Publications des chercheurs de PSE

We develop a theoretical framework analyzing responsible firms (REFs) that prioritize worker welfare alongside profits in labor markets with search frictions. At the micro level, REFs' use of market power varies with labor conditions: they refrain from using it in slack markets but may exercise it in tight markets without harming workers. Our macro analysis shows these firms offer higher wages, creating a distinct high-wage sector. When firms endogenously choose worker bargaining power, there is a trade-off between worker surplus and employment, though this improves with elastic labor supply. While REFs cannot survive with free entry, they can coexist with profit-maximizing firms under limited competition, where their presence forces ordinary firms to raise wages.

The equivalent income is a preference-based, interpersonally comparable measure of well-being. Although its theoretical foundations are well-established, empirical applications remain limited, primarily due to the detailed data requirements on individuals' preferences across various wellbeing dimensions. This paper reviews the literature on preference elicitation methods with a focus on estimating equivalent income. We examine several survey-based methods, including contingent valuation, multi-attribute choice or rating experiments, and life satisfaction regressions. The review highlights the advantages and limitations of each method, emphasizing the considerable scope for methodological improvements and innovations.

Suppose that, for whatever reason, it is decided that inequalities within countries are more offensive than inequalities between countries, and that inequalities between populations living together are more offensive than inequalities between generations living in different times. Can a social welfare function express that preference? We show that it is actually difficult to incorporate such a localist preference into a social welfare function, except in a limited way (i.e., from a situation of specific similarity between countries). We also show that in order to obtain such preferences, the relative size of inequality aversion within and between countries may be counter-intuitive in some relevant cases, in the sense that a greater inequality aversion may happen to be required across countries than within countries. This research highlights new social welfare functions that aggregate the outcomes of evaluations over pairs of agents.

Unweighted benefit–cost analysis (BCA) based on aggregate willingness to pay might be, at long last, falling into disrepute, as it is widely recognized that it exhibits a bias toward the wealthy, and as alternatives are appearing more and more practicable. However, the choice of alternatives is often framed in terms of choosing an alternative metric to willingness to pay in money, such as willingness to pay in healthy life years, or a measure of subjective well-being. It is argued in this paper that (i) a simple summation of individuals’ willingness to pay in any numeraire (e.g., money, healthy life years) is bound to generate non-transitivity issues in a similar way as money-based BCA, and (ii) a metric such as subjective well-being involves distributional value judgments that are too specific to reflect the relevant spectrum in the public debate. The “orthodox” weighted BCA method, which links BCA to an underlying social welfare function, offers more flexibility and guarantees transitive choices. Fortunately, in some relevant cases, these various methods may provide similar results, and the main options currently proposed all give greater weight to the worse off in the population than does unweighted BCA.

A model that only focuses on economic relations, and in which efficiency and equity are defined in terms of resource allocation may miss an important part of the picture. We propose a canonical extension of the standard general equilibrium model that embeds economic activities in a larger game of social interactions. Such a model combines general equilibrium effects with social multiplier effects and considerably enriches the analysis of efficiency and equity. Efficiency involves coordination between economic and social interactions, may depend on social norms, and may strongly interact with the distribution of resources. Equity can be defined in a comprehensive, socioeconomic way, and a decomposition into an economic and a social component is possible.

Climate policy is often described by economists as an intertemporal consumption trade-off: consume all you want today and face climate damages in the future, or sacrifice consumption today to implement costly climate policies that will bring future benefits through avoided climate damages. If one assumes enduring technological progress, a society that is more averse to intertemporal inequalities should postpone climate policies and let future, richer generations pay more. Growing evidence however suggests that the trade-off is more complex: abrupt, extreme, irreversible changes to the climate may cause discontinuities to socio-economic systems, possibly leading to a sharp decline of human population and consumption per capita. In this paper, we show that, when accounting for a very small risk of catastrophic climate change, it is optimal to pursue stringent climate policies to postpone the catastrophe. Our results conform with the well-known conclusion that tight carbon budgets are preferred when aversion towards inequalities between generations is low. However, by contrast with previous studies, we show that stringent policies are also optimal when inequality aversion is high. The non-monotonicity of the influence of inequality aversion is due to the fact that, for a given investment in abatement, a higher inequality aversion gives a smaller weight to avoided future non-catastrophic damages, but a larger weight to the catastrophic outcome. We also explore the role of population ethics, and show that the size of the optimal carbon budget decreases with the social preference for large populations, although this parameter plays almost no role at extreme levels of inequality aversion. Our result demonstrates that views from opposite sides of the ethical spectrum in terms of inequality aversion converge in terms of climate policy recommendations, warranting immediate climate action.

