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Archives

• Jeudi 23 mai 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Andrew POSTLEWAITE (U. Penn) : Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility

  Co-author(s): David Dillenberger et Kareen Rozen

  Abstract

  Savage (1954) provides axioms on preferences over acts that are equivalent to the existence of a subjective expected utility representation. We show that there is a continuum of other expected utility" representations in which for any act, the probability distribution over states depends on the corresponding outcomes and is

• Jeudi 16 mai 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Sidartha GORDON (Science Po) : Figures of Speech and Informative Strategic Communication

  Abstract

  > We provide a class of tractable communication games where each sender > type chooses a possibly truth-distorting figure of speech, which the > receiver interprets before choosing an action. Because language is > inherently vague, a figure of speech mapping determines > informativeness of communication: Exaggeration results in better > information transmission than understatement. A sender's choice of a > figure of speech trades off the action he wants to induce and his > lying aversion. There can be between one and five equilibria, all of > them fully separating, yet only partially revealing, which can be > ranked by level of informativeness. At most two of these equilibria, > the less informative ones, are ironic. The other (at most three) > equilibria are straight-talking, either exaggerating or understated. > We find that a receiver may prefer a sender who is more dissimilar to > him, and also a sender who is less honest. He may prefer a language > that has more vagueness, and a sender who is less competent. Finally, > we study the limit of the equilibria as either (i) the language > vagueness vanishes or (ii) the lying aversion vanishes.

• Jeudi 25 avril 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Alexandre DE CORNIERE (Oxford) : Integration and Search Engine Bias

  Co-author(s): Greg Taylor (Oxford)

  texte intégral [pdf]

  Abstract

  Competition authorities all over the world worry that integration between search engines (mainly Google) and publishers could lead to abuses of dominant position. In particular, one concern is that of own-content bias, meaning that Google would bias its rankings in favor of the publishers it owns or has an interest in, to the detriment of competitors and users. In order to investigate this issue, we develop a theoretical framework in which the search engine (i) allocates users across publishers, and (ii) competes with publishers to attract advertisers. We show that the search engine is biased against publishers that display many ads---even without integration. Although integration may lead to own-content bias, it can also reduce bias by increasing the value of a marginal consumer to the search engine. Integration also has a positive effect on users by reducing the nuisance costs due to excessive advertising. Its net effect is therefore ambiguous in general, and we provide sufficient conditions for it to be desirable or not.

• Jeudi 18 avril 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Perrin LEFEBVRE (PSE) : Horizontal differentiation in lobbying

  Abstract

  This paper considers strategic information gathering by competing interest groups that want to influence an uninformed decision-maker. Policy decision depends on different parameters, and groups can choose which parameters to specialize into when searching for information. Common wisdom wants groups to differentiate by specializing in different dimensions in order to soften competition. I show that differentiation is indeed the only equilibrium when dimensions are equally relevant; but far from softening competition, it increases the groups search cost without guaranteeing better policies. Compared to a situation where groups concentrate on the same information, differentiation favors the decision-maker and hurts interest groups. I also characterize the different types of equilibria when the decision-maker attributes different weights to different dimensions.

• Jeudi 11 avril 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Matti LISKI (Aalto University School of Economics, Helsinki) : Resource relationships

  Co-author(s): Reyer Gerlagh

  Abstract

  We consider a model of resource dependence where only the seller knows the resource reserve. The model captures phenomena such as trust in the relationship and "bribing" for continuation through generous supplies. It also explains supply shocks in equilibrium: privately informed sellers have incentives to reveal their types too late through a supply disruption after which their exploit the consumers inability to immediately adjust demand. Two puzzles that a standard exhaustible-resource theory cannot explain are resolved: sellers have an incentive to overstate their resources rather than emphasize scarcity, and buyer's can switch to alternatives before exhausting the resource thereby leaving socially valuable resource in the ground.

• Jeudi 4 avril 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Catherine GENDRON-SAULNIER (Université de Montreal) : Information Sourcing in a Strategic Environment

  Abstract

  Many models in economics assume that individuals are endowed with exogenous information. Yet, individuals are making choices about what to learn and from which sources of information. In this paper, we study the sourcing decisions of individuals interacting in a game where the payoff function is quadratic and the information structure is gaussian. Our game is as follows. There are two players that have to make two sequential decisions. First, each player chooses his sources of information independently of, and simultaneously with, the other player. Then each player chooses an action after observing the realization of the signals send by the sources he chose in the first step, but not the signals of the other player (unless they have chosen the same information sources). As a motivating example we consider the situation of two oligopolists competing in price on a market for a differentiated good that acquire information on their demand function. We answer the question of whether the players make the same sourcing decisions and how similar the information they acquire is. We also perform some static comparative exercises and provide some welfare analysis.

