Seminars

Behavior Work Group

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Upcoming events

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Archives

• Thursday 26 November 2020 11:00-12:00

  Zoom TBA

  COMOLA Margherita (Université Paris Sud, PSE) : Bidding on Links: Experimental Evidence on Multi-object Auctions

• Friday 13 November 2020 11:00-12:00

  CHARROIN Liza (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) : Anticonformism: An experiment with matching pennies

  Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Agnieszka Rusinowska

• Wednesday 29 April 2020 15:00-16:00

  LOBECK Max (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES, PSE) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution

• Thursday 19 March 2020 11:00-12:00

  LOBECK Max (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES, PSE) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution (canceled)

• Friday 28 February 2020 11:00-11:45

  MSE, Room B2-1

  RACHIDI Tobias (PSE) : Double-sided opportunism in infrastructure investment

  Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Marian Moszoro

• Thursday 30 January 2020 10:30-11:30

  R2-20

  MUN Soffia (PSE) : Econometric estimation of Prospect Theory for Natural Ambiguity

• Friday 29 November 2019 11:00-12:00

  MSE Salle S/1

  MIKEL Hualde (University of Navarre) : On the aversion to incomplete preferences. An axiomatic approach

• Thursday 23 May 2019 10:00-10:45

  Jourdan, R2-20

  LOBECK Max (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES, PSE) : Principals' Distributive Preferences and the Incentivization of Agents

• Thursday 21 March 2019 10:00-10:45

  Jourdan R1-14

  MUN Soffia (PSE) : Risk and Ambiguity Preferences: Attitudes of the Self and Beliefs About Others

• Thursday 21 February 2019 10:00-10:45

  PALMINTERI Stefano (ENS) : Learning to speculate: A neuroeconomics approach (R1-13)

  BASILE Garcia (ENS)

• Thursday 20 December 2018 10:00-10:45

  Jourdan, R1-11

  JACQUEL Pierre (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES) : The impact of overconfidence on information cascade: A new experimental approach

• Thursday 15 November 2018 10:00-10:45

  COMPTE Olivier (PSE) : A war game

• Friday 26 October 2018 10:00-10:45

  MSE S/18

  WANG Olivier (NYU Stern) : Information curse in financial forecasting

• Thursday 27 September 2018 11:00-11:45

  Jourdan: R1-14

  COMOLA Margherita (Université Paris Sud, PSE) : Social and economic inequality

  MERLINO Luca Paolo (University of Antwerp)

• Thursday 17 May 2018 10:00-11:00

  R2-20

  CETRE Sophie (PSE - Sciences Po) : Do incentives conflict with fairness

• Thursday 12 April 2018 10:00-11:00

  Campus Jourdan, R1-16

  HEMON Antoine : Should We Take Experimental Recommendations at Face Value ? Social Image Motivation & Self-Sorting in a Public-Good Experiment

• Thursday 29 March 2018 10:00-11:00

  Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

  SINGH Juni : Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal

  GIULIO Iacobelli (PSE)

• Thursday 8 February 2018 10:00-11:00

  LOBECK Max (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES, PSE) : An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility

• Thursday 18 January 2018 10:00-11:00

  BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Pay-for-certainty, an experiment to elicit (in)complete preferences

• Thursday 14 December 2017 10:00-11:00

  salle R1-10, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

  LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : The shooter anxiety at the penalty kick

  ARRONDEL Luc (PSE)

  DUHAUTOIS Richard (CNAM)

• Thursday 30 November 2017 11:30-12:30

  salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris

  COMOLA Margherita (Université Paris Sud, PSE) : An experiment on strategic targeting in networks

  RUSINOWSKA Agnieszka (Paris 1)

  VILLEVAL Marie Claire (CNRS - University of Lyon)

• Thursday 12 October 2017 10:00-11:00

  R1-15

  ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions

  YIN Rémi (PSE)

• Thursday 21 September 2017 09:30-10:30

  Test

• Friday 1 September 2017

  Behavior Working Group

  Abstract

  This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.

• Friday 23 June 2017 10:00-10:45

  MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle du 6ème étage) 75013 Paris

  "Evaluating average confidence (psychology) towards a bargaining task (economics)"

• Thursday 1 June 2017 11:00-11:45

  DORIN Camille : Socio-economic status and redistribution behavior: an experiment

• Thursday 27 April 2017 11:00-11:45

  An experimental approach to preventive behavior

• Thursday 23 March 2017 11:00-11:45

  Room R1-14, Jourdan

  ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: measurement issues and lab experiment

  YIN Rémi (PSE)

• Friday 3 February 2017 10:00-10:45

  Room 115, Maison des Sciences Economiques

  BOULU-RESHEF Béatrice : Towards the management of donors: Experiments in the lab and in the field on charitable donations to a Arts firm

• Thursday 1 December 2016 11:00-11:45

  A2 room, Jourdan

  SENIK Claudia : Choice experiments to elicit inequality aversion

• Friday 25 November 2016 10:00-10:45

  B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques

  HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments

• Thursday 13 October 2016 10:45-11:45

  DSS room, Building B, 2nd floor, Jourdan

  BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Indifference or Indecision: an Experiment using Choice Correspondences

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  B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques

  HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments