Applied Microeconomics Seminar
2016/2017: ce séminaire n’est plus actif au sein de PSE
....................
The seminar typically takes place on second and fourth Thursdays of the month, from 12 to 13 at the Maison des Sciences Economiques (106 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris - M° Campo Formio), room S18 (1st floor, MSE2 building).
- To receive information about this seminar http://listes.univ-paris1.fr/wws/sima
To submit articles and ask questions: Margherita Comola (margherita.comola at univ-paris1.fr)
This seminar receives financial support from the Paris School of Economics and the Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne.
Upcoming events
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Archives
- Thursday 30 June 2016 12:00-13:00
- Nathan FAIVRE
- Thursday 16 June 2016 12:00-13:00
- Michael KEARNS
- Thursday 2 June 2016 12:00-13:00
- Gregory VERDUGO
- Thursday 19 May 2016 12:00-13:00
- Flavio CALVINO
- Thursday 31 March 2016 12:00-13:00
- Beatrice BOULU
- Thursday 17 March 2016 12:00-13:00
- Fabrice LE LEC
- Thursday 11 February 2016 12:00-13:00
- Morgane LAOUENAN
- Thursday 28 January 2016 12:00-13:00
- Léa BOUSQUET
- Thursday 14 January 2016 12:00-13:00
- Haomin WANG
- Thursday 10 December 2015 12:00-13:00
- Elias BOUACIDA
- Thursday 26 November 2015 12:00-13:00
- Aya AHMED
- Thursday 12 November 2015 12:00-13:00
- Carmine ORNAGHI
- Thursday 15 October 2015 12:00-13:00
- Luca MERLINO
- Thursday 17 September 2015 12:00-13:00
- Thomas FAGART
- Thursday 25 June 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 MSE
- François Fontaine
- Thursday 11 June 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 MSE
- Manon Garouste
- Thursday 28 May 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 MSE
- Fabrice Le Lec
- Thursday 9 April 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Antoine Prevet
- Thursday 26 March 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 MSE
- Hector Moreno
- Thursday 12 March 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Stéphane Gauthier
- Thursday 29 January 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Almedina Music
- Thursday 15 January 2015 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Robert Somogyi
- Thursday 27 November 2014 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Chaimaa Yassine
- Thursday 13 November 2014 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Matthieu Cassou
- Thursday 9 October 2014 12:00-13:00
- S/18 (MSE)
- Guilhem Lecouteux
- Thursday 22 May 2014 12:30-14:30
- Room S/17 (MSE2)
- Angela Greulich
- Thursday 27 March 2014 12:30-13:30
- Room S/17 (MSE2)
- Juliette Rey
- Thursday 13 March 2014 12:30-13:30
- Room S/18 (MSE2)
- Léontine Goldzahl
- Thursday 30 January 2014 12:30-13:30
- Room S/17 (MSE2)
- Angelo Secchi
- Thursday 16 January 2014 12:30-13:30
- Room S/17 (MSE2)
- Alexandra Belova
- Thursday 12 December 2013 12:30-13:30
- Room S/18 (MSE2)
- Sébastien Massoni
- Thursday 28 November 2013 12:30-13:30
- Room S/18 (MSE2)
- Manon Garouste
- Thursday 14 November 2013 12:30-13:30
- Room S/18 (MSE2)
- Omar Sene
- Thursday 10 October 2013 12:30-13:30
- Room S/18 (MSE2)
- Claire Thibout
- Thursday 13 June 2013 11:00-12:00
- Le Lec Fabrice
- Abstract
Fabrice Le Lec
Eliciting social preferences (avec Michal Krawczyk)
13/06/2013
11h à 12h
Salle S/17 (MSE2)
- Thursday 24 January 2013 12:30-13:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle S18
- Nicolas ROUX
Information Precision and Group Polarization
- Thursday 13 December 2012 12:30-13:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle S18
- Tuğba ZEYDANLI
Social Interactions in Job Satisfaction
- Thursday 22 November 2012 12:30-13:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle S18
- Margherita COMOLA
Departures from Payoff Maximization in Market-like Link Formation: An experimental study (with M. Fafchamps)
- Thursday 25 October 2012 12:30-13:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle S18
- Housseima GUIGA
Pauvreté Persistante et Inégalité : Une Etude Comparative entre le Centre Est et le Centre Ouest de la Tunisie
- Thursday 11 October 2012 12:30-13:30
- Hector BELLIDO
Divorce Laws and Fertility Decisions - Abstract
This paper explores the effect of divorce law reforms on fertility. By modifying the value of marriage, the adoption of no-fault and unilateral divorce may impact fertility decisions. To identify the effects of those reforms on fertility, we use a quasi experiment exploiting the legislative history of divorce liberalization across Europe. Results suggest that divorce law reforms have a negative and permanent effect on fertility. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and controls for observed (such as the liberalization of abortion and the availability of the birth-control pill, among others) and unobserved country-specific factors, and time-varying factors at the country level.
Supplemental analysis, developed to understand the mechanisms through which divorce law reforms affect fertility, shows that both marital and out-of-wedlock fertility declines, but that the impact on marital fertility varies depending on whether couples are married prior to or after divorce law reform.
- Tuesday 26 June 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Margherita Comola
The Effect of Financial Access on Networks: Evidence from a field experiment in Nepal - Abstract
Using a field experiment that randomly gave access to a savings account to half of the households in 19 slums in Nepal, we study how this exogenous expansion in formal financial access affects the structure of the network of financial transactions. We use a unique panel dataset that contains detailed information on the network’s financial transactions before and after the intervention. While previous literature has mostly taken the network structure as exogenous, our paper attempts to shed light on the individuals strategic incentives to link formation.
