#### The Value of Leisure Synchronization

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<u>Abstract</u>: This paper explores the extent to which workers are willing to trade hours worked for leisure time shared with their spouse. This parameter is essential to properly assess contemporary trends in the regulation of work and leisure time. We use the fact that the number and timing of paid vacation days to which French employees are entitled vary in a quasi-random way, from year to year, along with the dates of public holidays. Self-employed workers do not benefit from public holidays but we show that a large fraction of them substitute a day of unpaid leisure for a day of paid work whenever their spouse gets an extra day of paid leave.

Keywords: leisure time, synchronization, public holidays

JEL: J22, D13

#### **1. Introduction**

Leisure complementarities between spouses have long been identified as a potentially very important determinant of family labor supply (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974). They also represent a key policy parameter as they provide a channel through which reforms changing the working time or working schedules of a small fraction of workers can affect a much larger proportion of the population. Leisure complementarities between spouses also represent a potentially important factor of marital quality and stability and may be associated with improvement in a wide range of outcomes, from better health status to better child development. While leisure complementarities have deep economic and social implications, it is very difficult to assess their true importance. Such an assessment requires observing independent variation not only in the amount of leisure enjoyed by spouses, but also in the timing of their leisure time. Available data generally do not provide sufficiently high-frequency information on the alternation of work and leisure time to develop such an analysis. Furthermore, for variations in the amount and timing of one spouse's work hours to identify cross-hour effects (rather than cross-income effects), they must be uncorrelated with that spouse's income. Finally, it is important to be able to focus on individuals who are not constrained by adjustment frictions and have real leeway to adapt the amount and timing of their leisure time to those of their spouse.

In this paper, we take advantage of the features of paid leave and public holidays in France to overcome these difficulties and re-evaluate the influence that spouses actually exert on each other's leisure time. The French regulations allow to explore the consequences of incomeneutral quasi-random shocks affecting the spouses of self-employed individuals, i.e., individuals who can freely adjust the amount and timing of their leisure activities over time. This research design highlights much larger cross-hour effects than those identified in the literature so far. In France, employees (but not self-employed workers) are granted paid days off for eleven public holidays. Eight of these days fall on the same date every year, but not necessarily on a workday. For instance, All Saints Day (November 1) fell on a Friday in 2013, but on a Sunday in 2015. The three other days fall on the same workday every year, but not necessarily on the same date of the year. For example, Easter Monday fell at the end of April in 2014, but at the end of March in 2016. As a result, the timing and overall number of days off employees get from public holidays varies year-on-year according to predetermined rules that are completely exogenous to the potential determinants of labor supply. When, from one year to the next, an additional public holiday falls on a workday, it increases the number of days off for employees at that time of year, without affecting their income or their number of days off at other times of the year. Using data that track the alternation of work days and days off for large samples of workers, we show that self-employed workers who live with employees are much more likely to stop working on that additional public holiday than those who live with another selfemployed person. We also show that it does not lead them to work more at other times of the year, consistent with the idea that their response does not simply reflect intertemporal substitution effects. Ultimately, when their spouse gets an extra day off, about 30-40% of selfemployed workers living with employees take an additional day off work on the same day, namely substitute a day of joint leisure for a workday. For significant fractions of self-employed workers, the marginal rate of substitution of one day of joint leisure for one day of paid work appears to be larger than their daily income. These findings cannot be explained by complementarities between spouses in the workplace, since we exclude from the sample selfemployed people who work with their spouse.

The cross-effects on the number of days off work are highly significant, but heterogenous. Specifically, they tend to be stronger for women than for men in families without children, but are much stronger for men in families with children. This result is consistent with the idea that children tend to reduce the value of non-market time shared with family for women, but to increase it for men.

The identifying assumption underlying our results is that the extra free time of their spouse is the only reason why self-employed people living with an employee take more time off on public holidays. In particular, we assume that public holidays do not have a more depressing effect on the business volume (or profit prospects) of self-employed living with an employee than on that of self-employed living with another self-employed. In line with this assumption, we checked that estimated cross-effects on work-leisure decisions disappear after spouses' retirement (or when spouses are temporarily out of the labor market). It is only when their spouse has extra time off that self-employed people living with an employee take more time off on public holidays.

To further test the robustness of our results, we also use the fact that some collective agreements authorize work on public holidays in the hotel, restaurant or food trade industries as well as in public services that cannot interrupt their activity (e.g., hospital or police). Available data confirm that the proportion of employees who take time off work on public holidays is on average much higher outside these specific industries than within these industries. The same data reveal that self-employed workers who live with employees who work outside these specific industries are themselves much more likely to take days off on public holidays than self-employed workers who live with employees who work in these industries. This alternative identification strategy leads to similar results to those obtained with the first strategy. In particular, estimated cross-effects are again much stronger for women in families without children than for women in families with children.

Our paper contributes to the literature that seeks to measure and explain leisure synchronization within couples.<sup>1</sup> This literature has long emphasized that spouses' work schedules are more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See e.g., Hamermesh (2002), Hallberg (2003), Jenkins and Osberg (2005), van Klaveren and van den Brink (2007), Connelly and Kimmel (2009), Voorpostel et al. (2010), Bredtmann (2014), Qi et al. (2017).

synchronized than would occur randomly. However, it remains unclear whether this timing reflects the desire of spouses to spend time together rather than a selection effect and the fact that it is those with similar time constraints who end up living together. By focusing on workers' response to independent changes in the amount and timing of leisure enjoyed by their spouse, we are able to identify the extent to which workers are willing to trade hours worked for leisure time shared with their spouse. This parameter is essential to properly assess contemporary trends in the regulation of work and leisure time. Weekend work and non-standard working hours (evening, night or early morning) are pervasive in many developed countries, even though a large majority of workers report that these non-standard arrangements make it very difficult to reconcile family and work life (Taiji and Mills, 2020). Our results highlight that a comprehensive evaluation of policies that give employers more flexibility to set employees' working hours and days should take account of the specific value that individuals place on the synchronization of their schedules.

More generally, our paper contributes to the long-standing literature on the interdependence of spouses' decisions within couples. There is a vast body of research that explores how workers' labor supply responds to changes in their spouses' work hours or earnings, whether at the time of their spouse's retirement, during unemployment spells or after a tax reform (e.g., Lundberg, 1988, Bingley and Lanot 2007, Gelber, 2014, Lalive and Parrotta, 2017, Johnsen et al., 2022). These contributions provide estimates of cross-effects that are often relatively modest, but that do not necessarily reflect leisure complementarities, if only because they generally capture both cross-income and cross-hour effects. A related strand of the literature focuses on reforms that lead to an income-neutral reduction in the length of the legal workweek and this approach makes it possible to better identify cross-hour effects (Hunt, 1998, Hamermesh et al. 2017, Goux et al. 2014). By exploiting higher frequency data and quasi-random variations affecting not only the

amount of time worked, but also its timing, we extend this literature and isolate the key role played by the desire to synchronize leisure time.

From their analysis of the cross-effects of the 35-hour workweek reform on French employees, Goux et al. (2014) conclude that a 10% reduction in the length of the workweek for a wife leads to a 2.5% reduction in the length of her husband's workweek (mainly through the reduction of unpaid overtime), whereas a 10% reduction in the length of the workweek for a husband has no significant effect on his wife. From their analysis of the cross-effects of Japanese and Korean reforms, Hamermesh et al. (2017) find even smaller cross-effects. Our results suggest that these earlier findings may reflect employees having little leeway to adapt the length of their workweek, at least in the short run (e.g., Altonji and Paxson, 1992, Dickens and Lundberg, 1993, Chetty et al., 2011). Focusing on self-employed workers (and, consequently, much more elastic margins), we identify larger cross-effects and highlight large gender differences in the willingness to synchronize one's leisure time with that of one's spouse. Our findings help to reconcile the literature exploring the magnitude of cross-effects on work and leisure time with the literature showing that leisure synchronization is both pervasive and associated with higher levels of well-being.<sup>2</sup>

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the French regulations pertaining to public holidays. Section 3 presents a conceptual framework for our empirical analysis and section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 outlines our main findings and section 6 concludes.

#### 2. Institutional Context

In France, employment contracts specify the number of days of paid leave that each employee must take during the year, and this number cannot be less than 25 workdays. In addition to these days of paid leave, French employees can also benefit from a total of up to 11 public holidays

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See e.g. Kingston and Nock (1987), Hill (1988), Sullivan (1996), Flood and Genadek (2016), Hamermesh (2020).

in the year.<sup>3</sup> Eight of these public holidays occur on a specific date of the year, but on a day of the week that changes from year to year: New Year's Day (January 1st), Labour Day (May 1st), Victory in Europe Day (May 8th), Bastille Day (July 14th), Day of the Assumption of Mary (August 15th), All Saint's Day (November 1st), Armistice Day (November 11th), and Christmas (December 25th). The other three public holidays take place on specific days of the week, but on dates which vary from year to year: Easter Monday (which date is set according to the computus), Ascension Thursday (38 days after Easter Monday), and Pentecost Monday (49 days after Easter Monday). Figure 1 describes how the different public holidays are distributed across months and weeks of the year, for the period 2013-2019.

