Bundling, tying, and collusion
Article dans une revue: Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.
Auteur(s)
David Spector
Revue
- International Journal of Industrial Organization
Date de publication
- 2007
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Bundling
- Tying
- Collusion
Pages
- 575-581
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 25