- Tuesday 12 June 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Gaelle Ferrant
Welfare Comparisons, Economies of Scale and Equivalence Scale in Time Use - Abstract
(with Hélène Couprie)
This paper proposes a framework that allows identi_cation and estimation of economies of scale and indi_erence scales in time use. Indi_erence scales are de_ned on an individual basis following Browning, Chiappori, Lewbel (2010). Our framework allows to answer questions such as: how much time does a couple save by living together versus living apart? How much time would a single individual require to attain the same utility level she would attain living n a couple?? What percentage of time resources of a couple goes to each member? The empirical application to UK Time Use Survey (2000) suggests that two singles living apart need 8.57% free time more to achieve the same utility level as living in couple, about 3 hours more. Moreover, share of time is 0.42 meaning that 42% of the household time-resources is used by the wife. Finally, computations of indi_erence scales suggest that the woman requires 72% of joint time-resources to be as well when she lives alone and men 70%.
- Tuesday 29 May 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Emmanuelle Lavaine
Morbidity And Sulfur Dioxide: Evidence From French Strikes At Oil Refineries - Abstract
This paper examines the impact of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in France on health outcomes
at a census track level. To do so, we use recent strikes affecting oil refineries in
France, in October 2010, as a natural experiment. Our work offers several contributions.
We first show that a temporal shut down in the refining process leads to a reduction in
sulfur dioxide concentration. We then use this narrow time frame exogenous shock to
assess the impact of a change in air pollution concentration on respiratory outcomes.
Our estimates suggest that daily variation in SO2 air pollution has economically significant
health effects at levels below the current standard.
- Tuesday 15 May 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Nicolas Roux
Group Performance in a Signal Detection Task - Abstract
Signal detection experiments consist in observing the ability of subjects to tell which one of two visual stimuli is stronger. Visual perception is such that subjects receive noisy information at each trial so that there is room for collective benefits if subjects can share their private informations. Bahrami et al. (2010;2012) argue that the composition of groups affects their ability to reach collective benefits. Specifically, they present evidence that groups composed of heterogeneous individuals in terms of perceptive information precision are likely to be outperfomed by their best member, whereas homogeneous groups consistently reach collective benefits. We attempt to specify where the problem lies in a variation of their experiment. In a particular we are interested in checking whether we can find evidence that information sharing is impaired by group heterogeneity.
- Tuesday 3 April 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Julie Poirier
How to deal with protest bids and preference for the status quo in choice experiments? A cross-nested logit model approach to stated-preference choice data - Abstract
This paper is an extension of a previous work on water quality valuation. In the latter, the choice experiment method was used to estimate the value of water quality improvements at a river basin in France through the examination of local residents’ preferences for different management options. In order to take into account heterogeneity of preferences, we estimated a random parameters logit model. First we found positive willingness-to-pay for improvements in water quality. Second we observed that a significant proportion of respondents always chose the status quo scenario (which referred to the current management regime and was associated with a zero price) irrespective of the choice set she was presented. Status quo responses are considered as being zero bids and may be categorized into two types: true zero bids, where the respondent really places a zero value on the good, and protest bids, where the respondent states a zero willingness-to-pay even though her true value for the good is positive. We excluded protest bids from the analysis and re-estimated our random parameters logit model. Results showed that protest bids do affect the result. The goal of that paper is to take into account the peculiarity of protest bids when estimating the willingness-to-pay. Therefore a repeated cross-nested logit model is proposed, which takes into account the existence of two types of zero bids.
- Tuesday 20 March 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Théodora Dupont-Courtade
Insurance demand under ambiguity and conflict for extreme risks: Evidence from a large representative survey - Abstract
This paper investigates how the general public behaves when confronted
with low probability events and ambiguity in an insurance context. It
reports the results of a questionnaire completed by a large
representative sample of the French population that aims at separating
attitudes toward risk, imprecision and conflict and at determining if
there is a demand for ambiguous and extreme event risks. The data show
a strong distinction between two aspects of the problem: the decision
of purchasing insurance or not, and the willingness to pay for
insurance. In the decision to insure, results reveal that more than
25% of the respondents refuse to buy insurance and that people are
more willing to insure in a risky situation than in an ambiguous one.
This certain taste for risk also highlights a lack of confidence in
the insurance markets. In addition, this decision can be explained by
the respondents’ observable characteristics. When it comes to
willingness to pay, people exhibit ambiguity seeking behaviors. They
are willing to pay more under risk than under ambiguity (embracing
here imprecision and conflict), revealing that people consider
ambiguous situations as inferior. Furthermore, respondents behave
differently under imprecision and under conflict. They exhibit a
preference for consensual information and dislike conflicts. However,
the willingness to pay is poorly correlated with observable
characteristics.
- Tuesday 6 March 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Rawa Harati
Heterogeneity in the Egyptian informal market, choice or obligation? - Abstract
This paper provides historical and institutional arguments which can explain
the development of the Egyptian informal sector between 1998 and
2006.After recalling the various approaches proposed in the literature, it identifies
the configuration that overrides the Egyptian labor market by allowing
for the possibility of heterogeneity of informal jobs and therefore the existence
of different segments within the informal sector in 1998 and 2006 using
a mixture model. It concludes that an additional segment has been created in
the Egyptian informal economy between these two dates. Barriers to entry to
each sector exist. And an important virtual cost prevent people from working
in their optimal sector.
- Tuesday 7 February 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Clémence Berson
Does Competition Induce Hiring Equity? - Abstract
This paper tests the impact of competition on the hiring process in the
French retail sector. Using various local Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes, a
corresponding study ensures to observe how competition affects discrimination.
A strong discrimination is observable against second generation
immigrants and women are favored as cashiers. Results depend on the
target population: a preference for men appear when a low competition
allows it whereas discrimination due to origin is not sensitive to the level
of competition.
