Seminars

Regulation and Environment Seminar

The Regulation and Environment Seminar is a moment dedicated to presenting and discussing external and internal research in Industrial Organization and in Environmental Economics at PSE. Twice every month there is an invited seminar where guests present their latest research both in Industrial Organization and in Environmental Economics. The rest of the slots are allocated to PSE faculty and students to present and discuss ongoing research or papers.
The seminar takes place on Mondays from 12:00 to 14:00 in room 10 at Campus Jourdan, unless noted otherwise.
The seminar is financed by Paris School of Economics and University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.
Organizers: Katrin Millock (internal), Hélène Ollivier (Environment), Katheline Schubert (Environment) and Angelo Secchi (Regula

Upcoming events

Monday 23 October 2017 12:00-13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WILLIAMS III Roberton (University of Maryland) : Unemployment and Environmental Regulation in General Equilibrium
Abstract
This presentation will cover two closely related papers. The first paper analyzes the effects of environmental policy on employment (and unemployment) using a new general-equilibrium two-sector search model. We find that imposing a pollution tax causes substantial reductions in employment in the regulated (polluting) industry, but this is offset by increased employment in the unregulated (nonpolluting) sector. Thus the policy causes a substantial shift in employment between industries, but the net effect on overall employment (and unemployment) is small, even in the short run. An environmental performance standard causes a substantially smaller sectoral shift in employment than the emissions tax, with roughly similar net effects. The effects on the unregulated industry suggest that empirical studies of environmental regulation that focus only on regulated firms can be misleading (and those that use nonregulated firms as controls for regulated firms will be even more misleading). This paper’s results also suggest that overall effects on employment are not a major issue for environmental policy, and that policymakers who want to minimize sectoral shifts in employment might prefer performance standards over environmental taxes.
Monday 6 November 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BOURGEON Jean-Marc : *
Monday 13 November 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CASSI Lorenzo : *
Monday 20 November 2017 12:00-13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DUSO Tomaso (DIW (Berlin) ) : *
Monday 4 December 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SCHUMACHER Ingmar : *
Monday 8 January 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 15 January 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 22 January 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LEGROS Patrick : *
Monday 29 January 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 5 February 2018
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 12 February 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 19 February 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CREPIN Anne-Sophie : *
Monday 5 March 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 12 March 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TAYLOR Alan (UC Davis) : *
Monday 19 March 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 26 March 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Sara (M.I.T / CESifo) : *
Monday 9 April 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 16 April 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TRAEGER Christian : *
Monday 14 May 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*
Monday 4 June 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JESSOE Katrina : *
Monday 11 June 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WAGNER Ulrich : *
Monday 18 June 2018 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
*

Archives

Monday 16 October 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHEN Zhijun (Monash University) : Competitive Personalized Pricing with Sophisticated Consumers
Chongwoo Choe, Monash University
Abstract
Abstract Personalized pricing, a limiting case of price discrimination as the number of targeted consumer segments increases, becomes increasingly common due to the availability of vast amount of individual-level data. This paper studies personalized pricing in a Hotelling setting when each firm has a given target segment and consumers can be sophisticated. Sophisticated consumers can overcome the hurdles for price discrimination and have access to the price offered to non-targeted consumers, which naive consumers cannot. When all consumers are naive, personalized pricing leads to intense competition and total industry profit lower than that under the Hotelling equilibrium. But market is always fully covered. Sophisticated consumers raise the firm's cost of serving non-targeted consumers, hence discourage firms from poaching the rival's targeted customers. This softens competition. When firms have sufficiently large and non-overlapping target segments, consumer sophistication allows firms to extract full surplus from their targeted customers through perfect price discrimination. Consumers are strictly worse-off under competitive personalized pricing, a result in contrast to the common view in the literature. With sophisticated consumers, firms also choose not to serve the entire market when the commonly non-targeted market segment is small. Thus consumer sophistication can lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the use of customer data by firms. Key words: Personalized pricing, consumer sophistication, customer targeting, privacy JEL Classification: D43, D8, L13, L5
Full text [pdf]
Monday 2 October 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FLECKINGER Pierre (Ecole des Mines - PSE) : The Incentive properties of collective reputation
FABRE Adrien (PSE) : French favored redistribution derived from surveys: A political assessment of optimal tax theory
Wanda Mimra, ETH Zürich, and Angelo Zago, University of Verona
Monday 25 September 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LISKI Matti (Aalto University) : Carbon leakage: a mechanism design approach
co-author: Lassi Ahlvik (NHH, Bergen)
Full text [pdf]
Monday 18 September 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TOEWS Gerhard (Oxcarré, Oxford University) : Resource discoveries and FDI bonanzas: An illustration from Mozambique
MAVI Can Askan (Univ. Paris I - PSE) : What can abrupt events tell us about sustainability ?