• Jeudi 21 mars 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Romain DE NIJS (Hass School of Business) : An empirical assessment of the effects of the French Hadopi law

  Co-author(s) : C. Bellégo

  texte intégral [pdf]

  Abstract

  This article uses the French anti-piracy law known as Hadopi, to study the effects of online piracy on movie box office performances. Results from difference-in-differences estimations indicate that the law increased admissions in movie theaters by 13 percent in France relative to control countries. Results also show that the Hadopi effects tend to decrease over time and are particularly strong for American movies that are the most heavily pirated movies. Last, the Hadopi effects are very unlikely to be explained by supply side reactions of the industry nor by a concomitant but unrelated to Hadopi positive shock in the French market for movies in theaters.

• Jeudi 7 mars 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Junjie ZHOU (PSE) : Economics of Leadership and Hierarchy

  texte intégral [pdf]

  Abstract

  This paper explores leadership within hierarchical organizations. For each hierarchy, I consider a dynamic signaling game in which each player observes only the actions of his direct superiors before choosing his action. At the top of the hierarchy are the leaders, who learn the state from nature. The hierarchy controls the flow of information and the timing of the game, and determines the equilibrium output and welfare. I show that the welfare-optimal hierarchy is the chain, because it maximizes the incentive of players to ``lead by example'' for their subordinates. The chain remains optimal even in the presence of verifiable or unverifiable costly information acquisition by the leaders. Lastly, I characterize optimal hierarchies when the number of layers or the number of leaders is limited. Applications to fund-raising are also discussed.

• Jeudi 28 février 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Guilhem LECOUTEUX (Ecole Polytechnique) : The formation of preferences in game theory

  Abstract

  Following Hausman's analysis of the concept of preferences (Preference, Value, Choice and Welfare, Cambridge University Press, 2012), we suggest modelling the formation of preferences in game theory, by introducing a distinction between utility --- defined as individual welfare --- and preferences --- defined as a subjective total comparative evaluation. We provide then an analytical framework where players can choose their own preferences before playing a game, and introduce the $\Sigma$ -equilibrium as a new notion of equilibrium in non cooperative game theory in order to model such a decision process. This notion of equilibrium seems to present more robust methodological foundations and also to have a better predictive power than Nash equilibrium in some standard games, and that is why we suggest it as a substitute to Nash equilibrium. We show that in a very large class of games, if we assumed that players choose their preferences in order to maximize in fine their utility, they will generally decide to maximize a different function than their own utility function: this means that for a very large class of games, maximizing one's own utility is self-defeating. We show that players choose their preferences in order to get a strategic advantage on the other players, such that the strategy that satisfies their preferences is in fact the strategy they would play if they were a Stackelberg leader. A direct corollary of this result in welfare economics is that --- if we assume that players are rational --- the preferences of the individuals are in general distinct from their utility: therefore preference satisfaction is not welfare, and we cannot easily infer individual welfare from choices and preferences.

• Jeudi 21 février 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Nicolas SCHUTZ (University of Mannheim) : Cross-Border Price Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions - A Quantitative Framework for Competition Policy

  Co-auteurs : Holger Breinlich and Volker Nocke

  texte intégral [pdf]

  Abstract

  Decisions of national competition authorities have important effects on other jurisdictions. We provide a framework to quantify the domestic and cross-border effects of mergers, and to draw conclusions for the coordination of national merger policies. We develop a two-country model with many sectors. In each sector, producers vary in terms of their marginal costs, and are engaged in Cournot competition. We allow for pro?table mergers to take place subject to the non-violation of a given national competition policy. Because of trade costs and perceived differences in qualities between domestic and foreign products, mergers may have different consumer surplus effects in the home and the foreign country. We calibrate the model using data for the year 2002 for 167 manufacturing sectors in the U.S. and Canada, two well-integrated markets where cross-border effects of M&As are likely to be important. We choose parameters to match relevant moments in the data, including industry sales, concentration ratios and trade ?ows. We ?nd that merger decisions taken in isolation by national competition authorities lead to ine cient outcomes compared to a scenario where competition policy is coordinated, and that these ine ciencies are quantitatively important. While there is considerable variation across industries, we ?nd that in the majority of industries a merger approval policy based on domestic consumer surplus is too restrictive from the viewpoint of the neighboring country.

