Paris Environmental and Energy Economics
The Paris Environmental and Energy Economics Seminar is a joint initiative of Université Paris 1 - Paris School of Economics, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Université Paris Dauphine, Agro ParisTech, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Mines, Ecole des Ponts, CEA, CIRED, Climate Economics Chair and IFP School.
In 2015-2016, the seminar takes place every three weeks on Thursday, 4.30 pm to 6.30 pm, at Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris.
The seminar allows to present and discuss frontier research by French and foreign scholars on Environmental and Energy Economics.
Seminar coordinator: Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline.
The seminar is partly financially supported by Paris School of Economics, the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and is also concerned by the convention between MEEDM and PSE.
Upcoming events
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Archives
- Thursday 2 June 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Renewable and non-renewable resources
Stephen Salant (University of Michigan)
Armon Rezaï (Vienna University of Economics
- Thursday 12 May 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Public good management
Michael Finus (University of Bath)
“Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology”
Pierre Courtois (INRA-LAMETA)
“Managing Biological Invasions: How to set Priorities?”
- Abstract
Michael Finus (University of Bath)
“Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology”
We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest-link technology. Coordination of and cooperation on migration policies, money laundering measures and biodiversity conservation efforts are prime examples of this technology. Whereas for symmetric players, policy coordination is not necessary, for asymmetric players cooperation matters but fails, in the absence of transfers. In contrast, with an optimal transfer scheme, asymmetry may not be an obstacle but an asset for cooperation, with even the grand coalition being stable. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of agreements and associate gains from cooperation.
Pierre Courtois (INRA-LAMETA)
“Managing Biological Invasions: How to set Priorities?”
Biological invasions are one of the most important causes of biodiversity losses. They also involve tremendous economic impacts and these overall damages justify important management efforts. Because resources are limited, the scarce funds available to control biological invasions need to be allocated in the most efficient way. Applying a cost/benefit approach incorporating species utility, distinctiveness, robustness and species interactions, this paper provides with an operational optimal method for setting management priorities under a limited budget constraint.
- Thursday 14 April 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Regulation
Stephen Smith (UCL)
“Environmental regulation using multiple instruments”
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet (CIRED)
“Global warming as an asymmetric public bad”
- Abstract
Stephen Smith (UCL)
“Environmental regulation using multiple instruments”
A large part of the economic literature on environmental regulation considers instruments as alternatives. For example, an extensive literature compares the relative merits of using price-based instruments or quantity-based instruments to control externalities. A rather smaller literature considers the properties of instrument combinations. This paper considers the case for combined use of taxes and regulation, in the context of information costs and asymmetries which prevent the attainment of optimal outcomes using a single instrument.
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet (CIRED)
“Global warming as an asymmetric public bad”
The impacts of anthropogenic global warming are not uniform across latitudes. Cold regions may benefit from, say, lower heating expenditures, while adaptation may lead warm regions to adopt air conditioning, the emissions of which potentially exacerbate warming. In parallel, mitigation capabilities differ across economies: abatement in India is more expensive than in Russia but cheaper than in the US. We extend the canonical dynamic game model of global warming to accommodate such asymmetries in adaptation and mitigation. Within a two-player, linear-state framework, we consider three strategies: myopic, reminiscent of a pre-Kyoto system; forward-looking non-cooperative, mimicking the current pledge system; and cooperative. The tradeoffs between global warming and economic efficiency are found to depend upon five public bad regimes. In the most theoretically studied regime where both players suffer damages, free-riding arises and warming is too high under pledges. In more empirically relevant regimes where one player enjoys benefits, free-riding is counterbalanced by free-driving. If the loser has fewer mitigation capabilities, e.g., India vs. Russia, pledges can lead to even more warming than myopia. Otherwise, e.g., India vs. USA, pledges generate too little warming. Unless players are myopic or face identical damages, the optimal carbon price should be differentiated across countries.
- Thursday 17 March 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Biodiversity
Frans P. de Vries (University of Stirling)
“Transaction Costs, Communication and Spatial Coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes”
Lauriane Mouysset (GREThA, Université de Bordeaux)
“Bio-economic trade-offs in agricultural public policies”
- Abstract
Frans P. de Vries (University of Stirling) joint with Simanti Banerjee,Timothy N. Cason and Nick Hanley
“Transaction Costs, Communication and Spatial Coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes”
Landowner participation and spatial coordination of land use decisions are key components for enhancing the effective delivery of ecosystem services from private land. However, inducing landowner participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes for coordinating land management choices is challenging from a policy design perspective owing to transaction costs associated with participation. This paper employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of such costs on participation and land use in the context of an Agglomeration Bonus (AB) scheme. The AB creates a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria relating to alternative spatially-coordinated land use patterns. The experiment varies transaction costs between two levels (high and low), which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating on the different equilibria. Additionally, the possibility of communication is implemented between neighboring landowners arranged on a local network to facilitate spatial coordination. Results indicate a significant difference in participation under high and low transaction costs, with a lower uptake when transaction costs are high. This effect is, however, impacted by transaction costs faced in the past. Communication improves AB performance with the effect being greater for participants facing high transaction costs.
Lauriane Mouysset (GREThA, Université de Bordeaux)
“Bio-economic trade-offs in agricultural public policies”
This paper examines the role played by biodiversity goals in the design of agricultural policies. A bio-economic model is developed with a dynamic and multi-scale perspective. It combines biodiversity dynamics, farming land-uses selected at the micro level and public policies at the macro level based on financial incentives for land-uses. The public decision-maker identifies optimal subsidies or taxes with respect to both biodiversity and budgetary constraints. These optimal policies are then analysed through different costs. The model is calibrated and applied to metropolitan France at the small agricultural region scale, using common birds as biodiversity metrics. First results relying on optimality curves and private costs stress the bio-economic trade-off between biodiversity and economic scores. In contrast, the analysis of public costs suggests that accounting for biodiversity can generate a second benefit in terms of public budget. Social costs defined as the sum of private and public costs also show possible bio-economic synergies.
- Thursday 25 February 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Pollution and Health
Due to security measures, thanks to come with an ID card or passport and a copy of the invitation email.
Marcella Veronesi (University of Verona)
“Crop diversification and child health: Empirical evidence from Tanzania”
Emmanuelle Lavaine (University of Annecy)
“The Risks of Pollution and the Costs of Misperceptions”
- Abstract
Marcella Veronesi (University of Verona)
“Crop diversification and child health: Empirical evidence from Tanzania”
Malnutrition is recognized as a major issue among low-income households in developing countries with long-term implications for economic development. Recently, crop diversification has been recognized as a strategy to improve nutrition and health, and as a risk coping strategy used by farmers in the face of climate change. However, there is no systematic empirical evidence on the role played by crop diversification in improving human health. We use the Tanzania National Panel Survey to investigate the effects of crop diversification on child health. We use fixed effects panel estimation to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and perform several robustness checks including placebo tests to test the validity of our findings. We find a positive and significant effect of crop diversification on long-term child nutritional status, in particular for very young children and children living in households with limited market access.
Emmanuelle Lavaine (University of Annecy)
“The Risks of Pollution and the Costs of Misperceptions”
This paper estimates the change in averting behavior following the opening of residual waste plants in Mexico in the period 2000 to 2011. The theoretical averting behavior model, with a constant measure of utility, shows firstly that the difference in willingness to pay between two different perceptions of a risk can be attributed to preventive behavior. Following an environmental change which does not entail any health risks, the theoretical model allows curative and preventive health care to be differentiated skill-fully. Empirical results of the difference-in-difference model show households increase their bottled water spending even if the health risks of drinking contaminated tap are close to zero. Household income and education levels play an important role in the demand for health care and bottled water.
- Thursday 4 February 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Climate change
Due to security measures, thanks to come with an ID card or passport and a copy of the invitation email.
Johannes Emmerling (FEEM)
“Spanning the Inequity Simplex across Time, States and Regions”
Fei Teng (Tsinghua University)
“Identifying industrial sectors with risk of carbon leakage in China”
- Abstract
Johannes Emmerling (FEEM)
“
Spanning the Inequity Simplex across Time, States and Regions”
Global models of the integrated assessment of climate change have stressed the importance of heterogeneity. Moreover, considering uncertainty has been found crucial in the context of climate change. We combine both features and using a disentangled welfare functional across different dimensions and explore theoretical properties of such an approach.
We also present a methodology to incorporate more fine grained regional resolutions of income and damage distributions than typically found in integrated assessment models. Finally, we present quantitative estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon that use our disentangling of different types of inequality aversion using different integrated assessment models.
Fei Teng (Tsinghua University)
“Identifying industrial sectors with risk of carbon leakage in China”
China is gradually establishing an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to implement its plan to peak energy-related carbon emissions by 2030. A central debate on ETS design involves addressing the carbon leakage concern. In this study, a detailed quantitative assessment is conducted to identify the industrial sectors at risk of carbon leakage in China. The identification process is undertaken at the four-digit sector level according to the National Economic Industries Classification. Results show that the majority of emissions quotas must be allocated to several energy-intensive sectors. The criterion that focuses on maximum value at stake filters out 27 four-digit sectors, whereas the dual criterion of carbon and trade intensity highlights 17 four-digit sectors that are considered at actual risk of carbon leakage. Quantitative analysis results indicate that allocating 9% of emission quotas for free is sufficient to compensate these vulnerable sectors. The risk of exposure to carbon leakage can vary significantly due to the different levels of data disaggregation, as per the findings from the comparison of carbon intensity data obtained from four-digit sectors belonging to one two-digit sector in the Standard Industry Classification. Therefore, the importance of using high-quality disaggregated data is highlighted in this research. Official criteria for assessing the key indicators of industrial sectors must be designed to accurately evaluate the sectors at risk of carbon leakage.
- Thursday 14 January 2016 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Policy instruments
Due to security measures, thanks to come with an ID card or passport and a copy of the invitation email.
Thomas Sterner (University of Gothenburg and Collège de France)
“Refunding Emissions Payments” - Abstract
Thomas Sterner (University of Gothenburg and Collège de France) joint with Cathrine Hagem, Michael Hoel and Bjart Holtsmark.
“
Refunding Emissions Payments”
We analyze two mechanism designs for refunding emissionspayments to polluting firms: output-basedrefunding (OB) and expenditure-based refunding (EB). In both instruments, emissions fees are returned to the polluting industry, typically making the policy more politically acceptable than a standard tax. The crucial difference between OB and EB is that the fees are refunded in proportion to output in the former but in proportion to the firms’ expenditure on abatement equipment in the latter. We show theoretically that to achieve a given abatement target, the fee level in the OB design exceeds the standard tax rate, whereas the fee level in the EB design is lower.Furthermore, the use of OB and EB may lead to large differences in the distribution of costs across firms. Both designs imply a cost-ineffective provision of abatement,as firms put relatively too much effort into reducing emissions through abatement technology compared with reducing output or improving management. However, maintaining output may be seen as a political advantage by policymakers if they seek to avoid activity reduction in the regulated sector.
- Thursday 17 December 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Energy issues
Due to security measures, thanks to come with an ID card or passport and a copy of the invitation email.
Maria Luisa Mancusi (Catholic University Milan and CRIOS, Bocconi University)
“Intra-EU knowledge flows in the renewable energy sector: A patent citation analysis”
Anna Cretì, (U. Paris Dauphine Leda-CGEMP and Ecole Polytechnique)
“Evaluating the trade-off between hydropower revenues and ecosystem integrity: a case study in Southern France”
- Abstract
Maria Luisa Mancusi (Catholic University Milan and CRIOS, Bocconi University) joint with Chiara Conti, Francesca Sanna-Randaccio, Roberta Sestini and Elena Verdolini.
“Intra-EU knowledge flows in the renewable energy sector: A patent citation analysis”
We test whether demand-pull environmental measures, introduced with the 1997 Commission White Paper and following Directives, had an impact on the fragmentation of EU research and innovation effort in the strategic field of renewable energy. By focusing on knowledge spillovers, we study the pattern and evolution of knowledge flows within the EU and between the EU and two frontier innovators: the United States and Japan. This research question is motivated by increased concern that the fragmentation of EU renewable energy research and innovation systems may hamper the ability to address climate challenges at socially acceptable costs. Following a well-established tradition, we measure the intensity and the direction of knowledge flows by looking at patent citations. Our results suggest that after 1997 Member States’ national innovation systems have evolved towards a more integrated innovation space at the EU level. Furthermore, environmental policies seem to have pushed the EU to become a frontier innovator, since the EU15’s role as a source of knowledge for the US increased. However, innovative activity at EU level is still poorly integrated if compared to the American and Japanese systems.
