Does Competition Induce Hiring Equity?*

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Abstract

This paper tests the impact of competition on the hiring process in the French retail sector. Following the Becker's theory, higher the competition, lower is discrimination. Using local Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes, a correspondence study ensures to observe how competition affects discrimination. A strong employment gap is observable between French natives and second generation immigrants. Concerning gender, women are favored as cashiers. The impact of competition depends on the target population: a preference for men appears when a low competition allows it, whereas discrimination due to origin is not sensitive to the level of competition.

JEL Codes: C35, J31, J45, J71

Keywords: Discrimination, hiring, competition

*I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds d'expérimentation pour la jeunesse of the French Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité and from the Paris School of Economics.

1 Introduction

The presence of discrimination on the labor market is now well documented (Altonji & Blank (1999)). Wage differentials, glass ceilings and employment access are studied in many countries and show a persistent discrimination against women and ethnic minorities. Discrimination against sexual minorities or disables is yet observed. In order to test the Becker's theory, researchers analyze the impact of competition on discrimination and results tend to confirm theory. However, these studies focus on labor outcomes on employment. This article aims at filling out the literature by testing the impact of competition on hiring discrimination.

Discrimination is introduced in economics by Becker (1957). He defines discrimination as the result of a taste. Some employers, coworkers or consumers do not want employ, work with or buy something to an individual belonging to a particular group. It induces a different treatment of these workers from the other workers, in spite of identical observable productive characteristics. However, in the case of employers, satisfying their taste for discrimination is costly as it reduces the pool of applicants for the firm, and workers belonging to the group discriminated against receive a lower wage because of the psychological cost of their employer. In a competitive market, prejudiced firms are less efficient than the others and will be drive out of the market. Arguments are relatively similar in the case of prejudiced co-workers except in case of total segregation, which is not realistic. The case of prejudiced consumers is the only stable case but concerns only jobs, which implicate a direct contact with customers. In order to avoid these limits, Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) enhance this theory by developing the concept of statistical discrimination. In this case, discrimination does not result from a particular taste but from imperfect information and beliefs of employers. These formers are assumed to know the true productivity level of workers belonging to her group and ignore the productivity of workers belonging to another group. To set the wage of workers of the minority, they also use the expectancy of the average estimated productivity of this group. Generally, individuals of the majority believe that workers of the minority are less productive in average and the wage offered to them is lower than the wage

offered to workers of the majority. However, a phenomenon of learning makes it disappear. In both theories, discrimination does not have to persist. That is why a lot of empirical studies aiming at outstanding the role of competition in the phenomenon of discrimination in the labor market.

Empirically, most of studies focus on discrimination on the job. They first compare wage gap and employment rate in differently concentrated sectors (Comanor (1973), Hellerstein *et al.* (2002)). However the comparison of distinct sectors induces biases due to unobservable characteristics of each sector. To avoid them, Peoples & Saunders (1993), Heywood & Peoples (1994) and Black & Strahan (2001) used external shocks of competition within a sector in order to observe its consequences on wage gap, employment rate and occupations. Ashenfelter & Hannan (1986) slightly differed in their method and the diversity of local competition in the US banking sector allows them to determine the impact of competition on labor market output. A third way to study the impact of competition is to observe variations due to the globalization of trade. Black & Brainerd (2004) show that competition decreases wage differentials between men and women, improves job attainment and the rate of workers discriminated against in the sector. However, no study focuses explicitly on the hiring process, because of the lack of data concerning employment. This is an important issue, particularly, in a period of large unemployment, where the discrimination will be revealed more in the hiring process than in wages. This article offers to complete the literature by leading a field experiment in areas with different level of competition. A lot of correspondence studies underline discrimination in the hiring process against ethnic minorities across a large set of countries and ethnicities. Particularly, the study of Duguet *et al.* (2010) shows that French accountants with a Moroccan sounding name were discriminated against in 2006 in Ile-de-France. The existence of discrimination against this population allows me to focus on the topic of this article: the impact of competition on the discrimination due to origin and gender. In order to easily measure the level of competition, the tested sector is the French retail sector. Indeed, databases on strategic data are available and the local competition varies sharply across regions.

In this correspondence study, discrimination is observable against second

generation immigrants and women are favored. The impact of competition on employment varies according to the type of discrimination: A less competitive environment leads to a higher equity between men and women whereas the impact of competition is ambiguous concerning origin. Discrimination against men seems to be a statistical discrimination as when competition is sharper, employers favor women. This mirrors the study of Askenazy *et al.* (2009) where women are said more susceptible to work in bad conditions. The type of discrimination against second generation immigrants is not straightforward. A large gap of one fifth is observable in callbacks and it could be too large to observe any variations depending on competition.

This paper is organized as follows. The design of the experimentation is presented in Section 2. The Section 3 gives the empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.

2 Experimental Design

A correspondence study is a field experiment aiming at measuring discrimination in the hiring process among a particular characteristic such as gender, ethnicity, nationality and so on. Two similar resumes are spontaneously sent to a large number of firms or in order to answer to an ad. The only significant difference between both resumes is the characteristic we want to test. This experiment can be extended by an audit but it induces a lot of biases because of unobservable characteristics of the fictious applicants. Moreover we consider that an interview is costly for the firm and the selection due to discriminatory criteria is often done during the resume step. In order to find a more precise argumentation, see Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004). Thereafter, an econometric study of the likelihood of callback of each candidate measures discrimination.

Riach & Rich (2002) surveyed audit and correspondence studies and listed them by country and methodology. The first correspondence study was done by Jowell & Prescott-Clarke (1970) in Great Britain. This experiment concerned discrimination against non-white looking for white-collar jobs. They aimed at distinguishing between discrimination due to 'color' and discrimination due to 'foreignness' by using different origins, and they found evidence on a greater

disadvantage for the colored immigrant group than for the white immigrant group. Other field experiments followed in a large set of countries like Australia, the United-States, Canada and France. International economic reviews began to publish correspondence studies in the 1980s and this procedure is now well-known as an objective measure of discrimination in the hiring process by researchers in economics. The correspondence study of Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) on racial discrimination in Boston and Chicago is now the reference of field experiment on discrimination. They tested the impact of a sounding African-American name in the labor market. They found a significant discrimination against African-American workers, which seems to be due to some tastes of employers because a better quality of resume does not improve the number of callbacks of this minority.