• Jeudi 14 février 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Jean-François LASLIER (Ecole Polytechnique) : Vote au pluriel: How people vote under different voting rules

  Abstract

  The seminar presents a survey of recent research on voter behavior. Using traditional laboratory experiments, innovative "in situ" experiments, and on-line surveys, we observe how people vote under different voting rules. The goal of the investigation is two-fold. In an Institutional Design perspective, we want to understand the consequences of possible political institutions (who is elected ?). In a Political Psychology perspective, we want to understand the individuals' conception of the act of voting. The set of candidates being given, we describe what kind of candidates are favored by what kind of rules. As to voters, we find that they use heuristics and behave partly strategically and partly sincerely, the mixture depending on the detailled circumstances. We note that voters have both self-serving and ideological preferences over voting rules.

• Jeudi 7 février 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Daniel GARRETT (TSE) : Dynamic Mechanism Design with Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values

  Abstract

  I will discuss dynamic mechanism design settings where agents preferences evolve stocastically and where agents arrive over time. Agents need not participate at the arrival date and can be strategic with respect to the first date of participation in the mechanism. Profit-maximizing allocations, which maximize a “dynamic virtual surplus” are derived. Applications to the durable goods problem (see `Incoming Demand with Private Uncertainty’) and overselling of capacity in the airline industry (see `Overbooking’ with Jeff Ely and Toomas Hinnosaar) will be discussed.

• Jeudi 24 janvier 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Chetan DAVE (NYU Abu Dhabi) : Confirmation Bias with Motivated Preferences

  co-authored with Gary Charness

  Abstract

  Models of confirmation bias as an individual decision making error predict systematic departures from Bayesian updating and can imply that no learning may ever take place. While some experimental evidence for a confirmation bias has been found, an implicit assumption in many stochastic economic models is that strategic (or market) pressures cause individuals to not exhibit systematic deviations from Bayesian updating. We investigate in the laboratory the effect of subtle background strategic considerations on signal extraction, finding that people are affected by the presence of motivated preferences (here a preference for one state having manifested). Our results suggest that players with motivated preferences over probabilistic end states deviate less from Bayesian updating. However, such players still exhibit a confirmation bias when the directions of updates are analyzed.

• Jeudi 10 janvier 2013

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Eun JEONG HEO (University of Rochester) : Probabilistic Assignment Problem with Multi-unit Demands: A Generalization of the Serial Rule and a Characterization

  Abstract

  Abstract: We study a probabilistic assignment problem when agents have multi-unit demands for objects. We first introduce two fairness requirements to accommodate di erent demands across agents and show that each of these requirements is incompatible with stochastic dominance efficiency (henceforth, we use the prefix sd" for stochastic dominance) and weak sd-strategyproofness, unless all agents have unitary demands. We next introduce a new incentive requirement which we call limited invariance. We explore implications of these requirements, together with consistency and converse consistency. Our main result is that the generalized serial rule, which we propose as an adaptation of the serial rule to our setting, is the only rule satisfying sd-efficiency, the sd proportional-division lower-bound, limited invariance, and consistency. Uniqueness persists if we replace the sd proportional-division lower-bound by sd normalized-no-envy, or consistency by converse consistency, or both. The serial rule in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) is characterized as a special case of our generalized serial rule.

• Jeudi 13 décembre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Liam WREN-LEWIS (PSE, Paris) : Hold-up problems in international electricity trade

  Abstract

  This paper investigates the underdevelopment of electricity trade between African coun- tries. I build a model where hold-up problems originating from incomplete contracts decrease countries' willingness to trade. In particular, an inability to commit to future trade reduces the specialisation of investment. The paper then uses the model to explore potential policy solutions including deregulation and the liberalisation of ownership.

