

wartime trauma the denizens of the butte could by no means escape. Alas, Hewitt's own restricted focus on Montmartre does not permit comparison with other artistic enclaves on the continent after the Great War.

Francis Carco, Léon-Paul Fargue, and others wallowed in an aestheticized pining for "old Montmartre," whose death they attributed to cosmopolitanism, tourism, and to democratized access to leisure (which was greatly enabled in the 1930s by the Front Populaire). "Today," writes Fargue in *Le Piéton de Paris* (1938), "the zinc bars and the velvet or leather seats have been taken over by representatives of all sections of the French people, beginning with the owners of those small second-hand Renaults, who one day decided that they had had enough of being kept at arm's length from the pleasures of the café" (182). In this moment of recoil, Hewitt finds the birth of a "place of memory," a shrine to which future generations of tourists would flock to buy schlock. "After Céline and Aymé, there was no way for Montmartre culture to go except repetition, which is why, from the 1950s onwards, it lived on, not in literature or painting, but in the mechanical means of reproduction of photography and film" (266).

Hewitt's *Montmartre* is a labor of love, rich in arresting detail. One regrets, however, the relative lack of women in this account—the female dancers, artists, workers, models, and prostitutes who made the culture of Montmartre possible. Furthermore, Hewitt relies rather heavily on Pierre Nora and Louis Chevalier, whose classic studies have sustained substantive critiques. Hewitt cites *Classes Laborieuses et classes dangereuses*, for instance, and then observes that "criminal activity naturally goes hand in hand with major railway stations and their transitory population," an echo of Chevalier's debunked notion that criminality was inherent to the marginalized and mobile elements of Parisian society (7). Nevertheless, this book has much to offer to students of Parisian cultural history in the contemporary period.

David Spector, *La Gauche, la droite, et le marché: Histoire d'une idée controversée (XIX^e–XXI^e siècle)* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2017)

Review by Jonah D. Levy, University of California Berkeley

In *La Gauche, la droite, et le marché: Histoire d'une idée controversée (XIX^e–XXI^e siècle)*, David Spector offers a fascinating take on contemporary French economic policy. He starts by showing that France is a clear outlier

when it comes to sentiment about the market. Spector notes that in a recent survey, only 15 percent of French respondents believed that a market economy works relatively well, which is far and away the lowest score of any developed country and less than one-third the figure for Germany or the United Kingdom.

But France does not only stand out in public opinion polls for its hostility to the market. Spector presents a number of recent policy debates in which the opponents of market reform emerged victorious. A 2014 proposal to open competition in liberal professions carved out an exception for notaries, who make an average of €20,000 per month. That same year, both chambers of parliament voted unanimously for a so-called “Anti-Amazon Law” that prohibited online booksellers from matching the 5 percent discount that brick-and-mortar stores may offer. The government also enacted a law preventing Uber from challenging the monopoly of French taxi drivers. More recently, a 2016 law made it harder for big supermarkets to cut prices. All of these initiatives shielded producers from competition, while raising prices for (generally much less wealthy) consumers.

At the EU level, Spector observes that France has consistently resisted efforts to move the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) away from price setting and toward more market-friendly and less expensive support for farmer incomes. Back home (quite literally), a 2014 law expanded rent control in large French cities. At the same time, municipal leaders resisted imposing tolls on automobile traffic, opting instead for direct controls, mostly by banning cars altogether from city centers.

Even the most extreme circumstances have failed to dislodge the French from their anti-market stance. After the terrible Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the UK and Germany, which both had Left governments at the time, proposed to lower EU tariffs on textiles from the affected countries. France responded by putting together a coalition to block the proposal. All of these anecdotes, Spector notes, point to a distinctive French hostility to the market:

Whether concerning farmers, notaries, the Internet, the place of cars in cities, Sri Lankan textiles or hypermarkets; whether the level of policymaking is the municipality, the nation-state, or the European Union, the policies pursued and the preferences expressed by the majority—and often even unanimously—are systematically less favorable to market mechanisms than in other large developed countries (17, translation by the author).

Why is France so out of step with the rest of Europe? Spector argues that the answer lies in the nature of the French Left, specifically in the Left’s penchant for privileging ideology over the interests of its supporters. Many of the market-resisting policies that he describes harm the interests of leftist voters. Restrictions on competition in supermarkets, books, trans-

portation, and notaries raise the cost of living for the average citizen. According to Spector, it is not surprising that the Right would support such restrictions, since they benefit groups that tend to vote for the Right (large retailers, taxi drivers, notaries, etc.); rather, what is surprising is the behavior of the Left. A Left committed to the interests of its electorate should oppose restrictions on market competition that harm consumers for the sake of affluent and conservative producers. That is how left-led governments in Germany and the UK have acted, according to Spector. In the case of the French Left, however, anti-market ideology invariably trumps the economic interests of leftist voters. The result is a French version of the Baptist-bootlegger coalition, marked by “clientelistic antiliberalism on the right, intellectual anti-liberalism on the left” (16).

Spector’s explanation of this distinctive behavior of the French Left is historical in nature. In a series of chapters comparing France and the UK from the 1830s to World War I, Spector identifies two historical junctures. The first was the push for free trade in the middle of the nineteenth century. In Britain, where land was highly concentrated among an aristocratic elite, the liberal cause of free trade stood to reduce food costs for workers while harming the interests of only the privileged few. In France, by contrast, where the Revolution had entrenched a large rural population on the land, free trade threatened the livelihood of millions of farmers. Market-opening proposals in France, therefore, generated mass opposition and rarely advanced. Free trade’s close association with the British social system further undermined its cause: leftist critics feared that free trade would immiserate French workers in the manner of the oppressive British factory system.