- Tuesday 24 January 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Hélène Huber
Approche expérimentale de la demande pour l’assurance et la mutuelle santé - Abstract
(avec Thibault GAJDOS, Sébastien MASSONI et Jean-Christophe VERGNAUD)
Sur le marché de la complémentaire santé facultative, la tendance aussi bien des mutuelles que des assureurs privés est de plus en plus de tarifer en fonction des risques individuels et la mutualisation entre individus dont les niveaux de risque sont différents tend à se réduire. Cette tendance à la segmentation du marché conduit à l’exclusion de certaines populations en raison de primes trop élevées et pose des problèmes d’équité. Nous proposons un cadre expérimental pour tester différentes politiques visant à limiter la segmentation du marché. Nous supposons que les individus sont sensibles aux questions d’équité et cette existence de “préférences sociales” explique la demande pour des assurances mutualistes, mais que cette sensibilité à l’équité est dépendante de framing. Nous constatons effectivement dans l’expérience pilote que la mutualisation est choisie par un nombre non négligeable de sujets alors qu’ils n’ont pas d’intérêt financier à le faire. Un framing les informant sur les transferts potentiels et réalisés lors de la mutualisation semble avoir des conséquences sur les décisions, suggérant l’existence de préoccupations de justice sociale.
- Tuesday 10 January 2012 12:30-13:30
- MSE (114), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Stéphane Gauthier
A Tradeoff between Stability and Efficiency - Abstract
(avec Gabriel Desgranges)
We consider a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand, quadratic cost and a
fixed aggregate number of production units. The distribution of production
units across firms is exogenous and arbitrary. For a given number of firms,
the consumer surplus evaluated at the equilibrium is maximal when each firm
controls the same number of production units. It increases in the number of
firms. We assess market stability by appealing to global dominance
solvability (uniqueness of rationalizable outcome) and the size of the set
of rationalizable aggregate productions and prices. Stability is favored by
a large asymmetry between firms and a low number of firms. The market
structure maximizing the surplus at a stable equilibrium is always
symmetric, it is either a competitive market or an oligopoly with few
competitors.
- Tuesday 6 December 2011 12:30-13:30
- ROOM CHANGE: MSE (S17), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Noémie Berlin
The reference group neglect: an experimental test. - Abstract
We run a real task experiment to study the effect of the so-called “reference group neglect” bias. The “reference group neglect” is defined as a tendency to under adjust to changes in the reference group one competes with. Our experimental design aims at understanding how participants update their beliefs after receiving a feedback informing them of whether their performance is below or above the median performance and how they choose whether to enter a competition against a participant
belonging to the same ability group, who thus received the same feedback as they did. Our first result is that, participants react too strongly to the feedback they received, implying a deviation from Bayesian beliefs. This effect is larger for women than for men. Namely, following a positive feedback, they tend to believe that their performance must really be among the top performances, while the reception of a negative feedback leaves them to believe that they belong to the group of the worst performers. As far as entry in the competition is concerned, low-performing participants adjust their entry decision to the level of the competition while high-performing participants do not. However, the behaviors leading to these results are quite different for men and women: women mainly react to the information on their own performance while men seem to respond more to their beliefs concerning the level of the competition they will be evolving in.
- Tuesday 22 November 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (114), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Isis Durmeyer
Public Policies and Consumer Preferences: Lessons from the French automobile Market - Abstract
(with Xavier D’Haultfoeuille and Philippe Février)
In this paper, we investigate whether French consumers have modified their preferences towards environmentally friendly vehicles between 2003 and 2008. We estimate a structural model of demand for automobiles incorporating both consumers’ heterogeneity and CO2 emissions of the vehicles, together with their other attributes. Our results shows that there has been a shift in preferences towards low emitting cars, with an average increase of 536€ of the willingness to pay for a reduction of 10 grams of carbon dioxide per kilometer. The shift in preferences accounts for 20% of the overall decrease in average CO2 emissions of new cars on the period, 34% being related to manufacturers effect and 46% to price effects. We also stress a large heterogeneity in the evolution of preferences between consumers, young and rich people evolving in particular more than the others. Finally, we relate these changes with two environmental policies which were introduced at these times, namely the obligation of indicating energy labels by the end of 2005 and a feebate based on CO2 emissions of new vehicles in 2008. Our results suggest that such policies may be efficient tools to shift consumers utility towards environmentally friendly goods.
- Tuesday 8 November 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (114), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Catherine Sofer
Stereotypes upon Abilities in Domestic Production and Household Behaviour - Abstract
The collective model assumes that decisions taken inside the family are Pareto optimal. However, empirical studies cast doubts upon the efficiency assumption, especially on the production side of household decision making. In this paper, we present a model of household behavior including stereotypes about the ability of men and women in the production of domestic goods. At the beginning of couple formation, we assume that the distribution of abilities in domestic production of men and women is the same, and that one couple’s member is chosen to make an investment in domestic production, which increases his/her productivity. Couples decide who will invest by maximizing the expected profit from domestic production, which depends on a signal and on the stereotype. Even though spouses aim at maximizing the household welfare, the resulting allocation is not Pareto efficient. This result leads to examine the role of public policies to restore the first best optimum, as well as equity.
- Tuesday 18 October 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (114), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Sébastien Massoni
Insurance, beliefs and affects: An Experimental Study - Abstract
While neuroscientists and psychiatrists have shown that emotions play a crucial role in decision making, the impact of emotions is not often studied in economics. What happens exactly when emotions interfere with decision making is the topic of this experiment. Classical economic decision theory postulates that decisions under uncertainty are driven by beliefs and utilities. That emotions distort both beliefs and utilities is a folk but trivial explanation: per definition in a revealed preference approach, different behaviors are linked to different revealed beliefs and utilities. Following recent neuroscience results that show that decision making processes are not unique, we postulate that emotional priming may alter differently the decision making processes. This experiment investigates how different decision making processes (signal detection task, confidence judgment, insurance decisions) are biased by affects induced by the context (gain/loss framing, feeling of ownership, feedback).