During the 1990s and 2000s decades, these experiments gain an official recognition. The International Labor Office (LBO) commissioned audit and corresponding studies in European countries to deeply observe the phenomenon of discrimination on the labor market in Europe. Studies were executed in the Nederland, Germany, Spain, Belgium and, later, Italy, Sweden and France. This commission legitimated this kind of experimentation to measure discrimination on the labor market in the political sphere. Some countries, like France in 2004, legalized this practice in order to fight against discrimination.

As regards the aim of this article, a correspondence study is well-adapted to measure discrimination in the hiring process. Local variations of competition in the selected sector allow observing their impact on discrimination. The experimental design is described in four paragraphs. The first one explains how the retail sector has been selected. The second paragraph points out jobs and type of applicants targeted by the experiment. The third selection concerns geographical areas where the correspondence study takes place. The last section deals with the creation of the fictious resumes.

Sector selection The retail sector is highly regulated in France. The official aim of these policies is to protect traditional groceries from a sharp competition of supermarkets and megastores. A first law is voted in 1973 and made compulsory for new entrant to apply for an authorization to build a new store (or

just to enlarge an existing store) if the surface area is larger than $1000m^2$ in a small city or than $1500m^2$ in a large city. The regional board charged to study the application is composed of local elected members, store owners already established and representatives of consumers. This regional zoning board created a barrier to enter the market and only few new stores have been authorized to set up. Bertrand & Kramarz (2002) studied the impact of the Royer law and found that stronger deterrence of entry by local boards increased retailer concentration. Besides, the concentration ratio in the retail sector has a negative impact on employment, in the retail sector and in the economy. On the contrary, the number of approvals by the regional zoning board has a positive effect. It suggests that the zoning regulation introduced in France in the early 1970s to restrain the development of large stores has an impact on the whole economy.

In 1996, two other laws restricted the competition: The Galland and Raffarin laws, both applied in 1997. The Galland law consists in forbidding stores to pass on individually negotiated discounts to consumers. This is equivalent to allowing industry-wide price floors. Biscourp *et al.* (2008) and Allain *et al.* (2008) show that it induced an increase in prices and a decrease in the level of competition of the retail sector. The Raffarin law reinforced the Royer law of 1973 by generalizing the necessity of approval to enlarge or establish a large store. The new threshold dramatically decreased to $300m^2$. Both Galland and Raffarin acts strengthened the regulation of the market.

Recent laws relaxed both acts (Dutreil in 2003 and Chatel in 2008 for the Galland law and LME in 2008 for the Raffarin law) however the sector stays highly uncompetitive. In spite of these amendments, aiming at increasing the competition, the French retail sector remains highly concentrated. In a report of 2009, the French Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence) notes that the French retail sector is very concentrated, really similar to an oligopoly. Indeed, this sector is essentially composed of six main companies, which represent 85% of the sector in terms of market share in 2009. Companies are organizes in two different ways: One half is cooperative and the other half is integrated. Askenazy *et al.* (2009) point out the heterogeneity throughout the country as stores are unequally distributed. Some stores are in a monopolistic

situation, often in rural area, and others are surrounded by stores belonging to other groups and competition is sharper. This confirms the choice of a local competition index taking into account the affiliation of each store.

Types of job and applicants The job targeted is the cashier works in retail stores. The study of Askenazy *et al.* (2009) show a large turnover of almost 80% between 2003 and 2005 in the sector and it seems that this particular job is only a spell before a better one. The main modes of application are network, ad in the store or spontaneous applications. It does not need particular abilities even if a vocational education in trade practice is welcome. The training last two days when the worker has no experience but only half a day if she already worked as cashier. It is predominantly a women's job in France. As note Askenazy *et al.* (2009), cashiers are not unionized (only 2%) and are mainly very vulnerable workers. Employers admit that they favor single mothers because they need to keep their job in spite of low wages and the severity of working conditions. Moreover, they recognize to hire less foreigners and colored people, supposedly to answer to consumers' taste.

The second step of this correspondence study is to choose the target population. Since this experiment aims at testing the impact of competition on the hiring discrimination, the target population has to be discriminated against. In France, evidence of discrimination against the second generation immigrants is well-established, notably by the correspondence study of Duguet *et al.* (2010). They had shown that French young workers with Moroccan origin are clearly discriminated against in sectors of accounting and hotel business. A large part of them have North-African parents and obtained the French nationality at their legal majority. Their French nationality is not sufficient to obtain the same chance on the labor market than young French people with native origin and name. The first target population is the second generation immigrants. In this case, the referent population to estimate the level of discrimination is young workers with French origin. Moreover, as cashier is a women job, both genders are tested in order to detect a self-selection of women or a discrimination against men in this sector.



Figure 1: Herfinhal-Hirschmann Index by employment area

Areas selection The third step of this experiment is to locate favorable place to do the test. The important characteristics in this choice are the level of competition in the retail sector and the demographic characteristics of the selected zones. The employment areas or *zones d'emploi* are used to calculate local competition indexes. An employment area corresponds to a territory, where most of people, who live inside, work inside. It does not exactly correspond to the catchment area but, as Allain *et al.* (2008) argue, it is a good approximation. If inhabitants live and work in the area, it is not incongruous to consider that they purchase their food within their employment area too. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) seems to be a good measure of competition. This is the sum of the squares of the market shares of each chain of retail. The data base I use contains an exhaustive list of the retail stores in March 2011, with precise information on location, phone number, surface area, number of cash

desks. A merge with data from the French National Institute of Statistics, INSEE, on characteristics of employment areas enable I to calculate the HHI of each employment area (Figure 1). They are break down in three categories: competitive, uncompetitive and highly uncompetitive. The index goes from less than 1000 to more than 6000. An industry is usually considered as competitive when the HHI is less than 1000, uncompetitive between 1000 and 2000 and highly uncompetitive for more than 2000. The local retail sectors are highly uncompetitive and the bounds used in the article are slightly different. Each category contains one third of the total of employment areas without Corsica, which is very particular. An area is competitive under 2404, uncompetitive between 2404 and 3045 and highly uncompetitive above. Figure 3 shows that the density of HHI of the selected zones is similar to the whole employment areas.