Pierre-Louis Vézina, King's College London
Full text [pdf]
Tuesday 13 June 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DAVIS Lucas (Haas Business School, UC Berkeley) : Do Energy Eciency Investments Deliver at the Right Time?
Judson Boomhower
Abstract
Abstract Electricity cannot be cost-eectively stored even for short periods of time. Consequently, wholesale electricity prices vary widely across hours of the day with peak prices frequently exceeding o-peak prices by a factor of ten or more. Most analyses of energy-eciency policies ignore this variation, focusing on total energy savings without regard to when those savings occur. In this paper we demonstrate the impor- tance of this distinction using novel evidence from a rebate program for air conditioners in Southern California. We estimate electricity savings using previously unavailable hourly \smart-meter data and show that savings tend to occur during hours when the value of electricity is high. This signicantly increases the overall value of the program, especially once we account for the large capacity payments received by generators to guarantee their availability in high-demand hours. We then com- pare this estimated savings prole with engineering-based estimates for this program as well as a variety of alternative energy-eciency invest- ments. The results illustrate a surprisingly large amount of variation in economic value across investments.
Full text [pdf]
Monday 29 May 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GAVAZZA Alessandro (London School of Economics) : *
Monday 22 May 2017 09:00-13:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 paris
Journée interne du groupe Régulation et Environnement
Monday 15 May 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BERTHOD Mathias (PSE, Paris I) : A bargaining agreement between non-renewable resource producers: stability versus asymmetry
MAYOL Alexandre (PSE, Paris I) : Tarifs discriminants et monopoles de l'eau potable: Analyse économique des tarifs progressifs dans l'eau potable française à partir d'une expérience naturelle
Abstract
Within a linear quadratic differential game framework with economic depletion inspired by Salo and Tahvonen (2001), we use recent results of Reddy and Engwerda (2013) to characterize a Pareto optimal bargaining agreement between two non-renewable resource producers. The main result is that incentive to cartelize will depend on the symmetry of the producers. In contrast to Salo and Tahvonen, we find that the concentration in supply could then increase over time while countries have more and more interest to bargain.
Monday 24 April 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TOEWS Gerhard (Oxcarré, Oxford University) : Creative Destruction vs Destructive Destruction: A Schumpeterian Approach for Environmental Policy
ALTAGHLIBI Moutaz (PSE, Paris I, Dynamic Border Carbon Adjustment to Enhance Green Growth) : Dynamic Border Carbon Adjustment to Enhance Green Growth
Abstract
This article aims to show how a market exposed to catastrophic events finds the equilibrium level of adaptation and mitigation policies through R&D policy, with respect to different levels of Poisson probability of catastrophe. We study the effect of a pollution tax on the long-run growth rate and the implications of catastrophe probability on this effect. Our results suggest that the economy increases its R&D level with a higher catastrophe probability only if the penalty rate due to an abrupt event is sufficiently high. We also show that a pollution tax could increase the long-run growth. Besides, the catastrophe probability increases the amplitude of this positive effect if penalty rate is high enough. The market makes adaptation much more than mitigation with a higher catastrophe probability if total productivity of R&D is higher than cleanliness of innovations for intermediate goods. Lastly, we show that pollution growth could be higher with less polluting inputs, which we call a Jevons-type paradox. Abstract : This paper analyzes the growth and welfare impacts of Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA) across trading countries. I build a trade model with monopolistic competition and dynamic investment decisions using Ramsey growth model. The government in each country can invest either in green nonpolluting or in brown polluting capital. I solve numerically for an open loop Nash equilibrium to study different configurations of BCAs across countries. I find that a unilateral BCA is welfare enhancing for the country that applies it and an effective tool to shift the growth of the other country towards greener path even when countries are not concerned about the environment. In a case of a BCA war, results show that a bilateral BCA becomes welfare enhancing for both countries if governments care sufficiently about the environmental quality of their consumers. Moreover, the asymmetry in initial development levels across countries induces a slower growth for the initially poorer country only if the other country is richer in brown capital. Furthermore, the model shows that trade openness should be done gradually along the development path of countries.