- Tuesday 4 October 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (114), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Nicolas Roux
Information Aggregation and Group Decision - Abstract
Common sense suggests that in decision problems under uncertainty groups make better decisions than individuals because they gather their members’ informations. A experimental literature in the field of social-psychology presents regularities on the way individual and group decisions compare that suggests otherwise. This paper is an attempt to see those regularities as a natural outcome of groups having more information than individuals.
- Tuesday 20 September 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (114), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Clémence Berson
Discrimination and Competition in the French Retail Sector - Abstract
Discrimination on the labor market and competition on the product market are closely related. Theoretically, a better competition induces a decrease of the impact of discrimination on labor outcomes. This paper uses exogeneous shocks of competition in the French retail sector over the last decades to study the variations in wage differentials between French and foreign workers, men and women.
- Tuesday 5 July 2011 12:30-13:30
- Alba Martinez
L’effet des pairs dans l’éducation en Colombie : évidence avec PISA 2006 - Abstract
Cette étude utilise les données obtenues par les étudiants colombiens lors des épreuves internationales PISA en 2006 afin de vérifier l’existence et la magnitude des effets des pairs sur la réussite scolaire. L’existence de l’effet des pairs peut se révéler importante dans la formulation de stratégies qui cherchent exploiter la diversité de la population d’étudiants à l’intérieur des classes afin de faire profiter aux étudiants avec un niveau académique bas du partage avec de condisciples avec un bon niveau. Face à la limitation des ressources économiques, ce type d’actions peut s’avérer plus praticables que la diminution des tailles de classe ou bien l’augmentation de la taille d’encadrement dans la recherche de l’amélioration de la qualité éducative. Profitant du niveau de détaille de l’enquête PISA pour Colombie on estime des régressions par quantiles, dans lequel on constate des effets positifs très importants pour tous les élèves du group dans le modèle dit « de base ». Cependant, une fois introduit des variables de contrôle relatives aux caractéristiques familiales et de l’école, l’effet réduit sa dimension devienne significatif uniquement pour la variable indiquant le niveau de « richesse » du ménage des condisciples. Les résultats suggèrent l’existence d’un effet de contexte très important et relatif uniquement au niveau socioéconomique des collègues de classe.
- Tuesday 21 June 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- François Gardes
Estimation of full equivalence scales, full income and price elasticities within Becker’s domestic production framework - Abstract
We propose in this article a new method to estimate price effects and full equivalence scales on micro cross-sectional data using full prices derived from a matching of a budget survey and a time use survey. This methods allows to use micro information and to compute price parameters for different sub-populations.
- Tuesday 7 June 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Laetitia Placido
Ambiguity and compound risk attitudes: an experiment - Abstract
(joint with Mohammed Abdellaoui and Peter Klibanoff)
The identification of compound risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes has recently received experimental support (Halevy, 2007) and been incorporated in decision models (Seo, 2009; Halevy & Ozdenoren, 2008; Segal, 1987). Non reduction of compound lotteries is this literature’s explanation of Ellsberg type behavior.
We conduct an experiment measuring individual behavior under simple risk, under compound risk and under ambiguity. We also examine how each of these behaviors changes as the probability (or size) of the winning event varies. Our data support a partial link between compound risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes, but not the equivalence between reduction of compound risk and ambiguity neutrality. We find that attitudes towards all three types of uncertainties move from seeking to aversion as the probability level increases. Notably, for most probability levels, subjects who reduce compound lotteries tend to exhibit non neutral attitudes toward ambiguity.
- Tuesday 24 May 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Catherine Doz
Prévision de court terme de la croissance du PIB français à l’aide de modèles à facteurs dynamiques - Abstract
Les modèles à facteurs sont de plus en plus utilisés pour la prévision de court terme du PIB par les banques centrales et les grands organismes internationaux. Ils semblent en revanche un peu moins utilisés en France. Cet article propose une application de ces techniques à la prévision du taux de croissance trimestriel du PIB français à très court terme. Nous utilisons une base constituée d’une centaine de variables parmi lesquelles des variables d’enquêtes, des indicateurs réels, des variables monétaires et financières et des indicateurs sur l’environnement international. Une évaluation hors échantillon montre que la qualité des prévisions issues des modèles à facteurs est satisfaisante, même si les prévisions restent fragiles lorsque l’horizon de prévision est éloigné.
- Tuesday 10 May 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Christiane Ehses-Friedrich
Expert communication to an informed decision maker - Abstract
In this model we study a game of strategic information transmission with
conflicting interests between a perfectly informed expert and a decision
maker who is partially informed. We assume that the decision maker’s
information is observable by the expert and analyse the effect of this
partial information on communication extending the Crawford-Sobel model.
There are two forces at work, the bias in preferences leads to less
information revelation, whereas the expert benefits ex ante if
the decision maker has finer information. Equilibria take the form of
partition equilibria as in Crawford-Sobel. We analyse how the decision
maker’s partial information in relation to the bias parameter
can increase information revelation. The expected welfare of the
decision maker and the expert compared to the uninformed case
increases independent of the decision maker’s information structure.
However, the structure that yields the maximum number of steps does not
necessarily maximise the expected welfare.
- Tuesday 26 April 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Charlotte Cabane
Sports Participation and Unemployment Duration: evidence from Germany - Abstract
In this study we use the German Socio-Economic Panel to evaluate the impact of leisure sports participation on unemployment duration. The empirical literature on sports participation has focused on labour market outcomes and job quality while the impact of this activity on job search has not been studied. However, sports participation fosters socialization which, through the networking effect, accelerates the exit from unemployment. Furthermore, sporty people send out positive signals on their health status and motivation, which also stimulates a quicker exit from unemployment. These hypotheses are tested by using a parametric proportional hazard model which allows for duration dependence. We measure the impact of sports participation taking into account the temporality with respect to the unemployment spell. We find a positive and significant impact on the exit rate and compare the results with the ones got by using other ways to socialize. If sports participation reduces unemployment duration it is mainly due to the networking effect and not specific to networks built through sports participation.