The selected areas try to be representative of each category but could be various in term of demographic characteristics like the concentration of immigrants (Figure 2), population density, rural or urban location. Unemployment and immigration rates result from data collected by INSEE in 2007. A special attention is paid to equilibrate these characteristics in each competition category. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the selected employment areas. In order to determine the representativeness of the tested employment areas, the local HHI is regressed on particular interest variables: unemployment rate, immigration rate, density, population, surface area, number of retail stores, number of checkouts and region (see 13). Higher the number of inhabitants, lower is the HHI. A small employment area has a lower HHI too. The interaction of both terms is represented by density, which reinforces these trends: a higher density induces a better competition level. But the former is not significant. Moreover, the number of stores seems to slightly increase the HHI and the number of cash desks slightly decreases it. Region 3 and 4 (Northern and Eastern France) are more competitive than others. When a dummy variable on the selection for the correspondence study is interacted with all the other variables, results are almost identical. Effects of cash desks and stores are no more significant and the impact of density is larger. But other interactions are not significant. The selected employment areas seem to be representative of the French territory and there is no particular selection bias in the sample.

Table 1: Characteristics of selected employment areas

	Competitive	Uncompetitive	Highly uncompetitive
# observations	12	21	21
Population	384,465	248,367	127,583
	(331,571)	(257,579)	(86,993)
Immigration rate	0.07	0.06	0.08
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Unemployment rate	11.3	10.8	9.15
	(2.11)	(2.20)	(2.99)
Density	0.28	0.28	0.28
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)
# stores	36.5	24.9	13.9
	(29.38)	(19.98)	(7.56)
Surface area	103,490	63,124	36,164
	(84,734)	(52,143)	(23,555)
HHI	2,148	2,705	3,987
	(156.98)	(205.2)	(1061.1)

For each category, the first line is the mean and in brackets are the standard deviation coefficients.

Resumes creation The third step of a correspondence study is to create appropriated resumes. In order to make credible templates, a human resources manager of a retail store has given some accepted CVs. The characteristics of applicants are inspired from these true CVs. To keep a usual framework, biographies are designed with templates of the word processor. Four different one are used to be sure that a firm does not received resumes with an identical shape.

The applicants are 20, obtained a vocational high school degree in trade practice and have some work experience by trainings and student job during vacancies. The student jobs are cashier work at discounted retail establishments in order to have an experience in the job. The trainings concerns other trade sector, like clothing salesperson or salesperson in a DIY shop. She has basic computer skills and practices sport. The resumes are adapted to the location and firms used for training are national firms present in all regions.

Each applicant has an e-mail address, a phone number and a postal address. Fictious e-mail addresses are created for each applicant, made up of the name



Figure 2: Proportion of immigrants in the total population by employment area in 2007

Source : INSEE

and the surname of her. Applicants in each origin/gender cell have the same phone number. The phone lines have only a voice mailbox attached to them. A similar outgoing message is recorded on each of the voice mailbox but each message is recorded by someone of the appropriate gender and without any accent, which can indicate a foreign origin. Since the same phone number is allocated for applicants with different names, the outgoing message contains only the phone number and no person name. Concerning postal addresses, fictious addresses are determined in burgs when the employment area is rural and in the center of the city when the employment area is urban. This strategy allows avoiding districts with bad connotations.

Origins are suggested by the name and surname of the candidate. The French nationality is clearly written on resumes and typical Moroccan-sounding

Table 2: Names used in experiment by gender and origin

		Gender	
		Women	Men
Origin	Moroccan	Naïma Jlassi	Ahmed Charbit
		Aïda Djalouzi	Mounir Benzekri
		Fadela Khalis	Mehdi Brahimi
		Soraya Haddad	Selim Belkacem
	French	Gaëlle Dupuis	Pascal Martin
		Justine Bonnet	Nicolas Leroux
		Claire Dufour	Sébastien Rivière
		Stéphanie Masson	Vincent Dubois

or French-sounding name and surname informs of the origin of the applicant. Each tested type has four possible names to be sure that one of the chosen names does not affect the results. In order to select names of candidates, the correspondence study of Duguet *et al.* (2010) is used. They choose usual Moroccan surnames and first names are Moroccan usual names of this generation. Concerning French-sounding names, first names are the more common in the eighties and family names are the most current ones in France (Table 2). In both cases, names unambiguously sound Moroccan or French. Applicants' gender is clearly indicated on resumes and cover letters by the name of applicants and adjectives and nouns agreements.

3 Results

The experiment was carried out from April to July and from September to November 2011. The one-month break is due to annual closing of administrative service in August. An applicant name of each type is associated with a random chosen type of resume. By origin and gender, a resume with a motivation letter is sent to each store of the employment area. The sending order is random and two applications are sent with an interval of 15 days. 1250 stores have been targeted in 54 employment areas, which is equivalent to 5000 resumes sent. We consider that there is discrimination when the rate of positive return for a type of candidate is higher than another type. A positive return is a call back or an

e-mail asking more information on the candidate or offering an interview.

In the following section, the sample is bootstrapped in order to have robust results. The number of replications is 10,000 in the t tests and in the probit estimations.

Is there a gender/origin gap in callbacks?

First, Table 3 summarizes the callbacks for interview by origin and gender. Women have 8.80 percent chance of being called back. Equivalent resumes of

Table 3: Callbacks by origin and gender

	Moroccan	French	Total
Women	3.92	13.68	8.80
	[49]	[171]	[220]
Men	2.40	11.28	6.84
	[30]	[141]	[171]
Total	3.16	12.48	7.82
	[79]	[312]	[391]
H_0: Men=Women		p=0.0098	
By origin:	Moroccan	p=0.0298	
	French	p=0.0695	
H_0: Moroccan=French		p=0.0000	
By gender:	Women	p=0.0000	
	Men	p=0.0000	

For each category, the first line is the percentage of callbacks and in brackets are the number of callbacks. Each applicant sent 817 resumes and motivation letter.

male applicants have a 6.84 percent chance of receiving a callback. This represents a difference in callback rate of 1.96 percentages points, which is significant at 99%. Whereas this is a women's job in France, it seems to be partly due to a self-selection of women, the other part coming from discrimination. Breaking results by origin, the difference by gender is higher and more significant amongst workers with a Moroccan origin than workers with a French-sounding name.

Concerning origin, resumes with French sounding names have a 12.48 percent chance of having an interview. Equivalent resumes with Moroccan sounding names only have 3.16 percent chance of having a callback. The probability that a worker with Moroccan origin receives a callback is almost 4 times less than

the probability for an applicant with a French sounding name. This difference of 9.32 percentage points is highly significant. Since the names are randomly assigned during the experimental design, this difference can only be attributed to the name manipulation. This result is consistent with the findings of Duguet *et al.* (2010) that a significant discrimination against workers of Moroccan origin during the hiring process is observed in France. Dividing the sample by gender, a larger gap is observed for men than for women. In both cases, the null hypothesis of an equality of means is rejected.