Anna Cretì (U. Paris Dauphine Leda-CGEMP and Ecole Polytechnique) joint with Marc Joëts and Federico Pontoni
“Evaluating the trade-off between hydropower revenues and ecosystem integrity: a case study in Southern France”
In the coming years, France will renew hydroelectric concessions through beauty contests. Bidders will present offers for technical and environmental improvements, as well as a revenue sharing percentage for local authorities. This framework generates a potential trade-off between revenue sharing and environmental improvement, which we have investigated in this paper using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). The experiment has been conducted on a representative sample living in the Aspe valley, one catchment where concessions are active for a total of almost 100 MW. Our DCE is innovative because we package the revenue sharing as an immediate rebate on electricity bills while maintaining a willingness to pay (WTP) approach. Respondents could choose between higher rebates with lower ecosystem improvements or lower (or no) rebate with higher ecosystem improvements. From a methodological standpoint, we use (i) the standard approach to preference space, in which distributions of the coefficients are estimated and WTP is derived from the ratio of two coefficients; and (ii) the WTP space approach, in which we specify the distribution of WTP directly at the estimation stage. According to the experiment results, the highest compensating surplus is above € 1,225 per household per year. Individual marginal WTP for a satisfactory fish stock reaches 277 €/year, which is three times the maximum rebate offered. Finally, all environmental attributes are significant and worth a monetary effort. We then argue that hydroelectric concession bidders should give clear priority to environmental factors.
- Thursday 26 November 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Political Economy and Environment
Due to security measures, thanks to come with an ID card or passport and a copy of the invitation email.
Leo Simon (University of California at Berkeley)
“Polarized Environmental Debates”
Antony Millner (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment - London School of Economics and Political Science)
“Collective Intertemporal Choice: Time Consistency vs. Time Invariance”
- Abstract
Leo Simon (University of California at Berkeley) joint with Gordon Rausser and Jinhua Zhao
“Polarized Environmental Debates”
US and Europeans societies are becoming increasingly polarized on a growing number of issues, from abortion to gay rights, from tax policies to economic stimulus, from GMOs to climate change, etc. Increasing public and, especially, elite polarization has been blamed for political gridlocks and government failures. A number of factors have been proposed as driving such polarization, such as rising income inequality, migration patterns, and political redistricting. In this paper, we identify yet another factor, which has not previously been modeled: polarization can result from strategic information aggregation, in which the left and the right engage in exaggeration and counterexaggeration of their political positions in order to influence policy outcomes. We model the political process as one in which public debate by an “elite” with known political positions or biases is transformed into policies. Members of the elite are positioned along a political spectrum from the left to the right, and have private information about some issue such as the costs or damages of climate change, or the benefits and risks associated with GMOs. They send messages about their private information to the “center”—an amorphous institution perhaps best thought of as the “court of public opinion”—by declaring their political platforms. The center then makes a decision about the issue based on the aggregate of these messages. We argue that this information aggregation game captures certain aspects of real world political processes that exhibit polarization.
We distinguish between position polarization, which measures the heterogeneity of elite political orientations, and platform polarization, which measures the dispersion of elite public messages. While the former can be thought of as an objective measure of the political landscape, the latter directly contributes to policy making and is a output of the information aggregation process. We show that elites have incentives to distort their private information, causing platform polarization to exacerbate position polarization. Further, as position polarization rises, platform polarization will increase even faster. On the other hand, institutional changes designed to limit the degree of platform polarization might be counterproductive from the perspective of information aggregation.
Antony Millner (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment - London School of Economics and Political Science) joint with Geoffrey Heal
“Collective Intertemporal Choice: Time Consistency vs. Time Invariance”
We study collective choice when individuals have heterogeneous discounted utilitarian preferences. Two attractive properties of intertemporal preferences are indistinguishable for individuals, but have dramatically different implications for collective choice. Time Consistency requires a plan that is optimal at one evaluation date to be optimal at all later evaluation dates, while Time Invariance requires preferences to be unchanged under translations of the time axis. We study the implications of these two properties in a tractable dynamic model that captures both common resource and public goods problems. Utilitarian social planners implement the first best if collective preferences are time consistent, but not if they are time invariant. Decentralized alternatives — property rights (for common resources) and voting (for public goods) — can strictly improve on the planning equilibrium if social preferences are time invariant. We reflect on the implications of these findings for dynamic welfare economics. Revealed preference cannot determine which property we should impose on social welfare, but each property is normatively attractive in some contexts.
- Thursday 5 November 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room 114
- Environmental issues in India
Ujjayant Chakravorty (Tufts University)
“Who is Buying? Fuelwood Collection in Rural India”
Hélène Ollivier (CNRS - CES and PSE)
“Product mix, trade, and the environment: theory and evidence from Indian manufacturing”
- Abstract
Ujjayant Chakravorty (Tufts University)
“Who is Buying? Fuelwood Collection in Rural India”
Fuelwood collection is often cited as the most important cause of deforestation in many developing countries. There is a significant literature on fuelwood markets but almost no studies on who is using the fuelwood collected. Is the fuelwood collected in rural areas used locally or by people living in nearby towns and cities? The answer to this question has implications for both environment and energy policy. We study this issue by looking at the effect of reduced forest cover on the time allocation of buyers and sellers of fuelwood in rural India. We instrument time spent in fuelwood collection by the time it takes to travel from their home to the collection site. By matching two different datasets, we can identify households that buy fuelwood for their own use and those who sell fuelwood in markets. We see a clear difference in the time allocation of these two groups in response to costlier access to forest resources. When the forest is further away, fuelwood is scarce, and sellers decrease their time invested in self-employment activities. Buyers show no such trend in their behavior. Closer to town, sellers increase their collection effort, because fuelwood is likely to fetch higher prices. Buyers do not exhibit the same pattern. By differentiating buyers from sellers, we find that the number of fuelwood sellers rises closer to town and controlling for population, fuelwood sales increase. The main contribution of the paper is in disentangling fuelwood markets into those who buy and those who sell. We can therefore estimate an excess supply function of fuelwood as a function of distance from town. The main policy implication of the study is that fuelwood collection is likely driven not only by rural household demand but by demand from towns in close proximity. Thus energy policies that address deforestation and rural energy use need to target urban energy use as well.
Hélène Ollivier (CNRS - CES and PSE) joint with Geoffrey Barrows (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics)
“Product mix, trade, and the environment: theory and evidence from Indian manufacturing”
We develop a multiproduct multi-factor model with heterogeneous firms, variable markups, and monopolistic competition in which each product has a specific environmental emission intensity. Trade affects firm-level emission intensity through the endogenous response of product mix. First, we find that when varieties that are away from the core competency of the firm are cleaner, then tougher competition increases firm-level emission intensity, whereas when they are dirtier, then tougher competition improves the environmental performance of the firm. Second, we find that even though trade may cause some firms to become dirtier through product mix changes, reallocation effects dominates at the industry level so that trade still generates both economic and environmental efficiency gains. Third, we investigate changes in firm emission intensity in a unique panel dataset of Indian Manufacturing firms which reports both physical output and energy input by product. We find evidence of the importance of the across-firms reallocation effect in explaining the reduction in emissions per output in India over the last two decades.
- Thursday 8 October 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room 114
- Empirical issues
Matthew Neidell (Columbia University)
“Air Pollution and Investor Behavior”
François Cohen (London School of Economics and Political Science)
“Adapting American Homes to Climate Change”
- Abstract
Matthew Neidell (Columbia University)
“Air Pollution and Investor Behavior”
Recent research documents that external triggers, such as stress and depression, affect the behavior of investors. In this study, we explore whether air pollution, which induces similar physiological changes, affects risk taking of investors as captured by daily stock market returns from the S&P 500. Using plausibly exogenous daily measures of fine particulate matter (PM) obtained from a monitor less than 300 meters from the New York Stock Exchange, we find significant effects of PM on daily returns. An increase in PM from the bottom to top quartile reduces returns by 7 percent, a magnitude quite comparable to that from decreased sunlight. Moreover, we find that exposure during the morning hours has the largest effect, a finding consistent with mechanisms of how PM affects human health. These results are robust to numerous specification checks, including using distant forest fires as an instrument for PM. This finding has important implications for finance theory and environmental policy.
François Cohen (London School of Economics and Political Science) joint with Matthieu Glachant (Mines ParisTech) and Magnus Söderberg (Mines ParisTech)
“Adapting American Homes to Climate Change”
This paper assesses the economic cost of adaptation in US dwellings through home improvements and changes in energy consumption. Using household-level data, we estimate the adaptation cost per household to be low: 90 USD for a 1°F increase. This is driven by the fact that the installation and more intensive use of additional air-conditioners are partially offset by lower needs for space heating. These findings deliver an optimistic message on the adaptive capacity of US houses.
- Thursday 18 June 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Public good and cooperation
Scott Barrett (Earth Institute - Columbia University
“Tipping Versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good”
Jean-François Jacques (ERUDITE Université Paris-Est Marne la Vallée et LEDa-CGEMP Université Paris-Dauphine)
“Climate coalition in a mitigation-adaptation game”
- Abstract
Scott Barrett (Earth Institute - Columbia University) joint with Astrid Dannenberg
“Tipping Versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good”
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma, the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best outcome is attainable, but cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. In the tipping game, only a second best outcome may be attainable, but there exists a Nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the prisoners’ dilemma. We show that groups do significantly better when they choose the tipping game, and yet many groups repeatedly choose the prisoners’ dilemma, indicating a mistaken and persistent tendency to prefer a game with potentially higher payoffs to one having a strategic advantage.
Jean-François Jacques (ERUDITE Université Paris-Est Marne la Vallée et LEDa-CGEMP Université Paris-Dauphine) joint with Basak Bayramoglu (INRA, UMR Economie Publique) and Michael Finus (University of Bath)
“Climate coalition in a mitigation-adaptation game”
We study the strategic interaction between mitigation and adaptation strategies in the canonical model of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We show that these two strategies are strategic substitutes considering various definitions of substitutability, irrespective of the degree of cooperation. Moreover, different from a pure mitigation game, adaptation may cause mitigation levels between different countries to be strategic complements, generalizing a result by Ebert and Welsch (2011 and 2012) to more than two countries with the possibility that players form self-enforcing IEAs. We systematically analyze under which conditions this leads to more positive cooperative outcomes compared to the pure mitigation game. Particular emphasis is placed on sufficient conditions for the existence, and uniqueness of interior equilibrium strategies and how they link to the success of coalition formation.
- Thursday 28 May 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Taxation and Risk Issues
Julien Daubanes (ETH-Zürich)
“Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax”
Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti (University of Geneva)
“Collective Risk-Taking with Threshold Effects”
- Abstract
Julien Daubanes (ETH-Zürich) joint with Saraly Andrade De Sá
“Limit Pricing and the (In)Effectiveness of the Carbon Tax”
The conventional analysis of policy-induced changes in resource extraction is inconsistent with the actual way OPEC is exerting its market power. We claim that OPEC is practicing limit pricing, and we extend to non-renewable resources the limit-pricing theory. Facing a very inelastic demand, an extractive cartel seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones. With limit pricing, policy-induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic. For example, oil taxes have no effect on current oil production. Extraction increases when high-potential substitutes are promoted, and may only be reduced by supporting its ordinary substitutes. The carbon tax not only applies to oil; it also penalizes its ordinary (carbon) substitutes, whose market shares are taken over by the cartel. Thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long-term oil production.
Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti (University of Geneva) joint with Olivier Bochet, Justin Leroux and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
“Collective Risk-Taking with Threshold Effects”
It is commonly found that the presence of uncertainty helps discipline economic agents in strategic contexts where incentives would otherwise induce inefficient behavior (Eso and White (2004), Bramoullé and Treich (2009)). We consider a variant of the celebrated Nash Demand Game (Nash, 1953) where two values of the resource (low and high) are possible. We show that the presence of uncertainty here may actually have an opposite effect: strategic interactions may lead groups of risk-averse agents to take inefficiently risky decisions. We then develop an experimental setting to assess the severity of the coordination problem in the lab. Our findings confirm our theoretical predictions that the (Pareto-dominant) cautious equilibria are predominantly played at the individual level. In the aggregate, however, coordination failures abound but are decreasing in the likelihood of the high value of the resource. It is only when this likelihood becomes low enough that cautious behavior translates in high rates of cautious equilibria.
