Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Article dans une revue: This paper considers whether earned wealth affects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

Auteur(s)

Nicolas Jacquemet, Robert-Vincent Joule, Stephane Luchini, Jason Shogren

Revue
  • Economics Letters
Date de publication
  • 2009
Mots-clés JEL
C3 D1
Mots-clés
  • Auctions
  • Demand revelation
  • Experimental valuation
  • Hypothetical bias
  • Earned money
Pages
  • 36-38
Version
  • 1
Volume
  • 105