• Jeudi 6 décembre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  David CANTALLA (Centro de Estudios Economicos, El Colegio de Mexico) : Housing Markets with Endogenous Budget Constraints

  Co-auteur : Juan Sebastian Pereyra

  Abstract

  This paper addresses the existence of competitive equilibrium in the variant of the Assignment Game where budget-constrained agents are endowed with one good, that can be sold to buy another good. We de?ne the Money Scarcity (MS) condition and its Strong (SMS) and Weak (WMS) versions. The WMS condition ensures the existence of an equilibrium in cases where Quinzii’s indis- pensability of money assumption does not hold. We consider two mechanisms to ?nd a competitive equilibrium which are extended versions of Gale’s Top Trad- ing Cycles algorithm and of the Exact Auction Mechanism of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor. Under MS, the ?rst mechanism is strategy-proof; the second is not. We strengthen the MS condition (SMS) to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in the revelation game induced by the second mechanism, where the outcome coincides with the assignment found by the ?rst mechanism; moreover, this assignment is Pareto e?cient.

• Jeudi 29 novembre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Andrea POZZI (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) : The Effect of Internet Distribution on Brick-and-mortar Sales

  Abstract

  I study the introduction of an online shopping service for a large supermarket chain that also operates a wide network of brick-and-mortar stores. The establishment of the Internet channel led to a 13 percent increase in overall revenues, inducing only limited cannibalization on traditional sales. I provide insights on the mechanism behind this result. I show that selling on the web removes travel costs and helps the retailer to attract new business from customers living far away from its stores. I also document that revenues increase more in markets where the chain faces more competitors. This suggests that the new sales represent in part business diverted from rival supermarkets.

• Jeudi 15 novembre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h15-13h45)

  Manuel MARFAN (PSE) : Rules versus discretion under limited commitment

  Abstract

  This paper studies decision making by an uninformed authority that will be better informed in the future, and whose expected actions will affect a third party’s decision making. The trade-off between rules and discretion is studied in this setting, when information is not verifiable by the third party, thus inducing the authority to misreport it. A necessary and a sufficient condition for continuity of the decision rule as a function of the information parameter are given, and under some structural conditions the optimal mechanism is characterized.

• Jeudi 25 octobre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  David SPECTOR (PSE, Paris) : "Non-verifiable self-reporting and collusion"

  Abstract

  Many cartels involve companies reporting their sales to their competitors in a non-verifiable way, long before individual sales information becomes public. This paper assesses how the possible collusive outcomes depend on the possibility of engaging in such cheap talk. It is shown that for some parameter values, monopoly prices can be sustained in equilibrium only if such cheap talk is possible. The reason is that if communication is precluded, the occurrence of wasteful price wars may be the only way to deter deviations, whereas the possibility of communicating frequently, even if only by issuing non-verifiable reports, allows companies to fine-tune more efficient disciplining devices such as voluntary, temporary self-exclusion.

• Jeudi 11 octobre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Nax Heinrich (PSE) : "The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets"

  Co-auteur : Peyton Young, Bary Pradelski

  texte intégral [pdf]

  Abstract

  Decentralized matching platforms on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized learning process in such environments that leads to stable and efficient outcomes. Agents on each side of the market make demands of potential partners and are matched if their demands are mutually compatible. Matched agents occasionally experiment with higher demands, while unmatched agents lower their demands in the hope of attracting partners. This learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of other agents’ strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either.

• Jeudi 27 septembre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Lionel Wilner (Crest -LEI) : "Do consumers correctly expect price reductions? Testing dynamic behavior"

  Co-auteur : Philippe Février

  Abstract

  Both theoretical and empirical dynamics literature require agents to solve complex dynamic programs given their information set, which assumes implicitly that agents are fully rational and have perfect expectations. We claim that this assumption is easily testable provided that market-level data on prices and purchases are available. Using data on albums exhibiting frequent episodes of sales, we perform the test and find that consumers hold simple expectations on the timing of sales: everything happens as if consumers were expecting a Markov price process. On the contrary, the firm is more sophisticated and does not follow such a policy. Our results are coherent with the idea that agents rationality is bounded because of limited memory or limited capacity. These results have important implications in terms of demand estimation, firms' optimal pricing strategy and welfare.

• Jeudi 20 septembre 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Jonathan Weinstein (Northwestern University) : "A Bayesian Foundation for Classical Hypothesis Testing."

  texte intégral [pdf]

  Abstract

  A decision-maker can ensure dynamic consistency by following Bayes' rule, but he may wish to balance such consistency against other goals. That is, when the decision-maker is surprised by a pattern unaccounted for in his prior, he may wish to change his beliefs in a way which violates Bayes' rule, but he may also wish to limit his inconsistency. We show that if such non-Bayesian events, or \paradigm shifts," are rare, in the sense that they occur only with a small probability according to the decision-maker's initial belief, the decision-maker will be \approximately" dynamically con- sistent. Our notion of \approximate" dynamic consistency is that the possible arbitrage against the decision-maker is small compared to the size of his transactions. The quantity is equivalent to the level of a classical hypothesis test, so our results provide a decision-theoretic foundation for the classical criteria for rejecting a null hypothesis. Our ndings give the decision-maker some latitude to revise his model while bounding the pain of inconsistency, and unify the classical and Bayesian modes of inference.

