

Absence, Substitutability and Productivity: Evidence from Teachers

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Abstract

Worker absence is a frequent phenomenon but little is known on its effects on productivity nor on organizations' strategies to cope with this temporary disruptive event through substitute workers. Using a unique French administrative dataset matching, for each absence spell, each missing secondary school teacher to her substitute teacher, I find that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absences is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 15th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution. On average, tenured substitute teachers are able to compensate 37 % of this negative impact while contract substitute teachers do not have any statistically significant impact. Students in disadvantaged schools seem to be more sensitive to teacher absence and substitution than others.

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1 Introduction

Worker absence is frequent in many countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the United States and France alike, every year, two to three percent of annual work time is lost due to worker absence (DARES, 2013; UK Office for National Statistics, 2014; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). Despite the importance of this phenomenon, empirical evidence on the causal effect of worker absence on productivity is scarce.¹ Even much less is known on organizations' strategies to cope with this temporary disruptive event through worker substitution. When a worker is absent, how does it hurt her productivity? How easily can organizations mitigate this effect with substitute workers? Several major economic issues, from the impact of worker health and effort on productivity (Curie and Madrian, 1999; Lazear and Oyer, 2012) to the analysis of specific human capital (Jacobson et al., 1993; Altonji and Williams, 2005; Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010) and its relationship with worker substitutability (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996), depend on the answer to these questions.

I offer an empirical answer to these questions using a unique comprehensive administrative French panel dataset covering the 2007-2015 period and matching, for each absence spell, each missing secondary school teacher to her substitute teacher. The aim of this paper is to estimate, for Math, French and History ninth grade teachers and their students: a) the effect of the number of days of teacher absence on student test scores ; b) how this impact can be mitigated by the assignment of substitute teachers; c) how the impact of substitute teachers depends on their type (tenured vs. contract teachers).

Focusing on teachers to study worker absences is particularly relevant. First, teacher absences represent a significant share of their working time: in France, teachers are absent on average 7 % of the school year. Second, labor substitution is challenging for teaching. It requires a high level of human capital: finding skilled teachers to work as substitutes is a challenge because of the major teacher shortage experienced in many developed countries ². In France, there are not enough substitute teachers to cover all absent days: around 25 % of them are not replaced. The probability of replacement depends on the length of the absence spells and on the availability of substitute teachers. Over the last ten years, less and less tenured substitute teachers were available to cover absence spells. As a result, the government more and more resorts to contract teachers, hired on the spot without training nor certification, to fill vacancies.

¹To my best knowledge, there are only four papers covering this question: Miller et al (2008); Clotfelter et al. (2009); Duflo et al. (2012); Herrmann and Rockoff (2012)

²for more details, see Terrier, 2014 for France; Dee and Goldhaber, 2017 for the United States)

I identify the impact of the number of absence and replaced days by exploiting variations within teachers/school, across years (teacher-school fixed effects). I perform several specifications and robustness checks to confirm that the results are not driven by a) reverse causality: teachers are more absent when assigned to low performing students and it is more difficult to find quality substitution for this type of students; b) the fact that absences are only a reflection of poor on-the-job teacher productivity; c) or the fact that replaced absence spells are not comparable to non-replaced absence.

Based on the analysis of more than 100,000 teachers and three millions students, I show that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absence is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 15th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution, which is consistent with the very few studies on this question (Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). The fraction of absence spell replaced does not have any statistically significant compensating effect. However, when I make the distinction between the two type of substitute teachers, I find that one additional replaced day with a tenured substitute teacher (as opposed to a missed day at school) mitigates 37 % of the marginal impact of non replaced days. The marginal impact of a replaced day with a contract teacher (as opposed to a missed day at school) is not statistically significant. The heterogeneity analysis by length of absence spells suggests that the number of replaced days have a statistically significant impact only for absence spells longer than 30 days. Furthermore, the overall impact of one day of absence is 60 % larger in disadvantaged schools than in non-disadvantaged schools. In disadvantaged schools, tenured substitute teachers are able to compensate 45 % of the negative impact of absence against only 29 % in non-disadvantaged schools.

These results have several implications. First, even if teacher absence in France is less widespread than in developing countries, where teachers can miss up to 23 % of annual school time (Abadzi, 2009), the negative impact of teacher absences is still significantly large to be a worrying phenomenon. Second, whatever their type, substitute teachers seem unable to mitigate the totality of the negative impact of absences on student achievement. This might be due to the disruptive impact of absences: teaching requires specific human capital which can be acquired only through prolonged and repeated interactions with students. This intuition is supported by the fact that replaced days do not have any statistically significant impact for absence spells shorter than 30 days. This is the case whatever the type of substitute teacher, tenured or contract. Finally, whatever the length of the absence spells, contract teachers are unable to significantly mitigate the negative impact of absence, whereas tenured substitute teachers seem to do a good job. This is a source of inefficiency as contract teachers represent,

overall, an ever growing share of the teaching workforce. It is also a source of educational inequality as substitution spells ensured by contract teachers are concentrated in disadvantaged areas.

This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the very small literature on the effect of worker absence on productivity (Miller et al., 2008; Clotfelter et al., 2009; Duflo et al., 2012; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). This literature focuses on teachers and finds that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absence is on par with replacing a teacher of average productivity with one at the 10th-20th percentile of productivity. One of the most important limitation of this literature is that it does not provide any empirical evidence on the impact of substitute teachers and the channels through which teacher absence affects students. When a teacher is missing, her absence can impact her student through the loss of instructional time (non replaced days) but also through the difference in general and specific human capital between the missing teacher and the substitute teacher. This paper is, to my best knowledge, the very first to analyze these channels.

Second, this paper contributes to the small literature on contract teachers, which focuses on developing countries. The main paper on this question is Duflo et al.(2014), which shows that, in Kenyan primary schools, contract teachers are more efficient than regular teachers when their hiring is more closely monitored and they have higher incentives to exert effort. The French context analyzed in this paper is very different because the requirements to become a contract teacher are very low and contract teachers do not seem to have higher incentives than regular teachers to exert effort.

Third, this paper contributes to an emerging empirical literature on worker substitutability. Hensvik and Rosenqvist (2016) show that worker sickness absence is lower in positions with few internal substitute. They interpret this finding as evidence that firms try to keep absence low in positions with few internal substitute and that internal substitution insures firms against production disruptions caused by absence. Jäger (2016) provides more direct evidence of imperfect substitutability between insiders and outsiders. He analyzes the effect of unexpected worker deaths in the German private sector and shows these worker exits on average raise the remaining workers' wages and retention probabilities. While these papers use wage and retention as proxies for worker productivity, I measure it based on an actual and multidimensional output, student outcomes. I can rely on an important literature which consistently finds teachers to be the most important determinant of student outcomes, both in the short and long run (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014a;b). Moreover, because teaching is a complex, multidimensional task, based on

direct, personal and prolonged interactions with the “output” (students), it requires specific human capital (student-specific, grade-specific etc., see Ost, 2014), which makes it particularly well suited to the analysis of the relationship between human capital specificity and substitutability.

Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on instruction time (Pischke, 2007; Lavy, 2015). This literature finds that longer instructional time has a positive impact on student test scores and one-time grade progression. While these papers focus on variations in planned instruction time defined by law, I go a step further and analyze the impact on student outcomes of variations in the actual amount of instruction hours, and of variations with whom they are actually spent (regular or substitute teacher).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the French educational context, highlighting its relevance to the analysis of worker absence and substitutability. Section 3 presents a highly stylized conceptual framework to illustrate the mechanisms through which teacher absence and substitution affect student outcomes. Section 4 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 exposes the empirical strategy, section 6 the baseline results and section 7 the robustness checks. Section 8 analyses the impact of absence and substitution by length and reason of absence, student background and teacher topic. Section 9 concludes.

2 Institutional Setting

2.1 Secondary School Teachers in France

The public French educational system is highly centralized. Contrary to the United States for example, schools have little autonomy: they are all required to follow the same national curriculum. School principals cannot hire nor fire their teachers. The French territory ³ is decomposed in 25 large administrative school districts, called *académies* (hereafter regions).

Secondary school teachers are selected through a subject-specific national competitive examination, which is very demanding academically and has low passing rates (between 15 and 30 %). There are two main certification levels: basic, called CAPES (*Certificat d’aptitude au professorat de l’enseignement du second degré*) and advanced, called *Agrégation*. Conditional on passing this examination, teachers become civil servants managed by the government.

Certified teachers are assigned via a centralized point-based system (called SIAM,

³This paper focuses on mainland France and does not analyses its overseas territories.