- Thursday 7 May 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Environmental policy
Stefan Ambec (INRA - TSE)
“Environmental Policy with Intermittent Sources of Energy”
Marita Laukkanen (VATT)
“International Environmental Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring”
- Abstract
Stefan Ambec (INRA - TSE) joint with Claude Crampes
“Environmental policy with intermittent sources of energy”
We examine the impact of public policies that aim to decarbonate electricity production by substituting fossil fuel energy with renewable sources that are intermittent, namely wind and solar power. We consider a model of energy investment and production with two sources of energy: a clean intermittent one (e.g. wind), and a polluting reliable one (e.g. coal). We first characterize the first-best energy mix and its decentralization with a Pigouvian tax. Next we introduce several policy instruments. A carbon tax decreases electricity production while, at the same time, it increases investment in wind power. The tax may increase total production capacity because the retailing price of electricity does not depend on energy availability so that windmill capacity must be backed-up with thermal power plants. Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and feed-in tariffs (FIT) enhance investment into intermittent sources of energy. However, they both might boost electricity production beyond the efficient level, in which case they must be complemented with a tax on electricity consumption. We also consider the case of a monopoly thermal power producer. We show that the introduction a competitive fringe of wind power producers makes the thermal power producer reduce further production capacity, which increases the electricity price. Lastly we compute the social value of two technologies to cope with intermittency: energy storage and load curtailment.
Marita Laukkanen (VATT)
“International Environmental Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring”
Many prominent environmental problems are plagued by uncertainty in the underlying biological and physical processes. Noise in the environmental process makes the link between current actions and future environmental conditions indirect. Where international policy coordination is called for, adherence to an agreement cannot be monitored unambiguously. This paper studies how to construct a self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the case of a stock pollutant with stochastic stock dynamics. The strategy profile proposed involves harsh punishments after a suspected deviation, followed by forgiveness. The model of environmental cooperation is illustrated with an application to a linear-quadratic problem.
- Thursday 16 April 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Renewable resources
Olli Tahvonen (University of Helsinki)
“Economics of naturally regenerating, heterogeneous forests: goodbye to Martin Faustmann?”
Basak Bayramoglu (INRA - UMR Economie Publique)
“Trade and fisheries subsidies”
- Abstract
Olli Tahvonen (University of Helsinki)
“Economics of naturally regenerating, heterogeneous forests: goodbye to Martin Faustmann?”
An economic model for naturally regenerating, heterogeneous forests is specified to yield both clearcuts and continuous cover forestry endogenously. The model includes nonconvexities and any number of state variables but is, in its simplest form, a one-state variable problem. Clearcuts with various rotation lengths and continuous harvesting appear as locally optimal solutions. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the local and global optimality of these two forest management types are obtained. Discounting is found to increase rotation length and to favor continuous harvesting. Initial state may determine the optimality of continuous forest cover versus clearcuts. The relative value of large trees is an important factor in the optimality of different solutions. Analytical results are demonstrated by an empirical application.
Basak Bayramoglu (INRA - UMR Economie Publique) joint with Brian R. Copeland and Jean-François Jacques
“Trade and fisheries subsidies”
World Trade Organization members included fishery subsidies in the Doha round of trade negotiations. This paper develops a simple model to show why prospects for a deal on fisheries subsidies may be difficult. To focus on trade issues, we consider fisheries that do not fall under the jurisdiction of more than one country. Typically governments using subsidies find themselves in a Prisoner’s dilemma. If two countries use subsidies to promote employment in some sector, then one country’s subsidy will push down the world price, undermining the other country’s attempt to promote its output. This creates incentives to negotiate to curtail subsidies. These incentives may not exist in fisheries for 3 reasons. First, if fisheries are severely depleted, one country’s subsidy reduces its long run supply of fish, raising prices and benefiting other fish exporting countries. Hence the usual Prisoner’s Dilemma does not exist. Second, if governments use other policies (such as season closures) to control fish stocks, then changes in subsidies may not affect harvests and hence may not generate international spillover effects. And third, even if governments were compelled to reduce fishery subsidies, there may be little real effect because governments would be motivated to weaken other regulations targeting the fish sector.
- Thursday 26 March 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Energy Efficiency
Misato Sato (London School of Economics)
“The impact of relative energy prices on firms’ performance”
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet (Cired)
“Energy Efficiency Incentive Policies and Product Differentiation”
- Abstract
Misato Sato (London School of Economics) joint with Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Stefania Lovo and Ralf Martin
“The impact of relative energy prices on firms’ performance”
Whether high industrial energy prices harm firms performance vis-à-vis their international competitors is a politically sensitive issue given the different rates at which energy prices are currently changing across countries. Nevertheless, besides some US-focused analyses, the empirical evidence on the effects of energy prices on firms’ competitiveness remains sparse (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2014). One notable exception is Deschênes (2010) who finds that employment rates are weakly related to electricity prices, a 1% increase in electricity prices leading to a 0.1% decrease in full-time equivalent employment.
This paper analyses the impact of differences in energy prices across countries on firms’ performance across four major energy-intensive sectors: iron and steel, non-metallic minerals, paper, and chemicals. Using a sample of more than 500,000 companies located in 50 countries (both developed and emerging economies) collected from the Orbis database, we analyse the impact of relative sectoral energy prices on turnover and employment.
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet (Cired) joint with Marie-Laure Nauleau and Philippe Quirion
“Energy Efficiency Incentive Policies and Product Differentiation”
We compare the welfare impact of ad valorem subsidies, carbon taxes and energy efficiency standards on the energy efficiency product line. We consider a model with two types of consumers and a monopolist which can imperfectly price discriminate. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, there is a so-called “energy efficiency gap”: the monopolist offers the optimal level of energy efficiency to the high-end consumer but too low energy efficiency to the low-end consumer. Absent energy-use externalities, ad valorem subsidies and energy efficiency standards targeted on the low-end good can restore efficiency, though with contrasted distributional impacts. The former favors the monopolist and the latter favors consumers. If, in addition to addressing market power, ad valorem subsidies are used to internalize energy-use externalities, distinct subsidy rates should be applied to each of the two goods. As long as the externality is small relative to the energy price, the optimal rates should be decreasing in energy efficiency levels, a subsidization schedule at odds with actual practice. In contrast, instruments affecting indistinctly both goods, such as a carbon tax or a uniform subsidy, cannot fully achieve efficiency. If consumer types are too dissimilar, such instruments can even widen the energy efficiency gap.
- Thursday 5 March 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Trade and Environment
Inma Martinez-Zarzoso (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)
“On the Effects of Trade Liberalization on the Environment: Are the Central East European Countries Pollution Havens?”
Sandra Poncet (Univ. Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
“Trade openness as a way to reduce pollution in China?”
- Abstract
Inma Martinez-Zarzoso (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)
“On the Effects of Trade Liberalization on the Environment: Are the Central East European Countries Pollution Havens?”
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between environmental stringency and intra-EU trade flows. Two main hypotheses are tested. First, we test whether the stringency of a country’s environmental regulations may result in pollution havens. Second, we test whether the results differ by industry and for old and new EU member countries. An augmented gravity model is estimated using panel data for 21 European countries during the period 1999-2008 for the full sample and also separately for the CEECS and the old EU members. Our results show weak support for the pollution haven hypothesis for some dirty industries mainly for net exports from Western EU countries to the rest. Instead, support for the “Porter hypothesis” is found for trade in clean goods.
Sandra Poncet (Univ. Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) joint with Jose de Sousa and Laura Hering
“Trade openness as a way to reduce pollution in China?”
We use recent detailed Chinese data on trade and pollution emissions to assess the environmental consequences of China’s integration into the world economy. We rely on a panel dataset covering 218 Chinese cities and address the potential endogeneity of trade and pollution via the inclusion of various fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. We instrument the city’s trade openness rate with the city’s proximity to foreign consumers and the weighted average exchange rate variation experienced by the city’s trade partners.
We find a positive and significant effect of trade on emissions that is however limited to processing trade and activities undertaken by foreign firms. No significant gains result from either ordinary trade activities or domestic firms, even though these are today the main drivers of China’s export and import growth. This result invites caution about the prospects for pollution in a context of ongoing transition to ordinary trade.
- Thursday 12 February 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Sustainability
Stefan Behringer (University of Duisburg-Essen)
“Optimal Harvesting of a Spatial Renewable Resource”
Harold Levrel (AgroParisTech, Cired)
“Using habitat equivalency analysis to balance the cost-effectiveness of restoration outcomes in four institutional contexts”
- Abstract
Stefan Behringer (University of Duisburg-Essen) joint with Thorsten Upmann
“Optimal Harvesting of a Spatial Renewable Resource”
In this paper we investigate the optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in most standard approaches the resource is located at a single point, we allow the resource to be distributed spatially. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one location to another. For a fixed planning horizon, we investigate the speed and the path of harvesting chosen by the agent. We show that the agent adjusts this speed so as to visit each location only once, even in the absence of travelling cost. Since the agent does not return to any location for a second harvest, it is optimal to fully deplete the resource upon arrival. A similar type of bang-bang solution results when we drop the assumption of a constant harvesting rate: allowing for a variable harvesting rate, the agent chooses to fully exploit the resource either in the last or in the first travelling period. A society interested in conserving some of the resource thus has to take measures to limit the exploitative behaviour of the agent.
Harold Levrel (AgroParisTech, Cired) joint with Pierre Scemama
“Using habitat equivalency analysis to balance the cost-effectiveness of restoration outcomes in four institutional contexts”
One of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets adopted in 2010 in Nagoya, during the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, is to restore at least 15 per cent of degraded ecosystems (target 15) by 2020.
At the national scale, with a given amount of resource available for financing public investment in the restoration of biodiversity, it is difficult to priorizing alternative restoration projects. One way to do it is to assess the level of ecosystem services delivered by these projects and to compare them with their costs. The challenge is to be able to propose a common unit of ecosystem services in order to compare between them these projects, carried out in different institutional contexts (application of environmental laws, management of naturel reserve, production of specifics services for local population, etc.). The aim of this paper is to assess how it is possible to use the Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) as a tool to evaluate ecosystem services provided by various restoration projects developed in different institutional contexts. This tool was initially developed to quantify the level of ecosystem services required to compensate non-market impacts coming from accidental pollution in US. In this paper, HEA is used to assess cost-effectiveness of various restoration projects with regard to different environmental policies, using some case studies based in France. This work was conducted on four different case studies: (1) the creation of a market for wetlands both as mitigation credits and lagoon systems for filtration, (2) the public acceptance of a project of port development, (3) the rehabilitation of marshes to mitigate nitrates loadings to the sea and (4) the restoration of streams in a protected area.
Our main conclusion is that HEA can provide a simple tool to clarify the objectives of restoration projects, help to make a link between costs and effectiveness of these projects and then to carry out trade off, without requiring an important amount of human or technical means.
- Thursday 22 January 2015 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/17
- Risk and Climate Change
Simon Dietz (Grantham Research Institute - LSE)
“Spaces for agreement: a theory of Time-Stochastic Dominance and an application to climate change”
Alain Ayong Le Kama (UPOND)
“Mitigation and adaptation are not enough: turning to emissions reduction abroad”
- Abstract
Simon Dietz (Grantham Research Institute - LSE) joint with Nicoleta Anca Matei
“Spaces for agreement: a theory of Time-Stochastic Dominance and an application to climate change”
Many investments involve both a long time-horizon and risky returns. Making investment decisions thus requires assumptions about time and risk preferences. Such assumptions are frequently contested, particularly in the public sector, and there is no immediate prospect of universal agreement. Motivated by these observations, we develop a theory and method of finding ‘spaces for agreement’. These are combinations of classes of discount and utility function, for which one investment dominates another (or ‘almost’ does so), so that all decision-makers whose preferences can be represented by such combinations would agree on the option to be chosen. The theory is built on combining the insights of stochastic dominance on the one hand, and time dominance on the other, thus offering a nonparametric approach to inter-temporal, risky choice. We go on to apply the theory to the controversy over climate policy evaluation and show with the help of a popular simulation model that, in fact, even tough carbon emissions targets would be chosen by almost everyone, barring those with arguably ‘extreme’ preferences.
