Seminars

Behavior Work Group

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Archives

Thursday 10 November 2022 10:00-11:00
HUANG Yuchen (PSE) : Meritocracy for the Meritocrats: an Experiment on the Cultural Interpretation of Meritocracy
ZHEXUN MO Fred (PSE)
BELGUISE Margot (Warwick)
Thursday 13 October 2022 10:00-11:00
DEKEL Amit (PSE) : Testing myopic and farsighted stability concepts: a network formation experiment
Thursday 15 September 2022 10:00-11:00
STAROPOLI Carine (PSE) : Impact des tarifs sur les choix de mode de transport
Thursday 23 June 2022 10:00-10:45
WEBB Duncan (PSE) : Laws, Norms, and Discrimination: Gay Rights in India
Friday 15 April 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE
KORDA Hélène : *
Friday 18 March 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE (114)
SAUCET Charlotte : *
Thursday 24 February 2022 10:00-11:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan
HUANG Yuchen (PSE) : *
Thursday 17 February 2022 10:00-11:00
Salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan
CHAVEZ Emmanuel (PSE) : *
Friday 4 February 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE (114)
HENRY Emeric : Moral behavior: a tale of two images
JACQUEMET Nicolas
GALBIATI Roberto
Friday 21 January 2022 11:00-12:00
MSE (114)
SCARELLI Thiago (PSE) : Financial Concerns and Labor Income Discounting
Thursday 24 June 2021 11:00-12:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Redistributive Preferences when Inequality is an Externality
Morten Nyborg Stostad
Thursday 27 May 2021 11:00-12:00
ZAPPALÀ Guglielmo (PSE) : Drought exposure and accuracy: Motivated reasoning in climate change beliefs
Abstract
Despite scientific consensus, there is no unanimity among citizens in the beliefs about climate change. Understanding how people form beliefs about climate change and what drives their interpretation of climatic events is essential, especially in developing countries and among agricultural communities, who may most suffer from climate change consequences. Using survey data from rural households in Bangladesh matched with objective drought data, this paper studies how long-term average drought exposure and short-term deviations shape belief formation and accuracy in recollecting past drought events. In order to further investigate how agents interpret these past drought events, I use an instrumental variable approach to test and validate that individuals are subject to confirmation bias. The results show that the probability of overestimating the number of past drought events and the intensity with which individuals overestimate are significantly biased in the direction of their prior beliefs. The findings highlight the need of models that account for behavioral factors such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning to study climate change preference formation, and its implications for effective communication.
Thursday 29 April 2021 11:00-12:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/92401995708?pwd=SjU2ZnNWYzh0QnhuNXI4eG56ZXpEZz09
SALAMANCA Andrés (PSE) : Values of games without transferable utility: An experimental approach
Thursday 25 March 2021 11:30-12:30
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : Rumors diffusion in the lab
Francis Bloch (PSE) and Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech)
Thursday 11 March 2021 11:00-12:00
MUN Sofiia (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) : Deliberate Randomization and Ambiguity: Is There a Connection?
Elias Bouacida (Lancaster University, Management School)
Thursday 17 December 2020 11:00-12:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/91585525960?pwd=b0Evc2l2VlpuKzJiV1J6T2FSVTRDZz09
TZINTZUN Iván (PSE) : The Causal Effect of Physical Activity on Health in Early Adulthood: A Gene By Environment Instrumental Variables Approach
Lise Rochaix
Thursday 26 November 2020 11:00-12:00
Zoom TBA
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : Bidding on Links: Experimental Evidence on Multi-object Auctions
Friday 13 November 2020 11:00-12:00
On line
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : TBA
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : TBA
Friday 13 November 2020 11:00-12:00
CHARROIN Liza (Université Paris 1) : Anticonformism: An experiment with matching pennies
Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Wednesday 29 April 2020 15:00-16:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution
Thursday 19 March 2020 11:00-12:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Motivated Beliefs and Preferences for Redistribution (canceled)