• Jeudi 5 juillet 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment B, 2e étage, salle de Réunions (12h45-13h45)

  Antoine SALOMON (Imagine, Ecole des Ponts ParisTech) : Strategic learning and bandit games

• Jeudi 14 juin 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Miriam TESCHL (University of Vienna) : Theory of choice under internal conflict

• Jeudi 31 mai 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Perrin LEFEBVRE (PSE) : Downstream lobbying and informational frictions

• Jeudi 24 mai 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Fabio MICHELUCCI (CERGE-EI, Pragues) : The English Auction, Rushes, and a Selaed Bid Efficient Auction

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 10 mai 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Rachel KRANTON (Duke University and PSE) : Striving for Social Status in Networks

• Jeudi 5 avril 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Alexey KUSHNIR (University of Zurich) : A geometric approach to mechanism design

• Jeudi 29 mars 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Victoria VANASCO (UC Berkeley and PSE) : Learning by Lending: The Informational Role of Financial Intermediaries

• Jeudi 22 mars 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Marie LACLAU (HEC Paris) : Communication in repeated network games with private monitoring

• Jeudi 15 mars 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Michihiro KANDORI (University of Tokyo) : Asynchronous Revision Games

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 8 mars 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Onur OZGUR (Université de Montréal) : Dynamic Linear Economies with Social Interactions

• Jeudi 16 février 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Tom TRUYTS (U. Leuven) : Stochastic Signaling: Information Substitutes and Complements

• Jeudi 9 février 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Sandrine SPAETER (BETA, Univ. Strasbourg) : The Prudent Principal

  Co-author(s): Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 2 février 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Julian KOLM (Université de Vienna) : Learning Across Subgames: An Application to the Hold-up Problem"

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 12 janvier 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Roger GUESNERIE (PSE, Paris) : Eductive Stability in Real Business Cycle Models

  Co-author(s): G. Evans & B. McGough

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 5 janvier 2012

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Alessandra CASELLA (University Columbia) : Vote trading with and without party leaders

  Co-author(s) Tom Palfrey & Sebastien Turban

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 15 décembre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Arnold CHASSAGNON (U. Tours & PSE) : Multiple lenders, strategic default and the role of debt covenants

• Jeudi 1er décembre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Yves GUERON (UCL ) : Failure of Gradualism under Imperfect Monitoring

• Jeudi 17 novembre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (13h00-13h45)

  Christoph MARCH (PSE , Paris) : Do We Follow Others when We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations

  Attention exceptionnellement ce séminaire commencera à 13h

• Jeudi 10 novembre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Francisco RUIZ-ALISEDA (Ecole Polytechnique , Paris) : The Dynamics of Protection and Imitation of Innovations

  with Emeric Henry

• Jeudi 20 octobre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Frederic KOESSLER (PSE) : Extortion and Political Risk Insurance in Weak Governance Countries

• Jeudi 13 octobre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Milo BIANCHI (U. Paris-Dauphine) : Creative Accounting and Efficient Markets

• Jeudi 6 octobre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Alexandre DE CORNIERE (PSE) : Search Advertising

• Jeudi 29 septembre 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Jean-Edouard COLLIARD (PSE) : Rational Blinders: Is it Possible to Regulate Banks Using their Internal Risk Models?

• Jeudi 23 juin 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment B, 2e étage, salle de Réunions (12h45-13h45)

  Christoph MARCH (PSE) : Individual Learning and Strategic Thinking in Laboratory Cascades

• Jeudi 9 juin 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Yukio KORIYAMA (Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau) : Optimal Apportionment

  Co-auteur(s) : Jean-François Laslier

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 19 mai 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Stefan BEHRINGER (University of Bonn, Gremany) : Price Wars in Two-Sided Markets: The case of the UK Quality Newspapers

  Co-auteur(s) : Lapo Filistrucchi

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 5 mai 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Laurent LAMY (PSE, Paris) : On the use of absolute auctions and secret reserve prices