Alain Ayong Le Kama (UPOND) joint with Aude Pommeret
“Mitigation and adaptation are not enough: turning to emissions reduction abroad”
In this paper we focus on a long-term dynamic analysis of the optimal adaptation/mitigation mix in the presence of a pollution threshold above which adaptation is no longer efficient. We account for accumulation in abatement capital, greenhouse gases, and adaptation capital in order to better capture the arbitrage between abatement and adaptation investments. Pollution damages arise from the emissions due to the country consumption but also from the emissions of the rest of the world (ROW). A pollution threshold is then introduced, above which adaptation is no longer efficient. We obtain that if this threshold is lower than the steady-state level of pollution, there is no way for the modeled economy to avoid it. In particular, such a situation will appear if the ROW’s emissions are high. Next step is then to introduce another type of investment allowing for lower ROW pollution i.e. emissions reduction abroad through CDM for instance. We obtain that CDM may be a means to avoid a pollution threshold above which adaptation becomes of no use.
- Thursday 18 December 2014 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/18
- Energy Issues
Steven Gabriel (University of Maryland)
“Solving Discretely Constrained, Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems with Applications in Energy”
Olivier Massol (IFP-School, IFP Energies nouvelles)
“Joining the CCS Club : the Economics of CO2 Pipeline Projects”
- Abstract
Steven Gabriel (University of Maryland) joint with Antonio Conejo, Carlos Ruiz and Sauleh Siddiqui
“Solving Discretely Constrained, Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems with Applications in Energy”
This paper presents an approach to solving discretely constrained, mixed linear complementarity problems (DC-MLCPs). Such formulations include a variety of interesting and realistic models of which two are highlighted: a market-clearing auction typical in electric power markets but suitable in other more general contexts, and a network equilibrium suitable to energy markets as well as other grid-based industries.A mixed-integer, linear program is used to solve the DC-MLCP in which both complementarity as well as integrality are allowed to be relaxed. Theoretical and numerical results are provided to validate the approach insurance.
Olivier Massol (IFP-School, IFP Energies nouvelles) joint with Stéphane Tchung-Ming and Albert Banal-Estañol
“Joining the CCS Club : the Economics of CO2 Pipeline Projects”
The large-scale diffusion of Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage (CCS) imposes the construction of a sizeable CO2 pipeline infrastructure. This paper examines the economics of a CO2 pipeline project and analyzes the conditions for a widespread adoption of CCS by a group of emitters that can be connected to that infrastructure. It details a modeling framework aimed at assessing the break-even value for joint CCS adoption, that is the critical value in the charge for CO2 emissions that is required for each of the emitters to decide to implement capture capabilities. This model can be used to analyze how the tariff structure and the regulatory constraints imposed on the CO2 pipeline operator modify the overall cost of CO2 abatement via CCS. This framework is applied to the case of a real European CO2 pipeline project. We find that the obligation to use cross-subsidy-free pipeline tariffs has a minor impact on the minimum CO2 price required to adopt the CCS. In contrast, the obligation to charge non-discriminatory prices can either impede the adoption of CCS or significantly raises that price. Besides, we compared two alternative regulatory frameworks for CCS pipelines: a common European organization as opposed to a collection of national regulations. The results indicate that the institutional scope of that regulation has a limited impact on the adoption of CCS compared to the detailed design of the tariff structure imposed to pipeline operators.
- From 27 November 2014 09:00 to 28 November 2014 17:00
- UPOND
- FAERE 2nd Thematic Workshop
- Thursday 6 November 2014 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/1
- Kathryn Vasilaky and Jean-Pierre Ponssard
Kathryn Vasilaky (Earth Institute, Columbia University)
“Informal Networks within Index Insurance: Randomizing Distance in Group Insurance”
Jean-Pierre Ponssard (Ecole Polytechnique)
“EU ETS, free allocations and activity level thresholds, the devil lies in the details”
- Abstract
Kathryn Vasilaky (Earth Institute, Columbia University) joint with Daniel Osgood, Sofia Martinez and Radost Stanimirova
“Informal Networks within Index Insurance: Randomizing Distance in Group Insurance”
We study the effect of offering index insurance to groups versus individuals on individual’s savings and insurance decisions in a lab experiment in the .field, which offers real index insurance. We also look at how the network relationships among dairy farmers in the Dominican Republics aff.ects the demand for group index insurance. Individuals offered group insurance are exogenously grouped according to a distance measure reflecting what individuals know about one another’s assets (number of productive cows) in their dairy farmer association. We find that individuals who are offered group insurance (as well as those who end up purchasing the group insurance) purchase less index insurance on average. This .finding is in line with theory demonstrating that group purchase encourages individuals to internalize the additional risk taking that formal insurance might allow. We also find that groups in which individuals are closer, are less likely to purchase insurance as a group, and also contribute less of their endowment to insurance.
Jean-Pierre Ponssard (Ecole Polytechnique) joint with Frédéric Branger, Oliver Sartor and Misato Sato
“EU ETS, free allocations and activity level thresholds, the devil lies in the details”
This paper investigates incentives for firms to increase output above the activity level thresholds (ALTs) in order to obtain more free allowances in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. While ALTs were introduced in order to reduce excess free allocation to low-activity installations, for installations operating below the threshold, the financial gain from increasing output to reach the threshold may outweigh the costs. Using installation level data for 246 clinker plants, we estimate the effect of ALTs on output decisions. The ALTs induced 5.8Mt of excess clinker production in 2012 (4% of total EU output), which corresponds to 5.2Mt of excess CO2 emissions (over 5% of total sector emissions). As intended, ALTs do reduce overallocation (by 6.6million allowances) relative to a scenario without ALTs, but an alternative output based allocation would further reduce overallocation by 39.5million allowances (29% of total cement sector free allocation). Firms responded disproportionately to ALTs in countries with low demand, especially in Spain and Greece. The excess clinker output lead to increased EU clinker and cement exports, production shifting between plants and also an increase in clinker content of cement thus reducing the carbon efficiency of cement production.
- Thursday 16 October 2014 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/1
- Environmental policies
Larry Goulder (Stanford University)
“General Equilibrium Impacts of a Federal Clean Energy Standard”
David Hémous (INSEAD)
“The Dynamic Impact of Unilateral Environmental Policies”
- Abstract
Larry Goulder (Stanford University) joint with Marc A.C. Hafstead and Roberton C. Williams III
“General Equilibrium Impacts of a Federal Clean Energy Standard”
Economists have tended to view cap and trade (or, more generally, emissions pricing) as more cost-effective than a clean energy standard (CES) for the purpose of reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity generation. This stems in part from the finding that, in terms of cost-effectiveness, a CES relies too much on emissions abatement through the channel of fuelswitching and too little on the channel of reduced electricity demand.
Recent research reveals, however, that the CES has an advantage over cap and trade in a different dimension. In a realistic economy with prior taxes on factors of production, the adverse “tax interaction effect” is smaller under the CES than under the equivalent cap-and-trade program. This raises the possibility that the CES might not suffer an overall disadvantage relative to cap and trade on cost-effectiveness grounds.
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of the CES and an electricity-sector cap-and-trade program. These models reveal that a well-designed CES can be more cost-effective than cap and trade when relatively minor reductions in emissions are called for. Numerical simulations indicate that the costeffectiveness of the CES is sensitive to what is deemed “clean” electricity. To achieve maximal cost-effectiveness, the CES must offer significant credit to electricity generated from natural gas.
David Hémous (INSEAD)
“The Dynamic Impact of Unilateral Environmental Policies”
This paper builds a two-country, two-sector (polluting, nonpolluting) trade model with directed technical change, examining whether unilateral environmental policies can ensure sustainable growth. The polluting good generates more or less emissions depending on its relative use of a clean and a dirty input. I show that a unilateral policy combining clean research subsidies and a trade tax can ensure sustainable growth, while unilateral carbon taxes alone generally cannot. Relative to autarky and exogenous technical change respectively, the mechanisms of trade and directed technical change accelerate environmental degradation either under laissez-faire or with unilateral carbon taxes, yet both help reduce environmental degradation under the appropriate unilateral policy. I characterize the optimal unilateral policy analytically and numerically using calibrated simulations. Knowledge spillovers have the potential to reduce the otherwise large welfare costs of restricting policy to one country only.
- Thursday 2 October 2014 16:30-18:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques - room S/1
- Markets of Permits
Gabrielle Demange (Paris School of Economics - EHESS)
“Joint design of Emission Tax and Trading Systems”
Jean-Philippe Nicolaï (ETH Zürich)
“Emissions Reduction and Profit-Neutral Permit Allocations”
- Abstract
Gabrielle Demange (Paris School of Economics- EHESS) joint with Bernard Caillaud
“Joint Design of Emission Tax and Trading Systems”
This paper analyzes the joint design of fiscal and cap-and-trade instruments in climate policies under uncertainty. Whether the optimal mechanism is a mixed policy (with some firms subject to a tax and others to a cap-and-trade) or a uniform one (with all firms subject to the same instrument) depends on parameters reflecting preferences, production, and, most importantly, the stochastic structure of the shocks affecting the economy. This framework is then used to address the issue of the non-cooperative design of ETS in various areas worldwide and to characterize the resulting inefficiency and excess in emission. We provide a strong Pareto argument in favor of merging ETS of different regions in the world.
Jean-Philippe Nicolaï (ETH Zürich)
“Emissions Reduction and Profit-Neutral Permit Allocations”
This paper shows that when a regulator implements a market for permits, the number of free allowances ordinarily required to neutralize profits is low. More precisely, the impacts of three parameters are discussed: market structure, demand elasticity and the cap for emissions. This is shown in a model where firms compete “à la Cournot” and the demand function is iso-elastic. Firms use polluting technologies. The regulator implements a market for permits in order to reduce emissions. The paper determines the profit-neutral allocations and the level of reductions that a regulator could implement while it offsets profits’ losses. The paper shows that in the cases of either a monopoly or a duopoly with high reductions, the regulator cannot offset the firms’ losses. The model is illustrated for the two first phases of the EU-ETS. The percentage of permits which would have offset profits’ losses for the first phase of EU-ETS is less than 10%.
- Thursday 5 June 2014 16:30-18:30
- Climate Economics Chair, Palais Brongniart (4th floor) - 28, place de la Bourse - 75002 Paris
- Environment and International Relations
Santiago Rubio (University of Valencia)
“Sharing R&D Investments in Cleaner Tecnologies to Mitigate Climate Change”
Estelle Gozlan (UMR Economie Publique - INRA AgroParisTech)
“Trade Liberalization and Optimal Taxation with Pollution and Heterogeneous Workers”
- Abstract
Santiago Rubio (University of Valencia) joint with Abeer El Sayed
“Sharing R&D Investments in Cleaner Tecnologies to Mitigate Climate Change”
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and that they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as the coalition information exchanger decreases until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached. We also find that the grand coalition is stable if the countries sign an international research joint venture but in this case the effectiveness of the agreement is very low.
Estelle Gozlan (UMR Economie Publique - INRA AgroParisTech) joint with Philippe Bontems
“Trade Liberalization and Optimal Taxation with Pollution and Heterogeneous Workers”
In this paper, we address two questions: (i) how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives, design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly, and (ii) how does trade liberalization affect this optimal tax system, and modify the economy’s levels of pollution and inequalities? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor) and pollution, we fully characterize the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies). We provide simulations highlighting the linkages between pollution, labor income redistribution and increasing globalization with our endogenous fiscal system. In the redistributive case (i.e. in favor of the unskilled workers) and when the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, we show that (i) trade liberalization involves a clear trade-off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is mainly production ; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality; (ii) under openness to trade, the source of the externality matters for redistribution, while it is not the case in autarky. Finally we discuss the impact of an increasing willingness to redistribute income and of a technological shock affecting emissions intensity.