In most industries, collective agreements are such that these public holidays entitle employees to additional days of paid leave as long as they do not fall on a weekend.<sup>4</sup> Only a small minority of sectors and occupations have collective agreements that do not prohibit work on public holidays, notably the hospitality and catering industry. Figure 2 confirms that when a public holiday falls on a weekday (i.e., excluding Saturday and Sunday) about 80% of employees do not work, compared to only 20-25% when the same weekday is not a public holiday. However, public holidays do not necessarily fall outside of a weekend. Figure 3 focuses on the eight public holidays that do not fall on a specific day of the week and shows their distribution across the different days of the week for the period 2013-2019. It reveals that they fell on a weekend in about 21% of cases (0.21=12/56), a little less than if the distribution had been uniform (i.e., 0.28=2/7). In fact, the figure confirms that – over the 7-year period between 2013 and 2019 – each of these public holidays fell at least once on 6 of the 7 weekdays, reflecting the continual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In three administrative districts in eastern France (Moselle, Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin), Good Friday and Boxing Day are also considered public holidays and the total number of public holidays is 13. This is a legacy of the German occupation between 1870 and 1918.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The labor code requires that when work does stop for a public holiday, all employees with more than 3 months of seniority in the firm are entitled to their full wage for that day. It should be noted that the workdays which fall between a public holiday and the weekend are days when firms can also choose to grant additional paid days off. These days are referred to as *ponts* (hereafter, bridging days) in collective agreements.

changes in the days of the week on which each of them falls. Finally, it should be emphasized that the law and collective agreements only apply to employees: self-employed workers are free to work whenever they want. In this institutional setting, from one year to the next, at almost any time of the year, an employee may or may not benefit from an additional day of paid leave on the one hand, and on the other hand, in a largely independent manner, may be more or less close to periods where he or she has benefited from additional days of paid leave. If we consider, for example, All Saints Day (November 1), it corresponds to an additional paid day off in 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, but not in 2014 or 2015. In 2017, it is a paid day off but no other (non-weekend) public holiday falls nearby, while in 2016, it is again a paid day off and another non-weekend public holiday falls nearby (on November 11).<sup>5</sup>

In the rest of the paper, we consider married (or cohabiting) self-employed workers and use these year-to-year changes in the number and timing of public holidays to identify the effects of an extra day of paid leave granted to their spouses on (1) their own propensity to take an extra day off work at the same point in time (i.e., on their propensity to substitute a day of unpaid leave for a day of paid work at that same time), as well as on (2) their own propensity to take more or fewer days off work at more or less distant points in time. Identification will be based on the comparison of the year-on-year adjustments made by the self-employed workers who live with an employee and the self-employed workers who live with another self-employed worker.

#### **3.** Conceptual Framework

In this section, we present a simple conceptual framework in order to better define the parameters identified by our empirical strategies. In this framework, the regulation of public holidays separately identifies a parameter measuring the taste of spouses for the synchronization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> If we consider a variable indicating that workday d is a public holiday and a variable indicating the number of public holidays that fall on a workday in a one-year period centred around d (d excluded) the correlation between the two variables is only about -0.16.

of leisure activities and a parameter measuring the degree of intertemporal substitutability of leisure time.

#### The Model

We consider self-employed workers who are married and whose spouses are employees. Time is divided into intervals and each interval is divided into sub-periods (typically seasons). Specifically, each time interval (denoted t) is assumed to encompass two successive sub-periods (with w=0 or 1). We assume that self-employed workers have full leeway in choosing the number and timing of their days off. By contrast, their spouses (who are employees) are entitled to paid vacation days, the number and timing of which vary from year to year depending on the dates of public holidays. Finally, we assume that there is no leisure substitutability across time intervals, only across sub-periods within time intervals.

At the start of each time interval, the problem of workers is to choose the amount of leave in each sub-period. For each time interval *t*, we will denote  $L_{0t}$  the amount of leave taken during the first sub-period (w = 0) and  $L_{1t}$  the amount of leave during the second sub-period (w = 1). Similarly,  $L_{0st}$  will represent the amount of leave taken by their spouses during the first sub-period and  $L_{1st}$  the amount of leave taken during the second sub-period.

With respect to labor supply behaviors, we assume that workers seek to maximize an altruistic utility function (denoted  $V_t$ ) which depends on their own egotistical utility ( $U_t$ ) as well as on their spouse's egotistical utility ( $U_{st}$ ), namely,

$$V_{\rm t} = U_{\rm t} + \lambda U_{\rm st}$$

where parameter  $\lambda$  captures the influence of spouses on workers' own decisions. The  $U_t$  and  $U_{st}$  functions depend on workers' consumption (denoted  $C_t$  and  $C_{st}$ ) and leisure time as well as on the potential externalities generated by leisure synchronization. For simplicity, we assume that  $U_t$  and  $U_{st}$  are linear-quadratic,

$$U_t = (\mathbf{\epsilon}_t + \mathbf{\sigma} \mathbf{L}_{st}) \mathbf{L}_t^t - 0.5 \mathbf{L}_t \mathbf{B} \mathbf{L}_t^t + \gamma C_t$$
 and  $U_{st} = (\mathbf{\epsilon}_{st} + \mathbf{\sigma}_s \mathbf{L}_t) \mathbf{L}_{st}^t - 0.5 \mathbf{L}_{st} \mathbf{B}_s \mathbf{L}_{st}^t + \gamma_s C_{st}$ 

where  $\mathbf{L}_t = (L_{0t}, L_{1t})$  and  $\mathbf{L}_{st} = (L_{0st}, L_{1st})$ . The vectors  $\mathbf{\varepsilon}_t = (\varepsilon_{0t}, \varepsilon_{1t})$  and  $\mathbf{\varepsilon}_{st} = (\varepsilon_{0st}, \varepsilon_{1st})$  represent unobserved (sub-period specific) shocks to the utility of being on holidays. The  $\mathbf{B} = [\mathbf{b}_{ij}]$  and  $\mathbf{B}_s$  $= [\mathbf{b}_{sij}]$  matrices represent (2,2) matrices, with  $\mathbf{b}_{ii} = \mathbf{b}_{sii} = 1$  and  $\mathbf{b}_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\varphi}$  (and  $\mathbf{b}_{ij} = \boldsymbol{\varphi}_s$ ) when  $i \neq j$ . Parameters  $\sigma$  and  $\sigma_s$  represent taste-for-synchronization parameters whereas parameters  $\boldsymbol{\varphi}$  and  $\boldsymbol{\varphi}_s$  capture intertemporal substitutability of leisure across sub-periods. With these notations, workers are assumed to take  $\mathbf{L}_{st}$  and  $C_{st}$  as given and to choose  $\mathbf{L}_t$  and  $C_t$  so as to maximize  $V_t$ under income and time budget constraints.

#### Identification of Cross-effects

For self-employed workers, the total amount of vacation leave is not fixed and can be adapted from one time interval to the next. As their leave is uncompensated, the main constraint is an income budget constraint, which can be written  $C_t + C_{st} = R_s + \mathbf{r}_t(\underline{1}-\mathbf{L}_t)^t$ , where  $R_s$  represents the income per time interval of the spouse (as set in his or her labor contract) while  $\mathbf{r}_t = (r_{0t}, r_{1t})$ represents self-employed workers' own hourly labor income. Note that we normalized to 1 the length of time interval, so that  $\mathbf{r}_t(\underline{1}-\mathbf{L}_t)^t$  represents self-employed workers labor income. In this setting, it is not difficult to show that the first-order conditions imply a linear relationship between own and spouse's leisure demand,

#### (1) $L_{\rm wt} = \sigma_1 L_{\rm swt} - \varphi \sigma_1 L_{\rm s-wt} - \gamma i_{\rm wt} + v_{\rm wt},$

for w=0 and 1, where  $\sigma_1=(\sigma+\lambda\sigma_s)/(1-\phi^2)$  while  $i_{wt}=(r_{wt}-\phi r_{-wt})/(1-\phi^2)$  and  $v_{wt}=(\varepsilon_{wt}-\phi\varepsilon_{-wt})/(1-\phi^2)$ . The first parameter of interest in equation (1) is  $\sigma_1$ . It provides a measure of the work-leisure substitution effect induced at w by an elementary change in the spouse's leisure time at the same point in time, holding constant the income of the spouse as well as the amount of leisure enjoyed by the spouse at other points in time (denoted -w). It is all the greater as workers enjoy spending time with their spouses ( $\sigma$  and  $\sigma_s$  large) and care about each other ( $\lambda$  large). The second parameter of interest is  $\sigma_2=\phi\sigma_1$ . It provides a measure of the work-leisure substitution effect induced at *w* by an uncompensated elementary change in the spouse's leisure time at another point in time. It depends on  $\sigma_1$ , but it also captures very directly the extent to which days of paid leave taken at different points in time are easily substitutable with each other ( $\varphi$  large). In the remainder of the paper, we identify parameters  $\sigma_1$  and  $\varphi\sigma_1$  by focusing on self-employed workers who live with employees and examining how their demand for leisure at a given point in time responds to independent changes in the number of public holidays enjoyed by their spouses either at the same point in time or at other points in time. Public holidays induce arbitrary changes in the overall number of paid days off that spouses can enjoy each year in each subperiod and our identifying assumption will be that these changes are unrelated to the unobserved determinants of self-employed workers' demand for leisure (as conceptualized by both  $i_{wt}$  and  $v_{wt}$  in our model). As discussed below, we will provide placebo tests for this identifying assumption by looking at reduced-form effects of public holidays on self-employed workers whose spouses are retired.