Système d'information et d'aide aux mutations) with two rounds: the inter-regional round and the regional round. Candidates submit a rank-ordered list of choices and are assigned according to a modified version of the school-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Combes, Tercieux and Terrier, 2016). Teachers' priorities are mostly determined by their number of years of experience. Every year, i) new teachers and tenured teachers who want to change region apply to the inter-regional mobility round; ii) participants of the inter-regional mobility round, and tenured teachers who want to change school within their region, apply to the intra-regional mobility round.

Teacher wages are set through a national wage scale based on teachers' number of years of experience and certification level (none, basic and advanced). For example, the gross wage of a teacher with the basic certification level and a year of experience is approximately 2,000 euros per month. Wages do not vary across schools and depend on output only indirectly through teacher evaluations. Teachers are evaluated on the job every year by their school principal and regularly by external inspectors with classroom observations. The weighted average of the school principal grade (40 percent) and the classroom observation (60 percent) can foster promotion. Given that experience is the main criteria for promotion, teachers with a high weighted average need less teaching experience to go up on the wage scale than teachers with a low weighted average. Table 4 reports the relationship between teacher evaluation grades and teacher absences, controlling for teacher characteristics, including the number of years of experience. It shows that, whatever the specification (school fixed effects or teacher fixed effects), neither the number of absence spells neither the number of days of absence are significantly associated with the evaluation grades. This suggests that neither school principals nor external inspectors take into account teachers' absence behavior in their evaluation.

Secondary school teachers are subject-specific: each subject is taught by a different teacher. The legal working week is 15 hours for teachers with an advanced certification level and 18 hours for teachers with a basic certification level. Students are not tracked by major nor ability. Students stay in the same class, with the same peers throughout the school year and in every subject. For ninth graders, a typical week consists in 29 school hours, distributed across 11 teachers–subjects, among which 4 hours of French, 3.30 hours of Mathematics, and 3.30 hours of History ⁴.

At the end of 9th grade, students take a national and externally graded examination called *Diplôme national du Brevet* in three topics: French, Math and History. This

⁴The rest of the hours are distributed between Foreign Languages (5h30), Science (4h30), Sport(3h) and Art (2h), see <http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid80/les-horaires-par-cycle-au-college.html>

exam takes place in the very last days of June/early days of July.

2.2 Teacher Absence Leave Regulation

Teachers are fully paid during the first three months of their absence leave for minor illness, and during the first to third year of their leave for serious illness. After this period, they receive half of their regular pay. Teachers are fully paid during their maternity leave, which can last from 16 to 46 weeks depending on the order of the birth. Paternity leaves are also fully paid and can last from 11 to 18 days. Teacher can also take fully paid leave for professional reasons such as training, meetings, participation to an examination board *etc.*. Unlike in the United States for example (Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012), there is no limitation in the number of days of paid absence each teacher can take per year. The only absences that are constrained are those for child's sickness. Depending on the marital status, teachers can take up to 10 paid days to take care of their sick child.

2.3 Teacher Substitution Procedure

Teacher absences are not systematically replaced in France. Overall, the probability of replacement depends on the length of the absence spell and the availability of substitute teachers. Absences are handled by the regional educational authority (*rectorat*). There are no official precise criteria: regional educational authorities are simply asked to give priority to long term absences (IGEN, 2011).

In practice, when a teacher is absent, she has to notify her school principal, who then notifies the region via an online form, whatever the length of the absence spell. Principals can, additionally and separately, fill an online form to ask the region for an external substitute teacher. Regional educational authorities assign substitute teachers manually.

2.4 Substitute Teachers

Tenured Substitute Teachers. Certified teachers can ask to become substitute teachers during the intra-regional mobility round of the centralized teacher assignment procedure but most tenured substitutes (*Titulaires sur zone de remplacement*) are teachers who participated to the inter-regional mobility round and failed to obtain one of their choices in the intra-regional mobility round (IGAENR, 2015). They are as-

signed to a reference school called *établissement de rattachement administratif* (RAD), and can be called to replace absent teachers in any school located in an geographical area called *zone de remplacement*.⁵ There are around 250 *zones de remplacement* in France. Tenured substitute teachers' wages do not depend on the number of substitution they perform nor on the number of hours they work. Their wage has two main components: a fixed part which is equal the regular teachers' wage, and a variable part, which depends on the distance between the substitute's reference school and the school she is called to cover. The latter part consists in a daily compensation which goes from 15 €/day to 52 €/ day (Table 3).

As explained above, there is no clear rule for the assignment of tenured substitute teachers. Regional educational authorities, which are in charge of the assignment and do it manually, are simply given the general guideline to give priority to long absence spells (IGEN, 2011). In the context of the shortage of tenured teachers in France (Terrier, 2014), tenured substitute teachers are more and more assigned to fill one year vacancies that remained open in September because a regular teacher left definitely her school in June and her position remains unfilled.

Contract Teachers. When there is a shortage of available tenured certified substitute teachers to perform substitution, regions hire contract teachers on the spot. Contract teachers are not hired via the same procedure as certified teachers. Candidates apply directly to regional educational authorities via an online platform.⁶ To be eligible, they must hold a Bachelor's degree and have no criminal record. Candidates submit their resume, cover letter and, in some regions, their geographical preferences. The selection process is managed by regional professional inspectors. In general, professional inspectors are former experienced teachers. They screen candidates based on their online application and conduct interviews. Successful candidates are hired on a short term contract (*Contrat à durée déterminée*) of maximum a year. This contract can be renewed up to six consecutive times (DEPP, 2015). After six consecutive years of work without interruptions lasting more than four months, contract teachers have the legal right to a permanent contract (*Contrat à durée indéterminée*). Contract teachers' wage depends on their degree (High school degree, Bachelor's, Master's or more), their professional experience, and on their region.⁷ For example, the gross wage of a contract teacher in Paris, with a Bachelor's degree and a year of experience

⁵Décret 99-823 du 17 septembre 1999

⁶This online platform is called, depending on the region, either SIATEN (Système d'information des agents temporaires de l'Éducation nationale) or ACLOE (Application de gestion des candidatures en ligne)

⁷<http://vocationenseignant.fr/devenir-enseignant-contractuel-ou-vacataire-mode-d-emploi>

is 1699 €/ month.

3 Conceptual Framework

This section presents the main intuitions and predictions of the highly stylized conceptual framework which describes how teacher absences can impact teacher productivity and how this impact can be mitigated or aggravated by teacher substitutes. The detailed conceptual framework is presented in section 11.

Student yearly instructional time can be decomposed as follows:

- hours spent with the regular teacher
- hours lost because the regular teacher is absent and no substitute teacher is assigned
- hours spent with a substitute teacher. This substitute teacher can either be a tenured substitute teacher or a contract substitute teacher.

Teacher productivity depends on her ability, professional experience and, importantly, student-specific human capital. The basic intuition of student-specific human capital is that the longer teachers spend time teaching the specific students they are assigned to, the better they are at teaching them. This may be because they get to know and adjust to their students, and also have more time to implement a long-term instructional strategy. Several suggestive empirical evidence back this intuition. Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2011) suggest teachers adjust the level at which they teach in response to changes in class composition. Herrmann and Rockoff (2012) find daily productivity losses from absence decline with the length of an absence spell, consistent with substitute teachers learning on the job.

Therefore, teacher absence can impact teacher productivity through different channels, depending on whether the absent teacher is replaced, and on the quality of the substitute teacher:

1. if the regular teacher is absent and no substitute teacher is assigned, teacher absence can impact productivity through the loss in instruction time and the amount of student-specific capital the regular teacher loses during her absence
2. if the regular teacher is absent and a substitute teacher is assigned, the main channels are:
 - the difference in ability and experience between the regular and the substitute teachers

- how fast substitute teachers gain student-specific human capital
- the amount of student-specific capital the regular teacher loses during her absence

4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

4.1 Data

This paper relies on administrative data from the French ministry of Education covering the whole country and school years 2005-2006 through 2014-2015. I focus on Math, French and History teachers matched to their 9th grade students. A precise description of the data is found in the section 10. I exploit four main set of data:

- individual data on students including an encrypted national identification number, gender, financial aid status, parents' occupation, the identification number of their school and of their class. A separate database also includes their test scores at the end of 9th grade examination in French, Math and History, which I standardize by year and region.
- individual data on teachers including national identification number, date of birth, gender, number of year of teaching experience, teaching subject, identification number of their assignment, and the identification number of the school and of the class they teach. The two latter variables are used to match each teacher to her students. I take into account, throughout the paper, only open business days and remove holidays and weekends.
- data on teachers' absence spells: regional identification number of the absent teacher; day, month and year of the absence spells; detailed cause of absence (minor illness, maternity leave, training etc.); region identification number.
- data on teachers' assignment spells: region identification number of the substitute teacher, day, month and year of the assignment spells; identification number of their assignment; national identifying number of the school. The match between the absent and the substitute teachers is made on the identification number and dates of their respective assignment spells. As for absence spells, I take into account, throughout the paper, only open business days and remove from absence spells holidays and weekends.

