La science économique au service de la société

[12-13 juillet] Workshop “Advances in Mechanism Design”

Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”

July 12–13, 2012
Paris School of Economics
48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France

Organizer : Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics – CNRS)
If you wish to attend, please send a mail to lelievre chez pse.ens.fr
before June 22. Please specify if you would like to attend the lunch on
July, 12 and July, 13 (subject to limitation)


Thursday, July 12
10:00 - 10:45 : Tilman Borgers (Michigan U) : “Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules”
10:45 - 11:30 : Takuro Yamashita (TSE) : “A robustly revenue maximizing auction in admissible strategies”
11:45 - 12:30 : Andy Postlewaite (U Penn) : “Matching with Incomplete Information”
14:00 - 14:45 : Onur Kesten (Carnergie Mellon U) : “From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance : Theory and Experiments on a family of assignment mechanisms”
14:45 - 15:30 : Fuhito Kojima (Stanford) : “Promoting School Competition Through School Choice : A Market Design Approach”
16:00 - 16:45 : Lucie Ménager (Paris 2) : “Communication in procurement”
16:45 - 17:30 : Laurent Lamy (PSE) : “Equilibria in two-stage sequential second-price auctions with multi-unit demands”

Friday, July 13
09:15 - 10:00 : Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore) : “Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction”
10:00 - 10:45 : Alia Gizatulina (Max Planck Institute — Bonn) : “On Designer’ Uncertainty and Robustness of the BDP Property”
11:00 - 11:45 : Guillaume Haeringer (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) : “Two-Sided Matching with One-Sided Preferences”
11:45 - 12:30 : Nicole Immorlica (Northwestern) : “On the Limits of Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design”