- Thursday 15 May 2014 16:30-18:30
- MSE (room 117)
- Christopher Costello
Biodiversity
Christopher Costello (Bren School of Environmental Science & Management, UC Santa Barbara)
“The private provision of mobile public bads”
Michel De Lara (CERMICS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech & Université Paris-Est)
“A Sequential Decision Stochastic Model of Biodiversity Protection for Ecosystems Services”
- Abstract
Christopher Costello (Bren School of Environmental Science & Management, UC Santa Barbara) joint with Nicolas Quérou and Agnes Tomini
“The private provision of mobile public bads”
We examine theoretically the coordination problem arising across spatial property right owners who harbor a mobile public bad such as fire, invasive species, or agricultural pests. In the absence of a coordination mechanism, owners supply an inefficiently small level of control and the resulting stock of the bad is inefficiently large. We characterize the extent of this market failure both in economic terms (lost rents) and ecological terms (too much of the bad) and determine how it depends on property specific features. But when damage caused by the bad is sufficiently large, we find that complete eradication may be privately optimal (despite the lack of consideration of others’ welfare) – in these cases, eradication arises in the non-cooperative game and is also socially optimal.
Perhaps counterintuitively, then, the magnitude of the market failure may be decreasing in the size of the public bad. In contrast, when property harboring the bad is not owned, or is owned in common, we derive the side payments required to efficiently control the mobile public bad.
Michel De Lara (CERMICS Ecole des Ponts ParisTech & Université Paris-Est) joint with Christopher Costello, Laura Dee and Steve Gaines
“A Sequential Decision Stochastic Model of Biodiversity Protection for Ecosystems Services”
- Thursday 10 April 2014 16:30-18:30
- Climate Economics Chair, Palais Brongniart (4th floor) - 28, place de la Bourse - 75002 Paris
- Energy and IO
Fulvio Fontini (Universita di Padova)
“The Impact of the introduction (or phasing out) of nuclear power on electricity prices in a power exchange-based liberalized market”
Guy Meunier (INRA-UR1303 ALISS & Ecole Polytechnique)
“Risk aversion and technology portfolios”
- Abstract
Fulvio Fontini (Universita di Padova) joint with Eric Guerci
“The Impact of the introduction (or phasing out) of nuclear power on electricity prices in a power exchange-based liberalized market”
In this paper, we evaluate the impact on the electric energy price, formed in a liberalized, power-exchange based market, due to the introduction (or phasing out) of Nuclear Power (NP) plants. In order to do so, we build a realistic large-scale agent-based model that replicates the features of a real market (the Italian one). Firstly, we validate the computational model using exact historical data about supply, demand and network characteristics. A statistical analysis confirms that the simulator well replicates the observed prices. Then, a future scenario is simulated, based on plausible market evolutions and energy carriers’ price dynamics. The future electricity prices are evaluated with and without NP plants. Different NP plants’ ownerships are considered to take into account the possible impact on players’ strategies induced by the introduction (or phasing out) of NP in a liberalized market. Two effects are highlighted, a baseload and a strategic effect. It is shown that NP introduction (phasing out) generally reduces (increases) the prices and volatility. This finding depends however on the size and the volatility of the load, as well as on the ownership of NP.
Guy Meunier (INRA-UR1303 ALISS & Ecole Polytechnique)
“Risk aversion and technology portfolios”
This paper analyzes the choice of a technology portfolio by risk-averse firms. Two technologies with random marginal costs are available to produce a homogeneous good. If the risks that are associated with the technologies are correlated, then the .rms might invest in a technology with a negative expected return or, conversely, might not invest in a technology with a positive expected return. If the technology with the lower expected cost is riskier than the other technology, then this “low-cost” technology will be eliminated from the firm’s portfolio if the risks are highly correlated. With imperfect competition, the portfolios of .firms are di.fferent, and the diff.erence in risk tolerance can explain the full specialization of the industry: The less risk-averse .firms use the low-cost technology, and the more risk-averse .firms use the less risky, higher-cost technology.
- Thursday 13 March 2014 16:30-18:30
- MSE (room 115)
- Government environmental responsability
Karine Nyborg (University of Oslo)
“Reciprocal Climate Negotiators”
Patricia Crifo (Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense) joint with Marc-Arthur Diaye & Rim Oueghlissi
“Measuring the effect of government environmental social and governance performance on sovereign borrowing cost”
- Abstract
Karine Nyborg (University of Oslo)
“Reciprocal Climate Negotiators”
Research in behavioral and experimental economics indicate that reciprocity - the preference to repay mean (kind) intentions by mean (kind) actions – is widespread. If voters and/or individuals in power have reciprocal preferences, countries may conceivably act according to such preferences too. Compared to the case with standard preferences, countries would then be more willing to abate their greenhouse gas emissions, provided that other countries’ behavior is perceived as fair. If others’ behavior is seen as unfair, however, countries would be even less willing to abate than in the standard case. Within a simple model for climate coalition participation, I show that reciprocity may extend the set of feasible outcomes. Several coalition sizes may be stable, including no cooperation, full cooperation, and intermediate cases. Under certain conditions, however, reciprocity can make cooperation even more difficult than in the standard case.
Patricia Crifo (Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense) joint with Marc-Arthur Diaye & Rim Oueghlissi
“Measuring the effect of government environmental social and governance performance on sovereign borrowing cost”
This article examines whether the extra-financial performance of countries on environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors matter for sovereign bonds markets. We propose an econometric analysis of the relationship between ESG performances and government bond spreads of 23 OECD countries over the 2007-2012 period. Our results reveal that ESG ratings significantly decrease government bond spreads and this finding is robust for a wide range of model setups. We also find that the impact of ESG ratings on the cost of sovereign borrowing is more pronounced in bonds of shorter maturities. Finally, we show that extrafinancial performance plays an important role in assessing risk in the financial system. In particular, the informational content of ESG ratings goes beyond the set of quantitative variables traditionally used as determinant of a country’s extra- financial rating including electricity generation, CO2 emissions, forest rents per GDP, share of protected areas, social expenditure per GDP, female to male labor force participation rate, health expenditure per GDP, R&D expenditure per GDP, human development index, regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability, voice and accountability, and corruption control.
- Thursday 20 February 2014 16:30-18:30
- Climate Economics Chair, Palais Brongniart (4th floor) - 28, place de la Bourse - 75002 Paris
- Uncertainty and Environment
Christian Gollier (TSE)
“Evaluation of long-dated investments under uncertain growth trend, volatility and catastrophes”
Natacha Raffin (University Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) joint with Johanna Etner and Meglena Jeleva (University Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense)
“Environmental Uncertainties and Prevention: the Role of Ambiguity Aversion”
- Abstract
Christian Gollier (TSE)
“Evaluation of long-dated investments under uncertain growth trend, volatility and catastrophes”
In this paper, we examine the term structures of interest rates and risk premia when the random walk of economic growth is affected by some parametric uncertainty. Using a time-consistent expected utility framework, we show that parametric uncertainty does not affect assets prices of short maturities. We also show that the same arguments proposed in the literature to justify a decreasing term structure for the safe discount rate also apply to justify an increasing term structure for the risk premium. Another important consequence of parametric uncertainty is that the risk premium is not proportional to the beta of the investment. We apply these general results to the case of an uncertain probability of macroeconomic catastrophes à la Barro (2006), and to the case of an uncertain trend or volatility of growth à la Weitzman (2007). Finally, we apply our findings to the evaluation of climate change policy. We argue in particular that the beta of actions to mitigate climate change is relatively large, so that the term structure of the risk-adjusted discount rates should be increasing.
Natacha Raffin (University Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) joint with Johanna Etner and Meglena Jeleva (University Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense)
“Environmental Uncertainties and Prevention: the Role of Ambiguity Aversion”
Environmental quality evolution and environmental policy involve uncertainties in various dimensions. These uncertainties can often not be represented by a unique, probabilistic belief and thus standard expected utility preferences representation models can not be used for the determination of optimal mitigation and adaptation decisions. Several alternatives for the expected utility model have been proposed in the literature. The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal adaptation and mitigation levels when future environmental quality and the efficiency of adaptation are ambiguous. We consider three models of preferences representation under ambiguity: the smooth ambiguity model, the MaxMin model and the neo-additive capacities model. Hopefully, our results are quite robust to the model chosen. Ambiguity aversion drives the decision maker to undertake the economic instrument that involves less ambiguity.
- Thursday 30 January 2014 16:30-18:30
- MSE (room S17)
- Non-renewable resources
Pierre Lasserre (UQAM)
“The Supply of Non-Renewable Resources”
Raphaël Soubeyran (INRA - LAMETA)
“Recycling and Extraction of an Exhaustible Resource: The Case of Phosphorus”
- Abstract
Pierre Lasserre (UQAM) joint with Julien Daubanes (ETH Zürich)
“The Supply of Non-Renewable Resources”
There exists no formal treatment of non-renewable resource (NRR) supply, systematically deriving quantity as function of price. We establish instantaneous restricted (fixed reserves) and unrestricted NRR supply functions. The supply of a NRR at any date not only depends on the contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other dates. Besides the usual law of supply, which characterizes the own-price effect, cross-price effects have their own law. They can be decomposed into an intertemporal substitution effect and a stock compensation effect. We show that the substitution effect always dominates: a price increase at some date causes NRR supply to decrease at all other dates. This new but orthodox supply setting extends to NRR the partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies. The properties of restricted and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for Hotelling (homogenous) as well as Ricardian (non homogenous) resources, for a single deposit as well as for several deposits that endogenously come into production or cease to be active.
Raphaël Soubeyran (INRA - LAMETA)
“Recycling and Extraction of an Exhaustible Resource: The Case of Phosphorus”
The depletion of phosphorus, an essential component in fertilizer, may have disastrous consequences for worldwide food production. Phosphorus is an exhaustible and recyclable natural resource, it is mainly consumed in developed countries but the worldwide stock is mainly concentrated in Morocco. The paper shows that, when an exhaustible resource is produced by a monopolistic …firm, recycling by independent recyclers affects the pace of extraction of the resource. Whether recycling slows down or accelerates extraction depends on the relative strength of two forces because early extraction increases recyclable materials and late extraction compete with recycled materials.
- Thursday 9 January 2014 16:30-18:30
- Climate Economics Chair
- Environment, migrations and conflicts
Nicola D. Coniglio (University of Bari and NHH)
“Climate Variability and International Migration: an empirical analysis” - Abstract
Nicola D. Coniglio (University of Bari and NHH) joint with G. Pesce
“Climate Variability and International Migration: an empirical analysis”
Climate shocks and international migration flows are phenomena which attract a great deal of attention from policymakers, researchers and the general public around the globe. Are these two phenomena related? Is migration an adaptation strategy to sudden or gradual changes in climate? In this paper our aim is to investigate whether countries that are affected by climatic shocks with respect to long-term mean experience larger outmigration flows toward rich OECD countries in the period 1990-2001. Contrarily to the bulk of existing studies we use a macro approach and analyse the determinants of international bilateral migration flows employing an augmented gravity-like equation and test the relevance of climate anomalies in temperature and precipitation. One important novelty in our approach is the explicit consideration of the heterogeneous nature of
climate shocks (type, size, sign of shocks and seasonal effects). Our results show that the occurrence of climate anomalies in origin countries might have relevant effects on outmigration from poor to rich countries.
- Thursday 19 December 2013 16:30-18:30
- MSE (room 114)
- Energy efficiency
Herman Vollebergh (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
“Reducing Rents from Energy Technology Adoption Programs by Exploiting Observable Information”
Matthieu Glachant (Cerna - Mines ParisTech)
“Consumers’ implicit discount rate and impacts of energy taxation: Evidence from the UK refrigerator market”
- Abstract
Herman Vollebergh (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) joint with Rob Aalbers (CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis) and Henri L. F. De Groot (VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics; Tinbergen Institute)
“Reducing Rents from Energy Technology Adoption Programs by Exploiting Observable Information”
In this paper, we study how regulators may improve upon the efficiency of their energy technology adoption programs by exploiting readily observable information to limit rent extraction by firms. Using panel data on 862 investment decisions in the Netherlands, we find that rent extraction is closely linked not only to technology characteristics, but also to the firm’s capital budgetting technique. In particular, we find that firms are more likely to extract rent when either the technology’s pay-back period or its required investment is lower, but less likely if they do not use a formal capital budgeting technique. Standard firm characteristics, such as size and sector, correlate with firms’ use of capital budgeting techniques, thereby partly resolving the regulator’s asymmetric information problem.