4.2 Summary Statistics

Distribution of Absence Spells. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the number of absence spells per teacher-year. Each year, 55 percent of teachers do not take any absence leave. It is much more than in the United States where perfect attendance by a teacher occurs only in 3 percent of cases (Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). Around half of teachers who are absent take only one absence spell. Figure 10a shows that the majority of absence spells are health-related: 50 % for minor sickness, 10 % for long term illness, 3 % for maternity leave, 2 % for maternity leave extension (in case of a difficult pregnancy or childbirth) and 1 % for professional illness. The other reasons for absence are work-related (meeting, training) or family related. The average length, in number of days, of absence spells varies greatly by reason of absence: from 100 days per year on average for long term illness to 1.5 days for family-related absences. Therefore, the distribution of the number of absence per type of absence (Figure 10b) differs from the distribution of the number of absence spells (Figure 10a). Absences for long term illness account for 60 % of the total number of absence days, absences for minor sickness 16 % and maternity leave 12 %.

Teachers are absent on average 13.14 days per year on average, which represents around 7 % of the yearly instructional time. Figure 6 shows the cumulative distribution of the number of instructional days of absence per absence spell. More than 36 % of absence spells last only one day. The distribution of absence spells is right-skewed, with 80 % of absence spells lasting less than 20 days.

There are large infra-year variations in the total weekly absence rate. Figure 4 shows that the weekly absence rate can go as low as 1.5 % in the first week of September to as high as 7.8 % in the middle of January. This trend of higher absence rates in the winter than in the summer is common to all professions (Dares, 2013).

Distribution of Substitution Spells. Figure 9 shows the overall replacement rate per year. Over the period, the replacement rate has decreased by 25 %, going from 20 % of absence spells covered in 2007 to 15 % of absence spells covered in 2015. The replacement rate by tenured substitute teachers has also dramatically decreased. In 2007, 90 % of replacement spells were ensured by substitute teachers, against 55 % of replacement spells in 2015. The major shift seems to have occurred between 2010 and 2012. A possible explanation is that, in the context of the shortage of teachers, more and more tenured substitute teachers were assigned to fill vacancies, at the expense of substitution of absence spells. At the end of the period, in 2015, the number of replaced days is equal to 10 days per year, which means that around 75 % of absent days are replaced (Figure 5). On average, 5 days per year are replaced by tenured substitute

teachers. This means that on average in 2015, 3 % of annual instructional time is spent with tenured substitute teachers, against 6 % in 2007. Over the period, the share of replaced days by contract substitute teachers is more than four times higher in 2015 than in 2007 (from 10 % to around 45 %).

There are large variations in replacement rates by reason of absence (Figure 11). Short term absences such as minor sickness absence, maternity leave extension, family related and work-related absences are rarely replaced (Figure 11a). On average, only 9 % of absent days for minor sickness are replaced. Long term absences such as maternity leave, long term illness and professional illness are better covered: 67 % of absent days for maternity leave are replaced. Therefore, regional educational authorities, in charge of assigning substitute teachers, seem to comply with the instructions of the Ministry of Education asking them to give priority to long absence spells. Figure 7 reports the average replacement rate by length of absence spell over the period. On average, only 0.4 % of absence spells lasting a single day and 6 % of absence spells lasting a week are replaced. The replacement rate rises quickly with the length of absence spells, and reaches 50 % for 20 days absence spells and 90 % for 100 days absence spells. Importantly, the share of replacement spells ensured by contract teachers increases with the length of the absence spells for absence spells lasting less than 20 days (which represent more than 80 % of the absence spells). The share of replacement spells done by contract substitute teachers is equal to 6 % for one day absence spells, against more than 17 % for absence spells lasting 20 days. This is quite surprising as it goes against the instruction of the Ministry of Education asking them to give priority to tenured substitute teachers for long absence spells. For absence spells lasting more than 20 days, the share of replacement spells done by contract substitute teachers is constant around 15 %.

There are also large variations in replacement rates between regions. For example, in the Creteil region (disadvantaged Eastern suburb of Paris), only 6 % of absence spells are replaced whereas in the Nice region (French Riviera), almost 45 % of absence spells are replaced. The share of absence spells replaced by contract substitute teachers differs greatly between these two regions. In Creteil in 2015, 51 % of replacement spells are done by contract teachers, against 33 % of replacement spells in Nice the same year. These inequalities reflect disparities in the assignment of teachers. The overall share of contract teachers in the teaching workforce has increased over the period, going from 3 % of teachers in 2007 to almost 8 % in 2015 (Figure 8). However, this increase is not homogeneous across regions. In 2015, contract teachers account for more than 10 % of teachers in Creteil, against only 5 % in Caen (West of France).

Substitute Teachers Characteristics. Table 5 shows summary statistics on teacher characteristics. Contract teachers are on average less experienced than regular and tenured substitute teachers. Contract teachers have on average 4.6 years of experience, whereas tenured substitute teachers have 10 years of experience and regular teachers 14.1 years. 32 % of contract teachers have a year or less of experience, against 13 % of tenured substitute teachers and 2 % of regular teachers. Regular teachers and tenured substitute teachers have the same distribution by certification. For both regular and tenured substitute teachers, *Agrégation* recipients represent 5 % of the population and CAPES recipients approximately 75 %. By definition, contract teachers are not certified. I then focus on the subsample of contract teachers who take the same certification examinations as regular and tenured substitute teachers (Table 6). Candidates who are contract teachers perform very badly both at *Agrégation* and CAPES. For example, only 16 % of them pass the CAPES against 33 % of candidates who are not contract teachers.

5 Empirical Strategy

Empirical Strategy. As suggested by Table 9, absences and substitution can be correlated with observed and unobserved teachers’ characteristics which can have a direct impact on student achievement. For example, there is a statistically significant relationship between teacher substitution and her student socioeconomic background, experience and other teacher characteristics kept equal. Furthermore, low quality teachers can be systematically assigned to low achieving students. To deal with these issues, I resort to teacher fixed effects, which control for both observed and unobserved teacher fixed characteristics (Miller et al., 2008; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). Therefore, I exploit within teacher, across years variations in the number of days of absence and in the number of replaced days. This source of variation has already been exploited in the previous studies on the impact of teacher absences on student achievement (Miller, 2008; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). To better understand this strategy, Table 7 reports a small example. Mr Dupont is a 9th grade Math teacher who take, in 2010 and 2011, three absence spells. Each year, only one of them is replaced. The impact of the number of absent and replaced days is identified through the relationship between variations in Mr Dupont’s number of absent/replaced days and variations in Mr Dupont’s student’s test scores. I estimate the following regression specification:

$$Y_{j,t} = A_{j,t}\beta + R_{j,t}\gamma + \theta_j + \theta_t + e_{j,t} \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{j,t}$ is the test scores of teacher j 's students in year t in her topic. $A_{j,t}$ is the number of work day absences of all the absence spells taken by teacher j in year t and $R_{j,t}$ the number of replaced work days of all the absence spells taken by teacher j in year t . Finally, θ_t year fixed-effect to control for common trends across years, and θ_j is the teacher-school fixed effects to control for fixed individual characteristics. Robust standard standard errors are clustered by school, which is more conservative than clustering at the classroom or teacher levels.

Identification Hypotheses and Threats to Identification. The parameters of interests $A_{j,t}$ and $R_{j,t}$ are identified under the assumption that variations within teacher, across years in the number of days of absence/ number of replaced days are not correlated with variations of unobserved determinants of student achievement, such as i) within teacher variations in productivity; ii) student ability or iii) teachers' overall working conditions. First, table 9 shows that experience is strongly correlated with the number of days of absence and replacement. We also know from the literature that experience is an observable determinant of teacher quality. That is why I add experience and the square of experience as control variables. A source of unobservable variations in within teacher quality would be teacher motivation. If, for example, a teacher were burning out, then her absences would only be a symptom of poor on-the-job productivity. This point is discussed in the robustness checks with placebo tests in the number of days of absence and replacement. Second, low achieving students can discourage teachers and raise absences, i.e. there could be reverse causality. The match between substitute teachers and students could not be random. For example, high achieving students can be given priority in the substitute teacher assignment process. I tackle this issue by including in the specification students socio-economic background such dummies for parental profession and financial aid status. This issue of reverse causality is also further discussed in the robustness checks section. Third, I tackle the issue of unobserved variations in working conditions such as the school environment by combining teacher fixed effects with school fixed effects (i.e. with teacher-school fixed effects). With this specification, when a teacher moves to another school, he is assigned in the data another individual identifier and considered as a different teacher. Finally, in the heterogeneity analysis section, I distinguish between maternity leaves and other type of absences. Indeed, maternity leave is the reason of absence most likely to be unrelated to within teacher variations in motivation or burning out, student ability or working conditions.

