Campus Jourdan – 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
6th floor, office 03
Phone +33(0)1 80 52 16 03
- Bounded rationality
- Game Theory
- Individual Behaviour
- Mechanism Design and Economics of Contract
- Corruption and Collusion in Procurement : Strategic Complements - A survey, forthcoming in The International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption Vol.2 ed. S. Rose Ackerman.
- Théorie Quantique et Sciences Humaines (2009) editor Michel Bitbol in-press Edition CNRS Paris, p. 205-249
- An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making (2009) joint with Jerome Busemeyer (Indiana University). In Quantum Interaction, LNAI 5494, Springer, p. 113-128.
- Expected Utility Theory under Non-classical Uncertainty joint with V. Danilov (Central Mathematical Economic Insitute, Russan Academy of Sciences). On line in Theory and Decision 2009
- Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel - Favoritism in Procurement Auctions joint with Gregory Kosenok (New Economic School Moscow)
- In Public-Private Partnership Special number in the Review of Industrial Organization 2009
- Type indeterminacy - A Model of the KT(Khaneman Tversky)- man / joint with Shmuel Zamir (Jerusalem Hebrew University) and Hervé Zwirn (IHTPS and Cachan, Paris), On line the Journal of Mathematical Psychology 2009