Paris School of Economics - École d'Économie de Paris

Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Economie de Paris
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Séminaires

Paris Empirical Political Economics Seminar (PEPES)

The Paris Empirical Political Economics Seminar is a new monthly seminar series co-organized by the Department of Economics at Sciences Po and the Paris School of Economics.
Financial support from the DIMeco project of the Ile-de-France region is kindly acknowledged.
The PEPES seminar series is a forum for front-line research in applied political economics providing top international scholars in the field with the opportunity to present their work.
The seminar also aims to provide a common platform in which researchers working in this field in the Paris area may come together.
Seminars will be held on Thursday from 3:00 to 4:30 PM. 
To register for the seminar’s mailing list or to schedule a meeting with one of the speakers, please contact the organizers Katia Zhuravskaya and Ruben Durante.

Location :

  • Fall 2011, Paris School of Economics, Jourdan campus 48 bd. Jourdan
  • Spring 2012, Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints Pères

Prochainement

Aucun événement à venir.

Archives

  • Jeudi 15 mars 2012
    Sciences Po, Salle Jean Monnet (56 rue Jacob) (15h00-00h00)
    Alan GERBER (Yale University) : Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment
    Abstract
    Although the secret ballot has been secured as a legal matter in the United States, formal secrecy protections are not equivalent to convincing citizens that they may vote privately and without fear of reprisal. We present survey evidence that those who have not previously voted are particularly likely to voice doubts about the secrecy of the voting process. We then report results from a field experiment where we mailed information about protections of ballot secrecy to registered voters prior to the 2010 general election. Consistent with our survey data, we find that these letters increased turnout for registered citizens without records of previous turnout, but did not appear to influence the behavior of citizens who had previously voted. The increase in turnout of more than three percentage points for those without previous records of voting is notably larger than the effect of a standard get-out-the-vote mailing for this group. Overall, these results suggest that although the secret ballot is a long-standing institution in the United States, beliefs about this institution may not match the legal reality and that providing basic information about ballot secrecy can affect the decision to participate to an important degree.
  • Lundi 16 janvier 2012
    Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints Pères - Paris 75007 (00h00-00h00)
    Roberto PEROTTI (Bocconi University, Italy) : *
  • Jeudi 15 décembre 2011
    Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (15h00-00h00)
    Matthew GENTZKOW (Univ. of Chicago) : Competition and Ideological Diversity : Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers
  • Jeudi 17 novembre 2011
    Campus Jourdan, bâtiment principal, rez-de-chaussée, salle 8 (15h00-00h00)
    David STROMBERG (IIES, Stockholm) : Determinants of Media - Capture in China
  • Jeudi 13 octobre 2011 15:00-16:30
    13 octobre, Stefano DellaVigna (UC Berkeley)
    Abstract
    _ « {{Does Media Concentration Lead to Biased Coverage? Evidence from Movie Reviews}} », by Stefano DellaVigna _ Fueled by the need to cut costs in a competitive industry, media companies have become increasingly concentrated. But is this consolidation without costs for the quality of information? Concentrated media companies generate a conflict of interest: a media outlet can bias its coverage to benefit companies in the same group. We test empirically for bias by examining movie reviews by media outlets owned by News Corp.–such as the Wall Street Journal–and by Time Warner–such as Time. _ We find a statistically significant, if small, bias in the review score for 20th Century Fox movies in the News Corp. outlets. We detect no bias for Warner Bros. movies in the reviews of the Time Warner outlets, but find instead some evidence of bias by omission: the media in this group are more likely to review highly-rated movies by affiliated studios. Using the wealth of detail in the data, we present evidence regarding bias by individual reviewer, and also biases in the editorial assignment of review tasks. We conclude that reputation limits the extent of bias due to conflict of interest, but that nonetheless powerful biasing forces are at work due to consolidation in the media industry.
  • Jeudi 29 septembre 2011 16:00-17:30
    Room 8, Campus Jourdan
    29 septembre, Paolo Conconi (ULB-ECARES)
    Abstract
    _ « {{Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms}} », by Paola Conconi _ Does policymakers’ horizon affect their willingness to support economic reforms? Voting in the U.S. Congress provides an ideal setting to address this question. Differences between the House and Senate, in which members serve two-year and six-year mandates respectively, allow to examine the role of term length; the staggered structure of the Senate allows to compare the behavior of different “generations” of senators and study the impact of election proximity. Considering all major trade liberalization reforms undertaken by the U.S. since the early 1970’s, we find that Senate members are more likely to support them than House members. However, inter-cameral differences disappear for third-generation senators, who face re-election at the same time as House members. Considering Senate votes alone, we find that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two, a result that holds both when comparing different senators voting on the same bill and individual senators voting on different bills. Inter-generational differences disappear instead for senators who hold safe seats or have announced their retirement, indicating that the protectionist effect of election proximity is driven by legislators’ fear of losing office.

Siège : 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris France

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