Seminars
Industrial Organization
2016/2017: ce séminaire n’est plus actif au sein de PSE et se déroule désormais au sein du séminaire “Régulation et Environnement”
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The seminar covers industrial organization, both theory and applications, and the economics of incentive regulation; it also touches upon topics in the theory of organizations, the theory of the firm, marketing science, the economics of internet, network economics, intellectual property,…
The workshop fits in the research orientations characterizing the field “Markets and Organizations” of LABEX OSE. It is jointly organized by PSE-Jourdan and PSE-MSE, associated with TelecomParisTech and University of Paris 2, and it takes place monthly on the Jourdan Campus.
Scientific contact: Jean-Philippe Tropéano et Bernard Caillaud.
Operational contact: Violaine Tordeux
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The seminar covers industrial organization, both theory and applications, and the economics of incentive regulation; it also touches upon topics in the theory of organizations, the theory of the firm, marketing science, the economics of internet, network economics, intellectual property,…
The workshop fits in the research orientations characterizing the field “Markets and Organizations” of LABEX OSE. It is jointly organized by PSE-Jourdan and PSE-MSE, associated with TelecomParisTech and University of Paris 2, and it takes place monthly on the Jourdan Campus.
Scientific contact: Jean-Philippe Tropéano et Bernard Caillaud.
Operational contact: Violaine Tordeux
Upcoming events
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Archives
- Monday 23 May 2016 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- REY Patrick : Competitive Cross-Subsidization
- Zhijun Chen (Monash University)
- Full text [pdf]
- Monday 11 April 2016 12:00-13:15
- BURGUET Roberto : Bidding for Input in Oligopoly
- József Sákovics
- Monday 21 March 2016 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- DUBOIS Vincent : On the Role of Parallel Trade on Manufacturers and Retailers Profits in the Pharmaceutical Sector
- Morten Saethre
- Monday 15 February 2016 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- ORNAGHI Arianna (Hertie School) : Price and Advertising Competition among Prescription Drugs
- G. Siotis and M. Castanheira
- Monday 18 January 2016 12:00-13:15
- MIKLOS-THAL Jeanine (University of Rochester) : Resale Price Maintenance when Playing Favorites is Prohibited
- G. Shaffer
- Monday 14 December 2015 12:00-13:15
- The session was canceled.
- *
- Monday 16 November 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- REISINGER Markus (Frankfurt school of finance et management) : Sequencing bilateral negotiations with externalities
- J. Münster
- Monday 12 October 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- SPIEGEL Yossi (Tel Aviv University School of Management ) : Partial Vertical Integration, Ownership Structure and Foreclosure
- Co-authors : Nadav Levy and David Giloy
- Full text [pdf]
- Monday 21 September 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- ESTEVES ROSA BRANCA (UNIV. DO NINHO) : Competitive Targeted Advertising with Price Discrimination
- Co-author : Joana Resende (Universidade do Porto)
- Full text [pdf]
- Monday 1 June 2015 12:00-13:15
- HESKI Bar Isaac (University of Toronto) : Multidimensional Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Efficiency
- Co-author(s) : Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver
- Monday 18 May 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- SPIEGLER Ran Spiegler (Tel-Aviv University and University College London) : Search Design and Broad Matching
- Monday 13 April 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- FUMAGALLI Chiara (University of Bocconi) : Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure
- Monday 16 March 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- BELLEFLAMME Paul (UCL) : Strategic Promotion and Release Decisions in the Movie Market
- Co-author(s) : Dimitri Paolini
- AbstractWe study how production and promotion budgets can play a strategic role for movie studios to secure the most profitable release dates by scaring off the competition. In a game-theoretic setting, where two studios choose their budget before simultaneously setting the release date of their movie, we prove that two equilibrium configurations are possible: either releases are simultaneous (at the demand peak) or they are staggered (one studio delays the release of its movie so as to avoid any overlap with the other movie). Interestingly, in the latter equilibrium, the first-mover secures its position by investing more in production and promotion than the second-mover. We test the predictions of our theoretical model on a dataset that comprises more than 1500 American movies released in ten countries from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2013. Our empirical analysis largely confirms that higher budgets allow studios to move release dates closer to the demand peaks.
