Margherita Comola

Chercheuse associée à PSE

  • Professeure des Universités
  • Université Paris-Saclay
THÈMES DE RECHERCHE
  • Bien-être
  • Économie des réseaux
  • Microeconométrie
  • Réseaux sociaux et développement
Contact

Adresse :48 boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Publications HAL

  • Social networks and economic transformation: Evidence from a resettled village in Brazil Article dans une revue

    We study the role of social learning in the diffusion of cash crops in a resettled village economy in Brazil. We combine detailed geo-coded data on farming plots with dyadic data on social ties among settlers, and we leverage the variation in network formation induced by the landless workers’ movement land occupation. By using longitudinal data on farming decisions over 15 years, we find evidence of significant peer effects in the decision to farm new cash fruits (pineapple and passion fruit). Our results suggest that social diffusion is heterogeneous along observed plot and crop characteristics, i.e. farmers growing water-sensitive crop are more likely to respond to the actions of peers with similar water access conditions.

    Revue : Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

    Publié en

  • The Interplay Among Savings Accounts and Network-Based Financial Arrangements: Evidence from a Field Experiment Article dans une revue

    This paper studies how formal financial access affects network-based financial arrangements. We use a field experiment that granted access to a savings account to a random subset of households in 19 Nepalese villages. Exploiting a unique panel dataset that follows all bilateral informal financial transactions before and after the intervention, we show that households that were offered access to an account increased their loans and total transfers to others, independent of the treatment status of the receiver. The increase seemed to be driven by treatment households with more assets and greater financial inclusion at baseline.

    Revue : The Economic Journal

    Publié en

  • Treatment Effect Accounting for Network Changes Article dans une revue

    Networks may rewire in response to interventions. We propose a measure of the treatment effect when an intervention affects the structure of a social network. We develop a treatment-response model that incorporates dynamic peer effects and provide its identification conditions and the associated instrumental-variable strategy. We illustrate our estimation procedure using a panel dataset containing information on a financial network before and after a field experiment that randomized access to savings accounts. Results show that neglecting the network change results in underestimation of the impact of the intervention and the role played by informal networks through which the intervention diffuses.

    Revue : Review of Economics and Statistics

    Publié en

  • La valeur des réseaux. Economie des interactions sociales Ouvrages

    La vie quotidienne est le cadre d’interactions personnelles et professionnelles qui constituent l’un des moteurs du comportement et du succès de chacun. M. Comola nous propose de parcourir des situations diverses – recherche d’emploi, transmission d’informations, usage des plateformes numériques, recours aux technologies, mécanismes d’assurance, commerce ou encore discrimination sociale – dans lesquelles ce sont les liens sociaux qui font la différence entre la réussite et l’échec. On constate alors que ces liens, loin de se limiter à la sphère privée, acquièrent une dimension économique qu’il convient de mettre au coeur du débat public.

    Éditeur : Editions rue d'Ulm

    Publié en

  • An Experimental Study on Decentralized Networked Markets Article dans une revue

    We design a laboratory experiment to investigate matching in a decentralized market of deferred acceptance. Agents are undifferentiated and may have multiple partners; their payoff depends on who they match with. The experiment is designed in such a way that a stable configuration exists, but cannot be eyeballed by the participants due to the computational complexity of the game. In spite of this, subjects are remarkably good at reaching a stable match, even when the payoffs of others are not publicly observed. More information does, however, speed up convergence thanks to self-censoring. We trace irrational matching choices mostly to two sources: the tendency of over-think in a setting where strategic thinking is not necessary, and the reluctance to accept matching offers from those who have been disloyal in the past.

    Revue : Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

    Publié en

Onglets

Research Topics

  • Networks
  • Microeconometrics
  • Development Economics


  • “Democracies, Politics and Arms Supply,” Review of International Economics, forthcoming
  • “How does Decentralized Minimum Wage Setting affect Employment and Informality ? The case of Indonesia” (with L. de Mello), Review of Income and Wealth, forthcoming
  • “Fiscal Decentralization and Urbanization in Indonesia” (with L. de Mello), forthcoming in Globalization, Migration and Urbanization in Asia edited by J. Beall, B. Guha-Khasnobis and R. Kanbur, Oxford University Press