Paris School of Economics - École d'Économie de Paris

Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Economie de Paris
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Séminaires

Séminaire Interne de Microéconomie Appliquée (SIMA)

Le séminaire a lieu le mardi de 12h30 à 14h à la Maison des Sciences Economiques (106 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris - M° Campo Formio), salle 115 (1° étage).

Ce séminaire bénéficie d’un soutien financier de l’Ecole d’Economie de Paris et du CES. Pour être tenu informé de l’actualité du séminaire, et faire vos propositions de présentation, envoyez un message à nicolas.jacquemet univ-paris1.fr.


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Archives

  • Mardi 6 juillet 12:30-13:30
    Gaelle Ferrant/Yannick Bourquin :
    Peer Effects in the Labor Supply in South Africa
    Info
    This paper empirically examines the role of social interaction with peer group in labor market participation in South Africa and tests the hypothesis that there are peer effects in labor supply. We use two different empirical strategies to identify peer effects. In the first one, we explicitly model fixed effects for various subgroups in the population and use aggregated variables as an instrument. In the second one, we experiment with a procedure described in details by Bramoullé, Djebbari & Fortin (2009) which exploits non-linearities in peer effects as a source of identification. We show that both methods, although using completely different channels of identification, detect peer effects of a very similar magnitude.
  • Mardi 22 juin 12:30-13:30
    Guillaume Fréchette :
    Session-Effects in the Laboratory
    Page de l’intervenant
    Papier
    Info
    In experimental economics, where subjects participate in different sessions, observations across subjects of a given session might exhibit more correlation than observations across subjects in different sessions. The problem of session-effects is related to similar problems in many experimental and nonexperimental fields. This paper attempts to clarify what the issues are and proposes a set of practical tests to identify the problem as well as ways to test for treatment effects in the presence of session-effects. Simulations are used to assess how these tests perform given the relatively small samples typical of experimental data sets.
  • Mardi 8 juin 12:30-13:30
    Clémence Berson :
    Oligopsony and discrimination on the labor market
    Info
    Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers’ segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers’ preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and the existence of discrimination allows a non-null profit for unprejudiced firms. Consequently, unprejudiced firms have no incentives to push out discriminatory firms. Moreover, the wage gap is more affected by unprejudiced firms’ spread out than by the number of prejudiced firms in the market.
  • Mardi 18 mai 12:30-13:30
    Phillipe Gagnepain
  • Mardi 11 mai 12:30-13:30
    Angelo Secchi :
    Financial Constraints and Firm Dynamics
  • Mardi 6 avril 12:30-13:30
    Denis-Gilles Claude :
    Regulation of Brown and Green Firms
    Info
    We consider a dynamic model of pollution control in which a benevolent social planner seeks to regulate a polluting industry that exhibits the following features. The industry consists of two firms that market differentiated products. Each firm sells one variant of the product and consumers perceive the two variants as both horizontally and vertically differentiated. The horizontal dimension of product differentiation stems from intrinsic characteristics and attributes of the products (color, size or brand, for example) that different consumers may value differently. By contrast, the vertical dimension relates to the environmental quality of the products.
    The duopolistic industry is assumed to be responsible for the release of a pollutant that accumulates in the ambient environment causing present as well as long-run environmental damages. However the two products differ in their degree of environmental friendliness. Consumers are assumed to have perfect information about firms’ environmental performance and are willing to pay more for the cleaner product. Furthermore, they substitute away from the « dirty » good as the environmental problem becomes more severe ; i.e., when the stock of pollution increases.
    When the social planner implements the optimal corrective policy, such a shift in consumption patterns driven by the increase in the pollution stock becomes inconsistent and delusive. Indeed, consumers should recognize that the regulatory intervention solves the environmental problem and revise their preferences accordingly. In this paper, we consider a situation in which this revision does not occur. We characterize the optimal tax policy that decentralizes the social optimum as a Feedback Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game depending on whether or not the social planner corrects consumers preferences when evaluating consumers’ surplus.
