Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”

July 12–13, 2012

Paris School of Economics
48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Within the framework of the labex OSE

Thursday, July 12

10:00 - 10:45: Tilman Borgers (Michigan U):
“Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules”

10:45 - 11:30: Takuro Yamashita (TSE):
“A robustly revenue maximizing auction in admissible strategies”

Coffee Break

11:45 - 12:30: Andy Postlewaite (U Penn):
“Matching with Incomplete Information”

Lunch

14:00 - 14:45: Onur Kesten (Carnegie Mellon U):
“From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a family of assignment mechanisms”

14:45 - 15:30: Fuhito Kojima (Stanford):
“Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach”

Coffee Break

16:00 - 16:45: Lucie Ménager (Paris 2):
“Communication in procurement”

16:45 - 17:30: Laurent Lamy (PSE):
“Equilibria in two-stage sequential second-price auctions with multi-unit demands”
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Friday, July 13

09:15 - 10:00: Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore):

“Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction”

10:00 - 10:45: Alia Gizatulina (Max Planck Institute -- Bonn):

“On Designer’ Uncertainty and Robustness of the BDP Property”

Coffee Break

11:00 - 11:45: Guillaume Haeringer (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona):

“Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences”

11:45 - 12:30: Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern):

“On the Limits of Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design”

Organizer: Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics – CNRS)

If you wish to attend, please send a mail to lelievre@pse.ens.fr.
Please specify if you would like to attend the lunch on July, 12 and July, 13 (subject to limitation)