Matthieu Glachant (Cerna - Mines ParisTech) joint with Froiçois Cohen (Cerna) and Magnus Soderberg (Cerna)
“Consumers’ implicit discount rate and impacts of energy taxation: Evidence from the UK refrigerator market”
It is frequently argued in policy circles that imperfect information and other cognitive constraints may lead consumers to discard privately profitable investments in energy efficiency. Using productlevel panel data from 2002 to 2007 on the UK refrigerator market and a discrete-choice framework, we reject this view: our estimate is that purchasers of refrigerators implicitly discount future electricity costs at a reasonably low rate of 10.5%. As consumers apparently make rational investment decisions, taxing energy would be the route to further increase energy efficiency.
However, we make simulations which demonstrate a very small elasticity of energy use to the price of electricity (-0.16). The reason is that most of the energy cost increase is compensated by suppliers through relatively larger price reductions of highly energy consuming products. This finding calls for moving attention in the energy efficiency debate to the pricing behavior of manufacturers of durables.
- Thursday 28 November 2013 16:30-18:30
- Climate Economics Chair
- Climate change and international negotiations
Carolyn Fischer (Resources for the Future)
“Strategic technology policy as supplement to renewable energy standards”
Jean-Charles Hourcade (CIRED)
“Monetary compensations in climate policy through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment: The case of oil-exporting countries”
- Abstract
Carolyn Fischer (Resources for the Future) joint with Mads Greaker (Statistics Norway) and Knut-Einar Rosendahl (Statistics Norway)
“Strategic technology policy as supplement to renewable energy standards”
Renewable energy standards have been introduced in several countries as a supplement to climate policy. In addition some countries also subsidize the use of renewable energy or the producers of renewable energy capital. In this paper we examine the rationale for such policies.
Our point of departure is that a renewable energy standard creates new profit opportunities for firms that supply renewable energy capital. With imperfect competition among technology suppliers, technology policy could be used strategically. To our knowledge our paper is the first paper to analyze this case for industrial policy.
We consider subsidies provided downstream to renewable energy suppliers and/or upstream to renewable energy capital producers. To the extent that there is imperfect competition upstream, subsidies may improve welfare both globally and nationally.
Moreover, upstream subsidies are preferred over downstream subsidies from a national perspective. Finally, we show that strategically chosen subsidies by individual countries could in fact be optimal from a global perspective, too, given that the shadow price of emissions is correct from a global perspective.
Jean-Charles Hourcade (CIRED) joint with Henri Waisman (CIRED) and Julie Rozenberg (CIRED)
“Monetary compensations in climate policy through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment: The case of oil-exporting countries”
This paper investigates the compensations that major oil producers have claimed for since the Kyoto Protocol in order toalleviate the adverse impacts of climate policy on their economies.The amount of these adverse impacts is assessed through a general equilibrium model which endogenizes both the reduction of oil exportation revenues under international climate policy and the macroeconomic effect of carbon pricing on Middle-East’s economy. We show that compensating the drop of exportation revenues does not offset GDP and welfare losses because of the time profile of the general equilibrium effects. When considering instead compensation based on GDP losses, the effectiveness of monetary transfers proves to be drastically limited by general equilibrium effects in opened economies. The main channels of this efficiency gap are investigated and its magnitude proves to be conditional upon strategic and policy choices of the Middle-East. This leads us to suggest that other means than direct monetary compensating transfers should be discussed to engage the Middle-East in climate policies.
- Thursday 7 November 2013 16:30-18:30
- MSE (room 117)
- Global public good and sustainable development
Kirill Borissov (European University at Saint-Petersbourg)
“Ocean Economics”
Vincent Martinet (INRA - UMR Economie Publique)
“An environmental-economic measure of sustainable development”
- Abstract
Kirill Borissov (European University at Saint-Petersbourg) joint with Thierry Bréchet (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE), Stéphane Lambrecht (Université de Valenciennes et du Hainaut - Cambrésis and IDP, EQUIPPE - U. Lille 1 and CORE - UCLouvain) and Mikhail Pakhnin (Saint-Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics)
“Ocean Economics”
The ocean is the only renewable natural resource which is a global public good and provides productive services to the global economy. As a public good, the ocean suffers the tragedy of commons. A typical solution suggested by the economic theory to the tragedy of commons is to establish property rights. But, unlike land, the ocean cannot be split into individual plots. The failure is primarily a governance failure: there does not exist a global government able to manage the ocean efficiently.
In this paper we compare these two solutions suggested by the economic theory: creation of a global government or delegation to a private company. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of a global economy endowed with a renewable natural resource used by a competitive production sector to produce a final consumption good. Agents are heterogeneous in their time preference. We order the set of individuals by decreasing discount factors. In the case of public property, ecological democracy applies: one individual, one vote. Individuals vote on the extraction rate and receive the natural resource rent as a lump sum. In the case of private property, the natural resource is managed by a private company owned by shareholders. The shares can be bought and sold by individuals (households). The shareholders then vote on the extraction rate (one share, one vote) and they receive the rent. This is ecological capitalism.
We propose a definition of voting equilibrium in a dynamic setting. We prove the existence of voting equilibria and describe their asymptotic properties. In voting equilibria the desired extraction rate of each individual is determined by her own discount factor, and the desired extraction rate is decreasing in the individual’s discount factor. A key result is that the equilibrium extraction rates will be fully determined by the discount factors.
The steady states depend on the median discount factor in the case of public property, and on the discount factor of the most patient individuals in the case of private property. While private property
leads to income inequality between the most patient individuals and the others, there is no income inequality with public property. If the discount factor of the most patient individual is higher than the median discount factor, then, with private property, the extraction rate is lower and the resource stock and the output level are higher than with public property. In the long run, the economy is wealthier with private property but exhibits income inequality. Thus there exists a trade-off when comparing the two property regimes between income equality and global wealth.
Vincent Martinet (INRA - UMR Economie Publique) joint with Robert Cairns (McGill University)
“An environmental-economic measure of sustainable development”
A central issue in the study of sustainable development is the interplay of growth and sacrifice in a dynamic economy. This paper investigates the relationship among current consumption, sacrifice, and sustainability improvement in a general context and in two canonical, stylized economies. We argue that the maximin value of utility measures what is sustainable and provides the limit to growth. Maximin value is interpreted as a dynamic environmental-economic carrying capacity and current utility as an environmental-economic footprint. The time derivative of maximin value is interpreted as net investment in sustainability improvement. It is called durable savings to distinguish it from genuine savings, usually computed with discounted-utilitarian prices.
- Thursday 10 October 2013 16:30-18:30
- Climate Economics Chair
- Environmental economics and competition
Juan-Pablo Montero (PUC)
“Why electricity firms don’t contract forward that much”
Anna Creti (Dauphine University) and Maria-Eugenia Sanin (University of Evry)
“Commitment to Environmental Taxation under R&D Competition”
- Abstract
Juan-Pablo Montero (PUC)
“Why electricity firms don’t contract forward that much”
Anna Creti (Dauphine University) and Maria-Eugenia Sanin (University of Evry)
“Commitment to Environmental Taxation under R&D Competition”
One of the main arguments behind environmental regulation is that it provides incentives to adopt more efficient abatement technologies. In this paper we compare different commitment tax schemes in terms of adoption and efficiency when accounting for a non-competitive R&D sector that offers two technologies with differentiated value both in terms of quality and adaptability to polluting …firms. Our modelling choice is inspired by the Californian Green Chemistry Initiative and responds to the need to analyze the role of environmental regulation in complex R&D market structures. In contrast with Parry (1995) and Requate (2005), our main result is that the ex ante second best tax may be higher or lower than pollution marginal damage. Moreover, we are the …first to characterize how commitment to environmenal taxes determines the strategies of R&D …rms, which in turn determines the adoption pattern of the most efficient abatement technology.
- Thursday 19 September 2013 16:30-18:30
- MSE (room S17)
- Natural resources and game theory
Hassan Benchekroun (McGill University)
“On the effects of partial coalitions on equilibrium strategies and profits in a common property renewable resource oligopoly”
Fabien Prieur (LAMETA, University Montpellier 1 and INRA)
“Resource exploitation, growth, and the timing of conflict-related regime change”
- Abstract
Hassan Benchekroun (McGill University), joint with Gerard Gaudet (Université de Montreal)
“On the effects of partial coalitions on equilibrium strategies and profits in a common property renewable resource oligopoly”
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a coalition of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the coalition on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the coalition for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset’s stock such that any coalition is profitable if the stock at the time the coalition is formed falls within that interval. That includes coalitions that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.
Fabien Prieur (LAMETA, University Montpellier 1 and INRA), joint with Raouf Boucekkine (AMSE and GREQAM)- and Klarizze Puzon (LAMETA)
“Resource exploitation, growth, and the timing of conflict-related regime change”
We build a dynamic framework that allows for the endogenous determination of the timing of political regime change. A resource-dependent society is assumed to be composed of an incumbent elite and the opposing citizens. In the initial regime, the elite benefits from dictatorship and has absolute control over resource wealth. Under elite dictatorship with a revolutionary threat, the elite always transfers a fixed fraction of the resource to the citizens. The decision to conduct a revolution is hence modeled as a regime switching problem. A revolt results to a second regime of equal access over the resource. The citizens have to decide whether or not to instigate costly conflict against the elite, and when. This decision is also dependent on whether the elite’s behavior is growth-friendly or indolent. Different from previous literature, our integral contribution lies on the determination of the switching time. Under growth-friendly leadership, a revolt always occurs when the citizens’ direct switching cost is low. When the cost is high, the elite is able to provide concessionary transfers sufficient enough to hinder a revolt. When there is indolent leadership, a regime with permanent elite dictatorship is possible whatever the switching cost. Thus, the economy might be caught into a low growth trap with weak institutions.
- Thursday 20 June 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (salle des thèses, bâtiment Jacob, 5ème étage)
- Robert Tol (University of Sussex)
Targets for global climate policy: An overview - Abstract
A survey of the economic impact of climate change and the marginal damage costs shows that carbon dioxide emissions are a negative externality. The estimated Pigou tax and its growth rate are too low to justify the climate policy targets set by political leaders. A lower discount rate or greater concern for the global distribution of income would justify more stringent climate policy, but would imply an overhaul of other public policies. Catastrophic risk justifies more stringent climate policy, but only to a limited extent.
- Thursday 13 June 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (salle des thèses, bâtiment Jacob, 5ème étage)
- Robert J.R. Elliot (University of Birmingham)
International Environmental Outsourcing
joint with M. Cole (U. Birmingham) and T. Okubo (Keio University) - Abstract
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of firms shifting stages of their production processes overseas. In this paper we investigate whether firms outsource the dirtier stages of production to minimise domestic environmental regulation costs – a process broadly consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis. We develop a theoretical model of international environmental outsourcing that focuses on the roles played by firm size and productivity, transport costs and environmental regulations. We test the model’s predictions using a firm-level data set for Japan and do find evidence of an ‘environmental outsourcing’ effect.
- Thursday 16 May 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (room J 238 - 2nd floor, Building Jacob)
- Stephen Salant (University of Michigan)
Limits to Limiting Greenhouse Gases: Intertemporal Leakage, Spatial Leakage, and Negative Leakage
joint with Carolyn Fisher (RFF) - Abstract
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the Green Paradox (Hoel, 2011 and Harstad, 2012) that distinguishes between regulated and unregulated regions in a Hotelling framework. In our model, different grades of oil are characterized by different costs, emission factors, and underground reserves; furthermore, the clean backstop experiences cost-reducing technical change. As a result, even unregulated consumers may switch from fossil fuels to the backstop before exhausting them. Hence, cumulative emissions reductions can occur in this model, and we identify circumstances in which reducing emissions in the regulating coalition also induces reductions among unregulated consumers-“negative leakage”. Increasing an emissions tax, increasing the size of the regulated coalition and accelerating backstop cost reductions are policy substitutes for achieving a target emissions reduction. Given the difficulties in securing international cooperation on global warming, promoting technical change in clean energy sources may be a more effective instrument for reducing carbon emissions.
