Paris School of Economics / Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne
Maison des Sciences Economiques, CES – 106 - 112, Boulevard de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris
3e étage, bureau 314
- Dynamique macroéconomique
- Politiques monétaires et budgétaires
- Macroéconomie et accumulation d’actifs
- Économie Européenne
Directeur de thèse : KEMPF Hubert
Année académique d'inscription : 2013/2014
Titre de la thèse : Essays on fiscal policy and public debt sustainability
Année de la soutenance de thèse : 2017/2018
Date de la soutenance de thèse : 15 décembre 2017
Fiscal Policy in the US: Ricardian After All?
co-authored by Jérôme Creel [OFCE WP2017-23], R&R at Economic Modelling
Abstract: Historical data on US debt and primary surplus suggest the existence of different fiscal regimes which imply that, from time to time, US fiscal policy may have violated the government's intertemporal budget constraint. But does evidence of locally unsustainable regimes eventually jeopardize the global sustainability of US public debt? We apply a Regime-Switching Model-Based Sustainability test which derives sufficient conditions on a regime-switching fiscal policy feeback rule such that fiscal policy can globally be sustainable while allowing for persistent unsustainable regimes. We find significant evidence of a globally Ricardian US fiscal policy, despite periodic and persistent unsustainable fiscal regimes. This conclusion remains valid after controlling for the reverse causality between the primary balance and the output gap.
Why Fiscal Regimes Matter for Fiscal Sustainability Analysis: An Application to France
co-authored by Jérôme Creel [INFER WP 2017-01], Under revision
Abstract: This paper introduces a Regime-Switching Model-Based Sustainability test allowing for periodic (or local) violations of Bohn (1998, QJE)’s sustainability condition. We assume a Markov-switching fiscal policy rule whose parameters stochastically switch between sustainable and unsustainable regimes. We demonstrate that long-run fiscal sustainability not only depends on regime-specific feedback coefficients of the fiscal policy rule but also on the average durations of fiscal regimes. Evidence on French data suggests that both the No-Ponzi Game condition and the Debt-stabilizing condition hold in the long-run, when accounting for fiscal regimes, contrary to standard MBS tests.
Work in progress
Long-term Debt and the Sovereign Default Threshold: Does Maturity Matter?
Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: Theory and Practice in Europe. In: Douady R., Goulet C., Pradier PC. (eds) Financial Regulation in the EU, 2017. Palgrave Macmillan
- Macroeconomics, undergraduate (2013 - 2017)
- Statistics and Probability, undergraduate (2013 - 2014)
- Econometrics, undergraduate (2016- 2017)
- Ph.D. in economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics (2013 - 2017)
- Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Social sciences and Economics (2010 - 2013)