Before moving on to the econometric analysis, it should be noted that there is a one-to-one relationship between  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  on the one hand, and  $(\sigma + \lambda \sigma_s)$  and  $\phi$  on the other, so that the joint identification of  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$  provides direct information about  $(\sigma + \lambda \sigma_s)$  and  $\phi$ . Assuming for instance that the estimated  $\sigma_2$  is found to be negligible whereas the estimated  $\sigma_1$  is found to be very significant, it will be possible to conclude that the intertemporal substitution parameter  $\phi$  is weak and that the estimated  $\sigma_1$  provides a direct measure of the importance of leisure complementarities (as captured by the composite parameter  $\sigma + \lambda \sigma_s$ ).

#### 4. Data

The data used in this paper come from the Labor Force Surveys (LFS) conducted between 2013 and 2019 by the French Statistical Office. The LFS is conducted every quarter on a representative sample of about 55,000 households. It provides information on the main socio-

demographic characteristics of all household members as well as on their employment status<sup>6</sup> and occupation (or former status and occupation, when they are retired or temporarily out of the labor force). For respondents who are self-employed, we know whether their spouse work with them (either as an employee or a self-employed). In addition, since 2013, respondents provide detailed information on their working time during a specific week of the quarter (the "reference" week). In particular, we know the exact days of the week on which they worked. The reference weeks are uniformly distributed over the quarters. Households who have to be interviewed about what they did in a given reference week are surveyed on the following week. In case they are unreachable that week, other attempts are made in order to survey the household up to 2 weeks and 2 days after the reference week.

From these surveys, we build a dataset at the (individual, day) level for the period 2013-2019, which records whether individuals (and their spouses) worked that day. We restrict our sample to workdays only (Monday through Friday) and to married (or cohabiting) self-employed people who live either with an employee or with another self-employed person. We focus on full time workers and exclude those who work with their spouse as their propensity to synchronize with their spouse may reflect complementarities in the workplace rather than complementarities in leisure activities.

Table A1 in the online appendix provides some descriptive statistics about our working sample, considering separately individuals whose spouse is employed and individuals whose spouse is another self-employed. The table shows that the main difference between the two groups is in their distribution across industries: the group with employed spouses contains fewer workers in the agricultural sector (farmers) and more workers in the construction sector (construction craftsmen).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> When they have several jobs, their employment status is defined by the "main" one (the *emploi principal*), i.e. the one they spend the most time on.

Table A2 in the online appendix provides additional statistics describing the extent to which self-employed people and their spouses synchronize their time off. Their probability of taking a day off work is on average about 0.50 when their spouse takes time off in that day against only about 0.10 when their spouse works. The gap is similar regardless of whether they live with or without children. There is a clear tendency towards synchronization, even though the correlation between spouses' days of leave is far from perfect. In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the extent to which this correlation really reflects the influence that spouses exert on each other.

#### 5. Public Holidays and Work-leisure Substitution

In this section, we focus on our working sample of self-employed workers and we explore how they and their spouses adjust their work and leisure time in response to year-to-year changes in the number (and exact dates) of public holidays. For those whose spouses are employees, we expect a larger increase in the probability that their spouses will take a day off on days of the week that fall on a public holiday. The central question, however, is whether this increase is accompanied by a parallel increase in the probability that self-employed workers themselves will also take a day off, even if it means giving up a day of paid work. If so, the question will also arise as to whether this increase in the probability of self-employed workers not working during public holidays leads (through an intertemporal substitution effect) to a compensatory decrease at other times of the year.

#### Graphical Analysis

To start with, Figure 4a focuses on self-employed workers' spouses and shows the daily variations in their probability of being off work before, during and after days of public holidays, separately for those who are employees and for those who are self-employed themselves. The figure confirms that days of public holidays coincide with a significant increase in the probability of being off work for both groups of spouses. Consistent with public holidays'

regulation, it also shows that this increase is significantly larger for employed spouses than for self-employed ones. Figure 4b focuses on the difference between employed and self-employed spouses and confirms that public holidays coincide with a very significant increase in this difference (a little less than 25 percentage points).

Given this fact, Figure 5a considers the same sample of self-employed workers as Figure 4a and shows the daily variation in their own probability of being off work, separately for those who live with an employee and for those who live with another self-employed worker. The figure reveals that public holidays coincide with an increase in own probability of being off work which is significantly larger for those who live with an employee than for those who live with another self-employed worker. Figure 5b focuses on the difference between those who live with an employee and those who live with another self-employed worker. It confirms that the difference is small (and not significantly different from zero) in the days before and after public holidays, but that public holidays coincide with a sharp rise of about 12 percentage points in this difference. The increase in the gap shown in Figure 5b represents about 50% of the increase in the gap shown in Figure 4b. For comparison, Figures A1 and A2 in the online Appendix consider weeks in the year that do not contain public holidays (and are not adjacent to weeks that contain public holidays) and show that during these weeks (as during the days before and after public holidays) there are no significant differences in the probability of taking a day off between self-employed workers who live with an employee and those who live with another self-employed worker. Hence, the only days when differences appear are public holidays. Taken together, our graphical analyses are suggestive that a significant fraction of selfemployed workers are willing to substitute joint leisure for paid work: the more public holidays their spouses enjoy the more days off they take on these particular days, without working more on the other days. In the next section, we develop simple regression models to further test the robustness of these graphical findings and explore heterogeneous effects across men and women as well as across workers living with and without children.

#### Regression Analysis

For each worker *i*, we denote *Spouse*<sub>idwt</sub> a dummy indicating that the spouse of worker *i* did not go to work on the dth day of week *w* of year *t* (with *w*=1 to 52 and *d*=1 to 5) and  $E_{iwt}$  a dummy indicating whether the spouse of worker *i* is an employee. Using these notations, our baseline regression model is written:

(2) 
$$Spouse_{idwt} = \alpha_0 P_{dwt} + \beta_0 P_{dwt} \times E_{iwt} + \alpha_1 B_{-dwt} + \beta_1 B_{-dwt} \times E_{iwt} + \alpha_2 A_{-dwt} + \beta_2 A_{-dwt} \times E_{iwt} + \alpha_3 R_{-dwt} + \beta_3 R_{-dwt} \times E_{iwt} + \gamma_0 E_{iwt} + X_{idwt} \gamma_1 + u_{idwt},$$

where  $P_{dwt}$  is a dummy variable indicating whether day *d* of week *w* is a public holiday for year *t* while variable *B*<sub>-dwt</sub> indicates the number of public holidays that do not fall on *d* but that fall on another workday in the same week as *d* (so-called bridging days). Variable *A*<sub>-dwt</sub> captures the number of public holidays that fall in one of the two adjacent workweeks while *R*<sub>-dwt</sub> represents the number of days of public holidays that do not fall on the same week as *d* nor on adjacent weeks, but that fall on a workday in the rest of the one-year period surrounding *d*. Finally, *X*<sub>idwt</sub> represents a set of control variables that includes dummy variables indicating the age, gender and education of workers as well as a full set of industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, week fixed effects, day of the week fixed effects. We also include the full set of interactions between the industry dummy variables and the dummy variable indicating whether the day of observation is a public holiday. As mentioned above, self-employed workers whose spouse is an employee are more often in the agricultural sector and less often in the construction sector than self-employed workers whose spouse is another self-employed worker, so it is important to control for the potentially different effects of public holidays on the different types

of industry.<sup>7</sup> The model will be estimated separately on the different sub-samples defined by the gender of the individuals and whether or not they have children.

Model (2) distinguishes between public holidays falling in the same week as day *d*, public holidays falling in adjacent weeks, and public holidays further away. As discussed below, we also considered augmented versions of the model where we further distinguish the two weeks immediately after the two adjacent weeks, the two weeks immediately after, etc. In general, public holidays falling several weeks away from d have very little effect on behavior in *d*, and these augmented versions of the model do not provide additional results. The main parameter of interest in model (2) is  $\beta_0$  which captures the differential impact of public holidays on the propensity to take a day off for employed and self-employed spouses. This parameter is identified by looking at whether the difference in the probability of taking a day off between employed and self-employed spouses for a given day d tends to be stronger on years when a public holiday falls on *d*. The other parameters of interest are  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_3$ . They capture the differential impact of public holidays falls on spouses to take days off in periods more or less distant from those public holidays.

Table 1 focuses on the same sample of self-employed workers as Figures 4 and 5 and shows the regression results separately for those without children (panel A) and for those with children (panel B). In both panels A and B, the first column shows the regression results for the full subsample, while column (2) shows the results for the male subsample and column (3) for the female subsample.

As expected and consistent with graphical findings, regression results shown in panel A confirm that when an additional public holiday falls on a workday, it induces a very strong increase in the probability that spouses take time off on that particular day and that this increase is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> We have checked that our results remain unchanged when we further add the interactions between the dummy variables indicating the age and education level of the respondent and the dummy variable indicating whether the day of observation is a public holiday.

significantly more important when the spouse is an employee than when he or she is a selfemployed worker.<sup>8</sup> The estimated difference  $\beta_0$  is about 23 percentage points for men and 19 percentage points for women. These first-stage regressions also show that there is no compensatory decline in the probability that employees take time off on adjacent workdays or workweeks. In fact, we even observe an increase in this probability on adjacent workdays, even if this additional increase is much more modest than the one observed on public holidays (the estimated differential effect  $\beta_1$  is about 8 percentage points for men and 5 percentage points for women). This adjacent workdays' effect is in line with the fact that some employees receive additional days off on days between public holidays and weekends (so called bridging days).