Another type of threat for identification is more specific to the replacement parameters. These parameters would not be identified if the type of absence spells that are

replaced were not comparable to those who are not. For example, absences planned in advance may be more likely to be replaced than absences that are unexpected. In that case, the impact of replacement may be biased. Teachers who know in advance they are going to be missing a certain period of time can prepare their absence by giving guidelines to their substitute, specific homework to their students etc. In particular, the analysis of the impact of the assignment of tenured substitute teachers or contract substitute teachers would be biased if tenured substitute teachers were assigned to different type of absence spells, e.g. of different length, period of the year or reason, than contract substitute teachers. This is all the more relevant since the summary statistics (Figure 7) shows that, for absence spells lasting less than 20 days (more than 80 % of the absence spells), the share of replacement spells done by contract teachers increases with the length of the absence spell. I tackle this issue by performing several heterogeneity analyzes, in particular by length of absence spell and reason of absence. More specifically, distinguishing between maternity leaves and other types of absence can be fruitful because maternity leaves are the absences that are the most likely to be planned long in advance.

6 Baseline Results

Impact of the Number of Days Absence and Replacement. Table 10 reports regression estimates of the impact of the number of days of absence and the number of replaced days per teacher-year on their student test scores at the 9th grade examination. Each column corresponds to a single regression. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation. All regressions include year x topic fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by school. Column 1 reports naive estimates, without teacher-school fixed effect nor control variables. With this specification, an additional non-replaced day of absence is associated with a 0.13 % of a standard deviation decrease in student test scores. An additional replaced day (as compared to missing a day of school) is associated with a 0.06 % of a standard deviation increase of student test scores. In other words, replaced days compensate more than 45 % of the negative impact of absence. I now control for teacher-school fixed effects and time-varying teacher characteristics (teacher experience and seniority). The effect of absences is divided by three but remains statistically significant (column 2). This is consistent with a negative correlation between teacher quality and absences. Furthermore, the effect of replaced days becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests a non-random sorting between absent teachers and substitute teachers: the best absent teachers seem to have priority

in the assignment of substitute teachers. To get a sense of the influence variations in student composition can have on teacher absences and substitution, I add parental occupation and financial aid status of students as control variables to the specification of column 2. With this specification (column 3), the marginal effect of absence is only slightly different. The marginal impact of one additional non-replaced day of absence is to reduce student achievement by 0.05 % of a standard deviation. In other words, the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absences is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 15th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution.⁸ This is comparable to the results of the literature. Herrmann and Rockoff (2012) for example find that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absences is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 10-20 percentile of the teacher value-added distribution. Furthermore, the coefficient associated with the number of replaced days remains the same as in column 2. Thus, this suggests that, controlling for teacher fixed and varying characteristics, across years variations in student composition may not be a serious threat for identification. This question is further investigated in the robustness checks section.

Impact of the Number of Days of Replacement by Type of Substitute Teachers. The above results seem to suggest that substitute teachers are, on average, unable to compensate the negative impact of teacher absences. However, Table 11 shows that, in fact, the impact of replaced days largely depends on the type of substitute teachers. With the preferred specification (column 3), tenured substitute teachers are able to mitigate more than 37 % of the marginal impact of absences. On the other hand, the marginal impact of a replaced day with a contract teacher (as compared to missing a day of school) is not statistically significant.

7 Robustness Checks

7.1 Threat I: Reverse Causality

Placebo test with students' teacher in another topic. A concern for the validity of the baseline results is that they are biased because of unobserved variations in student ability, which can impact both teacher absences and replacement and student test scores. A first test is to see if absences and replacements of a teacher in one topic impact her students' test scores in another topic (i.e. with another teacher). If the baseline results were driven by student ability, then the absence days and replaced

⁸For the detail of the computation, see Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012

days of the Math teacher of student i would be significantly correlated with student test scores in French. Table 14 reports regression estimates of the effect of absence and replaced days of the “other topic” teacher of student i on student test scores in 9th grade. Each column-panel corresponds to a single regression. This table shows that Math absence and replacement days are not significantly related to student achievement in French and in History. This is also true for French absence and replacement days on Math and History test scores; and of History absence and replacement days on French and Math test scores. Thus, this placebo test gives strong evidence in favor of the robustness of the baseline results with respect to within teacher variations in student ability.

Student fixed effects. Another robustness check usually done in the literature is to control for students’ initial level of achievement with their previous year’s test scores (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; Chetty et al., 2014). Contrary to American and English students for example, who are regularly externally evaluated, French students take only one externally graded examination, in 9th grade, and in three topics: French, History and Math. Therefore, to give further support for the robustness of the baseline results, I use student fixed effects in cross-section (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2010; Lavy, 2010), exploiting with student, across topics variations in teachers. Table 8 presents a small fictitious example in order to give a better sense of this approach. The source of variation comes from the fact that teachers are subject-specific. Each student (Caroline and Henri) is observed, each year, once per teacher-topic. Thus, I exploit within student, across topics variations in the number of days of absence and in the number of replaced days. Regression estimates are reported in Table 15. The marginal impact of absence and replacement are very similar to the baseline estimates, which gives further support for the validity of the results.

7.2 Threat II: Absence as a symptom of poor on-the-job teacher quality

Previous and Following Year Absences and Substitution. I also give evidence against the idea that the baseline results are driven by the fact that absences are only a symptom of poor on-the-job teacher quality. If, for example, the impact of absence were only capturing the fact that absent teacher were burning out, then previous and following absences would have a statistically significant impact. Table 16 reports a placebo test of the effect of absence and replacement of the previous year ($t - 1$) and following year ($t + 1$) of teacher j on student test scores in 9th grade with teacher j

during the year t . Each column corresponds to a different regression. All regressions correspond to the preferred specification. This table shows absent days and replacement day of years $t - 1$ and $t + 1$ do not have any statistically significant impact on student achievement in year t . Therefore, it does not seem that the baseline result are biased by poor on-the-job teacher performance.

Absences During the Holidays. Teachers who fall sick or pregnant during the school holidays (days when they do not have class) or during summer time have the possibility to declare these days in order to have these absence days transferred during school time ⁹. These absence spells represent around 1 % of the observations. Half of them are maternity leaves happening over the summer. Table 17 shows regression estimates of the marginal impact of one day of absence during holidays. It shows that these estimates are not statistically significant. Therefore, this suggests that the baseline estimates are not driven by that the baseline estimates are not driven by the fact that absence would be a symptom of poor on-the-job teacher quality.

7.3 Threat III: Replaced Absences are not Comparable to Non Replaced Absences

Heterogeneity by Reason of Absence. Table 18 reports regression estimates by reason of absence. This table corresponds to a single regression. I make the distinction between absence spells for maternity leave and non maternity leave absence spells. As discussed in the empirical strategy, the reason for this distinction is that maternity leave absence spells are those less likely to be determined by within teacher variations in teacher quality, student ability or working conditions. Furthermore, maternity leaves are the type of absence the most likely to be planned long in advance. We observe that the marginal impact of absence for maternity leave is to reduce student test scores by 0.05 % of a standard deviation. The impact of absence for non maternity leave absences is similar. The impact of replacement by a tenured substitute teacher, for both maternity leave and non maternity leave absences, is to mitigate 30 - 35 % of the negative impact of absence. The fact that estimates for maternity leave absence spells and non maternity absence spells are very similar gives strong support for the robustness of the baseline results.

⁹Source: <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F2481>

8 Heterogeneity Analysis

Heterogeneity by Length of Absence Spells. Table 12 reports regression estimates of the effect of absence and replaced days on student test scores in 9th grade by length of absence spell. Each line corresponds to a single regression. All regressions correspond to the preferred specification. First, the marginal impact of one additional day of absence decreases with the length of absence spells. The marginal impact of absence is to reduce student achievement by 0.19 % of a standard deviation for absence spells lasting less than five days whereas it is equal to 0.10 % of a standard deviation for absence spells lasting less than 50 days. Second, the marginal impact of one. Third, the marginal impact of one replaced day with a tenured substitute teacher is not statistically significant for absence spells lasting less than 30 days (which represent more than 85 % of absence spells).

Heterogeneity by Topic. Figure 15 reports regression estimates by teaching topic. The marginal impact of one additional day of non-replaced absence in Math is to reduce student achievement by 0.08 % of a standard deviation. In French and History, this impact is equal to 0.04 % of a standard deviation. The fact that absences have a larger impact in Math than in other topics is consistent with the literature (Miller et al., 2008; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). A possible explanation is that teacher value-added is higher in Math than in other topics (Chetty et al., 2014).