Table 4: Distribution of callbacks by store and gender

Men Favored	0Wo+1Me	0Wo+2Me	1Wo+2Me
6.64	6.24	0.24	0.16
[83]	[78]	[3]	[2]
Women Favored	1Wo+0Me	2Wo+0Me	2Wo+1Me
9.92	8.32	0.88	0.72
[124]	[104]	[11]	[9]
Equal treatment	No callback	1Wo+1Me	2Wo+2Me
83.44	78.08	4.80	0.56
[1043]	[976]	[60]	[7]
H_0: Men=Women		p=0.0019	

Me stands for *Men* and *Wo* for *Women*. For each category, the first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title and in brackets is the number of store. For instance, $2Wo + 1Me$ means that both women and one man received a callback.

Rather than studying the number of callbacks by type of applicants, one can use the distribution of callback at the store level. This allows observing a preference for one type of applicant or another. Tables 4 and 5 reports three different treatments of applicants by employers. The first two lines count when there is a preference. The type A is favored in three cases: when an A applicant and none B applicant receive a callback, when both A applicants and none B applicant are called backed and when both A applicants and only one B applicant receive a callback. In the last line, both types of applicants (Moroccan/French origin, men/women) are equally treated. It occurs when no applicant is called back, or one applicant of each type receives a callback, or all four applicants are asking for an interview. As we can see in both tables, equal treatment is essentially composed of no callback. As it will be discussed thereafter, taking them into

account induces an under-estimation of discrimination. First, Table 4 shows that women and men are equally treated even if a man slightly receives less callbacks in average. The t test points out that the averages of stores favoring men and women are significantly different at 99%. In other words, it means that women are preferred by employers. It reinforces assessments of Askenazy *et al.* (2009) that employers want to hire women more than men because of a statistical discrimination. Then, Table 5 shows a preference for French origin

Table 5: Distribution of callbacks by store and origin

French Favored	0Mo+1Fr	0Mo+2Fr	1Mo+2Fr
17.20	12.32	4.08	0.80
[215]	[154]	[51]	[10]
Moroccan Favored	1Mo+0Fr	2Mo+0Fr	2Mo+1Fr
2.48	2.24	0.16	0.08
[31]	[28]	[2]	[1]
Equal treatment	No callback	1Mo+1Fr	2Mo+2Fr
80.32	78.08	1.68	0.56
[1004]	[976]	[21]	[7]
H_0: Moroccan=French		p=0.0000	

M stands for $Moroccan$ and Fr for $French$. For each category, the first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title and in brackets is the number of store. For instance, $2Mo + 1Fr$ means that both applicants with a Moroccan sounding name and one applicant with a French sounding name received a callback.

applicants. They are favored by 17.2 percentage points of employers whereas only 2.48 percent of employers prefer applicants with a Moroccan sounding name. This difference is highly significant and no symmetry is also observed in the favoring of workers with French sounding name and workers with Moroccan sounding name. This result confirms Table 3 figures and a strong discrimination against second generation immigrants from Morocco.

Does discrimination vary according to competition?

A discrimination against Men and especially applicants with Moroccan origin is well established by the previous section. This part aims at observing a statistical difference between employment areas of various level of competition.

First, Table 6 and Table 8 tabulate the average callback rates by gender and

HHI group, and by origin of names and HHI group, respectively. These tables give an overlook of some variations of discrimination depending on the level of competition of the employment area. It is worth observing that the percentage of callbacks for an interview decreases with the level of competition whatever the gender and the origin of the applicant. This is consistent with the fact that a more competitive environment induces a tighter labor market. Then, Tables 7 and 9 show the same analysis at store level instead of candidate level. Results are slightly different and encourage going into the explanation in greater depth by an econometric estimation.

Table 6: Callbacks by gender and HHI group

# applications	Competitive [874]	Uncompetitive [1042]	Hihly uncompetitive [584]
Women	9.49	7.68	9.76
	[83]	[80]	[57]
Men	7.78	6.24	6.51
	[68]	[65]	[38]
H_0: Men=Women	p=0.2018	p=0.1967	p=0.0420

For each category, the first line is the percentage of callbacks and in brackets is the number of callbacks.

As has already been pointed out, men and women are differently treated in average. A difference in favor of women is observed and is statistically significant. Table 6 shows that the variation of the degree of competition has an impact on the gap of interview between men and women. When the employment area is highly uncompetitive, an equality of means is rejected at a 5% level. At first thought, we can assume that men may be discriminated against in uncompetitive employment areas. A comparison by store gives a slightly different analysis. Tests of Hotelling show that higher competition, less an equality of means could be accepted. In other words, lower is the level of competition, the more a significantly different treatment is observable between men and women. A possible interpretation is that, in a more competitive framework, it is costly for stores to favor women as cashier. However, these results have to be confirmed *ceteris paribus* and not only be observed in descriptive statistics.

Table 7: Distribution of callbacks by gender and store

	Competitive	Uncompetitive	Highly uncompetitive
# stores	[437]	[521]	[292]
# answering stores	[106]	[102]	[66]
Women Favored	10.30	9.02	10.96
[124]	[45]	[47]	[32]
Men Favored	7.09	6.53	6.16
[83]	[31]	[34]	[18]
Equal treatment	6.86	4.03	5.48
[67]	[30]	[21]	[16]
No callback	75.74	80.42	77.40
[976]	[331]	[419]	[226]
H_0: Women=Men	p=0.0915	p=0.1318	p=0.0239

For each category, the first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title and in brackets is the number of stores. For instance, 10.30% of stores located in a competitive employment area favored women, which is equivalent to 45 stores.

Table 8: Callbacks by origin and HHI group

	Competitive	Uncompetitive	Hihly uncompetitive
# applications	[874]	[1042]	[584]
Moroccan	2.40	3.45	3.77
	[21]	[36]	[22]
French	14.87	10.46	12.50
	[130]	[109]	[73]
H_0: Mo=Fr	p=0.2018	p=0.1967	p=0.0420

For each category, the first line is the percentage of callbacks and in brackets is the number of callbacks.

