

Address:

Maison des Sciences Economiques
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - France
75647 Paris Cedex 13

Personal Informations:

Citizenship: French
Date of birth: 10/11/1990
Phone: +33(0) 6 73 41 69 72
email: antoine.prevet@univ-paris1.fr

Research topics

Industrial Organization; Contract Theory; Monitoring; Information Management; Public Sector

Education

2013 - present	PhD Economics, Paris School of Economics - Université Paris 1 Thesis title: Incentives and Contracts in the Public Sector Expected completion date: June 2018 Advisor: Pierre Fleckinger
2011-2013	M. Sc Empirical and Theoretical Economics (ETE), Paris School of Economics - Université Paris 1
2010-2011	B. A Sociology, Université Paris 4
2010-2013	Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan

Research

“Information Management by a Budget Constrained Principal” (Job Market Paper)

This paper contributes to the debate on transparency in the Public Sector by considering one of its major features: a limited budget. In a principal-agent model with moral hazard and bounds on transfers, I study an information design problem where the principal can choose to be transparent and fully reveal information before the agent takes action or remain opaque. On the one hand, transparency makes it possible for the principal to engage her limited budget only when the expected gain is worth the implementation cost. On the other hand, opacity does not allow these tailored-made contracts but ensures optimal incentives. I show that transparency is more likely to be optimal for the principal when the task is less valuable and the budget is lower. Furthermore, the optimal information structure is derived and requires that the agent only be told what action to undertake.

“Incentives, procedure and the extra mile” (Working Paper)

We model the widespread intuition that more bureaucratic management can lead to less effort and quality in a principal-agent framework. Introducing a procedure aiming at codifying and easing verification of effort can be socially inefficient yet chosen by the principal. In the model with three performance levels, the agent can either shirk, work or go the extra mile, standard effort decreases the occurrence of bad performance, while the extra mile increases the one of the best and is harder to codify. The usual monotone likelihood ratio property naturally breaks down in such a setting. We show that a procedure makes the extra mile both cheaper and less implemented than without procedure. The introduction of a procedure has implications for organizational design where the principal faces a trade off between incentive gains from task bundling and verification.

“Providing public utilities in a common agency framework: making, buying and level of association” (Working Paper), with Alexandre Mayol and Benjamin Michallet both fellow Ph.D students at Paris School of Economics.

As public service providers, local governments have to deal with three issues: the global quality of the considered service, the production mode either in-house or private, and the level of association with other local governments. We use a Principal-Agent LEN framework with moral hazard to model the three identified levels of association : “commune”, “syndicat” and “communauté de commune”, and the two possible modes of production: public (in-house) and private (outsourcing) in the French Water Industry. We show that the production mode is not sufficient to explain price differences: the level of association is a crucial determinant of cost structures. This model makes it possible to clarify the tradeoffs faced by local governments, and allows us to identify the major drivers of their choice namely the power of the organizational scale (dis)economies and the magnitude of their accountability. Using data from 15000 French drinking water providers, we test these theoretical results by benchmarking the combinations between public/private and the three levels of association. Our results suggest that the organizational form explains the largest variations in the efficiency of local public services.

“R v lation de l’information par un principal au budget limit ” (Working Paper), *Revised & Resubmitted, Revue Economique.*

We study under which circumstances a principal would prefer to inform her agent about the impact of his hidden action on the outcome. We show that this choice is a function of the principal’s incentive power. Indeed, moral hazard may require the use of very high ex-post bonuses not available to the principal. In these configurations, managing her scarce incentive power, the principal faces a trade-off between incentive efficiency when the agent is kept in the dark and incentive relevance with disclosure.

Presentations

2017	Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory (Universit� Paris 2, invited) JMA 2017 (Le Mans, France) Institutional and Organizational Economics Academy (Corsica, France) CERNA Doctoral Workshop (Ecole des Mines, France)
2016	JMA 2016 (Besan�on, France) QED Jamboree (University of Amsterdam) S�minaire de la Chaire EPPP (IAE, Paris) Rencontres d’Aussois 2016 (Labex OSE)
2015	AFSE 2015 (Rennes, France) SIMA (Paris 1) Rencontres d’Aussois 2015 (Labex OSE)

Teaching Experience

2016 - 2018	Universit� Paris 1 Assistant Lecturer (ATER)
2013-2018	Universit� Paris 1 Undergraduate Courses - Mathematics (L1)

2017 **Sciences Po Paris**
Undergraduate Courses - Macroeconomics - Prof. Yann Algan

2013 **Université Paris 1**
Undergraduate Courses - Microeconomics (L1)

2016-2017 **Lycée Stanislas Paris** - Level B.A
Exam preparation tutor for selective graduate schools

Professional Experience

2016 Economist, **Atexo impact**, Consultant for the French Parliament

2013 Internship, **Cour des Comptes**,
General Accounting Office of the French State
Inquiry - State Financing for Universities

Summer 2012 Internship, **Chamber of Commerce and Industry**, Normandy,
Empirical Study - Economic Intelligence Practices

Fellowship

PhD Scholarship, **Université Paris 1 - PSE**

Research References

[Pierre Fleckinger](#)
Associate Professor, **Mines ParisTech**
Associate Member, **PSE**
pierre.fleckinger@mines-paristech.fr

[David Martimort](#)
Research Director, **EHESS**
Associate Chair, **PSE**
david.martimort@psemail.eu

[Philippe Jehiel](#)
Research fellow, **PSE**
Professor of Economics, **University College London**
Ingénieur en chef, **Ponts et Chaussées**
jehiel@pse.ens.fr

Teaching References

[Jean François Caulier](#)
Assistant Professor, **Université Paris 1**
Department of Applied Mathematics
jean-francois.caulier@univ-paris1.fr