  • Mardi 30 mars 12:30-13:30
    Séminaire de recrutement
  • Mardi 16 mars 12:30-13:30
    Séminaire de recrutement
  • Mercredi 10 mars 12:30-13:30
    Antoine Terracol :
    Can reduced activity be a stepping stone for the unemployed
    !! Changement de salle : S17
    Info
    This article evaluates the effectiveness of subsidized temporary jobs as stepping stones to regular employment. We study a French program (Activité Réduite) that allows job seekers to work part-time while remaining registered with the unemployment agency. Under this program, insured individuals are allowed to concurrently receive part of their unemployment benefits and wage income. Using an administrative data set, we fit a multivariate duration model correcting for the endogenous nature of the time to treatment and the time in treatment. We find that subsidized temporary jobs have both a significant lock-in effect and a significant positive post-treatment impact on the hazard rate to employment. Since individuals facing a high implicit tax rate have incentives to self-select into better part-time jobs, we also find that a higher tax rate leads to a weaker lock-in effect and a stronger post-treatment effect. Simulations suggest that the lock-in effect first dominates, but that the overall effect eventually becomes positive. They also point to ways of improving the effectiveness of the policy.
  • Mardi 2 mars 12:30-13:30
    Adam Zylbersztejn :
    Learning, words and actions : experimental evidence on coordination-improving informations
    Info
    Strategic interaction involves beliefs about opponents likely behavior. This paper focuses on subjects perception about other’s rationality, and how to enhance its accuracy. We rely on a sequential one-shot coordination game introduced by Rosenthal (1981), in which coordination on the Pareto dominant outcome fails due to subjects’ reluctance to rely on the rationality of others. We introduce three information-improving features in the genuine setup. The baseline involves simple repetition of the game ; the first treatment implements one-way pre-play communication ; the second one provides historical information on partner’s past decisions. We find strong evidence that any additional information increases the odds of achieving efficiency. Cheap talk appears as rather « light » information that only work as a learning booster. It is outperformed by the « hard’ » information transmitted through actual past decisions. At the individual level, we account for considerable gender differences in both the level of reliance and the pattern of learning.
  • Mardi 16 février 12:30-13:30
    Séminaire de recrutement
  • Mardi 2 février 12:30-13:30
    Francesco Avvisati :
    Errors & Lies about Educational Attainment
    Info
    Using a French employer-employee data set, I document large misclassification errors in both employer reports and self-reports of workers’ educational attainment. I present a model for the data-generating process under which the precision of each report is identified. When major misclassification errors are considered only, estimates indicate that employer reports are correct for about 84% of the sample, while self-reports are accurate for almost 94% of observations.
    Using the same model to test whether wages are related to employers’ mistakes, I find that overstatements of worker education pay a positive wage-premium, whereas under-statements are not linked to significant differences in wages. I propose a simple interpretation of this pattern.
  • Mardi 26 janvier 12:30
    Jean-Phillipe Tropéano :
    Fight Cartels or Control Mergers ? On the Optimal Allocation of Enforcement Powers and Resources within Competition Policy
    Info
    This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of the competition law in terms of merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of the competition policy given the cost of resources available to the competition agency and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms’ behavior in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. We are thus able to infer the optimal allocation of enforcement efforts between controlling mergers and fighting cartels, and thereby conclude on their optimal competition policy mix. We show for instance that to the extent that firms may switch from cartel to merger depending on the current focus of the competition law enforcement, applying a stricter merger control to prevent anti-competitive mergers only pays if the cartel fighting policy is not too expensive.
  • Mardi 19 janvier 12:30-13:30
    Luke Haywood :
    Too rich to do the dirty work ? Wealth in quality job search
    Info
    Can money buy you a better quality job ? The common answer to this question focuses on wage di-erentials and attempts to identify the marginal willingness to pay for speci-c job attributes. However, assets and unearned income can be expected to also play an important role in job choice.