Table 8 gives the distribution of callbacks by origin and the level of competition of the employment area. The percentage of callbacks is lower for young workers with Moroccan sounding name and this gap is significant whatever the level of competition. However, the results do not seem to depend on competition. The ratio of positive answer to workers of Moroccan origin on workers of French origin varies from 0.16 in competitive employment areas, to 0.33 in uncompetitive markets and 0.28 in highly uncompetitive places. At first sight, the prediction of Becker is not validated by this experiment. A higher competition

Table 9: Distribution of callbacks by origin and store

	Competitive	Uncompetitive	Highly uncompetitive
# stores	[437]	[521]	[292]
# answering stores	[106]	[102]	[66]
French Favored	21.06	14.39	16.44
[118]	[92]	[75]	[48]
Moroccan Favored	2.06	2.69	2.74
[31]	[9]	[14]	[8]
Equal treatment	1.14	2.49	3.42
[1009]	[5]	[13]	[10]
No callback	75.74	80.42	77.40
[976]	[331]	[419]	[226]
H_0: Moroccan=French	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000

For each category, the first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title and in brackets is the number of stores. For instance, 21.06% of stores located in a competitive employment area favored French origin, which is equivalent to 92 stores.

level does not decrease the discrimination on the labor market. To confirm this conclusion, the next section presents an econometric study taking into account observable characteristics of employment areas.

Table 9 studies by HHI group how employers favor some applicants. Whatever the level of competition, employers favor workers with French sounding names. The difference in callbacks for an interview between both origins is statistically significant and the null hypothesis of equality of means between both groups is rejected. However, there is no strong evidence of an impact of competition in this difference. On the contrary, the less competitive the employment area, higher is the ratio of percentage of callbacks by origin.

To summarize, descriptive statistics does not show a disappearance of discrimination with a higher competition level in the case of origin, but it appears as an explanation for gender differences. A first interpretation could be deduced of the work of Askenazy *et al.* (2009). In this study, workers admit a discrimination against workers of foreign origin supposedly to answer of customers' taste. In this case, a higher competition will not have any impact of discrimination because the cost is borne by consumers. Concerning gender, the study explains that employers prefer hiring women suffering fragile economic condition in order

to decrease the turnover of employees. However, in case of highly competitive market, they cannot practice this policy because it is too costly.

What is the influence of competition on discrimination?

In order to study the impact of competition on the hiring process *ceteris paribus*, the probability to have an interview is estimated by a probit model. The explanatory equation of a call back is the following:

$$Int_i^* = X_i'\delta + X_{EA}'\gamma + \nu_i \tag{1}$$

where Int^* is latent variable, X_i the vector of characteristics of applicant i, X_{EA} the one of employment area EA, δ and γ the coefficient to be estimated and ν the error term. The latent variable is not observable and an index-function is used:

$$Int_i = 1 \text{ if } Int_i^* > 0$$
$$Int_i = 0 \text{ if } Int_i^* \leq 0$$

where $Int_i = 1$ indicates that the applicant received a callback and $Int_i = 0$ that she does not. The error term of the equation is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ_ν. Table 10 indicates the effect of origin, gender, the size of stores (number of employees) and four characteristics of the employment areas (the level of competition, the unemployment rate, the density and the region) on likelihood to receive a callback for an interview. The unemployment rate stands for controlling economic circumstances of the employment area. It impacts negatively the probability to have an interview as cashier. The interpretation is intuitive: In a high unemployment place, it would be more difficult to find a job than in another place because of a queue phenomenon. The density has a negative but insignificant effect. The number of employees increases the probability to be called back. As descriptive statistics already pointed out, competition has a positive effect on the hiring rate. In the probit model, the two first columns use the same measure of competition than in the previous

Table 10: Estimation of the probability to obtain an interview.

	(1) Interview	(2) Interview	(3) Interview	(4) Interview
Women	0.145***	0.146***	0.145***	0.146**
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Moroccan origin	-0.734***	-0.741***	-0.735***	-0.742***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.058)
# employees of the store	0.000392**	0.000398**	0.000386**	0.000393**
	(0.00019)	(0.00018)	(0.00019)	(0.00018)
Uncompetitive EA	-0.0852	-0.113		
	(0.064)	(0.070)		
Highly uncompetitive EA	-0.113	-0.142*		
	(0.076)	(0.083)		
HHI in value (x0.01)			-0.00796*	-0.00844*
			(0.0044)	(0.0045)
Unemployment rate of EA		-0.0719***		-0.0685***
		(0.018)		(0.018)
Density of EA		-0.736		-0.900
		(0.674)		(0.711)
Constant	-1.001***	-0.284	-0.854***	-0.128
	(0.089)	(0.237)	(0.148)	(0.267)
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Pseudo R-squared	0.0857	0.0923	0.0861	0.0924

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.

part. If the HHI is in the second interval, the probability to be called back decreases by 1.5% and by 1.9% if the HHI of the employment area is in the third one. In the last two columns, the value of the HHI is directly introduced in the estimation. This reinforces the idea that competition increases very significantly the probability to obtain an interview. When the HHI decreases by hundred points, the probability to receive a callback increases by 0.1%. In following estimation, the only three intervals of HHI are used to allow a non-linear impact of competition. As we could expect, to be a woman increases the likelihood to obtain an interview by 1.9% and to have a Moroccan origin decreases it by 9.9%.

Tables 11 and 12 show the results concerning the estimation of the likelihood to be called back, where variables are interacted with gender and origin,

Table 11: Estimation of the probability to obtain an interview by gender.

	Men Interview	Women Interview	Difference H_0: $\beta_{wo} = \beta_{men}$
Moroccan	-0.789***	-0.701***	0.0954
origin	(0.096)	(0.081)	(0.119)
Uncompetitive	-0.064	-0.153*	-0.089
EA	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.147)
Highly	-0.085	-0.191*	-0.105
uncompetitive EA	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.163)
Unemployment	-0.061**	-0.082*	-0.021
rate in EA	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.036)
Density of	-1.29	-0.357	0.936
EA	(1.040)	(0.908)	(1.397)
# of employees	0.001**	0.0002	-0.0005
in the store	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Constant	-0.420	-0.011	0.408
	(0.353)	(0.308)	(0.466)
Observations	2,500	2,500	5,000
Pseudo R-squared		0.0967	

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.

respectively. Concerning gender, differences between men and women are not significant. However, coefficients of HHI dummies are interesting as they suggest two types of discrimination. First, men are less called back than women. It is in keeping with to the statistical discrimination described by Askenazy *et al.* (2009): employers prefer women because their turn over is lower and they accept harder tasks. Second, the estimation of the likelihood to be called back points out a discrimination *à la* Becker against women. Indeed, these coefficients are significant for women and the negative effect is stronger for women than for men. Results are probably not significant for men because of fewer answers. The fact that a weaker competition induces a lower likelihood for women to be called back compared to men, can be interpreted in this way: when employers have a higher rent, they can spend more time and money to search a candidate corresponding to their taste and hire a man. Coefficients of unemployment rate reinforce this interpretation as the impact of a higher unemployment rate impacts sharply women than men. In other words, when the labor market is less

tight, employers prefer men than women, *ceteris paribus*.