The second historical juncture occurred in the early twentieth century with the emergence of the so-called “social question,” that is, the challenge of integrating a growing working class. In Britain, self-styled “New Liberal” economists took up the challenge, combining free trade with support for measures to help ordinary workers and provide a degree of security, including progressive taxation, a large welfare state, and later Keynesianism. In France, by contrast, there were no “New Liberal” economists. Traumatized by the upheaval of 1848, French liberal economists became unyielding defenders of the social order, embracing anti-socialist propaganda and hostility to even the most modest egalitarian reforms. As a result, liberalism never became attractive to the French Left. On the contrary, it was the economic voice of the enemies of the French working class.

La Gauche, la droite, et le marché represents an impressive marriage of contemporary public policy and comparative history. Spector offers a devastating critique of the French Left. Time and again, the French Left has privileged rigid adherence to anti-market ideology over distributive justice

and the well-being of its supporters. The Left, in Spector's view, has no business defending the monopolistic privileges of notaries. Spector also points to a more general proposition, which is that the Left can potentially support markets and competition in ways that protect or even enhance the interests of the disadvantaged. France, he suggests, desperately needs a contemporary variant of the "New Liberal" synthesis. Finally, Spector roots the behavior of the French Left neither in stupidity and venality (even if he is clearly frustrated by the Left's actions) nor in cultural stereotypes, but rather in struggles at critical moments in French history.

While I agree with almost everything in *La Gauche, la droite, et le marché*, I would push back in two regards. First, I think that Spector lets the French Right off too easily. The French Left is not the only unusual actor by European standards. The French Right betrays market principles to an extent unrivalled on the continent. If François Hollande was no Tony Blair, Nicolas Sarkozy and Jacques Chirac were no Margaret Thatcher. The French Right, like the Left, is torn between its ideological principles and the interests of its supporters, and it, too, has often sold out market principles.

The second place where I would push back against—or, more accurately, extend—Spector's analysis concerns the historical perspective. Spector jumps from the early twentieth century to contemporary public policy. In so doing, he misses a crucial historical piece of the argument. A lot has happened since the early twentieth century to shape French mindsets. In particular, the postwar *dirigiste* or statist economic model, which is not a focus for Spector, has shaped contemporary political behavior in multiple relevant ways. Governments of the Right, which dominated the initial decades of the Fifth Republic, largely administered the *dirigiste* system, while the Left was confined to the opposition. Thus, the anti-liberal behavior of the French Right stems not just from the interests of particular constituencies, but also from the Right's postwar experience running the statist model.

The French public too has been affected by legacies of the *dirigiste* model. The postwar boom period, the *trente glorieuses* (thirty glorious years), coincided with the heyday of *dirigiste* industrial policy. In the minds of many French citizens, it was the *dirigiste* model that produced the postwar prosperity (even if covariation is not necessarily causation). Moreover, since the break with the *dirigiste* model in 1983, France's economy has performed poorly, yielding anemic growth and persistent mass unemployment. Consequently, many French citizens have become frustrated or even hostile to market reform, which they regard as having failed. For this reason, in thinking about the historical roots of contemporary anti-market sentiment in France, the postwar *dirigiste* model should loom every bit as large as the earlier struggles that Spector describes.

These quibbles should in no way detract from the achievements of *La Gauche, la droite, et le marché*. David Spector has written a magisterial study of French resistance to the market. He shows that there is a distinctive French outlook and, using a cross-national comparison with Britain, traces that outlook to critical moments in the history of economic policy. *La Gauche, la droite, et le marché* is must reading for anyone who wishes to understand contemporary French economic policy as well as the challenges confronting progressive left reformers. It is especially relevant at a time when a French president who refuses to align himself with either the Left or the Right is seeking to advance market forces in the face of a weary, suspicious, and contentious French citizenry.

Graham M. Jones, *Magic's Reason: An Anthropology of Analogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

Review by Patricia Lorcin, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities

Is there a difference between the occult and entertainment magic and, if so, why do Western illusionists find the comparison compelling, whereas Western anthropologists find it unsettling? This question lies at the heart of Graham Jones' exploration of anthropological magic theory. Jones sets out to demonstrate that the definition of magic, which both anthropologists and illusionists have tried to understand, has led to complementary and at times seemingly collaborative projects. More significantly, he posits that these projects, whether pursued separately or in apparent conjunction, have shaped the culture of Western modernity.

Two nineteenth-century figures are central to his argument: the French illusionist Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin, and the English anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor. These two men, he argues, contributed to the ideological structure of Western imperialism, namely the contradistinction between civilization and primitivism. The first half of the book focuses largely on Houdin's activities, whereas the second looks more closely at the role of Tylor and his fellow academics in an attempt to unravel the French understanding of the cultural dimensions of magic. The book is divided into seven chapters, of which only four deal directly with activities in Algeria, the remaining three chapters being more concerned with the analogies between magic and illusionary performance or *prestidigitation*, the French word for sleight of hand. In these final chapters, Jones brings in the anthropologist Tylor and a number of other illustrious