Giacomo Weber

Doctorant

Site internet
  • Paris School of Economics, EHESS
Groupes de recherche
THÈMES DE RECHERCHE
  • Contrats et Mechanism Design
  • Rationalité limitée
  • Théorie des jeux
Contact

Adresse :48, boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Campus : Campus Jourdan
Bâtiment : R Étage : 2
Bureau : 17
Titre de la thèse :
Bounded rationality and the Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium
  • Directeur de thèse : Philippe Jehiel
  • Année académique d’inscription : 2019/2020
Déclaration d’intérêt

Publications HAL

  • Forthcoming : Endogenous clustering and analogy-based expectation equilibrium Article dans une revue

    Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behavior of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions minimize the prediction errors given the strategies. We distinguish between environments with self-repelling analogy partitions in which some mixing over partitions is required and environments with self-attractive partitions in which several analogy partitions can arise, thereby suggesting new channels of belief heterogeneity and equilibrium multiplicity. Various economic applications are discussed.
    Revue : Review of Economic Studies

    Publié en

  • Calibrated Clustering and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Pré-publication, Document de travail

    Families of normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes applying the K-means clustering technique to the data generated by the distributions of opponent’s behavior. This results in Calibrated Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions are derived from the strategies by the K-means clustering algorithm. We discuss various concepts formalizing this, and observe that distributions over analogy partitions are sometimes required to guarantee existence. Applications to games with linear best-responses are discussed highlighting the differences between strategic complements and strategic substitutes.

    Publié en

Toutes les publications

Onglets

My CV can be found here.