Besides, variables are further interacted with a dummy variable for whether the applicant has a Moroccan or a French sounding name. Results are summarized in the Table 12. The coefficients of interacted terms are only significant concerning employment rate, constant and the second HHI interval. It means that applicants with a Moroccan sounding name have a lower probability of 9% to obtain an interview *ceteris paribus*, which means that even in case of a competitive market, French applicants with a Moroccan origin are discriminated against. As in the gender case, the tightness of the labor market has not the same impact for both origins. A significant difference of 0.07 is observable in favor of the French origin. In other words, a labor market more competitive increases the likelihood to have a positive answer, but this increase is higher for workers with a Moroccan sounding name. Employers have fewer candidates and cannot fulfill their taste. Concerning competition, results are not standard for

Table 12: Estimation of the probability to obtain an interview by origin.

	French origin Interview	Moroccan origin Interview	Difference H_0: $\beta_{fr} = \beta_{ma}$
Women	0.114*	0.236**	0.122
	(0.066)	(0.106)	(0.129)
Uncompetitive EA	-0.225***	0.177	0.403**
	(0.081)	(0.136)	(0.158)
Higly uncompetitive EA	-0.183*	-0.016	0.166
	(0.097)	(0.165)	(0.201)
Unemployment rate in the EA	-0.055***	-0.125***	-0.070*
	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.044)
Density of EA	-1.338*	0.498	1.836
	(0.800)	(1.238)	(1.651)
# of employees in the store	0.0003	0.0006	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Constant	-0.219	-1.137***	-0.918*
	(0.255)	(0.411)	(0.530)
Observations	2,500	2,500	5,000
Pseudo R-squared		0.101	

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.

discrimination. At first sight, its impact is not linear. Moreover, competition does not decrease discrimination and the coefficient of the second HHI interval shows the contrary: applicants with Moroccan origin have a higher likelihood to be called back when the employment area is uncompetitive rather than competitive. However, when competition is really weak, its impact is negative. In this case, it is difficult to disentangle which type of discrimination is occurred.

Robustness checks

Experimental design The experimental design aims at controlling all applicants' characteristics. However, some templates for resumes may be better than others, or a specific name may have more callbacks due to a less typical feeling. Resumes are sent in a randomize order. However, to be sent first could have a positive effect on callbacks. In this section, the effect of applicants' characteristics is estimated on the likelihood of callback to confirm the neutrality of the design. Table 14 summarizes the results. As none coefficients of 'CV' is significant, templates of resumes are equivalent. Even if CV4 has a negative coefficient and CV2 and CV3 a positive one. Moreover, order of sending is not significant even if the first intuition is confirmed as to be sent first or second has a positive impact on the likelihood to be called. Finally, names are relatively equivalent as no coefficient is significant, except the second Moroccan female name of "Aïda Djalouzi", which has a positive and significant impact on the likelihood to obtain an interview. Concerning Moroccan names, and particularly for men, coefficients are really different because of the small number of callbacks. According to the results, the experimental design of this correspondence study is relatively neutral.

Preferences In order to better explain discrimination as a preference, an ordered probit model of the likelihood to favor an origin or a gender is estimated. Results basically mirror our previous findings (Table 15, estimations (1) and (3)) but are not significant, certainly due to a lack of data. Concerning gender, men have a higher probability to be favored when competition decreases. In the second estimation, applicants with a Moroccan sounding name increase their chance to have an interview when competition goes down, but it is not linear.

Indeed, the coefficient of the third interval is higher than the coefficient of the second one.

Answering stores As the main point of this paper is the impact of competition on discrimination, it could be interesting to restrict the sample to stores, which answer to, at least, one applicant. Indeed, stores, which did not answer, cannot be classified as discriminant or not. Table 15, estimations (2) and (4), summarizes results of the ordered probit estimation on preferences. They do not really change even if coefficients are higher. The few number of observations decreases the significance of coefficients.

Tables 16 and Table 17 sum up the results of a probit estimation of the likelihood to prefer one category of applicants. Results mirror previous results on the whole sample. Concerning gender, coefficients are not significant. However, it confirms our previous findings as competition increases the probability of women to obtain an interview whereas it decreases this probability for men. Findings on origin highlight two points. First, that the unusual effect of competition on discrimination concerns nepotism and not discrimination. Coefficients of applicants with Moroccan origin decrease with the competition level as Becker's theory predicts. Nevertheless, the estimation of French origin preference shows that the effect of competition is not linear and is stronger and negative for the middle interval. Second, the unemployment rate decreases the likelihood to obtain an interview for Moroccan origin candidates whereas it increases the likelihood of French origin applicants. This result reinforces the results on the tightness of the labor market.

4 Conclusion

This article uses an original way to study the impact of competition on labor market outcomes. This experiment adds to the literature on the consequences of a variation of competition. The hiring process has never been studied and this correspondence study in the French retail sector allows us to measure the effect of competition on hiring. The population tested is young French applicants with Moroccan sounding names, male and female. Results show that men do not face

discrimination, contrary to what one may think at first view. On the contrary, their callbacks decrease with competition, showing that if employers have a rent, they prefer hiring men. Concerning origin, a large and significant difference of callbacks for an interview underlines discrimination against the second generation immigrants from North Africa in France. The level of competition has a positive impact on the number of callbacks whatever the origin of the applicant. Nevertheless there is no evidence for a stronger effect concerning the population discriminated against. The Becker theory do not corresponds to this type of discrimination.

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Figure 3: Density of the HHI by employment area.