Focus on Disadvantaged Schools. Table 13 reports regression estimates of the impact of absence/replacement for disadvantaged schools and for non-disadvantaged schools. Disadvantaged schools are defined as those who are part of the national program *Éducation prioritaire*. They approximately represent the bottom 20 % of schools in term of social composition. In disadvantaged schools, the marginal impact of one day of absence is to reduce student test scores by 0.72 % of a standard deviation. This is 60 % higher than the marginal impact of absence in non-disadvantaged schools. Furthermore, tenured substitute teachers are able to compensate 45 % of the negative impact of absence against 29 % in non-disadvantaged schools.

Heterogeneity by Month of the School Year. Figure 14 reports estimates of the impact of the number of days/substitution by month of the beginning of the absence spell. The three graphs correspond to a single regression with the preferred specification. The graph 14a shows the seasonality of the marginal impact of absence (controlling for the number of replaced days with tenured substitute and contract substitute). The marginal impact of absence starting in September is not statistically significant at the five percent level. Between October and January, the marginal impact

of absence on student test scores is equal to $-0.06/-0.08$ percent of a standard deviation and is statistically significant at the five percent level. It then drops to $-0.10/-0.11$ percent of a standard deviation in February and March. The marginal impact of absence is the most negative in June when it reaches a -0.12 percent of a standard deviation. The 9th grade exam takes place in the last days of June/first days of July. This suggests that the presence and actions taken by regular teachers in the month just before the exam have a larger impact on student test scores than those taken in the previous months of the school year. This result is consistent with the previous literature (Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012). The graph 14b confirms the intuition that the month just before the exam is crucial for student test scores. It shows that the marginal impact of one replaced day with a tenured substitute teacher is the largest in June, where it is equal to 0.09% of a standard deviation in test scores and is statistically significant at the five percent level.

9 Conclusion

Using a unique French administrative dataset matching, for each absence spell, each missing secondary school teacher to her substitute teacher, this paper (a) estimates the effect of teacher absence on student achievement; (b) studies how the effect of teacher absence can be mitigated through the assignment and quality of substitute teachers. I find that the expected loss in daily productivity from teacher absences is on par with replacing an average teacher with one at the 15th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution. Tenured substitute teachers are able to compensate 37% of this negative impact, while contract substitute teachers do not have a statistically significant impact.

Thus, this paper shows that contract teachers are unable to significantly mitigate the negative impact of absence, whereas tenured substitute teachers seem to do a good job. This is a source of inefficiency as contract teachers represent, overall, an ever growing share of the teaching workforce. It is also a source of educational inequality as substitution spells ensured by contract teachers are concentrated in disadvantaged areas.

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10 Data Construction

Table 1 – Main Datasets

Name	Observation level	Period covered
OCC	teacher x assignment spell	2001 - 2015
CONG	teacher x absence spell	2001 - 2015
RELAIS	teacher x class x year	2004-2015
FAERE	student x year	2006-2015

The OCC and CONG datasets are raw administrative datasets which are not previously cleaned by the Statistical Department of the Ministry of Education. I do not use the cleaned version of these datasets because they are not exhaustive:

1. The cleaned version of the OCC datasets does not include all teacher assignment spells but only the assignment spells which are ongoing at the time of the extraction by the Statistical Department (in December of each year). This is highly problematic for the purpose of this study because I need to observe all teacher assignments through the school year in order to know, for each absence spell, whether a substitute teacher has been assigned, and the identity of this substitute teacher.
2. The cleaned version of the CONG datasets does not include all teacher absence spells but only absence for health reasons: minor sickness, maternity leave, long term illness and professional illness. This is highly problematic because, as shown in figure 10b, non health related absences (meetings, training, family) represent around 30 % of absence spells.

10.1 Merging Procedures

1. Merge between data on absence spells (CONG) and data on teacher assignment spells (OCC). Matching variables: dates of assignment spells, dates of absence

spells, regional teacher identification number, regional identification number. The dates variables give the exact day, month and year.

Table 2 – Description of the Merge between the Dataset on Teacher Assignments and the Dataset on Absence Spells

School Year	Nb of obs – OCC	Nb of obs – CONG	Matching Rate
2001	1,138,588	2,642,820	100 %
2002	1,208,334	2,752,949	100 %
2003	1,249,347	2,678,823	100 %
2004	1,237,848	2,827,934	100 %
2005	1,295,957	2,858,053	100 %
2006	1,961,504	2,778,671	100 %
2007	1,194,925	2,806,209	100 %
2008	1,376,532	1,376,532	100 %
2009	1,405,110	2,607,199	100 %
2010	1,387,348	2,667,126	100 %
2011	1,390,155	2,617,673	100 %
2012	1,343,316	2,481,001	100 %
2013	1,331,228	2,444,893	100 %
2014	1,324,245	2,418,418	100 %
2015	1,307,329	2,445,823	100 %

2. Merge between the obtained dataset and the dataset on teacher assignment spells (OCC) to match each teacher absence spells to its substitute teacher. Matching variables: dates of the assignment spells, dates of the absence spells, assignment identification number, school identification number:

- match on the dates: the assignment spell of the substitute teacher must be included in the absence spell of the absence teacher

match on the assignment identification number and school identification number: each position held by a teacher has an identification number, the assignment number. For example, “Math teacher #4 ” is an assignment. It is not school-specific and must be combined with the school identification number to identify a single assignment, e.g. “Math teacher #4 in school #154 ”. When a substitute teacher is assigned, she is given the same assignment number/school identification number as the absent teacher. Therefore, substitution spells are assignment spells which are included in the absent teacher assignment spell.

11 Detailed Conceptual Framework

I present a highly stylized conceptual framework aimed at understanding the intuitions of my empirical analysis. I essentially build on Herrmann and Rockoff (2012) and add to their framework the potential underlying mechanisms of the effect of absence and substitution on productivity.

Consider $q_{j,i,t}$ the productivity of a representative teacher j during a specific hour of teaching t with student i . The average hourly productivity of teacher j over her hours of teaching with student i , indexed from 1 to $T_{j,i}$ writes:

$$q_{j,i} = \frac{1}{T_{j,i}} \sum_{t=1}^{T_{j,i}} q_{j,i,t} \quad (2)$$

Crucially, I assume the average hourly productivity to be strictly increasing in the number of hours T_j teacher j spends instructing her student i :

$$q_{j,i} = q_j(T_{j,i}), \text{ with } \frac{\delta q_{j,i}(T_{j,i})}{\delta T_{j,i}} > 0 \quad (3)$$

The intuition is that teachers acquire, over their hours of teaching, student-specific human capital which contributes positively to their average productivity. Several suggestive empirical evidence back this intuition. Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2011) suggest teachers adjust the level at which they teach in response to changes in class composition. Herrmann and Rockoff (2012) find daily productivity losses from absence decline with the length of an absence spell, consistent with substitute teachers learning on the job. Therefore, I assume the longer teachers teach the student they are assigned to, the better they are at teaching them. This may be because they get to know and adjust to their students, and also have more time to implement a long-term instructional strategy.

I write total productivity $Q_{T_{j,i}}$ over hours of teaching indexed from 1 to $T_{j,i}$ as a function of hourly productivity:

$$Q_{T_{j,i}} = f_{T_{j,i}}(q_{j,i,1}, q_{j,i,2}, \dots, q_{j,i,T_{j,i}}), \text{ where } j = \begin{cases} r & \text{if the regular teacher is teaching} \\ s & \text{if the substitute teacher } s \text{ is teaching} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

From the student i perspective, the total number of planned hours of instruction

T_i writes:

$$T_i = T_{i,r} + T_{i,s} + T_{i,a} \quad (5)$$

where $T_{i,a}$ is the number of instruction hours lost by student i when her regular teacher is absent and no substitute teacher is assigned. I write $Y_{i,T}$, student i output over T , as a function g_T of the sum of regular teacher r and potential substitute teacher s respective productivity, lost instruction time $T_{i,a}$ and an idiosyncratic error ϵ_{i,T_i} (other inputs):

$$Y_{i,T_i} = g_T(f_{T_{i,r}} + f_{T_{i,s}}, T_{i,a}, \epsilon_{i,T_i}) \quad (6)$$

Following the standard education production function framework (Todd and Wolpin, 2003), I assume $f_{T_{i,j}}$ and g_T to be additive and separable:

$$Y_{i,T_i} = T_{i,r}q_r(T_{i,r})\cdot\alpha + T_{i,s}q_s(T_{i,s})\cdot\beta + T_{i,a}\cdot\gamma + \epsilon_{i,T_i} \quad (7)$$

Empirically, we observe two main different cases: 1) The regular teacher is absent and no substitute teacher is assigned; 2) The regular teacher is absent and a substitute teacher is assigned.

