Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

Article dans une revue: Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.

Auteur(s)

Laurent Lamy

Revue
  • International Journal of Game Theory
Date de publication
  • 2010
Mots-clés JEL
D44
Mots-clés
  • Core
  • Auctions
  • Core-selection auctions
  • Package bidding
  • Combinatorial bidding
Pages
  • 503-510
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 39