16-17 décembre : Workshop on Information Transmission and Persuasion in Games
Workshop on Information Transmission and Persuasion in Games
December 16-17, 2010
Paris School of Economics
48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Site du workshop : http://sites.google.com/site/workshopsit2010/
Thursday, December 16
09:30 - 10:30 : Françoise Forges (University of Paris Dauphine) : Communication in Bayesian games : Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory
11:00 - 11:45 : Lucie Menager (University of Lille 1, LEM and EQUIPPE) : Strategic communication with exponential bandits
11:45 - 12:30 : Nicolas Vieille (HEC Paris) : Dynamic sender-receiver games
14:00 - 14:45 : Elisabeth Schulte (University of Mannheim) : Informativeness of testing procedures with endogenous participation : The binary case
14:45 - 15:30 : Navin Kartik (Colombia University) : Pandering to persuade
16:00 - 16:45 : David Martimort (PSE) : How much discretion for risk regulation ?
16:45 - 17:30 : Jérôme Mathis (TSE and University of Paris 8) : Deliberation with hard information
Friday, December 17
09:30 - 10:30 : Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego) : Giving and receiving advice
11:00 - 11:45 : Sidartha Gordon (University of Montreal) : Strategic advice on a timing decision
11:45 - 12:30 : Regis Renault (University of Cergy-Pontoise) : When does a firm disclose product information ?
14:00 - 14:45 : Penélope Hernandez (University of Valencia) : Good Nash codes
14:45 - 15:30 : Ludovic Renou (University of Leicester) : Secure transmission of messages on directed networks
16:00 - 16:45 : Ricardo Alonso (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California) : Indispensable experts
16:45 - 17:30 : Wolf Gick (Georgia Institute of Technology and Harvard University) : Cheap talk equilibria with two senders in one dimension
Organizer :
Frederic Koessler, Paris School of Economics
CNRS Secretary : Isabelle Lelievre, Paris School of Economics, Phone +33(0)1 43 13 63 83. Email : lelievre chez pse.ens.fr
Sponsors : ADRES, CEPREMAP, Paris School of Economics, Région Île-de-
France
Inscription is free but to help us plan the event please indicate your attendance at lelievre chez pse.ens.fr