

**Workshop on
“Advances in Mechanism Design”**

June 11–12, 2013

**Paris School of Economics
“Grande Salle”
48 Boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris, France**

Tuesday, June 11

09:00 - 10:00: **Fuhito Kojima** (Stanford):

“Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications”

10:00 - 11:00: **Dorothea Kubler** (WZB Berlin):

“Implementing Quotas in University Admissions: Experimental Evidence”

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:30: **Yinghua He** (TSE):

“Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching”

Lunch

14:00 - 15:00: **Alfred Galichon** (Sciences Po):

“The Roommate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think”

15:00 - 16:00: **Estelle Cantillon** (ULB):

“Endogenous Preferences and the Role of the Mechanism in School Choice”

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:30: **Eduardo Azevedo** (U Penn):

“A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets”

Wednesday, June 12

09:00 - 10:00: **Jinwoo Kim** (Seoul National U):

“Stable Matching in Large Economies”

10:00 - 11:00: **Francis Bloch** (Polytechnique):

“Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents”

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:30: **Sonia Jaffe** (Harvard):

“Taxation in Matching Markets”

Lunch

14:00 - 15:00: **Tadashi Hashimoto** (Stanford):

“The Generalized Random Priority Mechanism with Budgets”

15:00 - 16:00: **Clayton Featherstone** (U Penn):

“A Rank-based Refinement of Ordinal Efficiency and a New (but familiar) Class of Ordinal Assignment Mechanisms”

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:30: **Muriel Niederle** (Stanford):

“Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets”

If you wish to attend, please send a mail to Beatrice.havet@ens.fr.

Please specify by June 03 if you would like to attend the lunch on June, 11 and June, 12 (subject to limitation)

Organizer: Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics – CNRS)



The workshop is a scientific meeting of the project SCHOOL CHOICE (ANR- 2012 - National Agency for Research – Agence Nationale de la Recherche) and within the framework of the labex OSE