A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes
Article dans une revue: The classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only slightly weaker than the original one but allows a much more transparent proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.
Auteur(s)
Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch
Revue
- Economic Theory Bulletin
Date de publication
- 2013
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Coalitional game
- Coalition formation process
- Shapley value
Pages
- 189-199
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1