- Thursday 25 April 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle R229, 2ème étage, Bâtiment principal)
- Andreas Lange (University of Hamburg)
Transparency and Accountability - Experimental Evidence from an Asymmetric Public Good Game
joint with Menusch Khadjavi and Andreas Nicklisch - Abstract
Transparency and accountability are often regarded as crucial for good governance and the efficient organization of public affairs. To systematically explore the impact of transparency and accountability on cooperation, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments on a variation of the public good game with asymmetric agents. While (standard) agents may only contribute to the public good, some (special) agents do not only have the option to contribute to the public good, but may also deteriorate it to their own advantage. In the absence of a sanction mechanism, transparency backfires: special agents extract significantly more resources for higher transparency, while standard agents delink their contributions from the special agents’ actions. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism, even a low degree of transparency sustains contributions to the public good: low transparency creates accountability of special agents for deterioration of the public good, since stigmatization allows standard agents to punish make them for non-cooperation. Finally, high transparency establishes higher contributions of standard agents, as it allows targeted punishment, thereby creating accountability of non-cooperative special agents and standard agents.
- Thursday 11 April 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006
- Matti Liski (University of Helsinki)
No news is good news in climate change?
joint with Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg)
Download the paper : http://hse-econ.fi/liski/papers/CarbonLearning.pdf
- Abstract
We develop a tractable climate-economy model for evaluating a price for carbon when climate change impacts are non-existing — they may arrive later. We identify the general-equilibrium value of learning (or not learning) the economic losses from impacts. The value justifies increasing carbon prices due to the increasing vulnerability to impacts when the global economy expands, although the assessment on climate change becomes more optimistic. The model produces a belief distribution for the social cost of carbon that can be calibrated to match a comprehensive survey of previous estimates. Even when climate change progresses without impacts for the coming century, the carbon price continues to increase as suggested by the “climate policy ramp” of existing evaluations. The quantitative assessment justifies climate policies for a rational skeptic.
JEL classification: H43; H41; D61; D91; Q54; E21.
Keywords: carbon tax, learning, climate change
Download the paper :
http://hse-econ.fi/liski/papers/CarbonLearning.pdf
- Thursday 28 March 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (room Curie B - 4th floor of the main building)
- Georges Zaccour (HEC Montreal)
An Empirical Differential Game for Sustainable Forest Management - Abstract
We model the role of the world’s forests as a major carbon sink and consider the impact that forest depletion has on the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. Two types of agents are considered: forest owners who exploit the forest and draw economic revenues in the form of timber and agricultural use of deforested land; and a non-forest-owner group who pollutes and suffers the negative externality of having a decreasing forest stock. We retrieve the cooperative solution for this game and show the cases in which cooperation enables a partial reduction in the negative externality. We analyze when it is jointly profitable to abate emissions, when it is profitable to reduce net deforestation, and when it is optimal to do both (abate and reduce net deforestation). It is shown how the cooperative solution can be sustained by means of a time-consistent payment mechanism.
- Thursday 14 March 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (room Curie B - 4th floor of the main building)
- Thomas Lyon (University of Michigan)
Linking Public and Private Politics: Activist Strategies for Industry Transformation
joint with Steve Salant (University of Michigan) - Abstract
We build a model of activist campaigns against corporations that captures both their direct impact through private politics, and their indirect impact through changing targeted firms’ incentives to engage in public politics. A strategic activist seeks to transform the behavior of an industry, and influence it to adopt a costly green technology that will reduce environmental damages. To do so, the activist can mount a campaign to convince one or more firms in an industry to adopt the green technology. The activist considers both the direct environmental benefits of a firm’s adoption, as well as its indirect effects through changes in the industry’s lobbying behavior. We characterize the activist’s optimal strategy and how it varies with underlying variables such as the cost of the alternative technologies, environmental benefits of technology adoption, and cost heterogeneity within the industry.
- Thursday 7 March 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle Vieussens C, Bâtiment Principal, 7ème étage)
- Matthew Neidell (Columbia University)
Climate, Human Capital, and Adaptation
joint with Joshua Graff Zivin (UC-San Diego and NBER) and Solomon M. Hsian (Princeton University and UC-Berkeley) - Abstract
We provide the first estimates of the potential impact of climate change on human capital, focusing on the impacts from both short-run weather and long-run climate. Exploiting the longitudinal structure of the NLSY79 and random fluctuations in weather across interviews to estimate well-identified models of the effect of temperature, we find that short-run changes in temperature lead to statistically significant decreases in cognitive performance on math (but not reading) beyond 26C (78.8F). Turning to the long-run effect of climate, we estimate cross-sectional models and exploit the richness of the NLSY79 to control for numerous background factors, including the mother’s and grandparents’ human capital. We do not find a statistically significant relationship between climate and human capital, suggesting that adaptation plays a significant role over longer time periods. When we directly examine the effect of air conditioning as a form of adaptation, we find that, consistent with short-run results, climate is significantly related to math (but not reading) human capital. The adoption of air conditioning effectively offsets the penalty from 4.5C (8.1F) additional degree days above 21C, though we present some suggestive evidence on the limits of air conditioning as a protective measure in very warm climates.
- Thursday 21 February 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle R229, 2ème étage, Bâtiment principal)
- Vlasios Voudouris (London Metropolitan Business School)
The ACEGES laboratory for energy policy: Exploring the production of crude oil
- Thursday 7 February 2013 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle R229, Bâtiment principal)
- Claude Crampes (TSE)
Increasing-block tariff and electricity poverty
joint with Jean-Marie Lozachmeur (TSE)
- Thursday 17 January 2013 16:30-18:00
- Due to the refurbishment of Paris V site, this week the seminar will exceptionnally take place at Fondation de l’X, 33 Rue Saint Guillaume, 75007 Paris, in the “Grande Salle”.
- Lucas Bretschger (ETH Zürich)
Energy Prices, Growth, and the Channels in Between: Theory and Evidence - Abstract
Abstract
The paper first looks at empirical evidence on energy use and growth in an international comparison. It then develops a theoretical framework to show how energy affects investments and economic growth. Empirical estimations using single equation methods and a system with five simultaneous equations for a sample of 37 developed countries with five-year average panel data over the period 1975-2009 are presented. It is shown that rising energy prices are not a threat to long-run development. On the contrary, I find conditions under which decreasing energy input induces investments in physical and knowledge capital. A ten percent increase in energy prices is found to raise the growth rate by 0.2 percentage points.
- Thursday 13 December 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (room “Curie D”, fourth floor in the main building)
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur (Université de Lille 1)
Looking Ahead versus Looking Back: Revisiting the Carbon Tax
joint with Justin Leroux (HEC Montreal)
- Thursday 22 November 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Christopher Beghin (Iowa State University)
Trade Restrictiveness Indices in Presence of Externalities: An Application to Non-Tariff Measures
joint with Anne-Celia Disdier (Paris School of Economics-INRA), and Stéphan Marette (INRA)
- Thursday 8 November 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob)
- Charles Mason (University of Wyoming)
Trade, Transboundary pollution, and foreign lobbying
joint with V. Umanskaya (University of California-Riverside) and E. Barbier (University of Wyoming)
- Thursday 25 October 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle R229 Bâtiment PRINCIPAL)
- Bahattin Buyuksahin (International Energy Agency)
Does paper-oil matters? Energy markets financialization and equity-commodities comovements
joint with M. A. Robe (Kogod School of Business at American University)
- Thursday 11 October 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob)
- Ulrich J. Wagner (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Industry compensation under the risk of relocation
joint with R. Martin (LSE), M. Muûls (Grantham Institute for Climate Change), L. De Preux (University of York)
- Thursday 20 September 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (room “Curie D”, fourth floor in the main building)
- Robert Cairns (McGill school of environment, CIREQ)
The green Paradox and the misapplication of the economics of exhaustible resources
- Thursday 21 June 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Thomas Olivier Leautier (TSE, IDEI)
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- Thursday 21 June 2012 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques (salle 115), 106-112 bd de l’Hôpital 75013 Paris
- Séance exceptionnelle
- Ujjayant Chakravorty (University of Alberta)
Biofuels, Food Prices and Poverty
- Thursday 7 June 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Wolfram Schlenker (Columbia University)
Airports, Air Pollution, and Contemporaneous Health - Abstract
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- Thursday 31 May 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Steve Salant (University of Michigan)
Experimental Departures from Self-Interest when Competing Partnerships Share Output
- Thursday 3 May 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Scott Taylor (Calgary University)
Back to the Future of Green Powered Economies
- From 12 April 2012 16:30 to 17 May 2012 18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Natalia Fabra (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Internalization and Passthrough of Emission Costs in Electricity Markets
- Thursday 5 April 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Madhu Khanna (University of Illinois)
Alternative Transportation Fuel Standards: Welfare Effects and Climate Benefits
- Thursday 22 March 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Sjak Smulders (Tilburg University)
Resource extraction, backstop technologies and growth
joint with Gerard Van der Meijden (VU University Amsterdam)
- Thursday 8 March 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Larry Karp (University of Berkeley)
Provision of a public good with altruistic overlapping generations and many tribes
- Thursday 23 February 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- George Mackerron (LSE)
Hapiness is greater in natural environments
joint with S. Mourato (LSE)
- Thursday 9 February 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Ian Parry (IMF, RFF)
Environmental tax reform: principles from theory and practice to date
joint with J. Norregaard and D. Heine
- Thursday 26 January 2012 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Geir Asheim (University of Oslo)
Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model
- Thursday 15 December 2011 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Room Wilkins, Main building Second Floor)
- Louis Hotte (University of Ottawa)
On the Dual Nature of Weak Property Rights
joint with Randy McFerrin and Douglas Wills
- Thursday 8 December 2011 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Dimitrios Varvarigos (Leicester University)
Growth and demographic change: Do environmental factors matter ?
- Thursday 24 November 2011 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Rolf Golombeck (Frisch Centre for Economic Research-Oslo)
Is Electricity More Important than Natural Gas? Partial Liberalizations of Western European Energy Markets
joint with K. A. Brekke (University of Oslo) and S.A. Kittelsen (Frisch Centre)
- Thursday 10 November 2011 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Nils-Henrik von der Ferh (University of Oslo)
Green certificates, Vertical integration and market power
joint with Stephanie Ropenus (University of Oslo)
- Thursday 20 October 2011 17:30-19:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle MENDELL A )
- Jayson Lusk (Oklahoma State University)
A calibrated auction-conjoint valuation method: Valuing pork and eggs produced under differing animal welfare conditions
joint with Bailey Norwood (Oklaoma State University) - Abstract
This paper develops a valuation method which generates consistent and systematic estimates of people’s preferences for complex multi-attribute goods by inextricably linking auction bids with conjoint ratings. The advantage of the valuation approach is that it permits the estimation of people’s values for many potential goods, allows one to decompose people’s values for a good into its sub-components, and permits the study of preference heterogeneity without distributional assumptions. We apply the method to an important and increasingly controversial topic: animal welfare. The method is used to determine people’s preferences for eggs and pork produced from different production systems. Data from experiments conducted in three diverse U.S. locations (Chicago, IL; Dallas, TX; and Wilmington, NC) indicates that people are, on average, willing to pay $0.95 more for a dozen eggs raised in an aviary, pasture system vs. a cage system, and are willing to pay $2.02 more for two-pounds of pork chops raised in a pasture system as opposed to a crate system.
The paper is available
here.
- Thursday 6 October 2011 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Elena Verdolini (FEEM)
“Heterogeneous Firms Trading in Ideas : An Application to Energy Technologies”
joint with Valentina Bosetti (FEEM) - Abstract
Notwithstanding the central role attributed to technology transfer (TT) and the effort to promote it through the creation of permanent international bodies such as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice of the UNFCCC, very little is known about the determinants of this process with respect to climate tech- nologies. This paper marries the literature on international trade with that on innova- tion and TT in carbon efficient technologies, making a number of important contribu- tions. First, a model of monopolistic competition shows how the decision to export a blueprint/technology depends on market and institutional characteristics of the receiv- ing country, on the geographical and technological distance of the two countries and on the quality of the innovator’s ideas. Asymmetry of TT are the result of differences in innovation levels and ideas productivity. Second, we empirically test our model using carefully selected patent data for both developed and developing countries. Greater geographical and technological distance hinders patenting. Conversely, lower financial risks in the receiving country is associated with higher levels of patent duplication. This effect is however influenced by the stage of economic develoment of the receiving country.
