

# MARIEKE PAHLKE

pahlke.marieke@gmail.com | <https://sites.google.com/view/pahlke>

Paris School of Economics  
48, Boulevard Jourdan  
75014 Paris, France

Citizenship: German

*Last updated: September 16, 2022*

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

---

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Economics

## EMPLOYMENT

---

**Post-Doctoral Researcher** since 2021  
Paris School of Economics

## EDUCATION

---

**Ph.D. in Economics** (summa cum laude) 2015 – 2021  
Center for Mathematical Economics and BiGSEM, Bielefeld University  
Thesis: “*Essays on Dynamic Consistency in Games with Ambiguous Information*”  
Supervisors: Frank Riedel, Peter Klibanoff

**Visiting Research Student** 2019  
Paris School of Economics  
Invited by Jean-Marc Tallon and Frédéric Koessler (2 weeks)

**Visiting Research Student** 2018  
Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management  
Invited by Peter Klibanoff (6 months)

**M.Sc. in Mathematical Economics**, Bielefeld University 2015  
Graduated Best of Cohort

**B.Sc. in Mathematical Economics**, Bielefeld University 2013

## PUBLICATIONS

---

**Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors**  
*Games and Economic Behavior*, 133 (2022), 85–108

## WORKING PAPER AND WORK IN PROGRESS

---

### **Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication**

Job Market Paper, R&R *Journal of Economic Theory*

Endogenous Feedback Functions with Ambiguity (with Frédéric Koessler)

Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Auctions

Knightian Equilibria in Activism Games (with Dominik Karos)

## AWARDS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS

---

<b>Dissertation Award</b> , Bielefeld University	2021
<b>German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Scholarship</b> for United States	2018
<b>Mobility Grant</b> of the Bielefeld Graduate School in Theoretical Sciences (BGTS)	2018
<b>Full Ph.D. Scholarship</b> by the German Research Foundations (DFG) through the Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management (BiGSEM)	2015 – 2018
<b>Best Master Degree of the Cohort</b> , Faculty of Mathematics, Bielefeld University	2015

## CONFERENCES AND INVITED TALKS

---

2022	Micro workshop LMU (Munich, invited talk), D-TEA Workshop (Paris), XXX EWET (Warsaw), 21th Annual SAET Conference (virtual), VFS Annual Conference (Basel)
2021	World Congress of the Game Theory Society (virtual)
2020	World Congress of the ES (virtual), TOM seminar PSE (virtual, invited talk)
2019	12th RGS Doctoral Conference in Economics (Bochum), 19th Annual SAET Conference (Ischia), ESEM (Manchester), TOM seminar PSE (Paris, invited talk)
2018	20th Workshop of Central European Program in Economic Theory (Udine), Workshop Mathematics of Subjective Probability (Milan), 13th BIGSEM Doctoral Workshop on Economic Theory (poster, Bielefeld)

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

---

Seminar Session: <i>Ambiguity in Mechanism Design (Ph.D.)</i> , Paris School of Economics	2021 – 2022
Lecture and Exercise Seminar: <i>Risk and Insurance (B.Sc.)</i> , Bielefeld University	2019 – 2021
Supervision of Bachelor Theses: <i>Topics on Uncertainty in Games</i> , Bielefeld University	2019
TA: <i>Microeconomics 1 (M.Sc.)</i> (Riedel), Bielefeld University	2018 – 2019
TA: <i>Seminar on Game Theory (M.Sc.)</i> (Riedel), Bielefeld University	2018 – 2019
TA: <i>Introduction to Microeconomics (B.Sc.)</i> (Szcztkowski), Bielefeld University	2014 – 2015
TA: <i>Game Theory (B.Sc.)</i> (Kuzmics), Bielefeld University	2012 – 2015

## REFEREEING AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

---

Refereeing for Games and Economics Behavior	since 2017
Support of Implementing the Recognition of the Lecture “Risk and Insurance” for the Examination of the German Association of Actuaries (DAV), Bielefeld University	2020 – 2021
Organization of the Weekly Economics Seminar, Bielefeld University	2018 – 2021
11th BIGSEM Doctoral Workshop on Economic Theory (Bielefeld), Organizer	2016

## LANGUAGES

---

German (native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent), French (basic)

---

 ABSTRACTS
 

---

**Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication (*Job Market Paper*)***R&R Journal of Economic Theory*

In most models of ambiguous communication, a sender can only benefit from ambiguous language if the receiver behaves dynamically inconsistently. A dynamically inconsistent receiver might not follow his ex-ante optimal plan after observing an ambiguous message. This paper proposes a novel approach to analyze ambiguous communication by studying dynamically consistent behavior in games with ambiguous strategies. I show that gains from ambiguous communication can be maintained even if players behave dynamically consistently. To achieve this, I define rectangularity, a condition on beliefs that ensures dynamically consistent behavior, for settings where ambiguity arises due to ambiguous strategies. Then, I analyze a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in an ambiguous persuasion setting. In this equilibrium, ambiguous communication outperforms standard Bayesian communication even if the receiver behaves dynamically consistently. Finally, I extend my analysis to settings with ambiguous communication in cheap talk and mechanism design.

**Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors***Games and Economic Behavior*, 133 (2022), 85–108

This paper explores multi-stage incomplete information games with common ambiguous information about states or types and ambiguity averse players. We characterize a belief formation process that allows players to take their knowledge about the structure of the game into account. This process leads to subjective rectangular ex-ante belief sets for all players. We show that given these sets of beliefs, players behave dynamically consistent. Therefore, using our belief formation process, we can extend the concept of sequential equilibria to multi-stage ambiguous incomplete information games. Furthermore, we characterize assumption under which sequential rationality implies rectangularity.

---

 REFERENCES
 

---

**Professor Frank Riedel**

Center for Mathematical Economics  
 Bielefeld University  
*frank.riedel@uni-bielefeld.de*

**Professor Peter Klibanoff**

Department of Managerial Economics  
 and Decision Sciences (MEDS)  
 Kellogg School of Management  
 Northwestern University  
*peterk@kellogg.northwestern.edu*

**Professor Frédéric Koessler**

CNRS and Department of Economics  
 and Decision Science  
 HEC Paris  
*koessler@hec.fr*