

Clean Industrial Policy

Ralf Martin


Joint with Dennis Verhoeven

**Prepared for PSE-CEPR Policy Forum
June 30, 2023**

Context

- Revival of vertical Industrial Policy
- IRA: \$400 billion over 10 years
- EU Green deal €1.5 Trillion

Energy funding from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act spans major funding themes, totaling \$370 billion.



Note: This exhibit reflects analysis of the appropriation figures contained in the Inflation Reduction Act, as well as those reported by the Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation. This analysis may differ from other analyses due to differences in methodology.
 Source: Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (2021-22); Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, H.R. 3684, 117th Cong. (2021-22)


Collection Net Zero Innovation Portfolio

The Net Zero Innovation Portfolio provides funding for low-carbon technologies and systems. Decreasing the costs of decarbonisation, the Portfolio will help enable the UK to end its contribution to climate change.

From: [Department for Energy Security and Net Zero](#) and [Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy](#)

Published 3 March 2021

Last updated 25 May 2023 — [See all updates](#)




Strategic partnerships – the 11 sectors


- Published
- Life Science Strategy (Dec 2011) and one year on update (Dec 2012)**
Aim: To make the UK the global hub for life sciences
 - Nuclear (March 2013)**
Aim: Grow the global market share; set out role that nuclear plays in UK energy mix
 - Information Economy (June 2013)**
Aim: to seize the opportunities from new ICT technology
 - Aerospace (March 2013)**
Aim: Maintain existing UK market share; secure UK employment
 - Oil and Gas (March 2013)**
Aim: Increase inward investment in energy supply chain
 - Construction (July 2013)**
Aim: make the UK the global leader in sustainable construction
 - Professional Business Services (July 2013)**
Aim: make the UK the global hub of expertise
 - Automotive (July 2013)**
Aim: Investment in R&D; grow and develop UK supply chain
 - Education (July 2013)**
Aim: Increase the UK's education exports
 - Offshore wind (August 2013)**
Aim: Build competitive and innovative UK supply chain
 - Agri-tech (July 2013)**
Aim: increase inward investment and exports



Policy objectives



- Inexorable tradeoffs?
- Or potential for win-win-win-win?
- Spillovers are key



Can we trick Tinbergen?





Our research...

Guillard et al: "Efficient Industrial Policy: Standing on the shoulders of hidden giants"

Efficient industrial policy for innovation: standing on the shoulders of hidden giants

Charlotte Guillard
Ralf Martin
Pierre Mohnen
Catherine Thomas
Dennis Verhoeven

- *New approach to measure knowledge spillovers and the return to public R&D subsidies from patent data*
- *Compare clean tech to other (trending) technology fields*
- *Examine spillover flows between countries and regions (and how they differ for clean tech vs other tech)*



Questions

And how we try to answer them..

- Can we have both: more and cleaner growth?
Are knowledge spillovers from clean tech bigger than from other techs?
- Which (clean) areas in particular should we support?
Do some clean areas generate more spillovers
- Should we be worried (e.g. in the UK or Europe) if the US expands subsidies for clean?
Examine spillover flows between major regions
- How inclusive is “green growth”?
Examine spillover flows between (and within) leading and lagging regions


Measuring knowledge spillovers from patent data

(12) **United States Patent**
Breebaart (10) Patent No.: **US 7,447,629 B2**
(45) Date of Patent: **Nov. 4, 2008**

(54) **AUDIO CODING**
(75) Inventor: **Dirk Jeroen Breebaart**, Eindhoven (NL)
(73) Assignee: **Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.**, Eindhoven (NL)
(*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 663 days.
(21) Appl. No.: **10/520,307**
(22) PCT Filed: **Jun. 19, 2003**
(86) PCT No.: **PCT/IB03/02858** (Continued)
FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS
§ 371 (g)(1), (2), (4) Date: **Jan. 5, 2005** EP 0618380 A1 10/1994
(87) PCT Pub. No.: **WO2004/088805** (Continued)
PCT Pub. Date: **Jan. 22, 2004** Primary Examiner—Daniel D Abebe
(65) **Prior Publication Data**
US 2006/0206323 A1 Sep. 14, 2006
(30) **Foreign Application Priority Data**
Jul. 12, 2002 (EP) 02077866
(51) **Int. Cl.**
G10L 21/00 (2006.01)
(52) **U.S. Cl.** 704/219; 704/500; 381/2; 381/307
(58) **Field of Classification Search** 704/219; 704/500; 381/2; 307
See application file for complete search history.


(56) **References Cited**
3,204,110 A 8/1965 Masuda
3,250,140 A 5/1966 Russel
3,750,386 A 8/1973 Harting

A method of encoding a multi-channel audio signal including at least a first signal component (LF), a second signal component (LR) and a third signal component (RF). The method comprises the steps of encoding the first and second signal components by a first parametric encoder (202) resulting in a first encoded signal (L) and a first set of encoding parameters (P1), encoding the first encoded signal and a further signal (R) by a second parametric encoder (201), resulting in a second encoded signal (T) and a second set of encoding parameters (P2), where the further signal is derived from at least the third signal component (RF) and the first encoded signal (L) and the second encoded signal (T) and a second set of encoding parameters (P2), representing the multi-channel audio signal at least by a further encoded signal (T) derived from at least the second encoded signal, by the first set of encoding parameters and by the second set of encoding parameters.