  Co-auteur(s) : Philippe Jehiel

• Jeudi 28 avril 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Wilfried SAND-ZANTMAN (Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse) : Contracting with Bypass in Bilateral Relationship

  with Bruno Jullien and Jerome Pouyet

• Jeudi 7 avril 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Michela LIMARDI (PSE, Paris) : Nongovernmental Regulation: NGO Monitoring and Firm Compliance with Social Standards

• Jeudi 31 mars 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Yann BRAOUEZEC (Ecole Supérieure d’Ingénieurs Léonard de Vinci, Paris) : Some theory of constrained third-degree price discrimination

• Jeudi 24 mars 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Yann BRAMOULLE (Université Laval, Québec) : Favoritism

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 10 mars 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Raphaël LEVY (University of Mannheim, Germany) : Humouring both parties: a model of two-sided reputation

• Jeudi 3 mars 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Janne TUKIAINEN (University of Helsinki, Finlande) : The Effect of Minimum Bid Increment on Revenue in Internet Auctions: Evidence from a Field Experiment

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 10 février 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Raphaël LEVY (U. Mannheim - TBA) : *

• Jeudi 3 février 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Olivier GOSSNER (PSE, Paris) : Entropy and the value of information for investors

  Co-auteur(s) : Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 20 janvier 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Ines MORENO DE BARREDA (LSE) : Cheap Talk With Two-Sided Private Information

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 6 janvier 2011

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Sara BIANCINI (Thema, Cergy) : Intellectual Property Rights Adoption in Developing Countries

• Jeudi 9 décembre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Sergei KOVBASYUK (TSE and CREST) : Optimal Certification Design

• Jeudi 2 décembre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Raphael GODEFROY (PSE, Paris) : Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection with Uncertain Issues

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 25 novembre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Alexandre DE CORNIERE (PSE & CREST-ENSAE, ) : Online Advertising and Privacy

  with Romain de Nijs

• Jeudi 28 octobre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Peter VIDA (University of Vienna) : Collusion communication schemes in first price auction

• Jeudi 14 octobre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Jean-Edouard COLLIARD (PSE, Paris) : The Impact of Private Information about Positive Feedback Trading

• Jeudi 7 octobre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Christina PAWLOWITSCH (PSE, Paris) : Why evolution does not necessarily lead to an optimal signaling system

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 30 septembre 2010

  Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (12h45-13h45)

  Christopher MARCH (PSE, Paris) : Adaptive Social Learning

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Mardi 8 juin 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Michal BRESKY (CERGE-EI, Prague) : Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions

• Jeudi 3 juin 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Pierre PICARD (Ecole Polytechnique: TBA) : *

• Jeudi 27 mai 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Romain de NIJS (PSE) : Dynamic Targeted Pricing in Online Markets

• Jeudi 20 mai 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Vincent CRAWFORD (Oxford) : New York City Cabdrivers’ Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income

  with Juanjuan Meng

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 13 mai 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Michal BRESKY (CERGE-EI, Prague) : Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions

• Jeudi 6 mai 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Jean-François LASLIER (Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau) : Stubborn learning

  with Bernard Walliser

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 8 avril 2010

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est annulée.

• Jeudi 25 mars 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Jos JANSEN (Max Planck Institute , Bonn) : Share To Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 11 mars 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Olivier GOSSNER (PSE : TBA) : A Folk Theorem in Robust Equilibrium Structures.

• Jeudi 11 mars 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  (*) : *

• Jeudi 18 février 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Arnaud FERAL (U. Cergy : TBA) : Merger Control with Transfers from the Capital Gains Tax

• Jeudi 4 février 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Mathieu PERONA (PSE) : How broadcasting quotas harm program diversity

• Jeudi 28 janvier 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  David MARTIMORT (TSE) : Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games

  with Lars Stole -
  David Martimort will be at PSE-Jourdan on thursday (building E), please fill this form if you want to meet him

• Jeudi 21 janvier 2010

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Flavio TOXYAERD (University of Cambridge) : The Economics of Infectious Disease

• Jeudi 10 décembre 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Ron HARSTAD (University of Missouri) : Two Examples of Why I've Worked with Mike Rothkopf : "Winner's Curse Corrections Magnify Adverse Selection" (joint with Robert Bordley) and "Auctioning Rights to Choose When Competition Persists"

  texte intégral [pdf] texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 26 novembre 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Brian ROGERS (Northwestern) : Diversity and Popularity in Social Networks (avec Yann Bramoulle).