- Tuesday 12 April 2011 12:30-13:30
- Spring break - no seminar
- Tuesday 29 March 2011 12:30-13:30
- Job market talks - no seminar
- Tuesday 15 March 2011 12:30-13:30
- Job market talks - no seminar
- Tuesday 1 March 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Charlotte Cabane
Childhood Sporting Activities and Adult Labour-Market Outcomes - Abstract
(joint with Andrew Clark)
It is known that non-cognitive skills are an important determinant
of success in life. However, their returns are not simple to measure
and, as a result, only relatively few studies have dealt with this empirical
question. We consider sports participation while at school as
one way of improving or signalling the individual’s non-cognitive skills
endowment. We use four waves of Add Health data to see how sports
participation by schoolchildren translates into labour-market success.
We specifically test the hypotheses that participation in different types
of sports at school leads to, ceteris paribus, very different types of jobs
and labour-market insertion in general when adult. We take seriously
the issue of endogeneity of sporting activities in order to tease out
a causal relationship between childhood sporting activity and adult
labour market success.
- Tuesday 8 February 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Syeda Batool
The Establishment Size-Wage Premium: a reassessment of evidence for France - Abstract
Many empirical studies have shown a strong and positive relationship between
employer size and wages. But there has been less agreement on the reasons of
size-wage impact. Using ECMOSS 1992 survey conducted by French Ministry of
Labor, we re-estimate the relationship between establishment size and
individual hourly wage in order to extend the literature by examining the
magnitude and sources of the establishment size-wage premium in France. OLS
estimation with White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, selection
bias correction through Heckman two step estimation procedure and Decomposition
of wages is done for this paper. We found that establishments depending on size
have different attributes vis-à-vis same productive characteristics of workers.
Our OLS estimation shows the strong impact of compensation and pay practices
paid by large employers as we see a very clear difference between gross and
basic hourly wages. Results for the elasticity of gross hourly wage with
respect to size show that as we double the size, wage will increase by 2
percent. The affect is more important for males than to females. Results for
basic hourly wage show no impact of size on wages. Results across gender,
professions and type of industry show that the size wage impact is higher for
male, blue collar workers and in the manufacturing sector. Results for
selection bias correction and decomposition of wage differentials show that
selectivity considerations or non random sorting reduces the wage differentials
between large and small establishments.
- Tuesday 25 January 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Luke Haywood
Entrepreneurship versus Joblessness: Choice and Necessity of Self-employment - Abstract
The self-employed constitute a large proportion of the workforce in
developing countries. Recent large-scale household data have confirmed an
increase in self-employment in many developing countries - both in rural
but especially urban contexts. In the econonmic literature,
self-employment equals entrepreneurship, i.e. the establishment of a
business transforming capital and labour into output. However, in
developing countries self-employment is often the only solution for
individuals without a job or welfare assistance. An indication of this is
that many self-employed operate with little to no capital.
Just as welfare implications of unemployment depend on whether this state
is voluntary or involuntary, so also the increase in self-employment may
be desirable or not, depending on the factors causing increased
self-employment. This article attempts to shed some light on the factors
causing changing patterns of sectoral employment. A particular aim is to
distinguish between push and pull factors of self-employment.
We estimate a basic two-sector model of the labour market applied to panel
data from Ghana allowing for differential returns to observables and
sector-specific individual effects.
- Tuesday 11 January 2011 12:30-13:30
- MSE (115), 106 Bd de l’hopital, Paris 13
- Phillipe Gagnepain
Complex versus simple menus of contracts: What are the welfare gains? - Abstract
This study focuses on the contractual relationships between public authorities and operators. The new theory of regulation suggests that, in a situation of asymmetric information, the principal may propose the agent a complex menu of linear contracts in order to maximize social welfare. While this practice is well understood from a theoretical point of view, it is difficult to implement in practice; instead, simple binary menus are frequently used in reality. Recently, Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007) have suggested through a theoretical exercise that simple binary menus capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the full optimal menu (at least 75%). A first goal of our paper is to challenge these results empirically in the particular case of the local public sector. Our preliminary results are much more pessimistic than those obtained by these authors. Second, we investigate whether the major source of benefit in contract design comes either from better designing cost reimbursement rules or extending contract length. That is to say we compare the welfare gains obtained if a complex menu is implemented in place of a simple binary menu to the ones obtained if a principal can commit to the same contract over a long period of time. Preliminary results suggest that being able to design complex menus is what matters most.
- Tuesday 23 November 2010 12:30-13:30
- Jérome Lê
Les régressions sur double discontinuité - Abstract
Dans ce papier nous étudions les propriétés des régressions discontinues dans le cas de deux variables. Pour cela, nous illustrons notre propos à partir de la décision d’amniocentèse des femmes enceintes. Le remboursement de cet acte est offert selon deux critères : avoir plus de 38 ans et/ou un risque de trisomie 21 supérieur à 1/250. Nous montrons tout d’abord que la présence d’une double discontinuité permet de distinguer deux effets « contrefactuels ». Par exemple, au-delà du seuil de 1/250, les femmes enceintes sont considérées comme appartenant au groupe à risque. Le surcroit d’amniocentèses observé à ce seuil peut alors tout autant être dû à un effet de remboursement qu’à un effet de prescription. Pour identifier séparément ces deux effets nous proposons deux estimateurs basés sur des méthodes à noyaux. Nos résultats suggèrent que les aspects monétaires sont prépondérants, révélant ainsi une forte aversion à la trisomie 21. D’autre part, le dispositif de remboursement permet de recréer les conditions d’une expérience naturelle autour des seuils de discontinuité. Il est alors possible d’étudier l’impact de l’amniocentèse sur la santé du fœtus. Contrairement au cas unidimensionnel qui ne permet qu’une estimation très locale, nous montrons que le cas bidimensionnel permet d’obtenir une estimation sur une plus large partie du support.