Panel B of the Table shows the results of replicating this analysis on the sample with children. The estimated  $\beta_0$  remains highly significant (about 17 percentage points for men and 16 percentage points for women) while the estimated adjacent gap  $\beta_1$  tends to be even larger than that estimated for the sample without children (about 9 percentage points for both men and women). Generally speaking, these large first-stage effects in panel A and panel B are consistent with the fact that not working on public holidays is a constraint on most employees, whether or not they have children.

Given these first-stage results, the next question is whether public holidays differentially affect own probability of being off work for self-employed workers living with employees relative to those living with self-employed workers. To explore this issue, Table 2 replicates the previous analysis using the same samples and specifications as Table 1, but using own probability to take a day off as the dependent variable (rather than the probability that the spouse takes a day off). Panel A of Table 2 shows the results for the sample without children while panel B shows the results for the sample with children.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Regardless of the status of their spouse, the self-employed are all potentially impacted by the fact that many people in their environment stop working on public holidays (on this issue see Georges-Kot et al., 2017). This explains why the probability of taking a day off on a public holiday also increases for those whose spouse is self-employed.

With respect to the sample without children, panel A confirms that public holidays induce an increase in the probability of being off work that is significantly more important for self-employed workers whose spouses are employees than for those whose spouses are self-employed. The estimated differential impact is about 10 percentage points for women and 6 percentage points for men, namely about 50% of the first stage effect for the latter and 25% for the former. Consistent with first stage results, there is no offsetting decline in adjacent days or weeks, but rather a slight increase in the probability that self-employed workers living with employees take additional days off. These regression results are in line with our graphical analysis and suggest that a significant fraction of both female and male self-employed workers without children are willing to trade paid work time for joint leisure with their spouse in the event that s/he benefits from additional public holidays.

Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of replicating this analysis on the sample with children. When we focus on the male subsample, we find that the reduced-form effect of public holidays on their own probability of being off work is about 7 percentage points stronger when their spouse's is an employee. It accounts for about 40% of the differential effect of public holidays on spouses' probability of being off work (which is 17 percentage points), i.e., an even stronger ratio than for self-employed men without children. In contrast, when we focus on the female subsample, we find that the reduced-form effect of public holidays on their own probability of being off work (significant at standard levels. In the presence of children, women appear to be much less responsive than men to an extra day off for their spouse, while the opposite is true when no children are present. Women generally spend a much greater proportion of their non-market time caring for children, which likely explains why the presence of children tends to make it less attractive for her to substitute a non-work day at home for a work day.

To take one step further, Table A3 in the online appendix shows the results of using the  $P_{dwt} \times E_{iwt}$  interaction variable as an instrumental variable (IV) to identify the impact of a day off taken by the spouse of a self-employed individual on the probability that this individual also takes a day off. Consistent with the results in Tables 1 and 2, we obtain an IV estimate of 0.34 for the sample without children (0.26 for men and 0.49 for women) and 0.28 for the sample with children (0.42 for men and 0.05 for women, the latter effect being non-significant at standard levels). Strictly speaking, these IV estimates measure the impact of a day off taken by the spouse only for a particular group of compliers, namely self-employed individuals, these compliers can adjust their leisure time over time much more freely than most employees. In this respect, the way in which they adjust their leisure time to that of their spouse likely provides a more accurate representation of their preference for synchronization.

#### Robustness Checks and Alternative Specifications

As mentioned above, the group of self-employed workers whose spouse is an employee is characterized by an under-representation of workers in the agricultural sector (i.e., farmers) and an over-representation of workers in the construction sector (i.e., construction craftsmen). This may contribute to bias our estimates if public holidays have a different impact on the profit prospects and work incentives specific to each of the two groups. This is why we have augmented our regressions with a full set of control variables capturing the interaction of the dummy variables indicating individuals' industry with the dummy variable indicating that the day of observation is a public holiday. As a robustness check, Table A4 and Table A5 in the online appendix show that our results are in fact robust to the removal of individuals from the two imperfectly distributed industries from our working sample. Using this restricted sample, the first-stage effects on spouses are of a lower magnitude than in the full sample, but this is not the case for the reduced-form effects on the self-employed themselves. In the end, the ratio

of reduced-form effects to first-stage effects is even higher in this restricted sample than in the full sample (between 55% and 65%), except again for self-employed women with children, for whom no differential effect of public holidays is observed between those whose spouses are employees and those whose spouses are self-employed.

As a second robustness check, Tables A6 and A7 in the online Appendix show the result of replicating our first-stage and reduced-form analysis when we distinguish a larger number of potential effects of public holidays that fall several weeks away from day d (namely the potential effect of public holidays falling 2 weeks way, 3 weeks away, 4 weeks away, 5-6 weeks away, 7-13 weeks away, beyond 13 weeks away). These additional effects are all negligible and the main results of the model are unchanged.

Finally, rather than asking whether the self-employed workers whose spouses are employees work less on public holidays, one can ask whether they work less overall in weeks that contain public holidays. This approach allows to take account of all the excess time off that surrounds the public holidays. Formally this amounts to using the variable  $S_{wt}$  which indicates the number of public holidays that fall during week *w* rather than the dummy variable  $P_{dwt}$  which indicates that day *d* is a public holiday in equation (2). When this approach is adopted, the first-stage and reduced-form effects are both smaller in magnitude and less accurately estimated, but the ratios between the reduced form and first stage effects remain similar to those obtained with the main method, around 30%-40% (see Table A8 and Table A9 in the online Appendix). This result is in line with the idea that the same dose-response relationship exists between individuals' demand for leisure time and the amount of leisure time granted to their spouse, whether one considers public holidays or days adjacent to public holidays.

#### Public Holidays After Spouses' Retirement

Overall Tables 1 and 2 suggest that self-employed workers adapt their demand for leisure from one year to the next, so as to be off on the same days as their spouses, even when it involves substituting leisure time for paid work. The assumption underlying this interpretation is that the extra free time enjoyed by their spouses on public holidays is the only reason why selfemployed people living with an employee take more time off on public holidays than other selfemployed people. To test this assumption, we replicated our regression analysis on the sample of self-employed whose spouses are retired. We also limit the sample to those who are no older than 65, to focus as much as possible on those who have just retired. If our working assumption is valid, we should no longer observe any difference in the timing of leisure time between our two groups of self-employed after the retirement of their spouses, since at that point there is no longer any difference in leisure time between their spouses either on or off public holidays.

Comfortingly, this analysis reveals that public holidays induce an increase in the probability of taking a day off which is not significantly different for self-employed workers living with former employees and for those living with former self-employed workers (Table 3, panel A). In fact, the increase is even smaller for the former than for the latter, but the estimated gap is not significantly different from zero. It is only before the retirement of their spouses that public holidays induce a significantly stronger increase in the probability to take a day off for self-employed workers living with employees.

We replicated the same analysis by focusing on the sample of self-employed workers whose spouse is not yet retired, but nevertheless, out-of-the-labor force after having already held a job (Table 3, panel B). We use available information about the last job held to define whether a person is a former employee or a former self-employed. This new sample is essentially composed of self-employed men whose wives have left the labor force, at least temporarily. Again, this analysis shows that public holidays coincide with an increase in the probability of taking a day off from work that is not different for self-employed workers living with former self-employed workers and for self-employed workers living with former employees.<sup>9</sup>

In the end, it is only when public holidays induce a specific increase in their spouses' probability to take a day off that self-employed workers have a stronger probability to take a day off during public holidays. This finding is consistent with the assumption that the stronger effect of public holidays on self-employed workers living with employees reflects their willingness to stay synchronized with their spouses, not their specific predilection for being off on public holidays.

#### Alternative Identification Strategy

To further check the robustness of our findings, we developed an alternative identification strategy building on the fact that some collective agreements do not prohibit work on public holidays, for example in the hospitality and catering industry, the food retail sector or the taxi industry.<sup>10</sup> Based on the French occupational classification, Appendix B provides a list of occupations that are covered by these derogating regulations and where more than 25% of employees work on public holidays. They represent about 20% of the total number of employees and we checked that the proportion of employees who work on public holidays is on average much higher for these specific occupations (32%) than for the other ones (15%). In this context, the question becomes whether self-employed workers who live with employees whose occupation is on the derogatory list actually take less days off on public holidays than self-employed workers who live with employees whose occupation is not on the list.

To shed light on this issue, Table 4 and Table 5 focus on the sample of self-employed workers whose spouses are employees and replicate our first-stage and reduced-form regression analysis

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> To take one step further, Figures A3a and A3b in the online Appendix show the differences in the proportions of individuals not working between self-employed living with former employees and self-employed living with former self employed, focusing on the days before and after the public holidays. These figures do not detect any peak in the differences at the time of the public holidays.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For example, in the taxi industry, the collective agreement imposes a minimum of only 5 public holidays (out of 11).

using those whose spouse's occupation is on the list as "treatment" group and those whose spouse's occupation is not on the list as "control" group.<sup>11</sup> Table 4 shows the results of the first stage regressions for individuals without children (panel A) as well as for individuals without children (panel B).

