A Theory of Political Entrenchment
Article dans une revue: Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.
Auteur(s)
Gilles Saint-Paul, Davide Ticchi, Andréa Vindigni
Revue
- The Economic Journal
Date de publication
- 2016
Mots-clés
- Political Entrenchment
Pages
- 1238-1263
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 126