United States Patent [19] **4,260,901**
Woodbridge [11] **Apr. 7, 1981**
[45]

(54) **WAVE OPERATED ELECTRICAL GENERATION SYSTEM**
(76) Inventor: **David D. Woodbridge**, 9190 Red Branch Rd., Columbia, Md.
(21) Appl. No.: **15,242**
(22) Filed: **Feb. 26, 1979**
(51) **Int. Cl.** F03B 13/12; E02B 9/08
(52) **U.S. Cl.** 290/42; 290/53; 417/331
(58) **Field of Search** 290/42, 53; 417/330-337, 341, 343
(56) **References Cited**
U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
1,244,309 10/1917 Fox 290/53 X
3,011,062 11/1961 Goldsmith 290/53
3,965,365 6/1976 Parr 290/42 X
4,060,344 11/1977 Ootsu 417/330
Primary Examiner—J. V. Truhe
Assistant Examiner—W. E. Duncanson, Jr.
10 Claims, 4 Drawing Figures




Understanding Ocean waves helped in dealing with Audio Waves



Hidden Giants vs Illusory Giants




Private Value (PV)=\$1MM



PV=\$0.1MM PV=\$0.1MM PV=\$0.1MM

Indirect impacts matter



PV=\$100MM

The **P**riate **V**alue of citing patents matter



PRANK vs Page Rank

From random surfer to economic value

Social Value of Innovation i

$$PRANK_i = PrivateValue_i + \sum_{j \in B(i)} \phi_{ij} PRANK_j$$

Private Value + Share of PRANK of citing innovations

All Innovations citing i

$$\phi_{sij} = \sigma \frac{1}{BackwardCitations_j} < 1$$

Similar to Google's Page Rank but social value interpretation instead of random surfer

$$PAGE\ RANK_i = \frac{1}{\#Webpages} \alpha + \sum_{j \in B(i)} \phi_{ij} PAGE\ RANK_j$$



Motivation: $PRANK_j = A_j \times (BC_j)^\sigma \times X_j^{1-\sigma}$

Think of it as a Social value production function

Sum of backward citations of innovations i

$\sigma = \text{elasticity of value response to citations}$

From PRANK to spillovers

$$PRANK_i = PrivateValue_i + \sum_{j \in B(i)} \phi_{ij} PRANK_j$$

Prank corresponds to the marginal impact of one more backward citation
 $B_j = \sum_i 1$

$$Spillovers_i = PRANK_i - PrivateValue_i$$



Prank vs counting citations

Let's stop being In-coherent

$$PRANK_i = PrivateValue_i + \sum_{j \in B(i)} \phi_{ij} PRANK_j$$

$$CiteCount_i = \sum_{j \in B(i)} 1$$

Innovations are heterogeneous on the LHS

Innovations are homogenous on the RHS




Private Value of an Innovation

- Private Value: Kogan (QJE2017) et al propose event study

Probability of Success


$$\Delta \text{MarketValue}_{\text{Firm}(i)} = (1 - \pi_i) \times \text{PatentValue}_i$$



For non public firms? → Extrapolate by


- Technology class
- Claim count
- Family size

National vs Global Spillover



How internalised are spillovers at the level of countries/regions/sectors



National vs Global vs between nations



The return on R&D subsidies...

- So far we discussed how we can compute "social value" of innovations
- Relevant for investors and government is the return on R&D or R&D subsidies
- Heterogeneity in R&D investment required for an inventive step (patent) across fields
- Heterogeneity in how innovators respond to R&D subsidies

A simple model



Flow of ideas
(Pareto
distribution)

Curvature of idea
distribution


Project cost

$$P(PV_i \leq v | \delta > \lambda) = \Phi^{PV}(v) = \begin{cases} \frac{\alpha v}{(\alpha+1)2c} & \text{if } 2c > v \\ 1 - \frac{2^\alpha c^\alpha}{(\alpha+1)v^\alpha} & \text{if } 2c < v \end{cases}$$

- We calibrate this model using the distribution of private patent values
- Specific parameters for narrow technology fields

Inferring R&D spending from the private value distribution

Backing out the innovation response from the curvature of the private value distribution





Backing out the R&D cost from the location of the peak of the private value distribution

Figure 7: Actual vs modeled PV distributions

(a) A61K



(b) G06F



Notes: Comparison of actual and modeled private value distributions for two prevalent IPC subclasses. Histogram plots actual private value distribution in the class, blue line shows the modeled density. Private values are based on those estimated in KPSS.