    In a job search framework where information about vacancies is limited (individuals receive job o-ers and must decide immediately to take or reject them), preferences for job characteristics (both monetary and non-monetary) will be expressed in di-ering job durations : as is well-known, turnover is higher where job quality is worse. Data on job duration can thus be used to identify workers’ marginal willingness to pay for job characteristics. What impact do di-ering wealth-levels have in this framework ?
    In analyses of the labour market focusing on monetary rewards to work, wealth typically reduces participation rates. In job search mod- els the marginal bene-t of search diminishes as the marginal utility of income associated with a job decreases - job search becomes less intensive (or, with exogenous job arrivals, the reservation wage rises). Higher wealth levels in a framework where jobs have a qualitative (non- monetary) component might augment the demand for non-monetary job characteristics. This would translate to a di-erential impact of job quality on turnover rates depending on the level of wealth.
    Using panel data including information on di-erent types of wealth, wages and (subjective) working conditions, this article -rst looks at the impact of windfalls (lottery wins, inheritance...) on job durations in jobs of di-ering quality. The impact of changes in wealth on the de- mand for job characteristics can be reconstructed.
    Second, a very preliminary model allowing for wealth accumulation in the labour market is sketched. The implications of allowing workers to save part of their earnings on job search and choice are considered.
  • Mardi 5 janvier 12:30-14:00
    Pierre Fleckinger :
    The Incentive Value of Deadlines
    Info
    We study the problem of dynamic incentives provision in a discrete-time Principal-Agent setting. The agent should complete one single project over an infinite time horizon. To control the stream of effort, the principal has to balance incentives over time, since future bonuses crowd out today’s motivation. As a consequence, while the first-best effort stream is stationary and unbounded, the optimal deterministic contract entails a bounded quantity of effort : even though the horizon is infinite, incentive provision terminates in finite time. Various extensions and comparative statics are studied.
  • Mardi 1er décembre 2009 12:30-14:00
    Milo Bianchi :
    Credit, Risk, and Entrepreneurial Choices : Evidence from Rural Mexico
    Info
    We explore the effects of randomly assigned cash transfers on occupational choices in rural Mexico. We report three main findings. First, the treatment significantly increases the probability to become entrepreneur. Second, those who become entrepreneurs due to the treatment are likely to work more, concentrate into one occupation and earn more. Third, occupational choices do not depend on the size of current transfers (above some minimal level), but they are significantly affected by the amount of future transfers. In light of this evidence, we discuss the role of credit and especially insurance constraints in shaping occupational choices.
  • Mardi 17 novembre 2009 12:30-13:30
    Jean-Marc Tallon :
    Ambiguity and the historical equity premium
    Info
    The paper seeks to estimate the impact of ambiguity and agents’ sensitivity to ambiguity on the historically observed equity premium. We consider a Lucas-tree pure-exchange economy. We introduce two key non-standard assumptions in this standard setting : the representative agent’s beliefs about the dividend/consumption process is ambiguous and two, the agent’s preferences are sensitive to this ambiguity (in the sense of the « smooth ambiguity aversion » model). We calibrate the agent’s belief by assuming that the economy evolves according to a hidden state model. We consider a range of parametric levels of ambiguity aversion plausible in the sense of being well within the range of observed behavior in laboratory experiments on ambiguity aversion. Putting this together with the ambiguity that is consistent with the historical growth path, we arrive at estimates of the contribution of ambiguity to the observed equity premium.
  • Mardi 20 octobre 2009 12:30-13:30
    Chantal Marlats :
    Reputation In Stochastic Games with two Long Lived Players
    Info