- Tuesday 9 November 2010 12:30-13:30
- Dorian Beauchene
Patent Race in an ambiguous setting: When pessimism meets optimism - Abstract
The study of patent races is relevant to policy makers as key incentive to promote innovation. The literature adopts strong assumptions concerning uncertainty in the patent race research, restricting itself to unique probability distributions (in conformity with the Savage or Bayesian models). Using a one-shot patent race game, I show that allowing for multiple priors, in accordance with the MaxMin Expected Utility model, can yield to a richer set of equilibria. The model notably exhibits an equilibrium where firms invest against their own pessimistic belief. This result stems from the fact that, unlike in monopoly, ambiguity aversion means firms are both pessimistic (regarding their investment) and optimistic (regarding their competitor’s) when evaluating a project. In addition to the profit incentive and competitive threat effects observed in the patent race literature, the ambiguity model exhibits a belief relevance effect.
- Tuesday 19 October 2010 12:30-13:30
- Nicolas Jacquemet
General Xenophobia in the Labor Market: a correspondence test in Chicago - Abstract
We study the effects of xenophobia in the labor market by sending out fabricated resumes to help-wanted advertisements in Chicago newspapers. We use three groups of identical resumes: one with Anglo-Saxon names, one with African-American names, and one with fictitious foreign names whom ethnic origin is unidentifiable to most Americans. We find that resumes with Anglo-Saxon names generate nearly a third more call-backs than identical resumes with African-American or Foreign names. Resumes with exotic sounding names, whether the ethnic origin is clearly identified or not, elicit exactly the same callback rates. We take this as evidence that discrimination against specific groups is underlined by a general prejudice against members of the non-majority group – which we label general xenophobia. We also find that discrimination is significantly higher in the Chicago suburbs as opposed to the city proper.
- Tuesday 5 October 2010 12:30-13:30
- Thierry Yogo
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND JOB QUALITY IN CAMEROON - Abstract
This paper focuses on the effects of social capital (in the sense of informal network) on job quality. As social capital, two dimensions were valued, namely weak ties or friendly relations and strong ties or family relations. As regards to job quality, two aspects have been taken into consideration: the social protection, identified by the affiliation to the national social protection skim and job stability captured by the type of contract. On a methodological plan, the indicators of weak ties and strong ties are built on the basis of principal component analysis. In order to capture the job quality as the combination of these previous two aspects, we make use of Ordered Probit Model. At the end of this analysis, the major observation is that social capital has a negative effect on job quality in Cameroon. By distinguishing the effects related to weak ties against of those related to strong ties, we notice that as well the weak ties as the strong ties negatively influence job quality. The magnitude of the effects ranges between 0.009 for strong ties to 0.05 for weak ties.
- Tuesday 6 July 2010 12:30-13:30
- Gaelle Ferrant/Yannick Bourquin
Peer Effects in the Labor Supply in South Africa - Abstract
This paper empirically examines the role of social interaction with peer group in labor market participation in South Africa and tests the
hypothesis that there are peer effects in labor supply. We use two different empirical strategies to identify peer effects. In the first
one, we explicitly model fixed effects for various subgroups in the population and use aggregated variables as an instrument. In the
second one, we experiment with a procedure described in details by Bramoullé, Djebbari & Fortin (2009) which exploits non-linearities in peer effects as a source of identification. We show that both methods, although using completely different channels of identification, detect peer effects of a very similar magnitude.
- Tuesday 22 June 2010 12:30-13:30
- Guillaume Fréchette
Session-Effects in the Laboratory
Speaker’s homepage
Paper
- Abstract
In experimental economics, where subjects participate in different sessions,
observations across subjects of a given session might exhibit more correlation
than observations across subjects in different sessions. The problem of
session-effects is related to similar problems in many experimental and nonexperimental
fields. This paper attempts to clarify what the issues are and
proposes a set of practical tests to identify the problem as well as ways to test
for treatment effects in the presence of session-effects. Simulations are used
to assess how these tests perform given the relatively small samples typical of
experimental data sets.
- Tuesday 8 June 2010 12:30-13:30
- Clémence Berson
Oligopsony and discrimination on the labor market - Abstract
Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers’ segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers’ preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and the existence of discrimination allows a non-null profit for unprejudiced firms. Consequently, unprejudiced firms have no incentives to push out discriminatory firms. Moreover, the wage gap is more affected by unprejudiced firms’ spread out than by the number of prejudiced firms in the market.
- Tuesday 18 May 2010 12:30-13:30
- Phillipe Gagnepain
- Tuesday 11 May 2010 12:30-13:30
- Angelo Secchi
Financial Constraints and Firm Dynamics
- Tuesday 6 April 2010 12:30-13:30
- Denis-Gilles Claude
Regulation of Brown and Green Firms - Abstract
We consider a dynamic model of pollution control in which a benevolent social planner seeks to regulate a polluting industry that exhibits the following features. The industry consists of two firms that market differentiated products. Each firm sells one variant of the product and consumers perceive the two variants as both horizontally and vertically differentiated. The horizontal dimension of product differentiation stems from intrinsic characteristics and attributes of the products (color, size or brand, for example) that different consumers may value differently. By contrast, the vertical dimension relates to the environmental quality of the products.
The duopolistic industry is assumed to be responsible for the release of a pollutant that accumulates in the ambient environment causing present as well as long-run environmental damages. However the two products differ in their degree of environmental friendliness. Consumers are assumed to have perfect information about firms’ environmental performance and are willing to pay more for the cleaner product. Furthermore, they substitute away from the « dirty » good as the environmental problem becomes more severe; i.e., when the stock of pollution increases.
