Vendredi 27 janvier 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/114
    Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham)
    Preference imprecision - what is it good for?
    Abstract
  • Vendredi 20 janvier 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Olivier Armantier (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, CIRANO, and CIREQ)
    Framing of Incentives and Effort Provision
    Abstract
    The object of this paper is to better understand how effort provision is af- fected when workers face economically equivalent employment contracts framed as a combination of bonuses and penalties. Using a simple prospect theory model, we show that the link between incentive framing and effort provision is ambiguous: small penalties yield higher effort (because of loss aversion), but large penalties may decrease effort (because of diminishing sensitivity). To test the model's predictions, we conduct a framed field experiment in which economically equivalent incentives contracts are framed as menus of either i) bonuses, ii) penalties, and iii) bonuses and penalties. Consistent with our model, we find that performance and effort are highest when bonuses and penalties are combined. These results suggest that both loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity can have explanatory power for labor decisions.
  • Vendredi 13 janvier 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/3
    Graham Loomes (University of Warwick)
    Which Way to Model the Stochastic Nature of Decision Making Under Risk
  • Vendredi 16 décembre 2011 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, B.2.2
    Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham)
    Preference imprecision - what is it good for?
    Abstract
  • Vendredi 9 décembre 2011 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/19
    Andreas Ortmann (Australian School of Business)
    Group Incentives or Individual Incentives? A Real-Effort Weak-Link Experiment
    Abstract
    Motivated by previous research on coordination problems and incentive design in organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new experimental test-bed: a real-effort task embedding a weak-link lab coordination game technology. Comparing group incentives and individual incentives, we find that the observed dynamics of both individual errors and worst performances within firms are largely indistinguishable, suggesting that firm-based incentives are as effective as individual-based incentives in the present context. Simulations suggest that, in our test-bed, production costs are lower and profits are higher under group incentives. We find that more than 80 percent of our laboratory firms, notwithstanding initially widespread inefficiency, were eventually able to achieve and sustain efficient coordination, despite the presence of extremely unforgiving payoff structure. This result stands in stark contrast to standard results in the coordination game literature and provides an interesting challenge to test-beds currently used.
  • Vendredi 2 décembre 2011 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, B.2.2
    Bo Sanitioso (Paris Descartes University)
    Motivated self-perception: Mechanisms and impact on social interaction and on general information processing
    Abstract
    People often process information and behave in ways that allow them to attain or maintain a positive perception of themselves. I will first present studies showing that the motivation to maintain a positive self influences what and how people recall past behaviors (leading to momentary self changes), followed in the second part by studies showing the impact of motivated self on social interactions (e.g., attention to social feedback) and on general information processing (e.g., whether people process information in a rational or an intuitive manner).
  • Vendredi 4 novembre 2011 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/18
    Mattia Nardotto (Telecom - Paris Tech)
    Nudging with information: a randomized field experiment on reminders and feedback
    Abstract
    Can people be helped to stick to their plans with a little help from information? We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of reminders and feedback on investment activities involving up-front costs and delayed benefits, such as education and healthy behavior. By means of a randomized field experiment, we show that simple weekly reminders induce users of a gym to substantially increase their levels of physical exercise. We show that limited attention helps explain our results, and we find evidence of mental accounting in users' response to the stimulus of reminders. These results show that virtuous behavior, such as following a healthy life style, can be promoted without the need for monetary incentives: providing incentives through information is both effective and cheap.
  • Vendredi 21 octobre 2011 11:00-12:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, S/18
    Pavlo Blavatsky (University of Innsbruck)
    Which decision theory?
    Abstract
    A new laboratory experiment is designed to identify the best theories for describing decisions under risk. The experimental design has two noteworthy features: a representative sample of binary choice problems (for fair comparison across theories) and a lottery set with a small number of outcomes and probabilities (for ease of non-parametric estimation). We find that a simple heuristic, rank-dependent utility and expected utility theory provide the best goodness of fit. Each theory can account for about a quarter of individual choice patterns. Most of choice patterns best rationalized by expected utility theory can be equally well described by Yaari's dual model. Some of choice patterns best rationalized by rank-dependent utility can be equally well described by modified mean-variance approach.