Friday 28 February 2020 11:00-11:45
MSE, Room B2-1
RACHIDI Tobias (PSE) : Double-sided opportunism in infrastructure investment
Béatrice Boulu-Reshef and Marian Moszoro
Thursday 30 January 2020 10:30-11:30
R2-20
MUN Soffia (PSE) : Econometric estimation of Prospect Theory for Natural Ambiguity
Friday 29 November 2019 11:00-12:00
MSE Salle S/1
MIKEL Hualde (University of Navarre) : On the aversion to incomplete preferences. An axiomatic approach
Thursday 23 May 2019 10:00-10:45
Jourdan, R2-20
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : Principals' Distributive Preferences and the Incentivization of Agents
Thursday 21 March 2019 10:00-10:45
Jourdan R1-14
MUN Soffia (PSE) : Risk and Ambiguity Preferences: Attitudes of the Self and Beliefs About Others
Thursday 21 February 2019 10:00-10:45
PALMINTERI Stefano (ENS) : Learning to speculate: A neuroeconomics approach (R1-13)
BASILE Garcia (ENS)
Thursday 20 December 2018 10:00-10:45
Jourdan, R1-11
JACQUEL Pierre (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES) : The impact of overconfidence on information cascade: A new experimental approach
Thursday 15 November 2018 10:00-10:45
COMPTE Olivier (PSE) : A war game
Friday 26 October 2018 10:00-10:45
MSE S/18
WANG Olivier (NYU Stern) : Information curse in financial forecasting
Thursday 27 September 2018 11:00-11:45
Jourdan: R1-14
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : Social and economic inequality
MERLINO Luca Paolo (Antwerpen University)
Thursday 17 May 2018 10:00-11:00
R2-20
CETRE Sophie (PSE - Sciences Po) : Do incentives conflict with fairness
Thursday 12 April 2018 10:00-11:00
Campus Jourdan, R1-16
HEMON Antoine : Should We Take Experimental Recommendations at Face Value ? Social Image Motivation & Self-Sorting in a Public-Good Experiment
Thursday 29 March 2018 10:00-11:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SINGH Juni : Social proximity and the choice of monitors: A lab in the field experiment in Nepal
GIULIO Iacobelli (PSE)
Thursday 8 February 2018 10:00-11:00
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz) : An experimental study on the link between anti-social preferences and within firm mobility
Thursday 18 January 2018 10:00-11:00
BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Pay-for-certainty, an experiment to elicit (in)complete preferences
Thursday 14 December 2017 10:00-11:00
salle R1-10, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LASLIER Jean-François (CNRS-PSE) : The shooter anxiety at the penalty kick
ARRONDEL Luc (PSE)
DUHAUTOIS Richard (CNAM)
Thursday 30 November 2017 11:30-12:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
COMOLA Margherita (PSE) : An experiment on strategic targeting in networks
RUSINOWSKA Agnieszka (Paris 1)
VILLEVAL Marie Claire (CNRS - University of Lyon)
Thursday 12 October 2017 10:00-11:00
R1-15
ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions
YIN Rémi (PSE)
Thursday 21 September 2017 09:30-10:30
Test
Friday 1 September 2017
Behavior Working Group
Abstract
This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions.
Friday 23 June 2017 10:00-10:45
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle du 6ème étage) 75013 Paris
"Evaluating average confidence (psychology) towards a bargaining task (economics)"
Thursday 1 June 2017 11:00-11:45
DORIN Camille : Socio-economic status and redistribution behavior: an experiment
Thursday 27 April 2017 11:00-11:45
An experimental approach to preventive behavior
Thursday 23 March 2017 11:00-11:45
Room R1-14, Jourdan
ETILÉ Fabrice (PSE) : Personal Identity and Preferences: measurement issues and lab experiment
YIN Rémi (PSE)
Friday 3 February 2017 10:00-10:45
Room 115, Maison des Sciences Economiques
BOULU-RESHEF Béatrice : Towards the management of donors: Experiments in the lab and in the field on charitable donations to a Arts firm
Thursday 1 December 2016 11:00-11:45
A2 room, Jourdan
SENIK Claudia : Choice experiments to elicit inequality aversion
Friday 25 November 2016 10:00-10:45
B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques
HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments
Thursday 13 October 2016 10:45-11:45
DSS room, Building B, 2nd floor, Jourdan
BOUACIDA Elias (PSE) : Indifference or Indecision: an Experiment using Choice Correspondences
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B2.1 room, Maison des Sciences Economiques
HEMON Antoine : Social Image Motivation or Social Image Constraint ? Voluntary Participation in Public Good Experiments