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Research interests: Market Design, Applied Microeconomics, Digital Economics

Education

- 2020 - present **Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University Paris 1.**
PhD candidate in Economics
Thesis Title: Market Design in the Platform Economy
- 2024 **Columbia University.** Visiting Scholar at the Economics department.
Sponsor: Yeon-Koo Che.
- 2018 - 2020 M.A. Economics, **Paris School of Economics** and **EHESS**. Highest honors ("très bien")
- 2013 - 2017 B.A. Philosophy & Economics. **University of Bayreuth**, Germany. Highest honors ("ausgezeichnet")

Job Market Paper

"Pricing in Markets without Money: Theory and Evidence from Home Exchanges"

I examine how peer-to-peer sharing platforms that use internal currencies instead of real money should set prices. Individuals must earn currency by supplying on the platform and can only spend it by consuming on the same platform. Beyond this difference, such systems often mimic real markets where prices equalize demand and supply. I argue that non-market-clearing prices can be superior. As individuals typically only have a limited demand for the specific goods on the platform, some may become satiated and reduce their supply. I illustrate with a stylized model of a dynamic exchange economy that reducing the price of attractive goods can increase their supply. In the empirical part, I focus on a widely used platform for exchanging holiday homes. Combining proprietary data on the universe of transactions with several quasi-experimental designs I confirm key predictions of the model. I demonstrate large income effects on supply and show that a reform that compressed prices increased the supply of over-demanded homes. Remarkably, participation does not decrease. Further evidence suggests that many hosts have a strong preference against for-money rental platforms. Broader insights are that lessons from traditional markets may not easily extend to markets without real money and that the latter may have advantages even in contexts where monetary transactions are commonplace.

Work in Progress

"Misplaced trust? Analyzing property owners' responses in an online market", joint with Gabrielle Fack and Liam Wren-Lewis.

We investigate homophily in an online platform for short-term rentals, where trust is crucial. Analyzing millions of requests received by property owners reveals that hosts are more likely to accept requests from guests with similar characteristics such as nationality, language, age, and home size. Interestingly, while guest quality indicators like prior ratings influence decisions, they are less critical than homophily. However, when evaluating exchange outcomes, guest quality emerges as a stronger determinant than similarity, particularly in hosts' decisions to continue using the platform. We confirm the causal interpretation of these results by exploiting quasi-random variation in request timing to generate exogenous variation in both guest quality and guest similarity. These results suggest that hosts often misplace trust based on similarity. We discuss platform design modifications to enhance overall trust and reduce market segregation.

"Changing seats: Two-sided markets in the presence of switchers", joint with Xavier Lambin and Jérôme Pouyet

While traditional two-sided market theory assumes that consumers are locked into one side of the market, we argue that in some cases, consumers may switch sides while staying within the same platform. We examine the strategic implications for platforms and their competitors. We test and calibrate the model using proprietary data from a global ride-sharing platform.

"A structural model of token systems with endogenous supply", joint with Sam Altmann and Liam Wren-Lewis

We develop a structural model of an exchange economy where agents trade indivisible goods (homes) with token-money. Building on Menzel (2015), we identify preferences assuming a stable matching in a large market. We estimate the model using proprietary transaction and request data from a large platform for exchanging homes. Observing rejected requests allows us to separately identify how token-wealth changes agents' willingness to supply. We the welfare and equity effects of different pricing schemes, the initial token endowment of new users and of using a currency system instead of facilitating only two-way exchanges.

Seminars and Conferences

- 2024 18th North American Meeting of the Urban Economics Association (UEA), MATCH-UP Oxford, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) conference, ZEW ICT conference, Matching Markets and Inequality Workshop Exeter, International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), Student Research Breakfast (Columbia), Micro Theory Colloquium (Columbia), Industrial Organization Colloquium (Columbia)
- 2023 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (EWMES), CIRM Conference 'From matchings to markets. A tale of Mathematics, Economics and Computer Science', Platforms and the Sharing Economy Workshop 2023, Internal Seminar (PSE), Public and Labor Seminar (PSE), Regulation Seminar (PSE)
- 2022 PSIPSE (PSE)

Grants and Scholarships

- 2024 Honorable mention for the "Best Student Paper Prize" of the North American Meeting of the Urban Economics Association (UEA)
- 2024 Selected for "Rising Star" session of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) conference
- 2024 ANR-funded research grant "Why (not) to use money in the sharing economy" (4,000 EUR)
- 2024 Selected for "Rising Star" session of the International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC)
- 2023 Doctoral mobility grant by Paris School of Economics
- 2023 Doctoral mobility grant by the Columbia Alliance to visit Columbia University
- 2020 - 2023 3-year PhD funding by l'École Doctorale Économie Panthéon-Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics
- 2018 - 2020 Scholarship by the German Economy Foundation (sdw)
- 2018 - 2020 Graduate scholarship by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

Teaching Experience

- 2017 *Econometrics I*, University of Bayreuth, undergraduate course, TA for Mario Larch
- 2016 - 2017 *Academic Writing and Presenting*, University of Bayreuth, undergraduate course, Co-Instructor
- 2015 *Decision and Game Theory*, University of Bayreuth, undergraduate course, TA for Olivier Roy

Other Experience

- 2020 - 2021 Research assistant. Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas. PIs: Olivier Tercieux and Victor Hiller. Simulating steady state kidney allocations under counterfactual assignment mechanisms.
- 2017 - 2018 Research assistant & manager (full-time). Center for Impact Evaluation and Development (C4ED), Mannheim. PI: Markus Frölich. Designing, implementing and analyzing RCTs on livestock insurance and natural disaster preparedness. Training and supervising enumerators in the field. Writing independent chapter on two treatment arms.
- 2016 Intern in the Digital Economy department, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim. Devising sampling strategies and web scraping programs for e-commerce survey commissioned by European Commission.

Language and IT skills

- Languages English (fluent), German (native), French (good)
- Software L^AT_EX, git, Open Data Kit
- Programming Stata, Python, R, Matlab, Java, SQL

References

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