We study the measurement of well-being when individuals have heterogeneous preferences, including dierent conceptions of a life worth living. When individuals dier in the conception of a life worth living, the equivalent income can regard an individual whose life is not worth living as being better o than an individual whose life is worth living. In order to avoid this paradoxical result, we reexamine the ethical foundations of well-being measures in such a way as to take into account heterogeneity in the conception of a life worth living. We derive, from simple axioms, an alternative measure of well-being, which is an equivalent income net of the income threshold making lifetime neutral. That new well-being index always ranks an individual whose life is not worth living as worse-o than an individual with a life worth living.

Nationalism has trumped solidarity, resulting in unnecessary loss of life and inequitable access to vaccines and therapeutics. Existing intellectual property (IP) regimens, trade secrets and data rights, under which pharmaceutical firms operate, have also posed obstacles to increasing manufacturing capacity, and ensuring adequate supply, affordable pricing, and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and other health products in low-income and middle- income countries. We propose: (1) Implementing alternative incentive and funding mechanisms to develop new scientific innovations to address infectious diseases with pandemic potential; (2) Voluntary and involuntary initiatives to overcome IP barriers including pooling IP, sharing data and vesting licences for resulting products in a globally agreed entity; (3) Transparent and accountable collective procurement to enable equitable distribution; (4) Investments in regionally distributed research and development (R&D) capacity and manufacturing, basic health systems to expand equitable access to essential health technologies, and non-discriminatory national distribution; (5) Commitment to strengthen national (and regional) initiatives in the areas of health system development, health research, drug and vaccine manufacturing and regulatory oversight and (6) Good governance of the pandemic prevention, preparedness and response accord. It is important to articulate principles for deals that include reasonable access conditions and transparency in negotiations. We argue for an equitable, transparent, accountable new global agreement to provide rewards for R&D but only on the condition that pharmaceutical companies share the IP rights necessary to produce and distribute them globally. Moreover, if countries commit to collective procurement and fair pricing of resulting products, we argue that we can greatly improve our ability to prepare for and respond to pandemic threats.

What utility notion—e.g. flow/lifetime, self/family-centered—do self-reported well-being (SWB) questions measure? Existing applications make different assumptions regarding the (i) life domains, (ii) time horizons, and (iii) other-regarding preferences captured by SWB data. To obtain relevant evidence, we ask survey respondents what they had in mind regarding (i)–(iii) when answering commonly used—life satisfaction, happiness, ladder—and new SWB questions. We find that respondents’ self-reports differ from researchers’ assumptions and differ across SWB questions and sociodemographic groups. At the same time, simple SWB-question wording tweaks are effective in moving self-reports toward desired interpretations. We outline actionable suggestions for SWB researchers.

The COVID-19 crisis and the policy responses to it have impacted many different areas of common concern including public health and the economy. This raises difficult questions about how to balance these concerns in making policy decisions. In this chapter, we review a number of tools that welfare economics offers for conceptualizing and studying such trade-offs. We argue that social welfare analysis is the most useful method for doing so. We show how concerns for the distributive and other effects of a policy on individual wellbeing can be evaluated using a Social Welfare Function (SWF) and survey some of the main features of such functions. As an illustration, we then use this approach to model and evaluate the implications for social welfare of the adoption of pandemic policies that vary in terms of the stringency of the controls that they impose on individual behaviour. Our model reveals how such evaluations not only are determined by empirical facts but may also depend on key judgments about the relative importance of the different determinants of individual wellbeing (health, income, longevity, and so on) and about the extent to which special concern should be given to the worse-off. In doing so, it illustrates how critical transparent modelling of these concerns is in developing responses to pandemics of this kind.

Ferreras's bicameral governance proposal for the corporation contributes to a recent wave of interest in democratizing the workplace. In this article, I connect this to a related ongoing movement in favor of the stakeholder approach to corporate purpose. I argue that this connection sheds light on, and may provide remedies for, some issues with the bicameral proposal: first, the risk of gridlock between the two parties in the dual governance structure; second, the indeterminacy of good management when shareholder primacy is abandoned. But I also note that shareholder primacy emerged spontaneously from structural features of the economy, so that special protection for the “good” firms is warranted, and that other key limitations of a market economy cannot be alleviated fully by democratizing the firm.

The stakeholder (or responsible) firm is defined in this paper as one that maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of the surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). We show that, although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely on constrained profit maximization. We find that unconstrained profit maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but that stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. We also show that long term entry decisions should rely on profit modied by Pigouvian pricing of externalities, incidentally providing a novel justication for the polluter-pays principle.