  • Vendredi 1er juillet 2011
    Tomaso Regianni (University of Bologna)
    Abstract
    Tomaso Regianni (University of Bologna)
  • Vendredi 24 juin 2011
    Charles NOUSSAIR (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
    Abstract
    Charles NOUSSAIR (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
  • Vendredi 17 juin 2011
    Georg Oechsler (Heidelberg University)
    Abstract
    Georg Oechsler (Heidelberg University)
  • Vendredi 27 mai 2011
    Katrin SCHMELZ (IMPRS, MPI of Economics, Jena, Germany)
    Abstract
    Katrin SCHMELZ (IMPRS, MPI of Economics, Jena, Germany)
  • Vendredi 6 mai 2011
    Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University)
    Abstract
    Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University)
  • Vendredi 29 avril 2011
    Guy MAYRAZ (Nuffield College, Oxford)
    Abstract
    Guy MAYRAZ (Nuffield College, Oxford)
  • Vendredi 8 avril 2011
    Jason LUSK (Oklahoma State University, Stillwater)
    Abstract
    Jason LUSK (Oklahoma State University, Stillwater)
  • Vendredi 1er avril 2011
    Ulrich SCHMIDT (Leibniz Universität, Hannover)
    Abstract
    Ulrich SCHMIDT (Leibniz Universität, Hannover)
  • Vendredi 25 mars 2011
    Aldo RUSTICHINI (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis)
    Abstract
    Aldo RUSTICHINI (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis)
  • Vendredi 18 mars 2011
    Benedetto DE MARTINO (University College of London)
    Abstract
    Benedetto DE MARTINO (University College of London)
  • Vendredi 11 mars 2011
    Gani Aldashev - University of Namur (Belgium), and European Development Network (EUDN)
    Abstract
    Gani Aldashev - University of Namur (Belgium), and European Development Network (EUDN)
  • Vendredi 4 mars 2011
    Andrea Isoni (University Warwick, UK)
    Abstract
    Andrea Isoni (University Warwick, UK)
  • Vendredi 4 février 2011
    Ganna Pogrebna (University of Warwick, Coventry)
    Abstract
    Ganna Pogrebna (University of Warwick, Coventry)
  • Vendredi 21 janvier 2011
    Johannes Abeler (Univ. Nottingham)
    Abstract
    Johannes Abeler (Univ. Nottingham)
  • Vendredi 14 janvier 2011
    Michael Ziegelmeyer (Mannheim University)
    Abstract
    Michael Ziegelmeyer (Mannheim University)
  • Jeudi 6 janvier 2011
    Han Bleichrodt (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)
    Abstract
    Han Bleichrodt (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)
  • Vendredi 26 novembre 2010
    Imran Rasul (LSE)
    Abstract
    Imran Rasul (LSE)
  • Vendredi 19 novembre 2010
    Peter Wakker (Erasmus University, Rotterdam/Warwick)
    Abstract
    Peter Wakker (Erasmus University, Rotterdam/Warwick)
  • Vendredi 12 novembre 2010
    Chris Boyce (PSE)
    Abstract
    Chris Boyce (PSE)
  • Vendredi 5 novembre 2010
    Hector Calvo (University of Southampton)
    Abstract
    Hector Calvo (University of Southampton)
  • Vendredi 29 octobre 2010
    Pavlo Blavatsky (University of Innsbruck)
    Abstract
    Pavlo Blavatsky (University of Innsbruck)
  • Vendredi 15 octobre 2010
    Katsunori Yamada (Osaka University)
    Abstract
    Katsunori Yamada (Osaka University)
  • Vendredi 8 octobre 2010
    Aurélien Baillon (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)
    Abstract
    Aurélien Baillon (Erasmus University, Rotterdam)
  • Vendredi 1er octobre 2010
    Luca Corazzini (Univ. Bocconi, Milan)
    Abstract
    Luca Corazzini (Univ. Bocconi, Milan)
  • Vendredi 17 septembre 2010
    Ferdinand Vieider (Ludwig-Maximilians University, Germany)
    Abstract
    Ferdinand Vieider (Ludwig-Maximilians University, Germany)
  • Vendredi 2 juillet 2010
    Guillaume Frechette (NYU)
    Abstract
    Guillaume Frechette (NYU) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 25 juin 2010
    Bob Willis (University of Michigan)
    Abstract
    Bob Willis (University of Michigan) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 11 juin 2010
    Michael MacBride (University of California, Irvine)
    Abstract
    Michael MacBride (University of California, Irvine) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 28 mai 2010
    Luc Arrondel et André Masson (PSE)
    Abstract
    Luc Arrondel et André Masson (PSE) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 14 mai 2010
    Thomas Dohnen (IZA)
    Abstract
    Thomas Dohnen (IZA) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 7 mai 2010
    Frederic Koessler (PSE)
    Abstract
    Frederic Koessler (PSE) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 16 avril 2010
    Jeremy Celse (U. Montpellier)
    Abstract
    Jeremy Celse (U. Montpellier) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 2 avril 2010
    Timothy Cason (Purdue University)
    Abstract