³³A61K: 'Preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes' and G06F: 'Electric digital data processing'

The marginal impact of subsidies



- Subsidy increase implies that barriers are lowered
- Somewhat lower quality ideas get now developed
- Impact depends on tech specific R&D cost and probability density of ideas near threshold
- Also: marginal spillovers might be different from average

ISTRAX Detail

Marginal financial return of increasing per project support s

$$I\text{Stra}X = \left(\frac{\partial E\{V\}}{\partial s} - \frac{\partial E\{S\}}{\partial s} \right) \times \left(\frac{\partial E\{S\}}{\partial s} \right)^{-1} \quad (21)$$

$$= \frac{1 + \frac{1}{c} E\{EV(\alpha - \alpha \times \mathbb{I}\{v > 2c\} + \mathbb{I}\{v < 2c\}) \mid \delta > \lambda\}}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{c} s} - 1 \quad (22)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & E\{EV(\alpha - \alpha \times \mathbb{I}\{v > \hat{2}c\} + \mathbb{I}\{v < 2c\}) \mid \delta > \lambda\} \Big|_{a,\kappa} \\ &= \frac{1}{\#A} \sum_{i \in A} EV_i \times (\alpha_a - \alpha_a \times \mathbb{I}\{v_i > 2c_a\} + \mathbb{I}\{v_i < 2c_a\}) \end{aligned}$$

Data

- PATSTAT (2021 edition)
- Innovation level (patent family) 2000-2018
- Drop own citations of firms (via ORBIS IP)


Table 1: Summary statistics

	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Min.	25th pct.	50th pct.	75th pct.	Max.
Innovations								
<i>PV</i>	7,017,805	17.44	20.24	0.0	2.62	12.83	23.57	590.05
<i>SV</i>	7,017,805	5.09	13.94	0.0	0.0	0.64	4.9	3236.8

What's clean?

- YO2
- BEIS categories

Figure 3: Innovations by country




Notes:

Our Results....


Global returns globally

Figure 4: Global returns – weighted average across countries



Clean advantage varies a lot

Figure 5: Clean Subsidy Advantage by country – Global returns



In most countries clean provides above average returns

Local (national) vs global returns

Figure 7: Local returns – weighted average across countries






Figure 8: Clean Subsidy Advantage by country – Local returns



Most countries will not have sufficient incentives for clean from a purely national perspective (global clean advantage > national clean advantage)


Share of spillover internalised




The value of supra national co-ordination

Policy Thought experiment: Increase clean innovation by 1%
A: according to national rank
B: according to supranational grouping rank

Figure 9: Benefits of supranational coordination



How much do the returns from clean R&D increase by supra national co-ordination?





Spillover flows

US clean subsidy increase = increase of indirect subsidy for EU inventors

Benefit per \$ spent in US					
	United States	Europe	Japan	Korea	China
Clean	1.47	1.26	1.07	1.09	1.10
All	1.50	1.18	1.06	1.07	1.09


Net effect higher elsewhere compared to US




Inside & outside the golden triangle

Lagging on Lagging


Return within lagging regions of the UK



Return within leading regions of the UK



Spillovers to lagging regions




Lagging on lagging average

Clean tech:


- **Creates highest returns within lagging regions**
- **Leads to highest spillovers from leading to lagging regions**

Lagging regions have a clean comparative advantage:



A. % total UK innovation



B. Covid-related % of regional innovation



C. Clean % of regional innovation



R&D investment in clean disproportionately helps lagging regions:

- Directly
- Indirectly: via spillovers from clean inventors in leading regions

Figure 1: Share of clean in total innovation (in %)

Conclusion

- **By providing strategic support for specific clean policies we can ensure that the transition to a clean economic equilibrium has the least negative impact on growth.**
- **These effects can be improved by supra national co-ordination of R&D policy**
- **We should welcome initiatives like the IRA: knowledge spillover effects will be felt everywhere and improve on status quo**
- **The clean transition can also have the potential to lessen economic differences within and between countries.**

possibly a positive impact

Transition to clean: a win-win-win-win strategy? Clean, inclusive and secure, growth




Thanks

r.martin@imperial.ac.uk




Share of spillover internalised




Global social return to R&D subsidies

Relative return clean vs other



Relative by detailed field




- In almost all countries the return to R&D subsidies is higher for clean tech
- Variation in top sub fields across countries





Within country (national) social return to R&D

subsidies

Relative return clean vs other



Return by detailed field




- National returns for clean are also generally larger (big exception CH)
- But different technologies matter from a national point of view


The global vs within country difference

- Reason for difference: Spillovers spill mostly out of countries
- Strong motivation for co-ordination of R&D policy (e.g. at EU level: 25% higher returns of R&D subsidies)
- Implication for how we assess policies such as Inflation Reduction Act (IRA): includes \$391 billion for climate change

Share of spillovers internalised within country



Gap between global and national in clean vs other tech



IRA will make the US generate more knowledge spillovers

Gap between global and national is 40% bigger for clean vs other tech in US