Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Article dans une revue: I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other.

Auteur(s)

Marie Laclau

Revue
  • Games and Economic Behavior
Date de publication
  • 2014
Mots-clés JEL
C72 C73
Mots-clés
  • Communication
  • Folk theorem
  • Imperfect private monitoring
  • Networks
  • Repeated games
Pages
  • 136–160
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 87