Consistent with collective agreements, these first-stage results confirm that when an additional public holiday falls on a workday, it induces a much smaller increase in the probability that spouses take time off on that particular day when the spouse's occupation is on the list than when the spouse's occupation is not on the list. The estimated gaps appear to be even larger in magnitude than the estimated gaps between employed and self-employed spouses shown in Table 1. For example, when we focus on the sample without children, the magnitude of the first-stage gap is about 31 percentage points in Table 4 (when we compare spouses on the list and not on the list), while it is only 22 percentage points in Table 1 (when we compare employed and self-employed spouses). First-stage regressions in Table 4 also confirm that there is no offsetting rise in the probability that spouses on the list take time off on adjacent workdays or workweeks. In fact, consistent with previous analyses, their probability of being off work in the days surrounding public holidays remains significantly lower than those of spouses whose occupation is not on the list. For the sample without children, the estimated gap  $\beta_1$  is about 11 percentage points for men and 13 percentage points for women. These adjacent workdays' effects are in line with the fact that employees whose occupation is not on the list often receive additional days off on days between public holidays and weekends (so called bridging days).

Given these first-stage results, the question is whether public holidays differentially affect own probability of being off work for self-employed workers living with employees whose occupation is on the derogatory list relative to those living with employees whose occupation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Note that, in this analysis as in the previous one, we remove from the sample individuals who work with their spouse.

is not on the list. To explore this issue, Table 5 replicates the previous analysis using own probability to take a day off as the dependent variable (rather than the probability that the spouse takes a day off).

With respect to individuals without children, the panel A of Table 5 shows that public holidays induce an increase in the probability of being off work that is significantly less important for self-employed workers whose spouse's occupation is on the list than for those whose spouse's occupation is not on the list. The estimated differential impact is about 16 percentage points for women and 6 percentage points for men, namely about 50% of the first stage effect for the latter and a little more than 20% for the former. Comfortingly, these ratios are quite similar to those obtained with the first identification strategy. Also, once again, there is no compensatory rise in adjacent days or weeks, but rather a slight further increase in the gap between the two groups of self-employed workers.

Again, the panel B of Table 5 shows that we get a somewhat different picture when we focus on individuals with children. On the one hand, men living with children are as affected as men without children by an additional day off for their spouse. On the other hand, women living with children appear once again to be much less affected than those without children. The estimated reduced form impact of public holidays is about -16 percentage points for women without children (about 50% of the first stage effect) whereas it is only about 4 percentage points for women with children (statistically non-significant and only 12% of the first stage effects). This result provides further confirmation that in the presence of children, women are much less likely to substitute a day with their family for a work day.

Finally, Table A10 in the online Appendix shows the results of using the interaction between a dummy variable indicating that the spouse's occupation is on the list and a dummy variable indicating public holidays as an instrumental variable to identify the impact of a day off taken by the spouse of a self-employed individual on the probability that this individual also takes a

day off. Consistent with the results in Tables 4 and 5, we obtain an IV estimate of 0.29 for the sample without children (0.21 for men and 0.49 for women) and 0.18 for the sample with children (0.22 for men and 0.12 for women, the latter effect being not statistically significant). These new IV estimates capture the preference for synchronization of the self-employed whose spouse's occupation is not on the derogatory list. Encouragingly, they are similar to those obtained in the previous sections with our first instrumental variable, except for the sample of men with children, for whom the IV estimate is lower with the second strategy, which may reflect the fact that the two strategies do not refer to the same set of compliers (although the difference is not statistically significant). With either of the two identification strategies, the estimated impact is stronger for women than for men in the sample without children, while the reverse is true in the sample with children.

#### 6. Conclusion

This article draws on French regulations of paid leave and public holidays to assess the extent to which male and female workers synchronize their leisure time with that of their spouses. These regulations imply that public holidays may fall quasi randomly either during the weekend or outside the week-end, depending on the year, which generates exogenous and income-neutral variation in the number and timing of paid days off that employees (but not self-employed workers) are entitled to. Employees benefit, in certain years, at certain specific times of the year, from additional days off. When comparing self-employed workers who are married to employees with those who are married to other self-employed workers, we show that a majority of the former choose to take more days off in years when their spouses receive additional leave and that they take them at the same time as their spouses. By comparing couples with and without children, we also show that the willingness to synchronize with one's spouse is more important for women than for men when there are no children in the household, but that the reverse is true when there are children in the household. Children tend to increase the value of time spent with one's spouse for men, not for women. Overall, our paper provides estimates of cross-effects on work and leisure time that are much larger than those previously found in the literature and much more consistent with the fact that time spent with one's spouse is generally associated with higher levels of subjective well-being as well as with the fact that many workers are willing to make significant wage concessions as long as it allows them to avoid non-standard and potentially desynchronizing work schedule (Mas and Palais, 2017).

Our work also highlights that the willingness to synchronize with one's spouse is unevenly distributed across families and between men and women. Generally speaking, these results help to understand why reforms affecting the working hours and leave entitlements of particular categories of employees - such as reforms allowing Sunday work in shops in exchange for more days off - can affect the working hours and well-being of many more workers, including self-employed workers. They also suggest that the final outcome of these reforms may be very different depending on whether they primarily affect a more female or a more male subset of the labor force. Finally, our results also help to understand the tensions generated by regulations that allow employers to adjust their employees' working hours and days more freely to fluctuations in business activity. By promoting firm flexibility, these reforms aim to boost growth and job creation, but they are not necessarily compatible with employees' own demand for working hour flexibility, their desire to share more time with their spouses and to better balance work and family life.

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#### Figure 1. Distribution of Public Holidays Across the Weeks of the Year, Between 2013 and 2019

Note: the figure shows public holidays falling during weekdays (+ symbol) and public holidays falling during weekends (o symbol) for the 2013-2019 period. The symbols in grey correspond to the two public holidays that are specific to the three Alsace Moselle districts.

Figure 2: Public Holidays and the Proportion of Employees not Working



Note: the figure shows the proportion of employees who work on a given workday when it falls on a public holiday (light grey bar) and when it does not fall on a public holiday (dark grey bar). Source: Labor Force Surveys, 2013-2019, Insee.

Figure 3. Distribution of Public Holidays across the Days of the Week (2013-2019 period)

Public holiday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
New year	1	2	1	1	1	0	1
Labour	1	1	2	1	1	0	1
Victory in Europe	1	1	2	1	1	0	1
Bastille	1	1	0	1	1	1	2
the Assumption of Mary	1	1	2	1	1	1	0
All saints	0	1	1	1	2	1	1
Armistice	2	1	1	0	1	1	1
Christmas	1	1	2	1	1	0	1
Total	8	9	11	7	9	4	8
Boxing day	1	1	1	2	1	1	0
Total (in Alsace Moselle)	9	10	12	9	10	5	8

Reading: between 2013 and 2019, the Labour Day (May, 1st) falls once on a Monday, once on a Tuesday, twice on a Wednesday, once on a Thursday, once on a Friday and once on a Sunday.



Figure 4. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-employed Spouses Taking a Day Off. (a) Probability of Self-employed Spouses Taking a Day Off.

(b) Difference in Probability of Taking a Day Off Between Employed and Self-employed Spouses



Note: the figures refer to the sample of self-employed workers whose spouses are either self-employed workers or employees (excluding those who work with their spouse). Figure (a) shows the proportion of spouses who do not work on a given weekday when it falls on a public holiday (d=0), as well as when it falls on one of the seven weekdays preceding that public holiday (d=-1,...-7) or on one of the seven weekdays following that holiday (d=1,...-7). The dashed line refers to self-employed spouses while the solid line refers to employed spouses. Figure (b) shows the estimated difference between the solid and dashed lines plotted in Figure (a), the average difference outside the [-7,+7] interval being taken as a reference. 95% confidence intervals are shown in dashed lines. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

Figure 5. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-Employed Taking a Day Off



(a) Probability of Taking a Day Off

(b) Difference in Probability of Taking a Day Off Between Those whose Spouse is an Employee and Those whose Spouse is Self-employed



Note: same sample and source as Figure 4. Figure (a) shows the proportion not working on a given weekday when it falls on a public holiday (d=0), as well as when it falls on one of the seven weekdays preceding that public holiday (d=-1,...-7) or on one of the seven weekdays following that holiday (d=1,...7). The dashed line refers to those whose spouses are self-employed and the solid line to those whose spouses are employed. Figure (b) shows the estimated difference between the solid and dashed lines plotted in Figure (a), the average difference outside the [-7,+7] interval being taken as a reference. 95% confidence intervals are shown in dashed lines.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday	0.452	0.400	0.499
	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.042)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.221	0.230	0.193
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Nb. public holidays on the same week	0.023	0.002	0.047
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week x spouse employee	0.063	0.078	0.054
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Nb. public holiday on adjacent weeks	-0.001	-0.003	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.016	0.013	0.025
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Nb. public holiday during the rest of the year	0.005	-0.001	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.002	0.005	-0.009
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Observations	74,600	45,850	28,750
Mean dep. var.	0.192	0.214	0.157
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday	0.427	0.433	0.433
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.171	0.171	0.160
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Nb. public holidays on the same week	-0.014	-0.019	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week x spouse employee	0.089	0.091	0.086
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Nb. public holiday on adjacent weeks	-0.008	-0.011	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Nb. public holiday during the rest of the year	0.002	0.000	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.001	0.004	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.207	0.234	0.164