Case 1. It corresponds to $T_{i,s} = 0$, $T_{i,a} > 0$ and $T_{i,r} = T_i - T_{i,a}$. The marginal effect of teacher absence writes:

$$\frac{\delta Y_{i,T_i}}{\delta T_{i,a}} = -\alpha \underbrace{[q_r(T_i - T_{i,a})]}_{(a)} + \underbrace{\frac{\delta q_r(T_i - T_{i,a})}{\delta T_{i,a}}(T_i - T_{i,a})}_{(b)} + \underbrace{\gamma}_{(c)} \quad (8)$$

Each term of this equation can be interpreted as follows:

- Term (a): The more productive the regular teacher is, the greater the output loss from her absence
- Term (b): It can be interpreted as the disruptive effect of the regular teacher absence. It is the additional student-specific human capital that teacher r would have acquired during her absence. Intuitively, teacher r absence give her less time to know her students and also creates discontinuities in her long-term instructional strategy.
- Term (c): This is the variation in student output caused directly by the fact that students do not have class during teacher r absence. Its sign can depend on the quality of the regular teacher and on whether the absence was expected. For ex-

ample, if the absence was expected and the regular teacher is forward-looking, she can give them extra homework: they have material to study during her absence, which can mitigate the negative impact of her absence. The sign of this term can also depend on the quality of the school environment outside the classroom. More precisely, it can depend on the amount and the quality of adult supervision outside the classroom, in the school and its premises. For example, if students are left without sufficient adult supervision during the hours teacher r is absent, they can adopt negative non-cognitive behavior (bullying, fighting, smoking drugs etc.), which can exacerbate the negative impact of teacher absence (Burdick-Will, 2013; Lacoë, 2013). The quality of the school environment depends on the quality of the school principal, and on the number and quality of hall monitors.

Overall, in case 1, the marginal effect of teacher absence will be negative unless $\gamma > \alpha[q_r(T_i - T_{i,a}) + \frac{\delta q_r(T_i - T_{i,a})}{\delta T_{i,a}}(T_i - T_{i,a})]$, i.e. unless students use their lost instruction hours so efficiently that these hours are more productive than the instruction hours they would have had with their missing regular teacher.

Case 2. It corresponds to $T_{i,s} > 0$, $T_{i,a} = 0$ and $T_{i,r} = T_i - T_{i,s}$. The marginal effect of teacher absence writes:

$$\frac{\delta Y_{i,T_i}}{\delta T_{i,s}} = -\alpha \underbrace{[q_r(T_i - T_{i,s})]}_{(d)} + \underbrace{\frac{\delta q_r(T_i - T_{i,s})}{\delta T_{i,s}}(T_i - T_{i,s})}_{(e)} + \beta \underbrace{[q_s(T_{i,s})]}_{(f)} + \underbrace{T_{i,s} \frac{\delta q_s(T_{i,s})}{\delta T_{i,s}}}_{(g)} \quad (9)$$

The terms (d) and (e) have similar interpretations as (a) and (b) in case 1, the other terms can be interpreted as follows:

- Term (f): The more productive the substitute teacher, the smaller the negative effect of teacher r absence
- Term (g): This is the additional student-specific human capital acquired by the substitute teacher.

Overall, in case 2, the marginal effect of teacher absence will be negative if and only if:

$$\alpha[q_r(T_i - T_{i,s}) + \frac{\delta q_r(T_i - T_{i,s})}{\delta T_{i,s}}(T_i - T_{i,s})] > \beta[q_s(T_{i,s}) + T_{i,s} \frac{\delta q_s(T_{i,s})}{\delta T_{i,s}}] \quad (10)$$

In particular, equation (10) will be verified when the regular teacher is of higher quality than the substitute teacher ($q_r > q_s$) and/or when the regular teacher acquire student-specific human capital faster than the substitute teacher ($\delta q_r / \delta T_{i,r} > \delta q_s / \delta T_{i,s}$).

12 Tables and Figures

Table 3 – Daily Compensation for Tenured Substitute Teacher by Distance between Reference School and Replacement School

Distance between reference school and replacement school	Daily compensation
Less than 6 miles	15.20 €
From 6 to 11 miles	19.78 €
From 12 to 18 miles	24.37 €
From 19 to 24 miles	28.62 €
From 25 to 30 miles	33.99 €
From 31 to 37 miles	39.41 €
From 38 to 49 miles	45.11 €
From 50 to 62 miles	51.85 €
For each additional 12 miles	6.73 €

Source: French Ministry of Education website. Note: A tenured substitute teacher who replace an absent teacher in a school situated 12 miles from his reference school will receive a compensation of 24.37 € per day.

Table 4 – Regression Estimates of the School Principal and Inside Classroom Observation Grades on Individual Teacher Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<u>A. School principal grade</u>			
Experience (in years)	0.073*** (0.007)	0.079*** (0.007)	0.090*** (0.019)
<i>Experience</i> ²	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003 (0.005)
Nb of absence spells	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.000)
Nb of days of absence	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002* (0.003)
<u>B. Inside classroom observation by external inspectors</u>			
Experience (in years)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.064** (0.028)
<i>Experience</i> ²	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.003)
Nb of absence spells	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Nb of days of absence	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.000)
Teacher Controls*	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.02	0.22	0.53
School Fixed Effect	No	Yes	No
Teacher Fixed Effect	No	No	Yes

Note: * Teacher controls: gender, teaching topic, certification level. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher. This table reports estimates of regressions of the administrative on secondary school teachers (middle and high school) individual characteristics. Each column corresponds to a single regression. The level of observation is teacher x year.

Table 5 – Substitute Teachers Characteristics

	Regular Teacher	Tenured Sub.	Contract Teacher
A. Demographics			
Male	0.36 (0.48)	0.39 (0.49)	0.43 (0.50)
Age	43.8 (10.3)	39.0 (10.5)	37.9 (8.9)
Average Experience (in years)	14.1 (8.3)	10.0 (8.8)	4.6 (10.2)
A year or less of experience	0.02 (0.12)	0.13 (0.34)	0.32 (0.47)
B. Certification			
Agrégation	0.05 (0.23)	0.05 (0.22)	–
CAPES	0.77 (0.42)	0.74 (0.44)	–
Other	0.17 (0.38)	0.21 (0.41)	–
C. Evaluations			
Classroom Observation Grade (/60)	46.82(5.99)	44.84 (6.39)	11.85 (9.59)
School Principal Grade (/100)	39.02(10.05)	39.15 (11.82)	13.86 (8.70)
Nb of teachers	193,766	67,541	23,035

Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. On average, regular teachers have 14.1 years of experience whereas tenured substitute teachers have 10 years of experience and contract teachers only 4.6 years of experience.

Table 7 – Empirical Strategy – Fictitious Example

Teacher	Topic	Year	# Days of Abs.	# Replaced Days	Student's test scores (/20)
Mr Dupont	Math	2010	1	0	11
Mr Dupont	Math	2010	3	3	11
Mr Dupont	Math	2010	1	0	11
Mr Dupont	Math	2011	1	0	10
Mr Dupont	Math	2011	3	0	10
Mr Dupont	Math	2011	2	2	10

Note: In 2010, Mr Dupont has three absence spells: two last a single a day and one lasts three days. Out of his three absence spells, only the one lasting three days is replaced. In 2010, the average test scores of his student in Math is 11/20.

Table 6 – Performance at the Certification Exam of the Contract Teachers who take it

	Contract Teachers Candidates		Other Candidates	
	Agreg.	CAPES	Agreg.	CAPES
<u>A. Demographics</u>				
Age (in years)	37.72 (7.75)	35.17 (7.68)	31.05 (8.32)	28.18 (6.65)
Male	0.53 (0.50)	0.39 (0.48)	0.46 (0.49)	0.35 (0.48)
<u>B. Performance</u>				
Passing Rate	0.03 (0.18)	0.16 (0.37)	0.15 (0.36)	0.33 (0.47)
Written Part Grade (/20)	3.91 (2.52)	5.67 (3.14)	6.25 (3.61)	7.30 (3.69)
Oral Part Grade (/20)	7.00 (3.78)	7.30 (4.17)	8.09 (3.83)	8.50 (4.58)
Nb of obs	286	1,232	8,037	11,779

Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. On average, the passing rate of contract teachers at the CAPES examination is 16 %. The average passing rate of other candidates is 33 %.

