Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
Article dans une revue: Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.
Auteur(s)
Laurent Lamy
Revue
- International Journal of Game Theory
Date de publication
- 2010
Mots-clés JEL
Mots-clés
- Core
- Auctions
- Core-selection auctions
- Package bidding
- Combinatorial bidding
Pages
- 503-510
URL de la notice HAL
Version
- 1
Volume
- 39