Monday 27 March 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PLANTINGA Andrew (Bren School of Environmental Science and Management - UC Santa Barbara) : Salience and the Government Provision of Public Goods
Matthew Wibbenmeyer et Sarah Anderson
Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of salience for the government provision of public goods. Salience is a common behavioral bias whereby people's attention is drawn to salient features of a decision problem, leading them to overweight prominent information in subsequent judgments. We analyze the case in which the public's demand for the good is distorted by salient events, and explore how salience influences public good allocation and efficiency. Theoretical predictions regarding public good allocation are ambiguous and depend on the magnitude of the change in payoffs and the extent of salience effects. We test whether salience increases or decreases allocation of government projects to reduce wildfire severity near wildland-adjacent communities. Even though the occurrence of a wildfire likely reduces the severity of future fires in the same area, it may increase the likelihood that fuels management projects are placed nearby if wildfire events strongly increase the salience of losses under future fires. We find strong evidence that the salience eects increase the likelihood of fuels management projects, and use robustness checks to eliminate competing explanations for our results. Our salience framework may also offer insights into government responses to terrorism, natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and environmental catastrophes.
Tuesday 21 March 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ITO Koichiro (University of Chicago) : Information Frictions, Inertia, and Selection on Elasticity: A Field Experiment on Electricity Tariff Choice
Monday 13 March 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle R2-20, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GAUTHIER Stéphane : Profit taxation and production efficiency
BEZIN Emeline
Guy Laroque (Sciences-Po, University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies)
Abstract
Stéphane Gauthier: Profit taxation and production efficiency. Ecrit avec Guy Laroque (Sciences-Po, University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies). Emeline Bezin: An economic theory of green consumer culture and sustainable technological change
Monday 6 March 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle 8, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ARMSTRONG Mark (University of Oxford) : Ordered Consumer Search
Full text [pdf]
Monday 27 February 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle 8, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JULLIEN Bruno (Toulouse School of Economics) : Privacy Protection
Yassine Lefouili et Michael Riordan
Abstract
We study the incentives of a website to sell its customers? personal information. Third parties buying that information can either benefi?t or harm consumers, who learn about their vulnerability to unwanted intrusions through experience. The cost to the website of selling the information is the risk that bad experience may cause consumers to end their relationship with the website. The measures adopted by the website to mitigate that cost are neither contractible nor discernible by consumers. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, the website has incentives to be cautious about selling information or spend resources to screen third parties. We characterize the equilibrium privacy policy of the website and its welfare properties, and discuss the difficulty of welfare-improving regulations.
Monday 20 February 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle 8, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SECCHI Angelo (PSE - Université Paris 1) : Volatility of growth: size matters
CHABROST Marion
Abstract
SECCHI Angelo: Volatility of growth: size matters. CHABROST Marion: “Get what you pay for” - The story underneath remunicipalization in the water sector. Co-écrit avec Stéphane Saussier et Simon Porcher.
Monday 30 January 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle 8, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PITTEL Karen (IFO, Münich) : Thinking Local but Acting Global? The Interplay Between Local and Global Internalization of Externalities
Abstract
The paper analyzes the long-run development of local and global pollution when two types of abatement activities can be undertaken. One type reduces solely local pollution (e.g., use of particulate matter filters) while the other mitigates global pollution as well (e.g., application of fuel saving technologies). In the framework of a 2-country endogenous growth model, the implications of different degrees to which global externality is internalized are analyzed. We focus especially on local and global pollution levels and the effects on growth in both countries. Furthermore we derive implications for optimal policies in the different scenarios.