- Monday 9 February 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- KYLE Margaret (Mines Paris Tech) : Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS
- joint with Yi Qian
- AbstractWe examine the eect of pharmaceutical patent protection on the speed of drug launch, price, and quantity in 60 countries from 2000-2013. The World Trade Organization required its member countries to implement a minimum level of patent protection within a specied time period as part of the TRIPS Agreement. However, members retained the right to impose price controls and to issue compulsory licenses under certain conditions. These countervailing policies were intended to reduce the potential static losses that result from reduced competition during the patent term. Using detailed patent data at both the product and country levels, we exploit the fact that selection into reatment" with a post-TRIPS patent is exogenously determined by compliance deadlines that vary across countries. We nd that patents have important consequences for access to new drugs: in the absence of a patent, launch is unlikely. That is, even when no patent barrier exists, generic entry may not occur. Conditional on launch, patented drugs have higher prices but higher sales as well. The price premium associated with patents is smaller in poorer countries. Price discrimination across countries has increased for drugs patented post-TRIPS and prices are negatively related to the burden of disease, suggesting that countervailing policies to oset expected price increases may have had the intended eects.
- Monday 19 January 2015 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- NIEDERMAYER Andras NIEDERMA (Uni Mannheim) : Foreclosure Auctions
- Co-author(s) : Artyom Shneyerov (Concordia University, CIREQ, CIRANO) and Pai Xu(University of Hong Kong)
- AbstractWe develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. We get three predictions: (i) lenders' bids are bunched at the amount owed, (ii) if all auctions observed exhibit a common value component, there are gaps in lenders' bids, (iii) if there are both independent private values and common value component auctions, there will be no gaps, but non-monotonicity of the probability of sale in the reserve price. Using novel data from Palm Beach County (US), we show that (i) and (iii), but not (ii) are consistent with the data. Further, the data is consistent with the claim that adverse selection plays less of a role for securitized than for non-securitized mortgages. Our theory also allows an analysis of the welfare effect of judicial versus non-judicial foreclosures.
- Monday 15 December 2014 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- RODRIGUEZ Ángel López (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) : Cross-ownership, R&D spillovers and Antitrust Policy
- Co-author(s) : Xavier Vives
- Monday 17 November 2014 12:00-13:30
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- WATANABE Yasutora (HKUST Business School Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) : Entry by Merger: Estimates from a Two-sided Matching Model with Externalities
- Monday 13 October 2014 12:00-13:30
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- VASCONCELOS Helder (University of Porto and CEPR) : Why entrepreneurs choose risky R&D projects - but still not risky enough
- Co-author(s) : Erika Färnstrand Damsgaard, Per Hjertstrand, Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson
- AbstractEntrepreneurs face higher commercialization costs than incumbents. We show that this implies that entrepreneurs will choose more risky projects than incumbents, aiming to reduce their high expected marginal commercialization cost. However, entrepreneurs may select too safe projects from a social point of view, since they do not internalize the business steal- ing e¤ect. We also show that commercialization support induces entrepreneurship but may lead to mediocre entrepreneurship by inducing entrepreneurs to choose less risky projects, whereas R&D support encourages entrepreneurship without a¤ecting the type of entrepre- neurship. Using Swedish patent citation data, we ?nd empirical support for predictions of the model.