    This paper analyses reputation effects in stochastic games when players are long-lived. In comparison to repeated games (i.e. stochastic game with an unique state), out equilibrium beliefs introduce an additional difficulty that may prevent a player to successfully establish a reputation : the uniformed player may persistently not play his best response against the stackelberg strategy because he wants to prevent the play to reach states in which he believes that his opponent will inflict him very low payoffs. We show that under one of the following restrictions, (1) independence of the support of the law motion to uniformed player’s actions and (2) state invariance of his asymptotic minmax payoffs, the informed player can guarantee almost the highest payoff consistent with his control over the law motion and his opponent’s rationality, in all the equilibria. We apply this result to a repeated hold up game in which a seller and a buyer face an ex-ante non contractible investment decision. The underlying stochastic game satisfies our conditions for reputation effects only when the seller is the informed player. In that case the socially efficient investment arises in finite time (almost surely) in all the equilibria. When the buyer is uncertain about the seller’s type, then there is an equilibrium in which the seller underinvests.
  • Mardi 23 juin 2009 12:30-13:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle/room 6°
    Anna Akatenko :
    Are Paul, Louise, Karim and Fatma all alike ? Cultural and Economic Segregation based on First Names
  • Mardi 9 juin 2009 12:30-13:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle/room 6°
    Irène Selwaness :
    Older Workers Employment in Egypt : A Multivariate Probit Analysis
  • Mardi 26 mai 2009 13:00-14:30
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle/room 114
    Gianluca Violante :
    How Much Insurance in Bewley Models ?
  • Mardi 12 mai 2009 12:00-13:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle du 6°
    Pierre FLECKINGER, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Collective reputation and market structure
  • Mardi 28 avril 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 6e
    Hélène Huber, Université Paris 1, CES :
    L’accès aux soins des populations immigrées et des minorités : l’exemple américain.
  • Mardi 31 mars 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    ANNULE :
    TBA
  • Mardi 17 mars 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Benjamin Remy Holcblat :
    TBA
  • Mardi 24 février 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Clémence Berson, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Is There More Discrimination in the Public Sector Than in the Private Sector ? The Case of Second Generation Migrants in France
  • Vendredi 6 février 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    David Margolis, Université Paris 1, CES :
    The Structure of Unemployment Compensation, Labor Market Signaling and Informal Sector Work
  • Vendredi 30 janvier 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Does team competition eliminate the gender gap in entry in competitive environments ?
  • Vendredi 23 janvier 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Séminaire de Recrutement EEP : Sophie Bade :
    Stochastic Independence with Maxmin Expected Utilities
    Info
  • Vendredi 9 janvier 2009 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    ATTENTION - Salle 115
    Moshik Lavie :
    Attention - salle 115. Match me, if you can : wage secrecy & matching in a search model
  • Vendredi 5 décembre 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Marie-Anne Valfort, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Ethnic diversity, trust and voting behaviour : experimental evidence from Benin
  • Vendredi 21 novembre 2008 13:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Mohamad Khaled, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Distributional dynamics using quartic-based state-space models
  • Vendredi 7 novembre 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Josselin Thuilliez :
    L’impact du paludisme sur la scolarité au Mali
  • Vendredi 24 octobre 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Natalia Kyui :
    Return to Education and Education-Occupation Matching within a Transition Economy. Empirical Analysis for the Russian Federation
  • Vendredi 10 octobre 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Anna Okatenko :
    Job Search with Bayes Priors
  • Mercredi 2 juillet 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    Salle 114
    Marie-Aude Laguna :
    boursiers : l’analyse des catastrophes chimiques
  • Mercredi 18 juin 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    ATTENTION - Salle 115
    Adam Rosen :
    Identification with Imperfect Instruments
  • Mercredi 4 juin 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    ATTENTION - Salle 115
    Elisabeth Cudeville, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Conjugal Contract, Gender Wage Discrimination and Social Norms
  • Mercredi 21 mai 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    ATTENTION - Salle 115
    Antoine Terracol :
    Can reduced activity be a stepping stone for the unemployed ?
  • Mercredi 7 mai 2008 12:30-14:00
    Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
    ATTENTION - Salle 115
    Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Université Paris 1, CES :
    Monetary Incentives to Learn Calibration : a Gender-Dependent Impact

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