Monday 23 January 2017 12:00-14:00
Salle 10, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CANTILLON Estelle (Université de Bruxelles) : Price formation in the European carbon market: The role of firm participation and risk management practices
Aurélie Slechten, Lancaster Business School
Abstract
A key argument in favor of emissions markets (relative to command-and-control types of regulation) is their ability to aggregate dispersed information about abatement costs and emissions and generate price signals to guide firms' trading and abatement decisions. We exploit trading data from the first phase of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) to assess the extent to which this market was indeed able to deliver such price signals. We know who traded, when, with whom, on which platform if any, and at what price. Participation was partial, trading patterns differed across categories of market participants and the market was fragmented. We build a model of trading and information aggregation that integrates the salient features of the market and use it to explore their impact on the price formation process. Risk management practices and partial participation help account for some of the price anomalies that have been identified in the past on the basis of the analysis of price time series only.
Monday 16 January 2017 12:30-14:00
MARTIMORT David (PSE) : *
TOULEMON Léa
Abstract
David MARTIMORT: Towards a Theory of the Precautionary Principle, joint with Louise Guillouet (Columbia) -- Lea TOULEMON: Regional Purchasing Groups and Hospital Medicine Prices: Evidence from Group Creations
Monday 5 December 2016 12:30-14:00
DI FALCO Salvatore (Université de Genève) : Mother of Invention: the Emergence of the Reluctant Entrepreneur in Rural Ethiopia
Monday 28 November 2016 12:30-14:00
VARIAN Hal (Google, Berkeley) : Use and Abuse of Network Effects
Abstract
The term ``network effects'' has a clear meaning in the context of economic models, but it is sometimes confused with other concepts like increasing returns to scale and learning-by-doing. This essay is an attempt to clear up some of this confusion.
Monday 21 November 2016 12:30-14:00
HERRERA ARAUJO Daniel (PSE) : Multiproduct retailing and buyer power: The effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior
HENRIET Fanny (PSE) : A Decomposition of Fuel Taxes
Jorge Florez, Universidad del Rosario / Stéphane Gauthier
Abstract
Daniel Herrera Araujo : Multiproduct retailing and buyer power: The effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior (joint with Jorge Florez, Universidad del Rosario) Fanny Henriet: A Decomposition of Fuel Taxes (joint with Stéphane Gauthier)
Monday 14 November 2016 12:30-14:00
LAURENT-LUCCHETTI Jérémy (Université de Genève) : Property Rights and Land Disputes: Theory and Evidence from Ethiopia
Salvatore Di Falco, Marcella Veronesi et Gunnar Kohlin
Full text [pdf]
Monday 7 November 2016 12:30-14:00
LINNEMER Laurent (CREST) : Partial Exclusivity
Philippe Choné et Thibaud Vergé
Monday 17 October 2016 12:30-14:00
CHIROLEU-ASSOULINE Mireille (Université Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) : *
MARCHI-ADANI Riccardo (University of Verona) :
Paola Valbonesi
Abstract
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline: Merchants of Doubt: Corporate Political Influence when Expert Credibility is Uncertain
Riccardo Marchi-Adani: Favoritism in scoring rule auctions:an empirical investigation on Italian public procurement for canteens
Full text [pdf]
Monday 10 October 2016 12:30-14:00
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment G, rez-de-chaussée, salle 10
DECHEZLEPRETRE Antoine (Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics) : Do Pollution Offsets Offset Pollution? Evidence from the Clean Development Mechanism in India
Abstract
We provide the first large-scale empirical evaluation of the additionality of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, the largest carbon emissions offset mechanism in the world, based on the universe of wind power projects implemented in India during the period 1993-2013. We deal with the self-selection of project developers into the CDM by comparing CDM projects with non-CDM projects, which are by definition not additional. We find strong evidence that the majority of CDM projects are not additional, suggesting that a large share of CDM carbon credits does not represent real emission reductions. Furthermore, the more profitable projects are, the more likely they are to receive carbon credits. Hence, the CDM is doing the opposite of its objective function, i.e. supporting projects that would have existed anyway rather than inframarginal projects.
Monday 3 October 2016 12:30-14:00
BELLEFLAMME Paul (Université catholique de Louvain) : Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Lucky Break or Double Jeopardy
Eric Toulemonde
Full text [pdf]
Monday 19 September 2016 12:00-14:00
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment G, rez-de-chaussée, salle 10
NUNEZ ROCHA Thais (Université Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics) : Legislation versus Treaties: the effect on environmental outcomes in an open economy and On the Pro-Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers in Two-Sided Markets
POUYET Jérôme (CNRS – PSE)
Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso