• Paris School of Economics, EHESS
Research groups
Research themes
  • Bounded rationality
  • Game Theory
  • Mechanism Design and Economics of Contract
Contact

Address :48, boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Tabs

My CV can be found here.

Publications HAL

  • Calibrated Clustering and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Pre-print, Working paper

    Families of normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes applying the K-means clustering technique to the data generated by the distributions of opponent’s behavior. This results in Calibrated Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions are derived from the strategies by the K-means clustering algorithm. We discuss various concepts formalizing this, and observe that distributions over analogy partitions are sometimes required to guarantee existence. Applications to games with linear best-responses are discussed highlighting the differences between strategic complements and strategic substitutes.

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