- Full text [pdf]
- Monday 22 September 2014 12:00-13:30
- MSE 106-112 bld de l'hôpital 75647 Paris cedex 13 - salle S2
- BENNEDSEN Morten (INSEAD) : Family firms and labour market reforms
- Monday 17 March 2014 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- CABRAL Luis (New York University – Stern School of Business) : Straggered Contracts, Market Power and Welfare
- Monday 17 February 2014 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- VERSAEVEL Bruno (EM LYON & GATE) : Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics
- AbstractIn a continuous-time model with uncertain market development, two potential entrants detect a nascent demand only if it reaches a threshold, which depends on nature, and can be firm-specific. Entry occurs by investing irreversibly before competing in quantities. When a post-entry first-mover market advantage is persistent, we examine how the firms' relative ``alertness'' drives the equilibrium outcomes. If the firms detect the new demand immediately (perfect alertness), equilibrium entry decisions are always sequential. Preemption occurs, rent dissipation is monotone in the magnitude of the market advantage, which reduces both firms' expected value, and rent-equalization is preserved. If the firms detect the new demand relatively late (imperfect alertness), the equilibrium outcomes differ qualitatively from those in standard real option games: (i) In case of symmetric detection, the probability of simultaneous entry is nonzero (it can be one). When preemption occurs there is no rent equalization, with the post-entry first-mover market advantage resulting in higher equilibrium expected value to the leader; (ii) In case of asymmetric detection, the more alert firm postpones entry by investing exactly when its rival detects demand, and preemption always occurs, again to the benefit of the leader. The positive marginal effect of the first-mover advantage on the leader's equilibrium value increases in the inter-firm alertness differential; (iii) With more demand volatility the impact of imperfect alertness on the entry sequence is less likely, and the value differential across firms decreases. This always benefits the second entrant, which enters even later, and possibly at a loss for the leader.
- Monday 20 January 2014 12:00-13:15
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- SHELEGIA Sandro (Université de Vienne) : Beliefs and consumer search
- Monday 16 December 2013 12:00-13:30
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment P, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- HERMALIN Benjamin (Haas School – UC Berkeley, visiting Oxford Univ.) : *
- Monday 18 November 2013 11:30-12:45
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment P, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- VERBOVEN Frank (University of Leuven) : Unbundling the incumbent : Evidence form UK Broadband
- Co-author(s) : M.Nardotto and T.Valletti. ATTENTION DEBUT DU SEMINAIRE A 11H30
- Monday 14 October 2013 12:00-13:30
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment G, 1er étage, salle de réunions
- MONTEZ Joao (London Business School) : How buybacks increase retail competition
- Monday 16 September 2013 12:00-13:30
- Campus Jourdan, bâtiment A, rez-de-chaussée, salle 4
- JEON Doh-Shin (Toulouse Sschool of Economics) : News Aggregators and Competition Among Newspapers on the Internet
- Co-autheur(s): N. Nasr Esfahani
- Full text [pdf]
- Monday 15 April 2013 12:00-13:15
- DE SILVA Dakshina : Disadvantaged business enterprise goals in government procurement contracting: An analysis of bidding behavior and costs
- Organisateur : Bernard Caillaud
- Monday 18 February 2013 12:00-13:15
- AVENEL Eric : Equilibrium strategic overbuying.
- Co-auteur : Clémence Christin.
- AbstractWe consider two rms competing both to sell their output and purchase their input from an upstream rm, to which they oer non-linear contracts. Firms may engage in strategic overbuying, purchasing more of the input when the supplier is capacity constrained than when it is not in order to exclude their competitor from the nal market. Warehousing is a special case in which a downstream rm purchases more input than it uses and disposes of the rest. We show that both types of overbuying happen in equilibrium. The welfare analysis leads to ambiguous conclusions.
- Full text [pdf]
- Monday 21 January 2013 12:00-13:15
- ANJA LAMBRECHT (LBS) : When does Retargeting Work ? Timing Information Specificity
- Co-auteur : K.Tucker
- Monday 17 December 2012 12:00-13:15
- KRETSCHMER Tobias (LMU Münich) : TBA
- Monday 19 November 2012 12:00-13:15
- PEITZ Martin (Univ. Mannheim) : New perspectives on media mergers
- Monday 15 October 2012 12:00-13:15
- RÉGIS Renault : “Platform Content”