Workshop: “Incomplete Information: Repeated Games and Cheap-Talk”

Paris, November 5th and 6th
Maison des Sciences Economiques
106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris
6th floor

Co-organized by:

Thursday, November 5th

9:00 – 9:15 : Accueil

Chair: Tristan Tomala

9:15 – 10:00 : Olivier Gossner (Ecole Polytechnique et CNRS)
Dynamic bank runs under asymmetric information
(joint with K. Fong, J. Hörner and Y. Sannikov)

10:00 – 10:45 : Nicolas Vieille (HEC Paris)
Optimal dynamic information provision (joint with E. Solan and J. Renault)

*** Break ***

Chair: Olivier Gossner

11:15 – 12:45 : Sergiu Hart (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
The long and short of cheap talk and incomplete information

*** Lunch ***

Chair: Nicolas Vieille

14:00 – 14:45 : Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago)
Competition in persuasion (joint with M. Gentzkow)

14:45 – 15:30 : Catherine Rainer (Université de Brest)
Continuous time, two-player, zero-sum game, where one player observes a Brownian motion
(joint with P. Cardaliaguet and F. Gensbittel)

*** Break ***

Chair: Catherine Rainer

16:00 – 16:45 : Tristan Tomala (HEC Paris)
Repeated games with public information revisited (joint with M. Laclau)

16:45 – 17:30 : Xavier Venel (Université Paris 1 and PSE)
Pathwise uniform value in gambling houses and partially observable Markov decision processes

19:30 : Social Dinner (SPEAKERS ONLY)
Restaurant Agapes, 47 bis rue Poliveau 75005 Paris
Saturday, November 6th

Chair: Fabien Gensbittel
9:15 – 10:00: Sylvain Sorin (Université Paris 6)
Information and games with vanishing stage duration: some comments

10:00 – 10:45: Antoine Salomon (Université Paris-Dauphine)
Limit equilibrium payoff sets of repeated games with incomplete information
(joint with F. Forges)

*** Break ***

Chair: Frédéric Koessler
11:15 – 12:00: In-Uck Park (University of Bristol)
Talking out of moral hazard (joint with B. Jullien)

12:00 – 12:45: Jérôme Renault (TSE)
Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games
(joint with J. Deb and J. Gonzales-Diaz)

*** Lunch ***

Chair: Jérôme Renault
14:00 – 14:45: Ludovic Renou (University of Essex)
The value of commitment in dynamic games
(joint with C. Mezzetti and T. Tomala)

14:45 – 15:30: Miquel Oliu-Barton (Université Paris-Dauphine)
The splitting game

*** Break ***

Chair: Ludovic Renou
16:00 – 16:45: Frédéric Koessler (PSE and CNRS)
Evidence based mechanisms (joint with E. Perez)

16:45 – 17:30: Fabien Gensbittel (TSE)
Continuous-time Markov games with incomplete information

Organizers:
- David Ettinger (Université Paris-Dauphine)
- Marie Laclau (PSE and CNRS)
- Vianney Perchet (Université Paris 7)
- Guillaume Vigeral (Université Paris-Dauphine)