  Brian Rogers sera à Jourdan la journée, contactez moi si vous voulez le rencontrer, ou complétez ceci: http://www.doodle.com/6paq5gc44vys3hzi

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 12 novembre 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Olivier TERCIEUX (PSE) : Common p-Beliefs and the Hold-Up Problem (avec Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden et Takashi Kunimoto)

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 15 octobre 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Bernard WALLISER (PSE) : La révision des croyances multi-agents (avec JC Vergnaud et A Billot)

• Jeudi 1er octobre 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Pierre FLECKINGER (PSE) : The Incentive Value of Deadlines

• Jeudi 24 septembre 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Lucie MENAGER (Paris 2) : Intimidation strategies in competitive bidding

• Jeudi 4 juin 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Jean-Edouard COLLIARD (PSE) : Competition between limit order markets and trading fees

• Jeudi 28 mai 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  George MAILTAH (University of Pennsylvania) : Common Learning in the Presence of Dependence

• Jeudi 14 mai 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Rachel KRANTON (University of Maryland) : Networked Teams and Public Goods: Who Does the Work?

• Jeudi 23 avril 2009

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est annulée.

• Jeudi 9 avril 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Philip RENY (University of Chicago) : On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games.

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 2 avril 2009

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est annulée.

• Jeudi 26 mars 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Konrad MIERENDORFF (University of Bonn) : Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design with Deadlines

• Jeudi 19 mars 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Salvator PICCOLO (University of Salerno) : Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing.

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 5 mars 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Sidartha GORDON (University of Montreal) : Iteratively Stable Equilibria in Cheap Talk Games

• Jeudi 26 février 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Takashi KUNIMOTO (McGill University) : Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Towards a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine

• Jeudi 19 février 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Tadashi SEKIGUCHI (Kyoto University) : Repeated Games with Costly Imperfect Monitoring (joint with Eiichi Miyagawa and Yasuyuki Miyahara)

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 12 février 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Jérôme MATHIS (TSE) : Rating the Raters: Are Reputation Concerns Powerful enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?

• Jeudi 5 février 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Ariane LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY (PSE) : TI-games I: An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 29 janvier 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Alexandre DE CORNIERE (PSE) : On the Optimal Design of a Search Engine's Advertising Platform

• Jeudi 22 janvier 2009

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Francis BLOCH (Polytechnique) : Optimal assignment of reassignable objects

• Jeudi 15 janvier 2009

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est reportée au 29/01/2009.

• Jeudi 11 décembre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Stefano LOVO (HEC) : Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: The N-player Case

• Jeudi 4 décembre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  David ETTINGER (Univ. Cergy) : Deception in a Repeated Expert/Agent Interaction: Theory and Experiment

• Jeudi 27 novembre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Daisuke OYAMA (Hitotsubashi Univ.) : On Ex Post Individually Rational Partnership Dissolution

• Jeudi 13 novembre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Matias NUNEZ (Ecole polytechnique) : A Study of Approval Voting on Large Poisson Games

• Jeudi 23 octobre 2008

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est annulée.

• Jeudi 16 octobre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Alessandra CASELLA (Columbia Univ., EHESS) : Storable Votes and Agenda Control. Theory and Experiments

• Jeudi 2 octobre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Laurent LAMY (PSE) : Mechanism Design with Partially-Specified Participation Games

• Jeudi 18 septembre 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Thibault FALLY (PSE) : Global Sourcing under imperfect capital markets

• Jeudi 29 mai 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  X. DENG (City univ. of Hong Kong) : Sales of Clicks and Auction Theory

  CHANGEMENT : La localisation est modifiée.

• Jeudi 15 mai 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  F. KOESSLER (PSE) : Multidimensional Communication Mechanisms: Cooperative and Conflicting Designs

  Co-auteur : D. Martimort

  texte intégral

• Jeudi 17 avril 2008

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est annulée.

• Jeudi 10 avril 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  Karine VAN DER STRAETEN (PSE) : A Communication Game on Electoral Platforms

  Gabrielle Demange

• Jeudi 20 mars 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  W. DESSEIN (Univ. of Chicago) : Organize to Compete

  R. Alonso and N. Matouschek

• Jeudi 21 février 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  F. MOIZEAU (Toulouse School of Economics) : Dynamic Regulation of Quality

• Jeudi 14 février 2008

  CHANGEMENT : La séance est annulée.