Table 13: Estimation of the HHI by OLS

		(1)
		HHI
		Interacted terms
Testing		2,050**
		(973.1)
Unemployment	-23.09	-36.92
rate	(28.26)	(64.67)
Density	-698.4	-5,191*
	(952.6)	(2,738)
Immigration	76.31	-3,450
rate	(1,800)	(4,569)
Population	0.00232*	-0.00231
	(0.00119)	(0.00316)
Surface	-0.238***	0.189
	(0.0566)	(0.148)
# cashdesks	-4.522***	6.677*
	(1.063)	(3.809)
# stores	21.41***	-71.11*
	(6.797)	(37.93)
Ile-de-France	-	-
Ile-de-France	-169.8	51.92
periphery	(292.3)	(635.4)
North	-728.0*	985.7
	(417.4)	(731.4)
East	-776.4***	0
	(277.6)	(0)
West	-91.95	0
	(316.8)	(0)
South East	-220.0	698.4
	(303.2)	(593.4)
Centre	39.49	0
	(280.6)	(0)
South West	319.0	-526.8
	(298.7)	(578.6)
Constant	4,049***	
	(451.8)	
Observations	347	
R-squared	0.3113	

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 14: Effect of application characteristics on likelihood to receive a callback

	Interview				
Name Fw 1	0.211	Name Mw 1	0.109	CV 2	0.062
	(0.272)		(0.215)		(0.077)
Name Fw 2	0.177	Name Mw 2	0.446**	CV 3	0.066
	(0.273)		(0.198)		(0.077)
Name Fw 3	0.155	Name Mw 3	0.268	CV 4	-0.123
	(0.273)		(0.209)		(0.081)
Name Fw 4	0.139	Name Mw 4	0	Second	0.059
	(0.274)		(0)		(0.077)
Name Fm 1	0	Name Mm 1	-0.335	Third	-0.018
	(0)		(0.282)		(0.079)
Name Fm 2	0.185	Name Mm 2	0.067	Fourth	-0.061
	(0.135)		(0.232)		(0.080)
Name Fm 3	0.199	Name Mm 3	0.300	Constant	-0.464***
	(0.135)		(0.218)		(0.116)
Name Fm 4	0.101	Name Mm 4	0		
	(0.140)		(0)		
Observations		5,000			
Pseudo R-squared		0.101			

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Estimation is controlled for gender, origin, regions, unemployment rate and density of the employment area, the number of employees in the store.

Fw stands for women with a French sounded name, Mw for women with a Moroccan sounded name, Fm stands for men with a French sounded name and Mm for men with a Moroccan sounded name.

Table 15: Estimation of the likelihood to favor a gender/origin by an ordered probit.

	(1) Gender preferences	(2) Gender preferences	(3) Origin preferences	(4) Origin preferences
Uncompetitive	0.0790	0.222	-0.225**	-0.309
EA	(0.092)	(0.183)	(0.095)	(0.227)
Highly	0.110	0.239	-0.139	-0.0602
uncompetitive EA	(0.113)	(0.219)	(0.112)	(0.274)
Density	-0.225	-0.432	-1.607*	-2.856
of the EA	(0.943)	(1.777)	(0.921)	(2.077)
Unemployment	0.00932	-0.0104	-0.00450	0.151**
rate in EA	(0.021)	(0.048)	(0.022)	(0.061)
# employees	0.000369	0.000789	0.000206	-0.000166
of the store	(0.00034)	(0.00059)	(0.00031)	(0.00070)
Constant 1	-0.922***	0.322	-2.589***	-1.002
	(0.310)	(0.590)	(0.336)	(0.666)
Constant 2	1.902***	0.981*	0.345	-0.549
	(0.317)	(0.592)	(0.310)	(0.665)
Observations	1,250	274	1,250	274
Pseudo R-squared	0.0125	0.0796	0.0107	0.0384

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Concerning gender, the interest variable is null when no preferences are revealed, −1 when women are favored and 1 when men are favored. Concerning origin, the interest variable is null when no preferences are revealed, −1 when Moroccan origin is favored and 1 when French origin is favored. In estimations (2) and (4), the sample only contains stores which call back at least one applicant. Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.

Table 16: Estimation of the likelihood to be preferred by gender.

	(1) Women favored	(2) Men favored
Uncompetitive EA	-0.160	0.318
	(0.201)	(0.209)
Highly uncompetitive EA	-0.207	0.304
	(0.242)	(0.256)
Density of the EA	0.296	-0.708
	(1.937)	(2.084)
Unemployment rate in EA	0.00747	-0.0195
	(0.053)	(0.055)
# employees of the store	-0.000415	0.00116*
	(0.00063)	(0.00064)
Constant	0.306	-0.956
	(0.641)	(0.682)
Observations	274	274
Pseudo R-squared	0.0306	0.0432

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The sample only contains stores which call back at least one applicant. In estimations (1) and (2), the interest variable is worth 1 if women/men are favored, 0 otherwise. In estimation (3), the interest variable is worth 1 if there is any favor (women and men) and 0 in case of equal treatment. Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.

Table 17: Estimation of the likelihood to be preferred by origin.

	(1) French origin favored	(2) Moroccan origin favored
Uncompetitive EA	-0.434*	-0.0864
	(0.237)	(0.280)
Highly uncompetitive EA	-0.174	-0.313
	(0.284)	(0.340)
Density of the EA	-3.696*	1.086
	(2.182)	(2.510)
Unemployment rate in EA	0.145**	-0.200**
	(0.063)	(0.083)
# employees of the store	-6.48e-05	0.000401
	(0.00073)	(0.00080)
Constant	0.922	0.149
	(0.696)	(0.835)
Observations	253	253
Pseudo R-squared	0.0624	0.0524

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The sample only contains stores which call back at least one applicant. Region 3 (Northern France) is dropped as it predicts perfectly preference for French origin. In estimations (1) and (2), the interest variable is worth 1 if French/Moroccan origin is favored, 0 otherwise. In estimation (3), the interest variable is worth 1 if there is any favor (French and Moroccan origin) and 0 in case of equal treatment. Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.

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Objet : Candidature poste d'hôtesse de caisse

Madame, Monsieur,

Je souhaite poser ma candidature au sein de votre grande surface pour le poste d'hôtesse de caisse.

J'ai déjà travaillé durant près d'un an de façon discontinue en qualité de caissière. De ce travail, j'ai appris à tenir une caisse, à accueillir et à écouter le client, à l'orienter dans le magasin et enfin à travailler en équipe.

De caractère sérieux, attentif et motivé, je souhaite vivement intégrer votre groupe qui a su se développer fortement grâce à une dynamique et un souci du client permanent.

Je suis disponible immédiatement et à temps complet

En espérant que vous me donnerez l'occasion de vous convaincre lors de l'entretien, je vous prie d'agréer, Madame, Monsieur, mes salutations distinguées.