Table 8 – Empirical Strategy with Student Fixed Effects – Fictitious Example

Teacher	Topic	Student	Year	Nb days of teacher's abs.	Nb of replaced days	Student's test scores (/20)
Mr Dupont	Math	Caroline	2010	10	2	6
Mr Pierre	French	Caroline	2010	0	0	10
Mr Jacques	History	Caroline	2010	5	5	12

Note: In 2010, Mr Dupont is the Math teacher of Caroline. Mr Dupont is absent 10 days, and 2 days are replaced. Caroline's test scores in the 9th grade exam in Math is 6/20.

Table 9 – Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Absence/Replacement and Teacher Characteristics

	# Abs. Days		Share Replaced Days		Share Replaced x Contr.		Share Replaced x Tenured Sub.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<u>Experience (Ref: 6 + years)</u>								
One year or less of experience	-4.976*** (1.255)	-4.099 (2.479)	-0.043*** (0.008)	-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.045*** (0.011)
Two years of experience	-4.854*** (0.613)	-5.415*** (1.061)	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.0382*** (0.008)	-0.008** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.020** (0.007)
Three years of experience	-3.475*** (0.455)	-4.059*** (0.658)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.0138** (0.005)
Four years of experience	-1.706*** (0.377)	-2.711*** (0.532)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.007 (0.004)
Five years of experience	0.637 (0.350)	-0.681 (0.449)	0.008** (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
<u>Seniority (Ref.: 6 + years)</u>								
One year of seniority	5.320 (10.26)	22.930 (13.150)	0.498** (0.210)	0.649** (0.257)	0.332 (0.200)	0.294 (0.263)	0.167 (0.177)	0.356 (0.319)
Two years of seniority	3.084*** (0.268)	0.004 (0.437)	0.018*** (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)
Three years of seniority	1.545*** (0.223)	1.001** (0.365)	0.012*** (0.00171)	0.0111*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)
Four years of seniority	1.368*** (0.222)	1.112*** (0.315)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.0101*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)
Five years of seniority	0.695*** (0.205)	0.374 (0.275)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)
<u>Evaluations</u>								
Classroom Obs. Eval.	-0.266*** (0.0170)	0.0115 (0.0371)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
School Principal Eval.	-0.532*** (0.065)	-0.222*** (0.075)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)
<u>Student Composition</u>								
Prop. of financial aid students	-0.492* (0.339)	0.901* (0.530)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.005)
<u>Gender</u>								
Male	-4.688*** (0.124)		-0.029*** (0.000)		-0.013*** (0.000)		-0.017*** (0.000)	
<u>Certification Level (Ref: Capes)</u>								
Agrégation	0.383 (0.219)		0.003 (0.002)		0.002* (0.000)		0.001 (0.001)	
<u>Teaching Topic (Ref.: History)</u>								
French	0.855*** (0.158)		-0.002* (0.001)		0.002*** (0.0005)		-0.003*** (0.002)	
Math	-0.851*** (0.144)		-0.002** (0.001)		0.007*** (0.000)		-0.010*** (0.000)	
<u>Teacher - school fixed effects</u>								
Nb. of obs.	No 282,001	Yes 282,001	No 282,001	Yes 282,001	No 282,001	Yes 282,001	No 282,001	Yes 282,001

* Each column corresponds to a single regression. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation. All regressions include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher-school.

Note: With teacher-school fixed effects, the relationship between the share of financial aid students assigned to a teacher and her share of replaced absent days is negative and statistically significant at the 1 % level.

Table 10 – Effect of Absence and Replaced Days on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade

in % of a SD	(1)	(2)	(3)
# days of absence	-0.130*** (0.009)	-0.044*** (0.006)	-0.053*** (0.005)
# replaced days	0.056*** (0.011)	0.010* (0.006)	0.010* (0.006)
Av. nb of days of abs.	[13.14]	[13.14]	[13.14]
Av. nb of replaced days	[10.06]	[10.06]	[10.06]
Teacher-School Fixed effect	No	Yes	Yes
Teacher experience & seniority*	No	Yes	Yes
Student background**	No	No	Yes
Number of observations	32,290,084	32,290,084	32,290,084

* Quadratic function of teacher experience and of teacher seniority. ** Student background: parents' occupation and financial aid status. Each column corresponds to a single regression. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation. All regressions include year x topic fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school. Note: With teacher-school fixed effects, teacher experience and seniority and student background as controls (column 3), the marginal impact of one day of absence is to reduce student test score by 0.04 % of a standard deviation. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 % level. The number of replaced days does not have any statistically significant impact on student test scores.

Table 11 – Effect of Absence and Replaced Days on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade by Type of Substitute Teacher

in % of a SD	(1)	(2)	(3)
# days of absence	-0.132*** (0.010)	-0.052*** (0.005)	-0.051*** (0.005)
# replaced days x tenured sub.	0.072*** (0.011)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.005)
# replaced days x contract sub.	0.024** (0.012)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
Average # days of abs.	[13.14]	[13.14]	[13.14]
Average # replaced days tenured sub.	[7.73]	[7.73]	[7.73]
Average # replaced days contract sub.	[2.22]	[2.22]	[2.22]
Teacher - school fixed effect	No	Yes	Yes
Teacher experience & seniority*	No	Yes	Yes
Student background**	No	No	Yes
Number of observations	32,290,084	32,290,084	32,290,084

* Quadratic function of teacher experience and of teacher seniority. ** Student background: parents' occupation and financial aid status. Each column corresponds to a single regression. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation. Robust standard errors clustered by school.

Note: With teacher fixed effects and teacher experience and seniority as controls (column 3), the marginal impact of one replaced day with a tenured substitute teacher is to increase student achievement by 0.016 % of a standard deviation. It corresponds to 30 % of the impact of teacher absence. The marginal impact of one replaced day with a contract substitute teacher is to decrease student achievement by 0.009 % of a standard deviation. It corresponds to 17 % of the impact of teacher absence.

Table 12 – Effect of Absence and Replaced Days on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade by Length of Absence Spell

(in % of a SD) # Days of Absence Smaller or Equal than...	Impact on student test scores of..		
	# Days of Absence	# Replaced Days with Contract Sub.	# Replaced Days with Tenured Sub.
5	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.11)
10	-0.20*** (0.01)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.04)
15	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
20	-0.12*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
25	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03* (0.02)
30	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)
35	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03** (0.02)
40	-0.12*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03** (0.02)
45	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03** (0.02)
50	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03** (0.02)
55	-0.09*** (0.00)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.01)
60	-0.08*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.00)
65	-0.08*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.00)
75	-0.07*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.00)
86	-0.07*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.00)
96	-0.07*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03*** (0.00)
106	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)
126	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)
180 (All)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)

Each line corresponds to a single regression. The dependent variable is student test scores in 9th grade. The regression includes teacher-school fixed effects, teacher experience, the square of teacher experience, topic fixed effects, year fixed effects, topic x year fixed effects, student background (parental occupation and financial aid status). Robust standard errors clustered by school.

Notes: For absence spells lasting less than five days (first line), the marginal impact of one additional day of absence is to reduce student test scores by 0.2 % of a standard deviation. The marginal effects of one additional replaced day with a contract substitute teacher or with a tenured substitute teacher is not statistically significant.

Table 13 – Impact of days of absence/replacement (in % of standard deviation) in Disadvantaged Schools

	Non Disadvantaged School	Disadvantaged School
# Days of Absence	-0.045*** (0.005)	-0.072*** (0.009)
Av. nb of days	[12.47]	[10.42]
# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub.	0.013** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.013)
Av. nb of days	[6.20]	[2.33]
# Replaced Days x Contract Sub.	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.014)
Av. nb of days	[3.80]	[5.22]
Teacher-school fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Teacher experience & seniority	Yes	Yes
Student background	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	26,405,328	5,940,132

Notes: Disadvantaged schools are defined as those who belong to the national program Éducation prioritaire. In disadvantaged schools, the marginal impact of absence is to reduce student test scores by 0.45 % of a standard deviation.

Table 14 – Robustness Check: Placebo Test of the Effect of Absence and Replaced Days of “Other Subject” Teacher on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade

	Math Exam		French Exam		History Exam	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Math Teacher						
# Days of Absence	-0.081*** (0.009)	-0.078*** (0.009)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)
# Replaced Days	0.001 (0.001)		-0.00 (0.00)		0.000 (0.000)	
# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub.		0.007 (0.011)		-0.007 (0.010)		-0.002 (0.011)
# Replaced Days x Contract Sub.		-0.012 (0.011)		-0.004 (0.010)		0.003 (0.011)
Math Teacher - School Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
B. French Teacher (with French Teacher -school fixed effects)						
# Days of Absence	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.044*** (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.10)
# Replaced Days	-0.002 (0.009)		0.013 (0.009)		0.013 (0.009)	
# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub.		0.004 (0.008)		0.016** (0.008)		0.017 (0.010)
# Replaced Days x Contract Sub.		-0.012 (0.010)		-0.005 (0.010)		0.007 (0.010)
French Teacher - School Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
C. History Teacher						
# Days of Absence	-0.004 (0.099)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.038*** (0.010)	-0.035*** (0.011)
# Replaced Days	-0.013 (0.011)		-0.003 (0.011)		0.013 (0.012)	
# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub.		-0.014 (0.011)		-0.001 (0.011)		0.013 (0.013)
# Replaced Days x Contract Sub.		-0.025 (0.020)		-0.013 (0.011)		-0.002 (0.014)
History Teacher - School Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Each column corresponds to a single regression. The dependent variable is student test scores in 9th grade. All regressions include topic fixed effects, year fixed effects, topic x year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school.