• Jeudi 31 janvier 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  O. GOSSNER (PSE, Paris) : Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma without conditional independence

  Co-auteurs : K. Fong, J. Horner, et Y. Sannikov

• Jeudi 24 janvier 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  O. BIRAN (Univ. de Paris 9) : Efficiency and the Final Consumer in Resale Markets with Externalities

• Jeudi 10 janvier 2008

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  M. OURY (PSE, Paris) : Continuous Implementation

  Co-auteur : O. Tercieux

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 20 décembre 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  L. RAYO (Univ. of Chicago) : Status, Market Power, and Veblen Effects

  Co-auteurs : Miguel Diaz, Haresh Sapra

  texte intégral [pdf]

  CHANGEMENT : La localisation est modifiée.

• Jeudi 13 décembre 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  L. SAURI ROMERO (European univ. institute) : Parallel trade and incentives to innovate when governments decide on prices

  CHANGEMENT : La localisation est modifiée.

• Jeudi 29 novembre 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  R. RENAULT (Univ. de Cergy-Pontoise) : Gathering and disseminating information in discrete choice models

• Jeudi 15 novembre 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  J. HAGENBACH (Univ. de Paris 1) : Strategic Communication Networks

• Jeudi 25 octobre 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  M. COMOLA (Univ. Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona) : The Network Structure of Informal Arrangements : Evidence from Rural Tanzania

• Jeudi 4 octobre 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  K. MIERENDORFF (Univ. Bonn) : An efficient Intertemporal Auction

• Jeudi 14 juin 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  N. SCHULTZ (PSE, Paris) : Anticompetitive Vertical Mergers Waves

  Co-auteur (s) : J. Hombert et J. Pouyet

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 7 juin 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  L. M. AUSUBEL (Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD) : Walrasian Tatonnement for Discrete Goods

• Jeudi 24 mai 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  S. TAKAHASHI (Harvard univ., Cambridge, MA) : Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners’ Past Play

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 10 mai 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  J. E. ROEMER (Yale univ., New Haven, CT) : The political economy of income taxation in a two-party democracy

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 26 avril 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  O. BOS (PSE, Paris) : Charity Auctions for the Happy Few

• Jeudi 5 avril 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  R. A. LAURENT (PSE, Paris) : Duopole avec biens d'expérience et consommateurs raisonnant par similarité

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 29 mars 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  S. CHASSANG (MIT, Cambridge, MA) : Fear of miscoordination and the robustness of cooperation in dynamic global games with exit

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 8 mars 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  M. VERDIER (ENST, Paris) : Interchange fees and incentives to invest in the quality of a payment card system

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 15 février 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  A. LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKI (PSE, Paris) : Système non-classique et rationalité limitée

  Co-auteur (s) : V. I. Danilov

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 8 février 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  P. T. LEGER (HEC, Montréal) : Provider Competition in a Dynamic Setting

  Co-auteur (s) : M. Allard & L. Rochaix

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 25 janvier 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  A. CHASSAGNON (PSE, Paris) : On moral hazard and non exclusive contracts

• Jeudi 11 janvier 2007

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  B. MENONI (Centre de recherche en économie et statistique, Paris) : Decision making with doubt regarding the consequences of an action

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 21 décembre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  G. WEYL (Princeton univ., Princeton, NJ) : The Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets

  texte intégral [pdf]

  CHANGEMENT : L'horaire et la localisation sont modifiés.

• Jeudi 7 décembre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  L. LAMY (Laboratoire d'économie industrielle, Paris) : Order Independent Individual Rationality

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 23 novembre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  R. NIKOLOVA (Laboratoire d'économie industrielle, Paris) : Incentives, markets and knowledge based hierarchies

• Jeudi 16 novembre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  G. DESGRANGES (THEMA, Cergy-Pontoise) : Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria, Endogenous Acquisition of Information and the Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox

  Co-auteur (s) : M. Heinemann

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 19 octobre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  R.A. LAURENT (PSE, Paris) : Differentiated Duopoly with Elimination By Aspects

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 12 octobre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  L. SIMULA (PSE, Paris) : Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax when Highly Skilled Vote with their Feet

  Co-auteur (s) : A. Trannoy

  texte intégral [pdf]

• Jeudi 21 septembre 2006

  Archives du Campus Jourdan

  W. KETS (Tilburg univ., Tilburg) : Learning to be Prepared

  Co-auteur : Mark Voorneved

  texte intégral [pdf]

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