Gaëlle Dupuis

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20 ans
Célibataire
Nationalité Française
Permis B

EXPÉRIENCE PROFESSIONNELLE

2010-2011 Leader Price Fos-sur-Mer
Hôtesse de caisse
CDD de sept mois

2009-2010 Leader Price Fos-sur-Mer
Hôtesse de caisse
CDD juillet-août

STAGES

2009 Idemboutique Fos-sur-Mer
Vente
Vente, réception des marchandises, mise en rayon. 8 semaines sur l'année

2009 Kiabi Martigues
Vente
Janvier (4 semaines)

2008 Cinéma Odyssée Fos-sur-Mer
Accueil, information, vente
Juin (4 semaines)

FORMATION

2005-2010
- Baccalauréat professionnel Services
- BEP Vente Action Marchande
- Certificat d'anglais niveau BEP

CENTRES D'INTÉRÊTS

Volley ball, peinture.

INFORMATIQUE

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Objet : candidature pour un poste d'hôtesse de caisse

Madame, Monsieur,

Votre société, par son dynamisme et son image jeune et performante dans le secteur de la grande distribution a retenu mon attention.

Je suis actuellement à la recherche d'un emploi de caissière dans la grande distribution et souhaiterais connaître les opportunités que vous pouvez actuellement proposer à une personne ayant déjà travaillé dans ce secteur.

J'ai en effet une expérience de la tenue de caisse complétée par l'obtention d'un baccalauréat professionnel de vente. Etant rigoureuse, aimable et souriante, ce poste me permettrait de mettre mes compétences au service de votre clientèle.

Je serais heureuse d'apporter de plus amples détails sur mon offre lors d'un prochain entretien. Dans cette attente, je vous prie d'agréer, Madame, Monsieur, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

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Célibataire
20 ans
Permis B
Nationalité Française

Aïda Djalouzi

Expérience professionnelle

2010-2011 Lidl Fos-sur-Mer
Hôtesse de caisse
CDD de remplacement d'un congé maternité

2009-2010 Leader Price Fos-sur-Mer
Hôtesse de caisse
CDD durant l'été

Stages en entreprise

10-12/ 2009 Benetton Istres
Vente, encaissement, réception des marchandises et mise en rayon.
8 semaines

01/2009 Cinéma Jean Renoir Martigues
Accueil, orientation et information
4 semaines

2008 Benetton Istres
Vente
4 semaines

Formation

2005-2010 Istres
Baccalauréat professionnel Commerce
CAP Vente
Formation d'Anglais

Centres d'intérêts Sport (course à pied,danse), voyages

Informatique Excel, Word, navigation Internet

Pascal Martin

10, rue de la Banque

02270 Nouvion-et-Catillon

Tel : 07 61 19 26 28

Email : pascal.martin9@gmail.com

Objet : poste d'hôte de caisse

Madame, Monsieur,

La renommée et le dynamisme de votre entreprise m'ont tout naturellement conduite à candidater à un poste d'hôte de caisse au sein de votre société.

Actuellement disponible, je souhaite mettre au service de votre entreprise mes qualités relationnelles et ma capacité à travailler rapidement. J'ai déjà une expérience dans ce domaine et serai donc immédiatement opérationnel. Je me tiens à votre disposition pour que nous discutions plus en détail de mes compétences et de ma motivation.

En espérant que ma demande retiendra votre attention, veuillez agréer, Madame, Monsieur, mes salutations distinguées.

Pascal Martin

10, rue de la Banque
02270 Nouvion-et-Catillon

Tel : 07 61 19 26 28
Email : 07 61 19 26 28

Pascal Martin

Célibataire
20 ans
Permis B
Nationalité Française

Expérience professionnelle

2010-2011 — Magasin Lidl — Fos-sur-Mer
Hôte de caisse
CDD de 8 mois

2009-2010 — Magasin Lidl — Fos-sur-Mer
Hôte de caisse
CDD durant l'été

Stages en entreprise

2009 — Marina Sport — Port-de-Bouc
Encaissements, mise en rayon, réception de marchandise
8 semaines

2009 — Mr Bricolage — Fos-sur-Mer
Accueil, information
4 semaines

2008 — Célio — Martigues
Vente
4 semaines

Formation

2005-2010
Baccalauréat Professionnel commerce et services
Formation Commerciale d'Anglais
CAP vente

Informatique

Maîtrise Internet, Word.

Centres d'intérêts

Football, cinéma

Ahmed Charbit
4, rue de Colombier
02240 Brissy-Hamégicourt
Email : ahmed.charbit33@gmail.com
Tel : 07 61 19 00 15

Objet : candidature hôte de caisse

Madame, Monsieur,

Votre société, par son dynamisme et son développement constant en France et dans le monde, a particulièrement retenu mon attention lors de ma recherche d'emploi.

Actuellement disponible, je pose ma candidature pour un poste d'hôte de caisse. Bonne humeur, respect du client et ponctualité sont les principales qualités que je souhaiterais mettre à votre profit. Ma formation, tournée vers la vente, m'a permis d'acquérir la rigueur et le respect du travail bien fait.

J'ajoute que je peux facilement m'adapter à des horaires variés et fluctuants en fonction de votre volume d'activité ou de facteurs saisonniers propre à votre société.

J'espère que l'éclectisme de mes compétences aura su éveiller votre curiosité. Un rendez-vous me permettra certainement d'achever de vous convaincre. Dans cette attente, veuillez agréer, Madame, Monsieur, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

Ahmed Charbit

4, rue de Colombier
02240 Brissy-Hamégicourt
Tel : 07 61 19 00 15
Email : ahmed.charbit33@gmail.com
Permis A
Célibataire
Nationalité française
20 ans

Ahmed Charbit

Expérience professionnelle

2010-2011 — Mr Bricolage — Fos-sur-Mer

Hôte de caisse

- CDD de 6 mois

2009-2010 — Netto — Port-de-Bouc

Hôte de caisse

- CDD Juillet-Août

Stages en entraprise

2009 — Leroy Merlin — Martigues

Vente

- 8 semaines
- Mise en rayon, réception des marchandises, conseil

2009 — Weldom — Istres

Vente, conseil

- 4 semaines – Janvier

2008 — Cinéma le Coluche — Istres

Vente

- 4 semaines

Formation

2005-2010 — Martigues

- Baccalauréat Professionnel services
- BEP Vente Action Commerciale
- Anglais commercial

Centres d'intérêts

Badminton, musique (pratique le piano)

Informatique

Office, Internet.