### Table 1. Public Holidays and the Probability of Spouses of Self-employed Workers Taking a<br/>Day Off

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Figure 4. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that their spouses do not work on a given weekday d on variables indicating (1) that d is a public holiday, (2) the number of public holidays falling on the same week as d (but not on d), (3) the number of public holidays falling on adjacent weeks, (4) the number of public holidays falling within the remainder of the one-year interval surrounding d, as well as the interactions between these 4 variables and a dummy indicating that spouses are employees. Additional controls include full sets of day of the week, week of the year, and year of observation fixed effects, as well as controls for school holidays, education, age and gender. We also include a set of ten industry dummy variables and their interactions with the dummy variable indicating that d is a public holiday. Column (1) shows the results for the full sample while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday	0.480	0.537	0.433
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.076	0.059	0.095
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.037)
Nb. public holidays on the same week	0.029	0.048	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week x spouse employee	0.018	0.005	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Nb. public holiday on adjacent weeks	0.007	0.010	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.015	0.011	0.022
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Nb. public holiday during the rest of the year	0.004	0.007	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.002	-0.001	0.004
The second se	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Observations	74.600	45.850	28.750
Mean dep. var.	0.148	0.132	0.174
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday	0.427	0.489	0.415
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.048	0.072	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Nb. public holidays on the same week	0.012	0.007	0.022
I	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week x spouse employee	0.039	0.044	0.028
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Nb public holiday on adjacent weeks	0.001	-0.001	0.004
ive. public holicity on adjacent weeks	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Nh pub hol adjacent weeks y spouse employee	0.004	0.011	-0.014
No. pub. noi. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Nh muhlic holiday during the root of the year	(0.000)	0.005	(0.00)
no. public holiday during the fest of the year	(0.003)	0.003	(0.001)
NTE and had made of the second	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
ND. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.159	0.130	0.205

#### Table 2. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-employed Taking a Day Off

Note: the table shows the regression result of the same model as Table 1, on the same sample of self-employed workers, when the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that they (rather than their spouses) do not work on a given weekday *d*. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: spouse is retired	0.445	0.650	0.000
Public holiday	0.447	0.652	0.339
	(0.078)	(0.147)	(0.106)
Public holiday x spouse former employee	-0.027	-0.071	$-0.0^{\prime}/1$
	(0.064)	(0.142)	(0.086)
Nb. public holidays on the same week	-0.004	0.031	-0.031
	(0.037)	(0.088)	(0.044)
Nb. pub. hol. on the same week x spouse	0.024	0.018	0.002
former employee	(0.037)	(0.088)	(0.046)
Nb. pub. hol. on adjacent weeks	-0.026	-0.049	-0.027
	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.025)
Nb. pub. hol. on adjacent weeks x spouse	0.012	0.030	0.014
former employee	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.027)
Nb. pub. hol. on the rest of the year	0.006	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.012)	(0.037)	(0.012)
Nb. pub. hol. on the rest of the year x spouse	-0.018	-0.012	-0.013
former employee	(0.012)	(0.038)	(0.013)
Observations	14,695	7,715	6,980
Mean dep. var.	0.164	0.151	0.179
Panel B: spouse not retired, but out of the			
labor force			
Public holiday	0.513	0.477	0.562
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.262)
Public holiday x spouse former employee	0.015	0.039	-0.065
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.411)
Nb. public holidays on the same week	0.034	0.039	-0.108
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.209)
Nb. pub. hol. on the same week x spouse	0.020	0.016	-0.172
former employee	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.326)
Nb. pub. hol. on adjacent weeks	0.051	0.053	-0.078
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.165)
Nb. pub. hol. on adjacent weeks x spouse	-0.031	-0.031	-0.183
former employee	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.183)
Nb. pub. hol. on the rest of the year	-0.004	0.002	-0.134
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.068)
Nb. pub. hol. on the rest of the year x spouse	0.010	0.004	0.203
former employee	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.060)
Observations	27,005	26,560	445
Mean dep. var.	0.156	0.154	0.243

#### Table 3. Public Holidays Effects when Spouses are no Longer in the Labor Force

Note: the table shows the regression results of the same model as in Table 1 when the dummy indicating that spouses are employees is replaced by a dummy indicating that they are former employees. Panel A refers to the sample of self-employed whose spouses are retired (either as former self-employed or former employees) and aged 65 or less. Panel B refers to the sample of self-employed whose spouses are not retired, but out of the labor market (again, as either former self-employed or former employees) aged 65 or less. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday	0.637	0.579	0.677
	(0.034)	(0.061)	(0.041)
Public holiday x spouse on the list	-0.313	-0.304	-0.323
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.073)
Nb. pub. hol. on the same week	0.091	0.088	0.100
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Nb. pub. hol. same week x spouse on the list	-0.121	-0.114	-0.128
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.063)
Nb. pub. hol. on adjacent weeks	0.018	0.013	0.030
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse on the list	-0.066	-0.056	-0.080
1 5 1	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.036)
Nb. pub. hol. on the rest of the year	0.008	0.007	0.011
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse on list	-0.026	-0.024	-0.028
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Observations	44 295	30 690	13 605
Mean dep. var.	0.231	0.247	0.195
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday	0 591	0.603	0 592
i done nondalj	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Public holiday x spouse on the list	-0.287	-0 278	-0 314
Tuble holiday x spouse on the list	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.046)
Nh pub hol on the same week	0.071	0.074	0.068
rto. publi noil on the sume week	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Nh pub hal same week y spouse on the list	-0.058	-0.079	-0.000
No. pub. noi. same week x spouse on the list	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Nh pub hol on adjacent weeks	0.000	0.003	0.011
No. pub. noi. on adjacent weeks	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.011)
Nh pub hal adjacent weaks y spouse on the list	(0.000)	0.000	0.056
No. pub. noi. adjacent weeks x spouse on the list	(0.012)	-0.009	-0.030
Nile with the law discussed of the second	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.019)
ND. pub. noi. on the rest of the year	0.004	(0.005)	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse on list	0.003	0.004	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Observations	113,330	76,690	36,640
viean dep. var.	0.239	0.258	0.198

### Table 4. Public Holidays and the Probability of Spouses of Self-employed WorkersTaking a Day Off: Alternative Identification Strategy

Note: the table refers to the sample of self-employed workers whose spouse is an employee. The estimated models are the same as in Table 1, except that the dummy indicating that the spouse is an employee is replaced by a dummy indicating that the spouse's occupation is on the list in Appendix B. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday	0.516	0.516	0.494
	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.050)
Public holiday x spouse on the list	-0.092	-0.065	-0.160
	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.075)
Nb. pub. hol. on the same week	0.043	0.057	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Nb. pub. hol. same week x spouse on the list	-0.052	-0.054	-0.055
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.051)
Nb. pub. hol. on adjacent weeks	0.018	0.018	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse on the list	-0.010	$-0.00^{7}$	-0.013
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.033)
Nb. pub. hol. on the rest of the year	(0.003)	0.006	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse on list	-0.004	-0.010	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Ubservations Mean den ver	44,295	30,690	13,605
	0.138	0.137	0.200
Panel B: with children	0.450	0.512	0.304
r ublic holiday	(0.430)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Public holiday y spouse on the list	0.051	0.061	0.030
Fublic honday x spouse on the list	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.039)
Nh nuh hal on the same week	0.050	0.053	0.045
ivo. pub. noi. on the same week	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.045)
Nh nuh hol same week y shouse on the list	-0.003	-0.022	0.046
ivo. pub. noi. same week x spouse on the list	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.033)
Nh nuh hol on adjacent weeks	0.004	0.007	-0.008
rvo. pub. noi. on adjacent weeks	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Nh pub hol adjacent weeks x spouse on the list	-0.004	0.006	-0.037
rvo. pub. noi. adjacent weeks x spouse on the list	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Nh nub hol on the rest of the year	0.002	0.002	0.001
rvo. puo. non on the rest of the year	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Nh pub hal rest of the year x spouse on list	0.001	0.004	-0.008
Two. pao. not. test of the year x spouse on list	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Observations	113 330	76 690	36 640
Mean den var	0 164	0.132	0 231

### Table 5: Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-Employed Taking a Day Off: Alternative Identification Strategy

Note: the table refers to the sample of self-employed workers whose spouse is an employee. The estimated models are the same as in Table 2 except that the dummy indicating that the spouse is an employee is replaced by a dummy indicating that the spouse's occupation is on the list in Appendix B. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.

Online Appendix

	Couples without		Coup	Couples with		All	
	chi	ldren	chi	ldren			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Spouse	Spouse	Spouse	Spouse	Spouse	Spouse	
	empl.	employee	empl.	employee	empl.	employee	
Education			<b>1</b>		- 1		
College (3 years or more)	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.26	
College (2 years dipl.)	0.13	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.21	
High school dipl.	0.19	0.19	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.20	
Vocational secondary	0.30	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.23	
End of middle school dipl.	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	
No dipl.	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.06	
Age							
Age less than 30	0.06	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	
Age 30-39	0.10	0.17	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.25	
Age 40-49	0.10	0.13	0.43	0.44	0.32	0.35	
Age 50-59	0.51	0.43	0.28	0.24	0.35	0.29	
Age 60 or more	0.24	0.14	0.04	0.02	0.10	0.06	
Industry							
Agriculture	0.25	0.14	0.24	0.11	0.24	0.12	
Food industry	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	
Other manufacturing ind	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	
Construction	0.04	0.14	0.05	0.15	0.05	0.15	
Retail	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.14	
Transportation	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	
Finance	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	
Real estate	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	
Hotel and catering	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.30	0.31	
Health, education, public adm.	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.16	
Unknown	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	
Observations	30,320	44,280	63,010	113,330	93,330	157,610	

**Table A1. Descriptive Statistics** 

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1. Columns (1), (3) and (5) refers to the subsample of self-employed whose spouse is self-employed while column (2), (4) and (6) refers to the subsample of those whose spouse is an employee. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	Probability to take a day off			
	All	Male	Female	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Panel A : without children				
When spouse takes a day off	0.493	0.433	0.624	
When spouse works	0.067	0.050	0.091	
Number of observations	74,600	45,850	28,750	
Panel B : with children				
When spouse takes a day off	0.462	0.393	0.619	
When spouse works	0.080	0.049	0.125	
Number of observations	176,340	108,195	68,145	

#### Table A2. Synchronization of Days of Leave in Couples with and without Children

Note: the table refers to the same working sample as Table 1.

