



TRANSATLANTIC THEORY WORKSHOP

Paris, 10th - 12th September 2014

Maison des Sciences Economiques - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital
75013 Paris

[Preliminary program]

Wednesday, 10th September, 2014

8:30 - 9:00: Welcome coffee & registration

9:00 - 09:50: [Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under Uncertainty](#) - Jean-Marc Tallon
(Paris School of Economics)

09:50 - 10:40: [Reference Points and Learning](#) - Alan Beggs (Oxford University)

10:40 - 11:10: Coffee break

11:10 - 12:00: [Reconciling Kinked and Smooth Approaches to Ambiguity](#) - Mohammed Abdelaoui
(HEC)

12:00 - 1:30pm: Lunch break

1:30 - 2:20pm: [Entropy and Memory](#) - Ron Peretz (LSE)

2:20 - 3:10pm: [Evidence based Mechanisms](#) - Eduardo Perez (Ecole Polytechnique)

3:10 - 3:40 pm: Coffee break

3:40 - 4:30pm: [Projection Equilibrium](#) - Kristof Madarasz (LSE)

4:30 - 5:20pm: [Fair Management of Social Risk](#) - Stéphane Zuber (Paris School of Economics)

Thursday, 11th September, 2014

8:30 - 9:00: **Welcome coffee & registration**

9:00 - 09:50: **Stable Observable Behavior** – Yuval Heller (Oxford University)

09:50 - 10:40: **Repeated Games with Public Information Revisited** – Marie Laclau (Paris School of Economics)

10:40 - 11:10: **Coffee break**

11:10 - 12:00: **Markov Perfect Equilibria in Revision Games** – Tristan Tomala (HEC)

12:00 - 1:30pm: **Lunch break**

1:30 - 2:20pm: **The Dynamics of Social Influence** – Bary Pradelski (Oxford University)

2:20 – 3:10pm: **A Belief-based Theory of Homophily** – Willemien Kets (NWU)

3:10 - 3:40 pm: **Coffee break**

3:40 – 4:30pm: **Geometry, auctions, matching and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities** – Elisabeth Baldwin (LSE)

Friday, 12th September, 2014

8:30 - 9:00: **Welcome coffee & registration**

9:00 - 09:50: **On Dynamics in Composite Congestion Games** – Cheng Wan (Oxford University)

09:50 - 10:40: **Peer Influence, Beliefs and Segregation with an Application to State/Private Education** – Ronny Razin (LSE)

10:40 - 11:10: **Coffee break**

11:10 - 12:00: **The Condorcet Jury Theorem under Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments** – Yukio Koriyama (Ecole Polytechnique)

12:00 - 1:30pm: **Lunch break**

1:30 - 2:20pm: **When Olson Meets Dahl... From Inefficient Group Formation to Inefficient Political Process** – **Perrin Lefebvre** (Paris School of Economics)

2:20 – 3:10pm: **Information Aggregation in Markets for Vote** – **Peter Eso** (Oxford University)

3:10 - 3:40 pm: **Coffee break**

3:40 – 4:30pm: **Nash Equilibrium in Games with Quasi-Monotonic Best-Responses** – **Luciano de Castro** (NWU)

INFORMATION

Organizers: Olivier Gossner - Frédéric Koessler – Nicolas Jacquemet.

Administrative contact: Paris School of Economics, Claire Saint-Léger, email: Claire.saint-leger@psemail.eu

Access to venue: <http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/CES/CES1418/brochures-palquettes-supports/Transport-ok.pdf>

Registration: <https://adobeformscentral.com/?f=Sapomnlk9LhiygruXU0-8Q>



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