    Timothy Cason (Purdue University) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 26 mars 2010
    Andrew Caplin (New York University)
    Abstract
    Andrew Caplin (New York University) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 19 mars 2010
    Mathias Pessiglione (MBB, CRICM, INSERM, UPMC, Hopital Pitié-Salpêtrière)
    Abstract
    Mathias Pessiglione (MBB, CRICM, INSERM, UPMC, Hopital Pitié-Salpêtrière) _ MSE
  • Vendredi 12 mars 2010
    Fabrice Etile (PSE)
    Abstract
    Fabrice Etile (PSE) _ MSE
  • Jeudi 18 février 2010
    Uri Gneezy
    Abstract
    Uri Gneezy _ ENS Ulm
  • Vendredi 12 février 2010
    Claudia Senik (PSE)
    Abstract
    Claudia Senik (PSE) _ Jourdan
  • Vendredi 5 février 2010
    Olivier Gossner (PSE)
    Abstract
    Olivier Gossner (PSE) _ Jourdan
  • Vendredi 29 janvier 2010
    Nagore Iriberri (Univ. Pompeu Fabra)
    Abstract
    Nagore Iriberri (Univ. Pompeu Fabra) _ Jourdan
  • Vendredi 22 janvier 2010
    Sabrina Teyssier (INRA, ALISS)
    Abstract
    Sabrina Teyssier (INRA, ALISS) _ Jourdan
  • Vendredi 15 janvier 2010
    Raphael Godefroy (PSE)
    Abstract
    Raphael Godefroy (PSE) _ Jourdan
  • Vendredi 8 janvier 2010
    Ori Heffetz (Cornell University)
    Abstract
    Ori Heffetz (Cornell University) _ Jourdan
  • Vendredi 18 décembre 2009
    Andrew Clark (PSE)
    Abstract
    Andrew Clark (PSE) _ Jourdan, building F, room F
  • Vendredi 11 décembre 2009
    Alpaslan Akay (IZA)
    Abstract
    Alpaslan Akay (IZA) _ Jourdan, building F, room F
  • Vendredi 27 novembre 2009
    Matthias Sutter (University of Innsbruck)
    Abstract
    Matthias Sutter (University of Innsbruck) _ Jourdan, building F, room F
  • Vendredi 20 novembre 2009
    Guillaume Hollard (PSE)
    Abstract
    Guillaume Hollard (PSE) _ Jourdan, building F, room F
  • Vendredi 13 novembre 2009
    Georg Weizsacker (LSE)
    Abstract
    Georg Weizsacker (LSE) Jourdan, Salle de réunion, B
  • Du 25 juin 2009 10:00 au 26 juin 2009 11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    John List, University of Chicago
    TBA
  • Vendredi 12 juin 2009 13:00-17:00
    Drazen Prelec - MIT
    Meta-knowledge and the Bayesian truth serum mechanism
  • Vendredi 5 juin 2009 13:00-17:00
    Jim Andreoni - UCSD
    Diverging opinions
  • Jeudi 4 juin 2009 16:00-19:00
    Salle 314
    Lise Vesterlund - Pittsburgh
    Gender differences in bargaining: a field experiment
  • Vendredi 15 mai 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Arno Riedl, Maastricht University
    Norm enforcement in heterogeneous populations
  • Vendredi 3 avril 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Rupert Sausgruber, University of Innsbruck
    Honesty on the streets : a natural field experiment on newspaper purchasing.
  • Vendredi 13 mars 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Lionel Page, University of Westminster, London
    The momentum effect in competitions : field evidence from tennis matches
  • Vendredi 6 mars 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Peter Wakker, Rotterdam and Maastricht Universities
  • Vendredi 13 février 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    ATTENTION - SEMINAIRE REPORTE A UNE DATE ULTERIEURE
    Nagore Iriberri, Pompeu Fabra University
    TBA
  • Vendredi 6 février 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Steffen Huck, University College of London
    Engineering Trust
  • Vendredi 30 janvier 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Theo Offerman, University of Amsterdam
    How to subsidize contributions to public goods - Does the frog jump out of the boiling water?
  • Vendredi 16 janvier 2009 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Jean-Robert Tyran, University of Copenhaguen
    The Demand for Discrimination
  • Vendredi 12 décembre 2008 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Orif Heffetz, Cornell University
    Conspicuous Consumption and Expenditure Visibility : measurement and application
  • Vendredi 21 novembre 2008 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Graham Loomes, University of East Anglia
  • Jeudi 20 novembre 2008 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle B.3.1
    Graham Loomes, University of East Anglia
    Séance Supplémentaire
  • Vendredi 14 novembre 2008 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Hilke Plassmann, INSEAD, Fontainebleau
    Neural basis of simple economic decision-making
  • Vendredi 17 octobre 2008 10:00-11:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L'Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Tibor Neugebauer, University of Luxembourg
    The Petersburg paradox : 300 years of introspection and experimental evidence at last

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