La science économique au service de la société
Rosanne Logeart

Rosanne Logeart


Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne

Campus Jourdan – 48, boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris

4e étage, bureau 72

Groupes de recherche : Régulation et Environnement
  • Économie politique et institutions
  • Économie politique des ONG

Directeur de thèse : Chiroleu-Assouline Mireille

Année académique d'inscription : 2020/2021

Titre de la thèse : Lobbying on Environmental Issues

Work in progress

Strategic Complementarity in NGO Advocacy: Evidence from the European Commission
This article analyzes the advocacy strategies of nongovernmental organizations towards policymakers. I develop a model in which NGOs can engage in costly lobbying activities to improve legislation on different policy topics. In equilibrium, NGOs lobby on the same topics when their efforts are complementary. Drawing on a novel dataset covering the universe of meetings held between environmental NGOs and European Commission members, I find support for strategic complementarity of lobbying efforts: NGOs tend to crowd in on the same topics at the same time. This result is driven by a political agenda effect, suggesting time-limited attention among policymakers.

Lobbying over Agenda-Setting
This article investigates the determinants of the ability of interest groups to bring topics on the European Union legislative agenda. I build a new dataset covering the universe of the minutes of the European Commission weekly meetings. Using text analysis, I derive a measure of the Commission's attention towards different topics and compare topic salience peaks in internal meetings with topic salience in external meetings (meetings held between interest groups and the Commission). I then compare the efficiency of different types of interest groups in influencing the content of the Commission's internal meetings in an event study design.

Firms' Incentives to Engage in Lobbying: Evidence from EU Consultations (with H. Subtil)
This project aims at understanding when and how firms engage in lobbying activities. We construct a novel dataset that assembles feedback received by the European Commission during periods of consultation over its new initiatives. We then study the initiatives firms decide to participate in and the types of narratives they use.