

CAMILLE TERRIER
cterrier@mit.edu

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
SCHOOL EFFECTIVENESS AND INEQUALITY INITIATIVE
PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

CONTACT INFORMATION

MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-508
Cambridge, MA 02139
+1 (857) 331-0924
cterrier@mit.edu
<https://sites.google.com/view/camilleterrier>

PSE PLACEMENT OFFICER

Professor David Margolis
david.margolis@psemail.eu
+33 (0)1 80 52 18 58

Assistant: Véronique Guillotin
veronique.guillotin@psemail.eu
+33 (0)1 80 52 16 60

FIELDS

Primary Fields: Labor Economics, Economics of Education
Secondary Fields: Market Design

CURRENT POSITION

Postdoctoral Fellow
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
School Effectiveness and Inequality Initiative (SEII)
June 2016 – June 2018

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Paris School of Economics (PSE)
PhD, Economics, October 2016
Dissertation: “*Three Essays in Economics of Education*”
Dissertation committee: Stephen Machin (LSE), Parag Pathak (MIT), Eric Maurin (PSE), Corinne Prost (INSEE), Marc Gurgand (PSE)

REFERENCES

Professor Josh Angrist
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52,
Cambridge, MA 02139
+1 (617) 253-8909
[*angrist@mit.edu*](mailto:angrist@mit.edu)

Professor Parag Pathak
MIT Department of Economics
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52
Cambridge, MA 02139
+1 (617) 253-7458
[*ppathak@mit.edu*](mailto:ppathak@mit.edu)

Professor Marc Gurgand
Paris School of Economics
48, bd Jourdan,
75014 Paris
+33 (0)1 43 13 63 05
[*marc.gurgand@psemail.eu*](mailto:marc.gurgand@psemail.eu)

AFFILIATIONS

Research Affiliate, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Research Associate, Centre for Economic Performance (CEP), London School of Economics (LSE)

CITIZENSHIP LANGUAGES

French
French (native), English (fluent), German (basic)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	2012 – 2014	Lecturer, University Paris Dauphine, Advanced Microeconomics
	2012	Teaching Assistant, Sciences Po, Microeconomics (undergraduate)
RELEVANT POSITIONS	2015 – 2016	Research Assistant for Prof. McNally and Prof. Machin, LSE
	2014 – 2015	Visiting PhD student, London School of Economics European Doctoral Program in Quantitative Economics
	2011 – 2012	Research Assistant, J-PAL
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES		Referee for American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Economics of Education Review.
SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES		<p>2017: Columbia University Applied Micro Theory Colloquium, Princeton Education Research Section Workshop, MIT Labor Lunch, Society of Labor Economics (SOLE) conference, American Economic Association (AEA) conference, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) conference, Laval University Labor seminar.</p> <p>2016: MIT Labor Lunch, European Economic Association (EEA) conference, Royal Economic Society (RES) conference, Stockholm University, University Carlos III, UQAM University, Bristol University.</p> <p>2015: LSE Labor Market workshop, PSE Applied Economics Lunch seminar, European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, University College London (UCL), French Ministry of Education Workshop, IZA European Summer School in Labor Economics, LEER Workshop on Education Economics, Royal Economic Society (RES) conference.</p>
RESEARCH PAPERS		<p>“Fiscal and Education Spillovers from Charter Expansion” (with Matthew White Ridley) Job market paper</p> <p><i>The fiscal and educational consequences of charter expansion for non-charter students are central issues in the debate over charter schools. Does the charter sector drain resources and high-achieving peers from non-charter schools? This paper provides causal evidence on the fiscal and educational impact of charter schools expansion on school districts. The empirical strategy exploits a 2010 reform that lifted caps on charter schools for underperforming districts in Massachusetts. The research design uses complementary synthetic control instrumental variable (IV-SC) and Differences-in-Differences instrumental variables (IV-DiD) estimators. The results suggest increases in charter attendance encourage districts to shift expenditure in the traditional sector from support services to instruction and salaries. At the same time, charter expansion has little effect on non-charter students’ achievement.</i></p> <p>“Boys Lag Behind: How Teachers’ Gender Biases Affect Student Achievement”, submitted.</p> <p><i>I use a combination of blind and non-blind test scores to show that middle school teachers favor girls when they grade. This favoritism, estimated in the form of individual teacher effects, has long-term consequences: as measured by their national evaluations three years later, male students make less progress than their female counterparts. Gender-biased grading accounts for 21 percent of boys falling behind girls in math during middle school. On the other hand, girls who benefit from gender bias in math are more likely to select a science track in high school.</i></p> <p>SEII Working Paper n° 2016.07, November 2016 Policy Brief n°14, December 2014, Institute for Public Policy</p>

Press: The Times (2015), BBC News (2015), Le Monde (2014), Le Monde les décodeurs (2014).

“The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence” (with Julien Combe and Olivier Tercieux), submitted.

A modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice to assign teachers to schools. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify the unique strategy-proof mechanism that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. We show that this mechanism performs much better by adopting a large market approach and by using a rich dataset on teachers' applications in France. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than doubles under our mechanism.

“Can Teacher Mobility be Improved Without Penalising Less Attractive Schools? The Role of a New Assignment Algorithm” (with Julien Combe and Olivier Tercieux)

We propose an extension of the You-Request-My-House-I-Get-Your-Turn (YRMH-IGYT) algorithm introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) to the two-sided and many-to-one matching environment. This generalization keeps the good properties of two-sided efficiency and strategyproofness. Using French data on the assignment of teachers to schools, we show that this algorithm could significantly increase teachers' mobility, while allowing for a fine control of movement from disadvantaged regions.

Education & Formation, n°92, Décembre 2016 (in French).
Policy Brief n°24 - April 2016 – Institute for Public Policy
Press: France Inter, Le Café Pédagogique, AEF.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Banning the Boston Assignment Mechanism: Effects on School Segregation and Student Achievement” (with Parag Pathak)

“Coordination of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms: Insights from the Pan-London Admission Scheme” (with Graham Carter, Parag Pathak, and Tayfun Sönmez)

“The Introduction of University Technical Colleges (UTC) in England: An Impact Evaluation” (with Stephen Machin and Sandra McNally)

“The Effectiveness of CEOs in the Public Sector: Evidence from Further Education Colleges in England” (with Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela and Clémentine Van-Effenterre)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

“Why French school curriculum and timetable reforms forced teachers onto the streets”, The Conversation, 22 May 2015

“Matching practices of teachers to schools in France”, 2014
matching-in-practice.eu

“The Attractiveness of the Teaching Profession: a Retrospective Study”, Note d'information n° 24, June 2014, French Ministry of Education.