When the social planner implements the optimal corrective policy, such a shift in consumption patterns driven by the increase in the pollution stock becomes inconsistent and delusive. Indeed, consumers should recognize that the regulatory intervention solves the environmental problem and revise their preferences accordingly. In this paper, we consider a situation in which this revision does not occur. We characterize the optimal tax policy that decentralizes the social optimum as a Feedback Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game depending on whether or not the social planner corrects consumers preferences when evaluating consumers’ surplus.
- Tuesday 30 March 2010 12:30-13:30
- Séminaire de recrutement
- Tuesday 16 March 2010 12:30-13:30
- Séminaire de recrutement
- Wednesday 10 March 2010 12:30-13:30
- Antoine Terracol
Can reduced activity be a stepping stone for the unemployed
!! Room change: S17 - Abstract
This article evaluates the effectiveness of subsidized temporary jobs as stepping stones to regular employment. We study a French program (Activité Réduite}) that allows job seekers to work part-time while remaining registered with the unemployment agency. Under this program, insured individuals are allowed to concurrently receive part of their unemployment benefits and wage income. Using an administrative data set, we fit a multivariate duration model correcting for the endogenous nature of the time to treatment and the time in treatment. We find that subsidized temporary jobs have both a significant lock-in effect and a significant positive post-treatment impact on the hazard rate to employment. Since individuals facing a high implicit tax rate have incentives to self-select into better part-time jobs, we also find that a higher tax rate leads to a weaker lock-in effect and a stronger post-treatment effect. Simulations suggest that the lock-in effect first dominates, but that the overall effect eventually becomes positive. They also point to ways of improving the effectiveness of the policy.
- Tuesday 2 March 2010 12:30-13:30
- Adam Zylbersztejn
Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving informations - Abstract
Strategic interaction involves beliefs about opponents likely behavior. This paper focuses on subjects perception about other’s rationality, and how to enhance its accuracy. We rely on a sequential one-shot coordination game introduced by Rosenthal (1981), in which coordination on the Pareto dominant outcome fails due to subjects’ reluctance to rely on the rationality of others. We introduce three information-improving features in the genuine setup. The baseline involves simple repetition of the game; the first treatment implements one-way pre-play communication; the second one provides historical information on partner’s past decisions. We find strong evidence that any additional information increases the odds of achieving efficiency. Cheap talk appears as rather « light » information that only work as a learning booster. It is outperformed by the « hard’» information transmitted through actual past decisions. At the individual level, we account for considerable gender differences in both the level of reliance and the pattern of learning.
- Tuesday 16 February 2010 12:30-13:30
- Séminaire de recrutement
- Tuesday 2 February 2010 12:30-13:30
- Francesco Avvisati
Errors & Lies about Educational Attainment - Abstract
Using a French employer-employee data set, I document large
misclassi cation errors in both employer reports and self-reports of
workers’ educational attainment. I present a model for the
data-generating process under which the precision of each report is
identi ed; estimates of this
model indicate that employer reports are correct for only about 84% of
the sample; while self-reports are accurate for 94% of observations.
Using the same model to test whether wages are related to employers’
mistakes, I find that overstatements of worker education pay a
positive wage-premium, whereas under-statements are not linked to
signi cant differences in wages.
- Tuesday 26 January 2010 12:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle S18
- Jean-Phillipe TROPEANO
Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control (with A. Cosnita)
- Tuesday 19 January 2010 12:30-13:30
- Luke Haywood
Too rich to do the dirty work? Wealth in quality job search - Abstract
Can money buy you a better quality job? The common answer to
this question focuses on wage di-erentials and attempts to identify the
marginal willingness to pay for speci-c job attributes. However, assets
and unearned income can be expected to also play an important role
in job choice.
In a job search framework where information about vacancies is
limited (individuals receive job o-ers and must decide immediately to
take or reject them), preferences for job characteristics (both monetary
and non-monetary) will be expressed in di-ering job durations: as is
well-known, turnover is higher where job quality is worse. Data on
job duration can thus be used to identify workers’ marginal willingness
to pay for job characteristics. What impact do di-ering wealth-levels
have in this framework?
In analyses of the labour market focusing on monetary rewards to
work, wealth typically reduces participation rates. In job search mod-
els the marginal bene-t of search diminishes as the marginal utility
of income associated with a job decreases - job search becomes less
intensive (or, with exogenous job arrivals, the reservation wage rises).
Higher wealth levels in a framework where jobs have a qualitative (non-
monetary) component might augment the demand for non-monetary
job characteristics. This would translate to a di-erential impact of job
quality on turnover rates depending on the level of wealth.
Using panel data including information on di-erent types of wealth,
wages and (subjective) working conditions, this article -rst looks at the impact of windfalls (lottery wins, inheritance...) on job durations in
jobs of di-ering quality. The impact of changes in wealth on the de-
mand for job characteristics can be reconstructed.
Second, a very preliminary model allowing for wealth accumulation
in the labour market is sketched. The implications of allowing workers
to save part of their earnings on job search and choice are considered.
- Tuesday 5 January 2010 12:30-14:00
- Pierre Fleckinger
The Incentive Value of Deadlines - Abstract
We study the problem of dynamic incentives provision in a discrete-time Principal-Agent setting. The agent should complete one single project over an infinite time horizon. To control the stream of effort, the principal has to balance incentives over time, since future bonuses crowd out today’s motivation. As a consequence, while the first-best effort stream is stationary and unbounded, the optimal deterministic contract entails a bounded quantity of effort : even though the horizon is infinite, incentive provision terminates in finite time. Various extensions and comparative statics are studied.