Reading: Among couples without children, the probability that self-employed workers take a day off work is 0.493 when their spouses are off work, but only 0.067 when their spouses are not off work.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Spouse does not work	0.342	0.255	0.494
	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.190)
Observations	74,600	45,850	28,750
Mean dep. var.	0.148	0.132	0.174
Panel B: with children			
Spouse does not work	0.281	0.424	0.046
	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.146)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.159	0.130	0.205

## Table A3. The Impact of a Day Off Taken by the Spouse on Own Probability to Take a Day Off: Instrumental Variable Estimates (Main Strategy).

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that they do not work on a dummy variable indicating that their spouse does not work, using the interaction between the dummy variable indicating that the spouse is an employee and the dummy variable indicating that the observation day is a public holiday as an instrumental variable. The control variables are the same as in Table 1 (except for the excluded instrument). Column (1) shows the results for the full sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.173	0.183	0.169
	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week x spouse employee	0.051	0.065	0.047
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.014	0.008	0.023
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.003	0.002	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Observations	53,735	29,655	24,080
Mean dep. var.	0.197	0.214	0.175
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.106	0.107	0.113
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week x spouse employee	0.088	0.106	0.067
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.018	0.024	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.003	0.008	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	127,680	69,225	58,455
Mean dep. var.	0.208	0.233	0.178

#### Table A4. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-employed Spouse Taking a Day Off (Sample Excluding Agricultural and Construction Sectors).

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1 excluding agriculture and construction. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that their spouses do not work on a given weekday d on variables indicating (1) that d is a public holiday, (2) the number of public holidays falling on the same week as d (but not on d), (3) the number of public holidays falling on adjacent weeks, (4) the number of public holidays falling within the remainder of the one-year interval surrounding d, as well as the interactions between these 4 variables and a dummy indicating that spouses are employees. Only the 4 regression coefficients corresponding to these interaction variables are reported in the table (panel A referring to the sub-sample without children and panel B to the sub-sample with children). Additional controls include full sets of day of the week, week of the year, and year of observation fixed effects, as well as controls for school holidays, education, age and gender. We also include a set of ten industry dummy variables and their interactions with the dummy variable indicating that d is a public holiday. Column (1) shows the results for the full sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.092	0.069	0.107
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Nb. pub. hol. on week x spouse employee	0.011	-0.005	0.019
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.018	0.014	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.004	0.002	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Observations	53,735	29,655	24,080
Mean dep. var.	0.171	0.152	0.195
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.035	0.063	-0.002
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Nb. pub. hol. on week x spouse employee	0.038	0.041	0.028
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.008	0.015	-0.008
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	127,680	69,225	58,455
Mean dep. var.	0.182	0.145	0.226

### Table A5. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-employed Taking a Day Off (Sample Excluding Agricultural and Construction Sectors)

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1 excluding agriculture and construction. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that they do not work on a given weekday d on variables indicating (1) that d is a public holiday, (2) the number of public holidays falling on the same week as d (but not on d), (3) the number of public holidays falling on adjacent weeks, (4) the number of public holidays falling within the remainder of the one-year interval surrounding d, as well as the interactions between these 4 variables and a dummy indicating that spouses are employees. Only the 4 regression coefficients corresponding to these interaction variables are reported in the table (panel A referring to the sub-sample without children and panel B to the sub-sample with children). Additional controls include full sets of day of the week, week of the year, and year of observation fixed effects, as well as controls for school holidays, education, age and gender. We also include a set of ten industry dummy variables and their interactions with the dummy variable indicating that d is a public holiday. Column (1) shows the results for the full sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday	0.453	0.402	0.498
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.042)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.218	0.226	0.191
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week $w_0 x$ spouse employee	0.059	0.073	0.052
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -1 or $w_0$ +1 x spouse employee	0.019	0.015	0.026
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -2 or $w_0$ +2 x spouse employee	0.000	0.014	-0.016
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -3 or $w_0$ +3 x spouse employee	-0.022	-0.017	-0.031
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -4 or $w_0$ +4 x spouse employee	-0.009	-0.002	-0.019
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the quarter x spouse employee	-0.005	0.004	-0.022
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the semester x spouse employee	0.001	0.007	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.002	0.004	-0.009
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Observations	74,600	45,850	28,750
Mean dep. var.	0.192	0.214	0.157

# Table A6. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-employed Spouses Taking a Day Off (Model with Larger Number of Potential Effects of Public Holidays)

#### Table A6 (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday	0.423	0.428	0.432
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.177	0.176	0.166
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week $w_0$ x spouse employee	0.095	0.096	0.092
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -1 or $w_0$ +1 x spouse employee	0.017	0.018	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -2 or $w_0$ +2 x spouse employee	-0.017	-0.010	-0.029
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -3 or $w_0$ +3 x spouse employee	-0.006	-0.004	-0.011
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -4 or $w_0$ +4 x spouse employee	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the quarter x spouse employee	-0.021	-0.026	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the semester x spouse employee	0.008	0.012	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.000	0.003	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.207	0.234	0.164

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that their spouses do not work on a given weekday d on 9 variables indicating (1) that d falls on a public holiday, (2) the number of public holidays falling on the same week (denoted w<sub>0</sub>) as d (but not on d), (3) the number of public holidays falling on the 2 adjacent weeks (i.e., w<sub>0</sub>-1 or w<sub>0</sub>+1), (4) the number of public holidays falling on the w<sub>0</sub>-2 or w<sub>0</sub>+12, ..., and (9) the number of public holidays falling within the remainder of the one-year interval surrounding d, as well as the interactions between these 9 variables and a dummy indicating that spouses are employees. Additional controls include full sets of day of the week, week of the year, and year of observation fixed effects, as well as controls for school holidays, education, age and gender. We also include a set of ten industry dummy variables and their interactions with the dummy variable indicating that d is a public holiday. Column (1) shows the results for the whole sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Public holiday	0.486	0.541	0.441
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.072	0.058	0.087
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week $w_0 x$ spouse employee	0.014	0.004	0.013
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -1 or $w_0$ +1 x spouse employee	0.015	0.012	0.021
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -2 or $w_0$ +2 x spouse employee	0.007	0.001	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -3 or $w_0$ +3 x spouse employee	-0.024	-0.017	-0.040
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -4 or $w_0$ +4 x spouse employee	0.009	0.009	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the quarter x spouse employee	-0.002	0.001	-0.012
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the semester x spouse employee	0.002	-0.000	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.002	-0.002	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Observations	74,600	45,850	28,750
Mean dep. var.	0.148	0.132	0.174

#### Table A7. Public Holidays and the Probability of Self-employed Taking a Day Off (Model with Larger Number of Potential Effects of Public Holidays)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel B: with children			
Public holiday	0.426	0.488	0.414
	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Public holiday x spouse employee	0.051	0.075	0.011
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Nb. pub. hol. on same week w <sub>0</sub> x spouse employee	0.042	0.047	0.031
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -1 or $w_0$ +1 x spouse employee	0.006	0.012	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -2 or $w_0$ +2 x spouse employee	-0.013	-0.016	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -3 or $w_0$ +3 x spouse employee	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Nb. pub. hol. on weeks $w_0$ -4 or $w_0$ +4 x spouse employee	-0.004	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the quarter x spouse employee	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the semester x spouse employee	0.000	-0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.159	0.130	0.205

#### Table A7 (continued)

Note: the table shows the regression result of the same model as Table A6, on the same sample of self-employed workers, when the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that they (rather than their spouses) do not work during a given weekday *d*. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.

