A live experiment on approval voting
Article dans une revue: This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes.
Auteur(s)
Jean-François Laslier, Karine van Der Straeten
Revue
- Experimental Economics
Date de publication
- 2008
Mots-clés
- Approval voting
- French politics
- Experiments
- Voting rules
Pages
- 97-105
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 11