Nicolas Jacquemet

Professeur titulaire d'une chaire à PSE

  • Professeur
  • Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Groupes de recherche
  • Chercheur associé à la Chaire Ouvrir la science économique.
THÈMES DE RECHERCHE
  • Economie comportementale
  • Économie expérimentale
  • Marché du travail
  • Microeconométrie
  • Patrimoine, revenu, redistribution et fiscalité
  • Politiques publiques
  • Psychologie
  • Rationalité limitée
  • Santé
  • Théorie des jeux comportementale
Contact

Adresse :48 Boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris, France

Publications HAL

  • Effectiveness of ex ante honesty oaths in reducing dishonesty depends on content Article dans une revue

    Dishonest behaviours such as tax evasion impose significant societal costs. Ex ante honesty oaths—commitments to honesty before action—have been proposed as interventions to counteract dishonest behaviour, but the heterogeneity in findings across operationalizations calls their effectiveness into question. We tested 21 honesty oaths (including a baseline oath)—proposed, evaluated and selected by 44 expert researchers—and a no-oath condition in a megastudy involving 21,506 UK and US participants from Prolific.com who played an incentivized tax evasion game online. Of the 21 interventions, 10 significantly improved tax compliance by 4.5 to 8.5 percentage points, with the most successful nearly halving tax evasion. Limited evidence for moderators was found. Experts and laypeople failed to predict the most effective interventions, though experts’ predictions were more accurate. In conclusion, honesty oaths were effective in curbing dishonesty, but their effectiveness varied depending on content. These findings can help design impactful interventions to curb dishonesty.

    Revue : Nature Human Behaviour

    Publié en

  • How large is “large enough” ? Large-scale experimental investigation of the reliability of confidence measures Pré-publication, Document de travail

    Whether individuals feel confident about their own actions, choices, or statements being correct, and how these confidence levels differ between individuals are two key primitives for countless behavioral theories and phenomena. In cognitive tasks, individual confidence is typically measured as the average of reports about choice accuracy, but how reliable is the resulting characterization of within-and between-individual confidence remains surprisingly undocumented. Here, we perform a large-scale resampling exercise in the Confidence Database to investigate the reliability of individual confidence estimates, and of comparisons across individuals’ confidence levels. Our results show that confidence estimates are more stable than their choice-accuracy counterpart, reaching a reliability plateau after roughly 50 trials, regardless of a number of task design characteristics. While constituting a reliability upper-bound for task-based confidence measures, and thereby leaving open the question of the reliability of the construct itself, these results characterize the robustness of past and future task designs.

    Publié en

  • Forthcoming : The motivated memory of noise Article dans une revue

    We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects report informativeness in a self-serving way: subjects with negative messages report that these messages are significantly less informative in the absence of reminder than with it. We also show that the lack of reminder about message informativeness allows subjects to keep a better image of themselves. These results are confirmed by complementary treatments in which we decrease messages informativeness: subjects tend to inflate the informativeness of positive messages that should now be interpreted as bad news.

    Auteur : Jeanne Hagenbach Revue : Games and Economic Behavior

    Publié en

  • The limits of behavioral nudges to increase youth turnout: Experimental evidence from two French elections Article dans une revue

    There is a significant gap in turnout between young people and older voters. The failure to instill a voting habit at an early age may have long term consequences in terms of future political participation as well as on other civic behaviors. Using a pre-registered online experiment with 3790 subjects, we implemented behavioral interventions aiming to stimulate youth turnout in the 2022 French presidential election. We rely on an innovative incentive scheme to measure their consequences on (self-reported) actual voting behavior. We also provide evidence on the effect of one behavioral intervention on youth turnout in a less salient election, the French legislative election that took place two months after the Presidential one. The results from the two experiments show the absence of any differences in turnout between the baseline and the treatment conditions. We investigate several mechanisms that can explain our results.

    Auteur : Agnès Festré, Angela Sutan, Aurélie Bonein, Dimitri Dubois, Etienne Dagorn, Etienne Farvaque, Herrade Igersheim, Isabelle Lebon, Lisette L. Ibanez, Loïc Berger, Marc Willinger, Matthieu Pourieux, Noémi Berlin, Olivier L’haridon, Paolo Crosetto, Quentin David, Sébastien Roussel, Stephane Luchini, Youenn Loheac Revue : Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

    Publié en

Onglets

Co-director of the Master in Economics and Psychology.

Co-PI of the An integrated approach of economic decisions project within the Opening Economics Chair, PSE-Hermès.

Nominated member of the PSE Institutional Review Board.

Livres / Books


Publications choisies / Selected publications

(full list here / liste complète ici)