Publications des chercheurs de PSE

We decompose the “China shock” into two components that induce different adjustments for firms exposed to Chinese exports: an output shock affecting firms selling goods that compete with similar imported Chinese goods, and an input supply shock affecting firms using inputs similar to the imported Chinese goods. Combining French accounting, customs, and patent information at the firm level, we show that the output shock is detrimental to firms’ sales, employment, and innovation. Moreover, this negative impact is concentrated in low-productivity firms. On the other hand, the impact of the input supply shock is reversed.

We analyze how demand conditions faced by a firm in its export markets affect its innovation decisions. We exploit exogenous firm-level export demand shocks and find that firms respond by patenting more; furthermore, this response is driven by the subset of initially more productive firms. The patent response arises two to five years after the shock, highlighting the time required to innovate. In contrast, the demand shock raises contemporaneous sales and employment for all firms regardless of their productivity. This skewed innovation response to common demand shocks arises naturally from a model of endogenous innovation and competition with firm heterogeneity.

We look at how the arrival of an invention affects wage returns and the probability of moving out of employment for white- and blue-collar co-workers of the inventor. First results suggest that older workers are hurt by the arrival of an invention. This negative effect disappears when we control for education and, in particular, for the time since obtaining the last formal degree, that is, distance to human capital frontier. If anything, this effect is slightly higher for non-STEM than STEM-educated co-workers. This result suggests that retraining programs could be helpful in making the process of creative destruction and economic growth more inclusive.

Innovation is a key source of sustainable growth, but it can affect inequalities in many ways—increasing some inequalities and decreasing others. The impact of any particular innovation on inequalities will depend importantly on who controls the property rights to exploit the innovation and what they decide to do with it. The introduction of an innovation can affect the power of different actors in a market, the way markets work, and the returns to different attributes of actors in the market. All of these factors and more will influence how innovation affects inequalities. We would like policy to encourage innovation while making sure that yesterday's innovators do not use their rents to deter innovation by new entrants, thereby eventually undermining productivity growth and social mobility, and increasing inequalities. This requires a combination of regulation, progressive taxation, and enlightened competition policy.

Should we fear or welcome automation? On the one hand, fear may prevail if we believe that human workers will be replaced by machines which perform their tasks, thereby increasing unemployment and reducing the labor share. On the other hand, we may welcome automation since it spurs growth and prosperity, as illustrated by the big technological revolutions – steam engine in the early 1800s, electricity in the 1920s – none of which generated the mass unemployment anticipated by some.

We investigate the effects of consumers’ environmental concerns and market competition on firms’ decisions to innovate in “clean” technologies. Agents care about their consumption and environmental footprint; firms pursue greener products to soften price competition. Acting as complements, these forces determine R&D, pollution, and welfare. We test the theory using panel data on patents by 7,060 automobile sector firms in 25 countries, environmental willingness to pay, and competition. As predicted, exposure to prosocial attitudes fosters clean innovation, all the more so where competition is strong. Plausible increases in both together can spur it as much as a large fuel price increase.

Using an event study methodology and comprehensive micro data from the French manufacturing sector, we analyze the local labor market effects of investments in modern manufacturing capital, including modern automation technologies. We estimate that commuting zones with higher investments in modern manufacturing capital and automation benefit from higher labor demand, with an increase in both local employment and wages. Our findings are consistent with a task-based model where the productivity effects of modern capital investments and automation outweigh their displacement effect.

Growth has fallen in the U.S. amid a rise in firm concentration. Market share has shifted to low labour share firms, while within-firm labour shares have actually risen. We propose a theory linking these trends in which the driving force is falling overhead costs of spanning multiple products or a rising efficiency advantage of large firms. In response, the most efficient firms (with higher markups) spread into new product lines, thereby increasing concentration and generating a temporary burst of growth. Eventually, due to greater competition from efficient firms, within-firm markups and incentives to innovate fall. Thus our simple model can generate qualitative patterns in line with the observed trends.

The last two years have been marked by an extremely dense literature inviting us to reinvent or rethink capitalism and, more broadly, our social models. What do you think the current crisis says about our economy and our social model? Is capitalism under threat today? Faced with the ‘rise in inequality’, the ‘concentration of rents’, the ‘casualisation of work’ and the ‘deterioration of health and the environment’, you call in your latest book for a better regulation of capitalism in order to direct creative destruction towards the objective of fairer and greener growth. What would be the essential features of this? You also see civil society as playing an important role in the implementation of an ‘incomplete contract’. What seems to undermine the cohesion of civil society today is inequality. Traditionally, it is considered that fiscal policy is the tool of choice for the redistribution of wealth, so that all stakeholders benefit from the economic system. Would you say that tax policy is still the main instrument for reducing inequality today? The calls for the development of a new industrial policy is becoming increasingly strong in Europe. Should European competition policy be reviewed to meet these new ambitions? Beyond the case of industrial policy, do you think that competition law needs to be more widely reformed to take into account the new characteristics of our economies?

In the COVID-19 pandemic many countries required COVID certificates, proving vaccination, recovery, or a recent negative test, to access public and private venues. We estimate their effect on vaccine uptake for France, Germany, and Italy using counterfactuals constructed via innovation diffusion theory. The announcement of COVID certificates during summer 2021 were associatedalthough causality cannot be directly inferredwith increased vaccine uptake in France of 13.0 (95% CI 9.7-14.9) percentage points (p.p.) of the total population until the end of the year, in Germany 6.2 (2.6-6.9) p.p., and in Italy 9.7 (5.4-12.3) p.p. Based on these estimates, an additional 3979 (3453-4298) deaths in France, 1133 (−312-1358) in Germany, and 1331 (502-1794) in Italy were averted; and gross domestic product (GDP) losses of €6.0 (5.9-6.1) billion in France, €1.4 (1.3-1.5) billion in Germany, and €2.1 (2.0-2.2) billion in Italy were prevented. Notably, in France, the application of COVID certificates averted high intensive care unit occupancy levels where prior lockdowns were instated.

What is the optimal form of firm organization during "bad times"? The greater turbulence following macro shocks may benefit decentralized firms because the value of local information increases (the "localist" view). On the other hand, the need to make tough decisions may favor centralized firms (the "centralist" view). Using two large micro datasets on decentralization in firms in ten OECD countries (WMS) and US establishments (MOPS administrative data), we find that firms that delegated more power from the central headquarters to local plant managers prior to the Great Recession outperformed their centralized counterparts in sectors that were hardest hit by the subsequent crisis (as measured by export growth and product durability). Results based on measures of turbulence based on product churn and stock market volatility provide further support to the localist view. This conclusion is robust to alternative explanations such as managerial fears of bankruptcy and changing coordination costs. Although decentralization will be suboptimal in many environments, it does appear to be beneficial for the average firm during bad times.

Innovation can affect inequalities in many ways – increasing some inequalities and decreasing others. An innovation can introduce a new good, improve the quality of existing goods, or lead to new ways of doing things. It can be produced by large firms, by small firms, by individuals working in their garden shed, by the public sector or by charities or non-governmental agencies. The impact of any particular innovation on inequalities will depend importantly on who controls the property rights to exploit the innovation and what they decide to do with it. The introduction of an innovation can affect the power of different actors in a market, the way markets work, and the returns to different attributes of actors in the market. All of these factors and more will influence how innovation affects inequalities.