Notes: With the Math exam test scores as the dependent variable (panel A, columns 1 to 6)

Table 15 – Robustness Check: Effect of Absence and Replaced Days on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade with Student Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
# Days of Absence	-0.047*** (0.001)	-0.051*** (0.005)	-0.046*** (0.001)	-0.051*** (0.005)
# Replaced Days	0.002 (0.001)	0.009 (0.006)		
# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub.			0.018*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.006)
# Replaced Days x Contract Sub.			-0.009 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)
Teacher Fixed effect	No	Yes	No	Yes
Teacher experience & seniority	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Student fixed effect	Yes	No	Yes	No
Number of observations	32,290,084	32,290,084	32,290,084	32,290,084

Notes: With student fixed effects (Columns 1 and 2), the marginal effect of one additional day of absence is to reduce student achievement by 0.05 % of a standard deviation. With this specification, the overall marginal impact of replacement is not statistically significant, but the marginal impact of one replaced day with a tenured substitute is to increase student test scores by 0.02 % of a standard deviation and is statistically significant at the 1 % level.

Table 16 – Robustness Check: Placebo Test of the Effect of Absence and Replaced Days of Previous and Following Year on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade

	Previous year		Following year	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
# Days of Absence	0.004 (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	0.002 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)
# Replaced Days	0.015 (0.023)		0.004 (0.018)	
# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub.		0.023 (0.027)		0.003 (0.020)
# Replaced Days x Contract Sub.		0.008 (0.029)		0.018 (0.027)
Teacher - school fixed effect	No	No	Yes	Yes
Teacher experience & seniority*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Student background**	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	31,643,528	31,643,528	31,643,528	31,643,528

* Quadratic function of teacher experience and of teacher seniority. ** Student background: parents' occupation and financial aid status. Each column corresponds to a single regression. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation. The level of observation is teacher/topic x student x year. All regressions include year x topic fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by teacher-school. Robust standard errors clustered by school.

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the number of days of absence, number of replaced days and number of replaced days with the two types of substitute teachers of the previous year are used as independent variables. Column 1 shows that the marginal impact of one additional day of absence and replacement of the teacher in the year $n - 1$ does not have any statistically significant impact on her student test scores, assigned to her during the year n .

Table 18 – Impact of Absence and Replacement by Type of Absence (Maternity leave vs. others) on Student Test Scores

N = 32,290,084 in % of a SD	# Days of Abs. (1)	# Replaced Days x Tenured Sub. (2)	# Replaced Days x Contract. Sub. (3)
Maternity Leave	-0.036*** (0.007) [53.67]	0.015*** (0.008) [21.67]	0.002 (0.009) [12.14]
Non Maternity Leave (same length)	-0.056*** (0.007) [49.30]	0.021*** (0.008) [16.69]	-0.060* (0.030) [8.42]

Note: Estimates corresponds to a single regression with the preferred specification. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation of student test scores.

Table 17 – Robustness Effect of Teacher Absence Spells During Holidays on Student Test Scores in 9th Grade

in % of a SD	(1)	(2)
# days of holiday absence	0.029 (0.035)	0.027 (0.024)
Teacher-School Fixed effect	No	Yes
Teacher experience & seniority*	No	Yes
Student background**	No	Yes
Number of observations	32,290,084	32,290,084

* Quadratic function of teacher experience and of teacher seniority. ** Student background: parents' occupation and financial aid status. Each column corresponds to a single regression. Results are reported in percentage of a standard deviation. All regressions include year x topic fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school.

Figure 1 – Share of Public Sector Workers Taking at Least One Minor Sickness Leave in 2013






Figure 2 – Average Number of Absence for Minor Sickness per Teacher - Year in England, the United States and France




Source: Hermann and Rockoff (2012); English Department of Education (2016) and author's computations. **Notes:** In England, the average number of days of absence taken for minor sickness is 5 days per teacher-year.

Figure 3 – Distribution of Absence Spells by Teacher-Year




Note: 55 % of secondary teachers do not take any absence spell per year.

Figure 4 – Average Absence Rate per School Week




Note: During the first week of September, approximately 1.5 % of secondary teachers are absent.

Figure 5 – Number of Days of Absence and Replacement per Year




Notes: In 2015, middle school teachers were on average absent 12 days. On average, the number of replaced days in 2015 is 10 days, which means that 78 % of absent days are replaced. The average number of replaced days with a tenured substitute teacher is 5.55 days in 2015, which means that 55 % of replaced days are done by tenured substitute teachers.

Figure 6 – Cumulative Distribution of Absence Spells per Length




Notes: 36 % of absence spells taken by middle school teachers last only one day. 90 % of absence spells last less than 40 days.

Figure 7 – Replacement Rate per Length of Absence Spell




Notes: 70 % of absence spells lasting 40 days are replaced (black line). 10 % of absence spells lasting 40 days are replaced by a contract substitute teacher. This implies that 60 % of 40 days absence spells are replaced by a tenured substitute teacher.

Figure 8 – Share of Contract Teacher per Year




Notes: In 2015, 10 % of middle school teachers are tenured substitute teachers and 8 % of middle school teachers are contract substitute teachers.

Figure 9 – Replacement Rate per Year




Notes: In 2015, 15 % of absence spells are replaced (black line). 10 % of absence spells are replaced by a tenured substitute teacher (light grey line) and 5 % of absence spells are replaced by a contract substitute teacher (dark grey line).

Figure 10 – Distribution of Absence Spells and Days per Type of Absence





Notes: Figure 10a plots the distribution of the number of absence spells (2006-2015) per type of absence. Absence spells for minor sickness account for 50 % of absence spells. Maternity leaves account for 3 % of absence spells. Figure 10b plots the distribution of the number of absence days per type of absence. Absences for minor sickness account for 16 % of the total of absence days per year. Maternity leaves account for 12 % of the total of absence days per year.

Figure 11 – Average Number of Days of Absence and Replacement per Type of Absence



Notes: Figure 11a and Figure 11b plot, per type of absence the average number days of absence, number of non-replaced days, number of days replaced by a contract substitute teacher and number of days replaced by a tenured substitute teacher, per year. Figure 11a focuses on short term absences: meetings, training, family reason, maternity extension and minor sickness. Figure 11b focuses on long term absences: maternity leave, long term illness and professional illness. For minor sickness, the average number of days of absence is 5.24 days per year, the average number of replaced days by a tenured substitute teacher is 0.41 days per year and the average number of replaced days by a contract teacher is 0.06 days per year.


Figure 12 – Share of Substitute Teacher per Region (2015)




Notes: In 2015, 10 % of secondary school teachers in the region of Creteil (Eastern Parisian suburb) are contract teachers.

Figure 13 – Replacement Rate per Region

(a) Replacement Rate per Region (2015)




(b) Replacement Rate per Year in Creteil and Nice Regions




Notes: In the Creteil region (Eastern Parisian suburb), 6% of absence spells are replaced in 2015. 45 % of replacement spells are made by tenured substitute teachers in the Creteil region in 2015. In the Nice region (French Riviera), 44 % of absence spells are replaced in 2015. 70 % of replacement spells are made by tenured substitute teachers in the Nice region.

Figure 14 – Impact of Absence/Replacement on 9th Grade Student Test Scores per Month of the Year



Notes: These figures corresponds to a single regression, with the preferred specification. It reports the marginal impact of one day of absence/replacement with a tenured substitute/replacement with a contract teacher on 9th grade student test scores by month of beginning of the absence spell.

Figure 15 – Impact of Absence/Replacement by Teaching Topic



Notes: All reported estimates correspond to a single regression with the preferred specification. Estimates by topic are estimated through interaction terms. For each topic, the first reported estimates corresponds to the number of days of absence, the second to the number of days with a contract teacher and the third to the number of days with a tenured substitute teacher. The marginal impact of one day of absence of the Math teacher is to reduce student test scores by 0.86 % of a standard deviation. This impact is statistically significant at the five percent level.