## Table A8. Weeks with a Public Holiday and the Probability of Self-employed Spouses Taking a Day Off

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Nb. pub. hol. in the week x spouse employee	0.0930 (0.0159)	0.1071 (0.0186)	0.0798 (0.0222)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.0163 (0.0108)	0.0131 (0.0128)	0.0247 (0.0148)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.0016 (0.0052)	0.0048 (0.0063)	-0.0092 (0.0069)
Observations	74,600	45,850	28,750
Mean dep. var.	0.192	0.214	0.157
Panel B: with children			
Nb. pub. hol. in the week x spouse employee	0.1045 (0.0110)	0.1060 (0.0135)	0.0992 (0.0139)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.0118 (0.0068)	0.0119 (0.0084)	0.0124 (0.0086)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.0015 (0.0035)	0.0044 (0.0045)	-0.0032 (0.0044)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.207	0.234	0.164

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that their spouses do not work on a given weekday d on variables indicating (1) the number of public holidays falling on the same week as d (including d), (2) the number of public holidays falling on adjacent weeks, (3) the number of public holidays falling within the remainder of the one-year interval surrounding d, as well as the interactions between these 3 variables and a dummy indicating that spouses are employees. Only the 3 regression coefficients corresponding to these interaction variables are reported in the table (panel A referring to the sub-sample without children and panel B to the sub-sample with children). Additional controls include full sets of day of the week, week of the year, and year of observation fixed effects, as well as controls for school holidays, education, age and gender. We also include a set of ten industry dummy variables and their interactions with the dummy variable indicating that d is a public holiday. Column (1) shows the results for the full sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children	7 111	Whate	Tennale
Nb. pub. hol. on week x spouse employee	0.0288	0.0151	0.0355
	(0.0146)	(0.0168)	(0.0210)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.0151	0.0112	0.0220
	(0.0099)	(0.0109)	(0.0140)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	0.0018	-0.0013	0.0040
	(0.0046)	(0.0051)	(0.0066)
Observations	74,600	45,850	28,750
Mean dep. var.	0.148	0.132	0.174
Panel B: with children			
Nb. pub. hol. on week x spouse employee	0.0410	0.0496	0.0244
	(0.0103)	(0.0113)	(0.0146)
Nb. pub. hol. adjacent weeks x spouse employee	0.0039	0.0109	-0.0140
	(0.0063)	(0.0069)	(0.0089)
Nb. pub. hol. rest of the year x spouse employee	-0.0013	-0.0022	-0.0023
	(0.0032)	(0.0035)	(0.0047)
Observations	176,340	108,195	68,145
Mean dep. var.	0.159	0.130	0.205

#### Table A9. Weeks with a Public Holiday and the Probability of Self-employed Taking a Day Off

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 1. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that they do not work on a given weekday d on variables indicating (1) the number of public holidays falling on the same week as d (including d), (2) the number of public holidays falling on adjacent weeks, (3) the number of public holidays falling within the remainder of the one-year interval surrounding d, as well as the interactions between these 3 variables and a dummy indicating that spouses are employees. Only the 3 regression coefficients corresponding to these interaction variables are reported in the table (panel A referring to the sub-sample without children and panel B to the sub-sample with children). Additional controls include full sets of day of the week, week of the year, and year of observation fixed effects, as well as controls for school holidays, education, age and gender. We also include a set of ten industry dummy variables and their interactions with the dummy variable indicating that d is a public holiday. Column (1) shows the results for the full sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

## Table A10. The impact of a Day Off taken by the Spouse on Own Probability to Take a Day Off: Instrumental Variable Estimates (Alternative Strategy).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All	Male	Female
Panel A: without children			
Spouse does not work	0.295	0.213	0.494
	(0.113)	(0.134)	(0.232)
Observations	44,295	30,690	13,605
Mean dep. var.	0.158	0.137	0.206
Panel B: with children			
Spouse does not work	0.178	0.218	0.124
	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.134)
Observations	113,330	76,690	36,640
Mean dep. var.	0.164	0.132	0.231

Note: the table refers to the same sample of self-employed as Table 4 or Table 5. It shows the results of regressing a variable indicating that they do not work on a dummy variable indicating that their spouse's occupation is on the list in appendix B and and the dummy variable indicating that the observation day is a public holiday as an instrumental variable. The control variables are the same as in Table 5 (except for the excluded instrument). Column (1) shows the results for the full sample, while col. (2) and (3) show the results for the male and female subsamples. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.





Note: the figure refers to the sample of self-employed workers whose spouses are either self-employed workers or employees. It shows the proportion of spouses who do not work on a given weekday d when it does not fall on a public holiday (d=0), as well as when it falls on one of the seven previous weekdays (d=-1,...-7) or on one of the seven following weekdays (d=1,...7). The dashed line refers to self-employed spouses while the solid line refers to employed spouses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.



#### Figure A2. Probability of Self-employedTaking a Day Off Before, During and After Regular Workdays

Note: the figure refers to the sample of self-employed workers whose spouses are either self-employed workers or employees. It shows the proportion who do not work on a given weekday when it does not fall on a public holiday (d=0), as well as when it falls on one of the seven previous weekdays (d=-1,...-7) or on one of the seven following weekdays (d=1,...7). The dashed line refers to self-employed spouses while the solid line refers to employed spouses. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

Figure A3. Differences in the Probability of Taking a Day Off Between Self-employed whose Spouse is a Former Employee and Self-employed whose Spouse is a Former Self-employed



(a) Spouse is Retired



(b) Spouse is out of the Labor Force, but not Retired

Note: figure (a) refers to the same sample of self-employed whose spouses are retired (either as former self-employed or former employee) and aged 65 or less as Panel A of Table 3. Figure (b) refers to the same sample of self-employed whose spouses are not retired, but out of the labor market (again, as either former self-employed or former employees) aged 65 or less as Panel B of Table 3. Source: Labor Force Survey, 2013-2019, Insee.

Code	Label
331.	Personnels de direction de la fonction publique (Etat, collectivités locales, hôpitaux)
334.	Officiers des Armées et de la Gendarmerie (sauf officiers généraux)
335.	Personnes exerçant un mandat politique ou syndical
352.	Journalistes (y. c. rédacteurs en chef)
	Auteurs littéraires, scénaristes, dialoguistes
377.	Cadres de l'hôtellerie et de la restauration
389.	Ingénieurs et cadres techniques de l'exploitation des transports
	Officiers et cadres navigants techniques et commerciaux de l'aviation civile
	Officiers et cadres navigants techniques de la marine marchande
424.	Moniteurs et éducateurs sportifs, sportifs professionnels
431.	Cadres infirmiers et assimilés
	Infirmiers psychiatriques
	Puéricultrices
	Infirmiers spécialisés (autres qu'infirmiers psychiatriques et puéricultrices)
	Sages-femmes (libérales ou salariées)
	Infirmiers en soins généraux, salariés
	Infirmiers libéraux
441.	Clergé séculier
	Clergé régulier
452.	Inspecteurs et officiers de police
	Adjudants-chefs, adjudants et sous-officiers de rang supérieur de l'Armée et de la
	Gendarmerie
468.	Maîtrise de restauration : salle et service
	Maîtrise de l'hébergement : hall et étages
488.	Maîtrise de restauration : cuisine/production
	Maîtrise de restauration : gestion d'établissement
526.	Aides-soignants (de la fonction publique ou du secteur privé)
	Assistants dentaires, médicaux et vétérinaires, aides de techniciens médicaux
	Auxiliaires de puériculture
	Aides médico-psychologiques
501	Ambulanciers salaries (du secteur public ou du secteur prive)
531.	Agents de políce de l'Etat
	Agents des polices municipales
520	Surveillants de l'administration penitentiaire
552.	Gendarmes (de grade interieur à adjudant)
	Hommes du reng (souf nompiors militaires)
534	A gonts givils de ségurité et de surveillence
554.	Agents civils de securite et de suivemance Convoyeurs de fonds, gardes du corps, enquêteurs privés et métiers assimilés (salariés)
5/16	Contrôleurs des transports (personnels roulants)
540.	Agents des services commerciaux des transports de voyageurs et du tourisme
	Funloyés administratifs d'exploitation des transports de marchandises
	Hôtesses de l'air et stewards
	Autres agents et hôtesses d'accompagnement (transports tourisme)
552	Caissiers de magasin
553.	Vendeurs non spécialisés
554.	Vendeurs en alimentation
2011	Vendeurs en ameublement, décor, équipement du fover
	Vendeurs en droguerie, bazar, guincaillerie. bricolage
	Vendeurs du commerce de fleurs
	Vendeurs en habillement et articles de sport

Code	Label
	Vendeurs en produits de beauté, de luxe (hors biens culturels) et optique
	Vendeurs de biens culturels (livres, disques, multimédia, objets d'art)
	Vendeurs de tabac, presse et articles divers
	Pompistes et gérants de station-service (salariés ou mandataires)
561.	Serveurs, commis de restaurant, garçons (bar, brasserie, café ou restaurant)
	Aides de cuisine, apprentis de cuisine et employés polyvalents de la restauration
	Employés de l'hôtellerie : réception et hall
	Employés d'étage et employés polyvalents de l'hôtellerie
	Pilotes d'installation lourde des industries de transformation : métallurgie, production verrière,
626.	matériaux de construction
	Autres opérateurs et ouvriers qualifiés : métallurgie, production verrière, matériaux de
	construction
	Opérateurs et ouvriers qualifiés des industries lourdes du bois et de la fabrication du papier-
	carton
636.	Bouchers (sauf industrie de la viande)
	Charcutiers (sauf industrie de la viande)
	Boulangers, pâtissiers (sauf activité industrielle)
	Cuisiniers et commis de cuisine
642.	Conducteurs de taxi (salariés)
	Conducteurs de voiture particulière (salariés)
654.	Conducteurs qualifiés d'engins de transport guidés
655.	Autres agents et ouvriers qualifiés (sédentaires) des services d'exploitation des transports
683.	Apprentis boulangers, bouchers, charcutiers
684.	Nettoyeurs
	Ouvriers non qualifiés de l'assainissement et du traitement des déchets
691.	Conducteurs d'engin agricole ou forestier
	Ouvriers de l'élevage
	Ouvriers du maraîchage ou de l'horticulture
	Ouvriers de la viticulture ou de l'arboriculture fruitière
	Ouvriers agricoles sans spécialisation particulière
	Ouvriers de l'exploitation forestière ou de la sylviculture
692.	Marins-pêcheurs et ouvriers de l'aquaculture