- Tuesday 1 December 2009 12:30-14:00
- Milo Bianchi
Credit, Risk, and Entrepreneurial Choices: Evidence from Rural Mexico - Abstract
We explore the effects of randomly assigned cash transfers on occupational choices in rural Mexico. We report three main findings. First, the treatment significantly increases the probability to become entrepreneur. Second, those who become entrepreneurs due to the treatment are likely to work more, concentrate into one occupation and earn more. Third, occupational choices do not depend on the size of current transfers (above some minimal level), but they are significantly affected by the amount of future transfers. In light of this evidence, we discuss the role of credit and especially insurance constraints in shaping occupational choices.
- Tuesday 17 November 2009 12:30-13:30
- Jean-Marc Tallon
Ambiguity and the historical equity premium - Abstract
The paper seeks to estimate the impact of ambiguity and agents’ sensitivity to ambiguity on the historically observed equity premium. We consider a Lucas-tree pure-exchange economy. We introduce two key non-standard assumptions in this standard setting: the representative agent’s beliefs about the dividend/consumption process is ambiguous and two, the agent’s preferences are sensitive to this ambiguity (in the sense of the “smooth ambiguity aversion” model). We calibrate the agent’s belief by assuming that the economy evolves according to a hidden state model. We consider a range of parametric levels of ambiguity aversion plausible in the sense of being well within the range of observed behavior in laboratory experiments on ambiguity aversion. Putting this together with the ambiguity that is consistent with the historical growth path, we arrive at estimates of the contribution of ambiguity to the observed equity premium.
- Tuesday 20 October 2009 12:30-13:30
- Chantal Marlats
Reputation In Stochastic Games with two Long Lived Players - Abstract
This paper analyses reputation effects in stochastic games when players are
long-lived. In comparison to repeated games (i.e. stochastic game with an
unique state), out equilibrium beliefs introduce an additional difficulty
that may prevent a player to successfully establish a reputation: the
uniformed player may persistently not play his best response against the
stackelberg strategy because he wants to prevent the play to reach states in
which he believes that his opponent will inflict him very low payoffs. We
show that under one of the following restrictions, (1) independence of the
support of the law motion to uniformed player’s actions and (2) state
invariance of his asymptotic minmax payoffs, the informed player can
guarantee almost the highest payoff consistent with his control over the law
motion and his opponent’s rationality, in all the equilibria. We apply this
result to a repeated hold up game in which a seller and a buyer face an
ex-ante non contractible investment decision. The underlying stochastic game
satisfies our conditions for reputation effects only when the seller is the
informed player. In that case the socially efficient investment arises in
finite time (almost surely) in all the equilibria. When the buyer is
uncertain about the seller’s type, then there is an equilibrium in which the
seller underinvests.
- Tuesday 23 June 2009 12:30-13:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle/room 6°
- Anna Akatenko
Are Paul, Louise, Karim and Fatma all alike? Cultural and Economic Segregation based on First Names
- Tuesday 9 June 2009 12:30-13:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle/room 6°
- Irène Selwaness
Older Workers Employment in Egypt: A Multivariate Probit Analysis
- Tuesday 26 May 2009 13:00-14:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle/room 114
- Gianluca Violante
How Much Insurance in Bewley Models?
- Tuesday 12 May 2009 12:00-13:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle du 6°
- Pierre FLECKINGER, Université Paris 1, CES
Collective reputation and market structure
- Tuesday 28 April 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 6e
- Hélène Huber, Université Paris 1, CES
L’accès aux soins des populations immigrées et des minorités : l’exemple américain.
- Tuesday 31 March 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- ANNULE
TBA
- Tuesday 17 March 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Benjamin Remy Holcblat
TBA
- Tuesday 24 February 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Clémence Berson, Université Paris 1, CES
Is There More Discrimination in the Public Sector Than in the Private Sector ? The Case of Second Generation Migrants in France
- Friday 6 February 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- David Margolis, Université Paris 1, CES
The Structure of Unemployment Compensation, Labor Market Signaling and Informal Sector Work
- Friday 30 January 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Université Paris 1, CES
Does team competition eliminate the gender gap in entry in competitive environments?
- Friday 23 January 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Séminaire de Recrutement EEP : Sophie Bade
Stochastic Independence with Maxmin Expected Utilities - Abstract
- Friday 9 January 2009 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- ATTENTION - Salle 115
- Moshik Lavie
Match me, if you can: wage secrecy & matching in a search model
- Friday 5 December 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Marie-Anne Valfort, Université Paris 1, CES
Ethnic diversity, trust and voting behaviour: experimental evidence from Benin
- Friday 21 November 2008 13:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Mohamad Khaled, Université Paris 1, CES
Distributional dynamics using quartic-based state-space models
- Friday 7 November 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Josselin Thuilliez
L’impact du paludisme sur la scolarité au Mali
- Friday 24 October 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Natalia Kyui
Return to Education and Education-Occupation Matching within a Transition Economy. Empirical Analysis for the Russian Federation
- Friday 10 October 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Anna Okatenko
Job Search with Bayes Priors
- Wednesday 2 July 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 114
- Marie-Aude Laguna
boursiers: l’analyse des catastrophes chimiques
- Wednesday 18 June 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- ATTENTION - Salle 115
- Adam Rosen
Identification with Imperfect Instruments
- Wednesday 4 June 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- ATTENTION - Salle 115
- Elisabeth Cudeville, Université Paris 1, CES
Conjugal Contract, Gender Wage Discrimination and Social Norms
- Wednesday 21 May 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- ATTENTION - Salle 115
- Antoine Terracol
Can reduced activity be a stepping stone for the unemployed?
- Wednesday 7 May 2008 12:30-14:00
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- ATTENTION - Salle 115
- Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Université Paris 1, CES
Monetary Incentives to Learn Calibration: a Gender-Dependent Impact