The paper is available
here.
- Thursday 29 September 2011 16:30-18:00
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle VIEUSSENS C-7ème étage)
- David Martimort (PSE)
“A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements”
joint with Wilfried Sand-Zantman - Abstract
The paper is available
here.
- Thursday 23 June 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Denny Ellermann (MIT and Florence School of Regulation)
The EU-ETS: Path to the future or dead end?
- Thursday 9 June 2011 15:30-17:00
- Cerna - MINES ParisTech - 60 boulevard Saint Michel (Salle L109)
- Exceptional Seminar: David Baron (Stanford University)
at The Economics of Corporate Social Responsability Conference, Paris 9th-10th June 2011 organized by Mines Paris Tech, Paris School of Economics and Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne.
- Thursday 26 May 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle CURIE E, Main Building)
- Stef Proost (K.U. Leuven)
Strategic incentives for car fuel taxes and R&D fuel efficiency subsidies - Abstract
The paper is available
here.
- Thursday 12 May 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Till Requate (University of Kiel)
Investment Incentives under Emission Trading: An experimental study
joint with Eva Camacho-Cuena (University Jaume 1er of Castellon) and Israel Waichman (University of Kiel)
- From 2 to 3 May 2011
- 21èmes Rencontres de l’Environnement
Les Rencontres de l’environnement, nées en 2004 d’une initiative conjointe de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne et de l’Université catholique de Louvain (CORE), réunissent des économistes de l’environnement français et francophones.
- Thursday 28 April 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Anastasios Xepapadeas (Athens University of Economics)
Spatial Energy Balance Climate Models and the Economics of Climate Change
joint with William Brock (University of Wisconsin) and Gustav Engstrom (The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics)
- Thursday 31 March 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Elisabeth Sadoulet (Berkeley University)
Can a populist political party bear the risk of granting property rights? Electoral outcomes of Mexico’s second land reform
- Thursday 17 March 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg University)
Energy Abundance, Trade and Industry Location
- Thursday 3 March 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Antoine Dechezleprêtre (London School of Economics)
Carbon taxes, Path Dependency and Directed Technical Change : Evidence from the Auto Industry
- Thursday 17 February 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Leonardo Meeus (EUI Florence, KULeuven)
Why (and how) to regulate Power Exchanges in the EU market integration context?
- Thursday 3 February 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Michael Dorsch (AUP)
Explaining the Willingness to Pay for Environmental Protection
- Thursday 20 January 2011 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Christoph Heinzel (LERNA, TsE)
Distorted Time Preferences and Time-to-build in the Transition to a Low-carbon Energy Industry
- Thursday 6 January 2011 16:00-16:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- TBA
tba
- Thursday 16 December 2010 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Timo Goeschl (University of Heidelberg)
Long-term environmental problems and strategic intergenerational transfers
- From 10 December 2010 09:00 to 11 December 2010 17:00
- Rencontres de l’environnement
Montpellier
- Thursday 2 December 2010 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné (HEC Montreal)
Polluters and Abaters - Abstract
- Thursday 25 November 2010 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Marcel Boyer (CIRANO, University of Montreal)
Liability sharing and safety regulation for the prevention of environmental/industrial accidents
- From 18 November 2010 09:00 to 19 November 2010 18:00
- CERDI - University of Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand
- Environment and Natural Resources Management in Developing and Transition Economies
- Abstract
- Thursday 28 October 2010 16:00-17:30
- Christoph Heinzel (LERNA, TsE)
Séminaire annulé pour cause de difficultés de transport.
- Thursday 14 October 2010 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Salle des thèses, 5e étage Bâtiment Jacob )
- Claude Henry (SciencePO and Columbia University)
Scientific Uncertainty and Fabricated Uncertainty: from Tobacco to Climate
- Thursday 30 September 2010 16:00-17:30
- 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 (Amphi Giroud, 3ème étage Bâtiment principal )
- Cees Withagen (VU University Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute)
Is there really a green paradox?
joint with R. Van der Ploeg - Abstract
- Thursday 17 June 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, 1er étage sur cour de la MSE
- Joel Bruneau, University of Saskatchewan, Canada
Pollution Terms of Trade and the Composition of Manufacturing
- Thursday 3 June 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, 1er étage sur cour de la MSE
- Gilles Lafforgue, Toulouse School of Economics (INRA and LERNA)
“Optimal capture and sequestration from the carbon emission flow and from the atmospheric carbon stock with heterogeneous energy consuming sectors”
Co-auteurs : Jean-Pierre Amigues (INRA and LERNA) et Michel Moreaux (IDEI and LERNA)
- Thursday 20 May 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, 1er étage sur cour de la MSE
- Mireille CHIROLEU-ASSOULINE (Université Paris 1, CES et PSE)
“Green Leader or Green Liar? Differentiation and the role of NGOs” - Abstract
Résumé :
This paper addresses how corporate environmentalism can be a means of differentiation and of green-washing. Since consumers can seldom directly observe a firm’s environmental quality (a problem not easily solved through eco-labeling), published environmental reports and advertising can mislead them. As a result, the role of the NGO becomes both crucial and ambiguous. On the one hand, by helping to increase consumer awareness, NGOs enlarge the market share of green differentiated firms. On the other hand, the risk that consumers will punish a firm perceived to be supplying inaccurate environmental information may bring about the paradoxical result of discouraging differentiation efforts.
- Thursday 6 May 2010 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, salle 17
- Ulrich J. Wagner (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid and CEP-LSE, London)
The Impacts of the Climate Change Levy on Business: Evidence from Microdata
Co-auteurs : Ralf Martin et Laure B. de Preux
- Thursday 25 March 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, MSE
- Lisa ANOULIES
The effect of trade integration on local and global pollution
- Thursday 11 March 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, MSE
- Thomas LYON (University of Michigan)
Competing Environmental Labels
- Thursday 18 February 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, RDC de la MSE
- Bertrand MAGNE (AIE)
World Energy Outlook 2009: Post-2012 climate policy framework
- Thursday 11 February 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 17, RDC de la MSE
- Philippe QUIRION (CIRED)
L’impact du système européen de quotas de CO2 sur la compétitivité industrielle : une analyse économétrique - Abstract
Co-auteurs : Marie-Laure Nauleau
- Thursday 4 February 2010 14:00-15:30
- Salle 19, RDC de la MSE
- Stéphanie MONJON (CIRED)
Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: results from the CASE II model
Co-auteur : Philippe QUIRION (CIRED)
- Thursday 28 January 2010 14:00-15:30
- María Eugenia SANIN (ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE)
Choosing a trading counterpart in the U.S. acid rain market
- Thursday 7 January 2010 14:00-16:00
- Salle 19, Maison des Sciences Economiques, RDC
- Jean De Beir (EPEE, Université d’Evry)
Alcoa re-revisité : Recyclage, pouvoir de marché et politiques environnementales
Co-auteur : G. Girmens (Université Toulouse 1)
- Thursday 17 December 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques salle S117 1er et.
- Stephen AMBEC (LERNA-INRA, Université Toulouse 1)
On the polluter-pays principle - Abstract
We consider the problem of regulating pollution in a general framework with externalities. A mechanism or regulation defines payments contingent on emissions and their impact on pollution. We characterize the polluter-pays principle as the only budget-balanced mechanism that is efficient, assigns non-negative welfare and renders agents responsible for their pollution impact. Next we examine its acceptability by agents. A mechanism is acceptable if no group of agents can be made better-off with another mechanism. We show that the polluter-pays principle might not be acceptable. It is acceptable if externalities are multilateral among homogenous agents.
Texte Upon Request auprès de l’auteur (sambec at toulouse.inra.fr)
- Thursday 10 December 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques salle S19 RDC
- Helene OLLIVIER (Ecole Polytechnique)
Growth, deforestation and the efficiency of the REDD mechanism - Abstract
Texte Upon Request auprès de l’auteur (helene.ollivier at gmail.com)
- Thursday 19 November 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques salle S19 RDC
- John MAXWELL (Indiana University)
Preempting uncertain regulatory threats
Co-author: Thomas P. LYON
- Thursday 12 November 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques salle S19 RDC
- Jean-Charles HOURCADE (CIRED)
Economie d’une fiscalité carbone en France
Co-auteurs : Emmanuel Combet, Frédéric Ghersi, Camille Thubin
- Thursday 5 November 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques salle S19 RDC
- Pierre LASSERRE (CIREQ, CIRANO, Montréal)
A Real Option Approach to the Protection of a Habitat Dependent Endangered Species
- Thursday 29 October 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques salle S19 RDC
- Laure Cabantous, Olivier Chanel et Jean-Christophe Vergnaud
Transports, santé et réchauffement climatique : A la recherche d’une politique optimale
- Thursday 2 July 2009 14:00-16:00
- Salle 314
- Sophie BERNARD (University of OTTAWA)
Remanufacturing
- Thursday 11 June 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Céline NAUGES, LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
TBA
- Thursday 28 May 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Daan VAN SOEST, Tilburg University
TBA
- Thursday 7 May 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Catherine BOBTCHEFF et Thomas MARIOTTI, Université de Perpignan, LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/Bobtcheff-Mariotti.pdf" title='PDF - 235.4 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 235.4 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Potential Competitors in Preemption Games
- Thursday 30 April 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Mathieu Glachant et Antoine Dechezleprêtre
What drives international transfers of climate change mitigation technologies? Empirical evidence from patent data
- Thursday 9 April 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Fabien PRIEUR, Université de Savoie
TBA
- Thursday 26 March 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Sandrine SPAETER, Université Nancy II - BETA
TBA
- Thursday 12 March 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Michel DE LARA, CERMICS-Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
- Thursday 5 March 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Michel MOREAUX, Université Toulouse 1, LERNA
- Thursday 26 February 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Philippe MAHENC, Université de Perpignan, LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/Mahenc.pdf" title='PDF - 204.8 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 204.8 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Harnessing Market Forces to Regulate Pollution
- Thursday 12 February 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Dominique PRUNETTI, Julien CIUCCI, Université de Corse
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/Maupertuis-Prunetti-Ciucci.pdf" title='PDF - 243 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 243 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Spatial Distribution of Economic Activities and Transboundary Pollution
- From 29 January 2009 14:00 to 29 March 2009 15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314 - Annule - Cause Grève
- Seminaire ANNULE
- Thursday 15 January 2009 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Natalia ZUGRAVU, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/zugravu.pdf" title='PDF - 372 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 372 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Trade and Sustainable Development: Should transition countries open their markets to environmental goods?
- Thursday 18 December 2008 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Bertrand MAGNE, International Energy Agency
- Abstract
- Thursday 4 December 2008 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Henry THILLE, University of Guelph, Ontario
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/thille.pdf" title='PDF - 737.8 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 737.8 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Dynamic Competition in Electricity Markets: Hydropower and Thermal Generation
- Thursday 20 November 2008 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Anne ROZAN, l’ENGEES-CEMAGREF
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/rozan.pdf" title='PDF - 248.7 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 248.7 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Is the Ambient Tax Adapted to the Regulation of Muddy Floods? An Experimental Study
- Thursday 23 October 2008 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Johanna ETNER, Université Paris 5
Optimal Decisions on Renewable and Non-Renewable Resources with Heterogeneous Risk Perceptions
- Thursday 9 October 2008 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Pierre FLECKINGER, Université Paris 1, CES - PSE et Matthieu GLACHANT, Ecole des Mines de Paris. CERNA, Mines ParisTech
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/fleckinger.pdf" title='PDF - 249.8 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 249.8 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Corporate Social Responsibility or Voluntary Agreement?
- Thursday 25 September 2008 14:00-15:30
- CORTE - CORSE
- CORSE
- Environmental Meeting, Université de Corse, Corte.
- Thursday 11 September 2008 14:00-15:30
- Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de L’Hôpital, Paris 13°
- Salle 314
- Carolyn FISCHER, Resources for the Future, RFF, Washington DC
- Abstract
- <a
href="IMG/pdf/fischer.pdf" title='PDF - 189 kb'
type="application/pdf"><img
src='plugins-dist/medias/prive/vignettes/pdf.png' width='52' height='52' alt='PDF - 189 kb' />
<dt
class='spip_doc_titre' style='width:120px;'>Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates
>